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Lord Pannick
Main Page: Lord Pannick (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Pannick's debates with the Department for International Trade
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have added my name to this amendment because I share the concern expressed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that it is simply not appropriate for Explanatory Notes to be used as the means by which overbroad powers enjoyed by the Minister are to be confined. I will add one point, however: the Minister gave an answer to the concern that we are all expressing. The answer was given in a letter on 19 February to the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, the much respected chairman of the Constitution Committee. In her response to the Constitution Committee’s report, the Minister suggested that the courts would apply a well- established legal presumption that, if powers were intended to be used for any of the purposes set out in the amendment, there would have to be an express reference to that effect in the legislation. Indeed, the Minister also expressed concern that this amendment, if accepted and written into the Bill, would undermine this legal presumption in relation to other legislation that does not include an express reference to these limitations.
My concern about that argument is that these powers are being conferred in this Bill in a Brexit context. The Minister’s letter emphasises that the Government are going to use the Clause 2 powers only to implement obligations and agreements that seek to provide continuity in respect of those already signed by the EU. My concern is that in this specific legislative context it might be said that when a Brexit Bill of this nature does not contain these express limits on the Minister’s powers—the limits set out in the amendment—it should be contrasted with Section 8 of the main Brexit Act, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, which expressly contains restrictions that are similar but not identical to these limitations. It is my concern that such a contrast might be drawn in this context.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the important point that the Pepper v Hart principle is a troublesome one but, if the Government are not going to accept this amendment, at the very least it would be helpful for the Minister to give the House the clearest possible response to it, in the terms set out in her letter—that the Government understand that the powers in Clause 2 do not extend to the sensitive issues—so that her comments could if necessary be relied on in court proceedings under the Pepper v Hart principle.
My Lords, we should be very grateful to the Constitution Committee for drawing our attention to this matter, which might otherwise not have been observed. I shall add just a few short points to those that have been made. The first is to stress the importance of the words in subsection (5), to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, drew our attention:
“Regulations under subsection (1) may, among other things, make provision—”.
It is the words “among other things” that cause me concern. They appear in the Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill as well: they seem to be a feature creeping in to this kind of legislation, which is quite disturbing. If we find that phrase, I suggest that we have to be even more exacting in setting out the qualifications to the power, otherwise the words “among other things” may be used to expand the power in a way that we have not foreseen. It is really very important, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, pointed out, that we take those words into account in what we make of this amendment.
My second point is to reinforce what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about the comparison between Section 8 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and what we have now, in reply to the point that we do not need to be concerned about that, because express provision would be needed for a regulation that sought, for example, to create a criminal offence. These exceptions, or almost exactly the same ones, are expressly set out in Section 8(7) as,
“regulations … may not … impose or increase taxation or fees … create a relevant criminal offence … establish a public authority”.
If it was thought appropriate to put those qualifications in that very important subsection, which does not contain the words “among other things”, I should have thought it was all the more important to have them here.
My last point is made with reference to the point made about Lord Steyn’s use of Explanatory Notes. I had the privilege of sitting with Lord Steyn for a number of years and of discussing with him how Explanatory Notes might be used. I do not think that at any point in our discussion he suggested to me that Explanatory Notes could be regarded as a form of legislation or its equivalent—certainly not. He was referring to them as a means of understanding ambiguities in legislation; he thought that one could look to the Explanatory Notes to understand the legislation one was seeking to explain. That was his point, and it was made in a number of cases where I agreed with him. It would be a mistake to think that he was embarking on something outside the normal use of Explanatory Notes, which is to explain but not to legislate. For these reasons and the others mentioned, I warmly support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has brought to our attention.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. Under the Pepper v Hart principle, what matters is not the Government’s intention but the Government’s understanding of the scope of the provision they are putting before the House. I am asking the noble Baroness to say on the record, in Hansard, that it is the Government’s understanding and intention that the Clause 2 power does not give them a power to create or extend criminal offences, impose fees, amend primary legislation other than retained EU law or create new public bodies. It is not about the intention, but about the Government’s understanding of what they are putting before the House.
I have heard a very well-argued case—the first time I have heard the impact of that case. I can commit to writing a detailed letter on our position, having a meeting and bringing this back on the second day on Report, if that is what this House would prefer to do.
I suggest that this matter cannot be brought back on the second day, because this is an amendment to Clause 2, which we will have passed. Given that the noble Baroness, fairly and properly, has accepted that what she has heard today requires further discussion, and that the Government may wish to consider further this matter after they have met with noble and noble and learned Lords who are concerned about this, surely the way to proceed is for the Government to accept that it is appropriate for this matter to be raised again at Third Reading to see whether any progress can be made.
My Lords, we are in a very similar situation to where we were in an earlier debate. Clearly there is an issue which needs to be resolved between the Minister and those who feel strongly about it. She is putting the mover of the amendment in a difficult position, because the only right thing to do at this stage is to test the opinion of the House, and I am sure that that is not where we need to go on this. We need to give the Minister time to reflect on the issues and to be convinced, if she has to be convinced, by further points made, and, if necessary, to come back at Third Reading. That is not an onerous consideration.
