Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, said in her answer to a question earlier this week that Foreign Office issues are not her area of expertise. They are not mine either, but this Bill overlaps to some extent with my responsibilities on these Benches for home affairs. I have one question for the Minister on Clause 40 and the power to make provision relating to immigration appeals. If noble Lords will allow me, if we can deal with this matter today by means of a comment from the Minister in his summing-up, it will obviate the need for amendments later in the Bill’s passage.

As noble Lords will know, the Bill gives powers to Ministers to impose sanctions, and among those sanctions are immigration sanctions or the power to designate persons to be excluded persons for the purposes of Section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971. In essence, part of the sanctions package could be either to remove designated persons from the UK or to prevent their entering the UK. In addition, the Bill provides mechanisms for those affected to ask for the decision to impose sanctions to be reviewed, initially by a Minister and subsequently by the courts—as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, has said, the Court of Session in Scotland and the High Court in the rest of the UK—including a decision to designate them as an excluded person. This would in effect be an appeal against the decision to impose the sanction.

An excluded person could also claim that they have a right to claim asylum in the UK, or that their human rights would be infringed if they were returned to their country of origin or refused entry to the UK. These would be appeals against the consequences of the imposition of the sanction, rather than appeals against the decision to impose the sanction itself. It is clearly important that these two potential routes to challenge either the decision to designate or the consequences of being designated are kept separate. My understanding is that that is what Clause 40 would allow the Government to do by regulation.

Clause 40 is quite complex and I wonder whether the Minister can reassure the House when he sums up that, as the Explanatory Notes appear to suggest at paragraphs 115 and 116, claims of asylum and human rights will continue to be dealt with by the Home Secretary—the Minister with the knowledge, experience and expertise to decide these matters—not the Minister imposing the sanctions, and that any appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision would be to the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, a specialist tribunal with expertise in deciding such claims, not the High Court or Court of Session, where an appeal against the imposition of the sanction would be heard. I appreciate that that is what is contained in the Explanatory Notes, but that does not have legal effect, whereas clarification from the Minister at the Dispatch Box would.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 29th November 2017 Lords Chamber

Debate on whether Clause 40 should stand part of the Bill.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in asking that Clause 40 should not stand part of the Bill, we seek the clarification that I asked for at Second Reading, and failed to receive from the Minister, about Clause 40 and the power to make provision relating to routes to challenging decisions with immigration implications. Noble Lords will know that the Bill gives powers to Ministers to impose sanctions. Among them are immigration sanctions or the power to designate persons as “excluded persons” for the purposes of Section 8B of the Immigration Act 1971. In essence, part of the sanctions package could be either to remove designated persons from the UK or to prevent them entering the UK. The Bill provides a mechanism for those affected to ask for the decision to impose sanctions to be reviewed, initially by a Minister and subsequently by the courts—the Court of Session in Scotland and the High Court in the rest of the UK—which could include the decision to designate an individual an excluded person. This would, in effect, be an appeal against the decision to impose the sanction.

An excluded person could, alternatively or in addition, claim that they have a right to asylum in the UK or that their human rights would be infringed if they were returned to their country of origin or refused entry to the UK. This would, in effect, be an appeal against the consequences of the imposition of the sanction, rather than against the decision to impose the sanction itself. It is important that these two potential routes to challenge being designated an excluded person—either the decision to designate or the consequences of being designated—are dealt with separately and appropriately. My understanding is that that is what Clause 40 allows the Government to do, by regulation.

However, Clause 40 is quite complex and, at the same time, non-specific about what the regulations and their effect might be. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill appear to suggest, in paragraphs 115 and 116, that claims of asylum and human rights will continue to be dealt with by the Home Secretary as the Minister with the knowledge, experience and expertise to decide these matters, not by the Minister imposing the sanctions, and that any appeal against the Home Secretary’s decision would be to the immigration and asylum chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, a specialist tribunal with expertise in deciding such claims, not the High Court or Court of Session, where an appeal against the imposition of the sanction would be heard.

In a letter dated 16 November, the Minister stated that it was the Government’s,

“intention to provide, at Committee stage, an illustrative draft Statutory Instrument in relation to the powers under clause 40, so that Peers can fully scrutinise how decisions that have immigration implications will be taken and the routes of challenge”.

We are in Committee and have come to Clause 40 in the Bill, and no illustrative draft statutory instrument has been made available. Can the Minister tell the Committee how noble Lords are expected to accept Clause 40 in the absence of what he promised in his letter?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, perhaps I might intervene in this debate and save the Committee some time. First, they say that sorry seems to be the hardest word but it is not for me. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, since after Second Reading, as he said, I wrote to him and said that the Government intended to bring forward a draft instrument and would put on record during Committee the Government’s intended policy in regard to this clause. I regret to say that we have not fulfilled the first part of that intention—I will come to it in a moment—but I hope that, through what I say, I can fulfil the second part of it now.

Let me assure the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the Committee more generally that much work has been, and continues to be, done between officials in various departments on refining this important policy area. As the noble Lord acknowledged, the issue is complex and involves not only the specialist tribunal but how this relates to other aspects of the Bill. This has meant that, despite best efforts by officials, the draft statutory instrument was not ready to be published. It was my view and that of the Government that, rather than publish a statutory instrument that is not yet fully ready, Parliament would be better assisted by seeing a more mature version of that instrument. To that end, my officials and others across Whitehall will continue this work apace. We will endeavour to publish a version of the statutory instrument ahead of Report. I would be happy to meet the noble Lord in the interim to discuss this specific issue. I would also like to put on record for the Committee the intention behind this clause and address some of the points that he made.