Lord Pannick
Main Page: Lord Pannick (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Pannick's debates with the Department for International Trade
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would also like to thank the Minister for introducing this amendment and the following one—Amendment 2 —which she also spoke to. That amendment combines the thinking from Report stage Amendments 3 and 4 with further discussions that the Minister alluded to, which took place offline. These discussions have led to a broader understanding, reflected in the debate today, that it is worth having a clear and unambiguous statement in the Bill about our current standards for activities including,
“the protection of human, animal or plant life or health … animal welfare … environmental protection … employment and labour”,
and—to pick up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Krebs—ensuring no regression can occur as result of trade deals which are being rolled forward. The lead name on this amendment is the government Minister’s, and she has been joined by the Green, Labour and Conservative parties in that. This suggests that we have struck a feeling in the House that needs to be reflected in the wording.
Having said that, there is an amendment in my name, which I would like to raise for discussion although I will not press it, and there is an amendment on food safety in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, which has already been referred to. That points to three things that I would like to get on the record.
In working through how to address the non-regression of standards in trade conversion, the officials—with whom we had good and robust discussions—pointed out very strongly not only the need to ensure that the list provided in the final legislation was rooted in statute and justiciable but that it would fit with the WTO regulations, to which it was being addressed at least in part. The wording before us would perhaps not normally be expected in this House, given the argument being made here that good standards already exist and should not be diluted; that better ones should be adopted in some cases, if they exist; and that we should look forward to an increase in the quality provided through this system. It meets the difficulty that words such as “standards” are apparently not admissible in the way we were trying to use them, and, as I have said, the WTO language is somewhat different.
Having said that, the reason for having the amendment on human rights—which the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has joined and spoke to earlier—was simply that, if the argument is made that statutory protections require or can benefit from a statement allowing that to be seen very clearly on the front of the Bill, why does that not apply to human rights? With food safety, one can never be more vigilant than we already are. None the less, we should make sure that it is available for future reference that this matter was considered and thought to be so important that it was part of that arrangement. I am sure that the Minister will want to respond to both of those points when she comes to them. As I have said, we will not be pressing this amendment.
I think this is a good day for the issues that people such as the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and McIntosh, have campaigned for. My noble friend Lady Henig has also been very persistent in making sure that we got something about that into the Bill. I am very happy to support that.
My Lords, I would like to add to what the noble Lord has said on human rights. I thank him for bringing forward the amendment specifically to add human rights, but I am satisfied with his decision not to move it. The powers conferred on Ministers under Clause 2 would not, as I understand it, permit Ministers to act in breach of the Human Rights Act—primary legislation—in any event. I would be very grateful if the Minister could confirm that understanding. It would also be inappropriate to include human rights in the main amendment because many pieces of legislation do not expressly refer to human rights. This is because we have primary legislation, which has a particular force. Therefore, including human rights in the amendment to Clause 2 might possibly cast doubt in those other areas.
My Lords, I turn first to Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and Lord Purvis of Tweed, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. I thank them for their contributions to the debate, and for the detailed and—as the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, correctly said—robust discussions that we have had on this critically important matter.
Let us be clear that the protection of human rights is important; in fact, it is fundamental. That is why it has been given its own legislative framework through the Human Rights Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, stated. Not only that, but we have been consistent and are clear about our position on human rights as we leave the EU. Simply put, we will continue to uphold human rights and meet our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. The rights set out in the ECHR are already effectively and extensively protected in our domestic law by the Human Rights Act. The effect of Section 6 of the Human Rights Act is that regulations made under Clause 2 must be consistent with ECHR rights. Further, Ministers are required by Section 19 of the Human Rights Act to make a statement about a Bill’s compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights, and this appears on the face of the Bill.
I am happy to confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that there is no power under the Bill to modify the Human Rights Act, because there is no power to modify any primary legislation which is not retained EU law. That is made clear by Clause 2(5)(a) of the Bill. Regulations under Clause 2 must therefore be consistent with maintaining the UK levels of statutory protection provided by the Human Rights Act, and no amendment is necessary to provide that. This is why the Government consider it neither necessary nor appropriate to include human rights in the list of protections in our amendment to the Bill.
In fact—noble Lords have referred to this—we were worried that including human rights in the list could have unforeseen, unintended and, frankly, unwelcome consequences. It might, for example, suggest that the Clause 2 power could have modified our domestic human rights protections but for such an explicit reference. We are clear that that is not possible. It could also have implied that existing powers in other legislation, where there is no such express restriction, could be used in a way that is not consistent with our domestic human rights protections. Again, we are clear that they cannot. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his agreement on this; I know that his expertise carries enormous weight in these matters.
I turn now to Amendment 4, tabled by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Henig. The Government agree with the spirit of this amendment: we must maintain UK statutory protections for food safety, including the protection granted by retained direct EU legislation. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for confirming in hard data the excellence of our standards. That is testament to the standards that we have in the UK. As I have previously said, and for the reasons I have given, we propose the broad formulation of,
“the protection of human, animal or plant life or health”.
I appreciate that this House will want to have confidence that this category includes food safety, and I am happy to provide that. The whole purpose of food safety regulation is to provide protection for human life and health. I am also happy to commit to publishing guidance that explains that this broad term should be read as encompassing all EU food safety and public health laws that will be retained in UK law, as well as being compatible with our international obligations.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked whether proposed subsection (4A) reflects the Government’s commitment to the environment. The UK is committed to upholding its high environmental standards around the world. As with other EU trade agreements, our aim is to replicate the effect of the existing agreements, restricting any changes to technical fixes deemed necessary. The UK continues to be a global leader on climate action, as demonstrated by our ratification of the Paris agreement last November, and as part of the UK’s Climate Change Act agreement of the UK’s fifth carbon budget in July 2016. The 2008 Climate Change Act commits the UK to reducing our greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80% by 2050 over the 1990 levels. We want to ensure that economic growth, development and environmental protection can go hand in hand. Wherever UK legislation protects the environment, this amendment requires that our Clause 2 regulations are consistent with maintaining that protection.
The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, also asked about the wording in proposed subsection (4A)—she asked about the protection of protections. I am advised by our lawyers that, in drafting legislation—and I believe this to be true—it is important to be legally precise, even where this means that a clause might sound slightly odd on a plain-English reading. Our amendment effectively sets up a two-stage test. First, do Clause 2 regulations make provision in any of the listed areas? Secondly, if so, is that provision consistent with maintaining UK levels of statutory protection in that area?
I turn to other questions asked by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked about the impact of the government amendment in devolved areas. Proposed subsection (4C) makes clear that the protections given through this provision apply to the levels of protection that have effect in the UK or part of the UK which are in place when the regulations are laid. If higher levels of protection are in place in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, these will be the levels that are maintained.
The noble Earl, Lord Lytton, asked how businesses and economic factors will be taken into account in the exercise of these provisions. This amendment is all about maintaining UK levels of protection in continuity trade agreements. We therefore think that this is outside that, because this is all about continuity.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister. She has devoted considerable time and effort to meeting those of us who signed the previous amendment and expressed concern about this matter, and she has addressed our concerns in a very positive manner. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, that I—and, I understand, my noble and learned friend Lord Judge—understand the Minister to be making a general statement: this is not a statement confined to the particular provisions of the Bill but a general statement about the Government’s view relating to Pepper v Hart and the use of Explanatory Notes. I very much welcome that statement, which, as the Minister said, is precisely what she said to us in the letter she wrote.
All this exemplifies a concern that your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, under the distinguished chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, expressed. My noble and learned friend Lord Judge, the noble Lord, Lord Beith—who was also party to the amendment on Report—and I have all expressed concern about the tendency of the Government to bring forward in legislation very broad powers and then to rely upon the good will and the good faith of the Minister in their exercise. We have repeatedly urged that Bills should not be so drafted and I think we have the support of the House in making those points regularly and consistently. We will continue to do so, I am sure, and it would be very helpful if other Ministers would understand that concern, as the Minister undoubtedly does, and ensure that legislation is tightly drafted so that proper parliamentary controls can take place.
Perhaps I might say a word, because I was the Chief Whip in the Commons when the Pepper v Hart decision was taken. What the Minister has said is of great advantage to her, because the difficulty I had then was that Ministers were being inhibited from giving proper explanations of Bills, because their advisers were telling them they might be infringing on Pepper v Hart and doing all sorts of things. So the fact that this matter has been cleared up after many years is a great advantage and I congratulate the Minister on doing it.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for reflecting his experience in this debate and for the constructive and clear conversations that we have had. I am happy to confirm to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, and to the House that I was making a general statement. I also confirm to my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe that I will listen to the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, who said that the important issue here is for clear legislation not lazy legislation, and that this is used only as a last resort and should not be relied upon.
Perhaps I might ask the Minister to confirm that, contrary to some of the comments that have been made, she is not introducing some major constitutional change today but that the rule in Pepper v Hart remains; it is a rule of law. All that she is confirming, as I understand it—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will say if he disagrees—is that the existence of the Pepper v Hart rule that in the case of ambiguity the courts can look at what was said by the mover of an amendment or a particular provision does not justify ambiguous legislation. It does not justify loose drafting. I think that that is all that the Minister is confirming.
I am happy to confirm that that is exactly what I meant. I do not, I believe, have the power to overturn Pepper v Hart, nor am I minded to do so. However, I want to confirm as a general statement exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has articulated. It has been of huge benefit to the House to address, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned, two heresies and I am grateful to my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, who has supported us in getting to this stage. I also thank my noble friend Lord Wakeham for his words of welcome, and I have taken on board the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. I am happy to take back, through the officials, the request of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to reflect to my colleagues continuing concern over phrases such as “among other things”.
The work on this amendment has been an illustration of the very best of the experience of this House. I hope that the detailed reassurances I have provided will allow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, not to move his Amendment 6.