Clause 40 concerns how appeals against the immigration consequences of UK autonomous sanctions are handled. I would like to give the Committee some background as to the current arrangements before I go on to speak about the clause. Under the current arrangements, UN or EU travel bans are, in the vast majority of cases, imposed on individuals who are outside the UK and have no connection to the UK. The Immigration Act 1971 already makes provision for persons subject to UN travel bans. Clause 40 allows us to ensure that the persons subject to UK autonomous travel bans can benefit from a similar provision.

In the unlikely event that a UK autonomous travel ban were to be imposed on a person in the UK, this would, as a matter of domestic law, have consequences for their immigration status in the UK—a point I know concerned the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Whereas a person who is outside the UK will be refused entry, those who are in the UK will lose the right to remain here and may be subject to removal. A person affected in this way might argue that any removal from the UK would interfere with their rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, or be contrary to our obligations under the refugee convention. As a result, they may wish to make a human rights or humanitarian protection claim to prevent their removal. These immigration claims are usually decided by the Home Secretary, and a very developed machinery has grown up around the decision-making process to ensure that it is fair and effective and, importantly, complies with our international obligations. Such decisions, once made, can also give rise to a right of appeal before the immigration and asylum chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, a specialist tribunal with expertise in deciding such claims.

I turn to the Bill. Such immigration claims may also be made against the immigration consequences of a UK autonomous travel ban imposed under the Bill. Again, immigration claims are most likely to arise where an individual in the UK would lose their right to remain here. Noble Lords might ask why we need Clause 40, given that this situation can already arise in the context of a UN or EU travel ban. I wish to explain the point here. The Bill establishes a new administrative reassessment process for designations and a court review process in the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session. No such equivalent administrative and court mechanisms are currently applied in domestic law for UN or EU travel bans. The mechanisms in place are different, so we will need to adapt the existing decision-making and appellate structures that I described earlier in order to accommodate the Bill. That is why we need Clause 40.

I turn back to the practicalities. Cases of this kind are likely to be limited in number, but it is vital that we get this right—a point made by the noble Lord himself. The Government consider it important to ensure that such claims are handled appropriately. We want to ensure that domestic sanctions do not unjustifiably interfere with fundamental rights or run contrary to our obligations under the refugee convention. It is also important that the effectiveness of our domestic sanctions regime is not compromised because our domestic legislation no longer enables us to manage effectively such immigration claims as may be made. The Government have therefore considered how these immigration claims should be treated in the context of the new administrative reassessment and court review processes.

Our conclusion is that, as a starting point, we should seek to maintain the status quo. The Home Secretary and the Immigration and Asylum Tribunal should remain the appropriate decision-makers, as they are now. Both the Home Office and the tribunal are vastly experienced in this area, having dealt with 38,681 human rights and asylum claims and appeals in 2016 alone. However, some changes will be necessary in order to ensure that domestic legislation enables us to manage situations where, for example, there would otherwise be the possibility of both the High Court and the tribunal considering the same issues, or the High Court being required to determine a protection claim that the Home Office had not had the opportunity to consider.

To illustrate the point, whereas the tribunal would be best placed to determine an appeal against an immigration decision, determining the lawfulness of a decision to freeze an individual’s assets is a decision that would be better suited to the High Court. The clause provides the powers necessary to make these changes, which will ensure that we continue to comply with our international obligations and that the effectiveness of our domestic sanctions regime is not compromised. To provide appropriate scrutiny, regulations made under this power will use the draft affirmative procedure.

I give this very detailed explanation along with, once again, an apology to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I believe that at Second Reading when he raised this issue I had momentarily left the Chamber or I was near the Box to clarify something, so I did not fully hear his contribution and read it only later in Hansard. As I said, I put on record that we would look to return to this in Committee, which clearly we have not been able to do. I am much minded that the instrument put forward is one that we have looked at extensively and reflects the detail of what I have just submitted to your Lordships’ House. I therefore hope that with that somewhat detailed explanation, which I briefly mentioned to the respective Front Benches out of courtesy to your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord will be minded to withdraw his amendment, with the assurance that I look forward to working with him specifically on that SI before Report.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I think that I am being corrected by my rather forceful Whip on my left. I am sure that this matter will be clarified through the usual channels.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I very much welcome the support and contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I am very grateful to the Minister for explaining that asylum claims, and any claim that somebody’s human rights will be infringed, will be dealt with by the most appropriate Minister—the Home Secretary—and through the immigration appeal tribunal route, and not by the provisions in the Bill to appeal against the imposition of the sanction itself. I am grateful for that reassurance; it is the one that I was seeking.

I am grateful, too, for the Minister’s apology for missing some deadlines, if I may put it that way. Obviously, I am content to withdraw my opposition to Clause 40 standing part of the Bill.

Clause 40 agreed.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 17th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Swinfen (Con)]

My Lords, can the Minister tell the House at what age the United Nations considers that a child ceases to be a child?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Clause 124(4)(b) refers to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which defines a child as a person under the age of 18, so we can assume that that is the working principle. Clause 124, introduced at a previous stage by an amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, talks about age-appropriate design, and so presumably that means appropriate at different ages—for example, safeguards for those aged 12 will be different from those for people aged 16 and 18. Bearing in mind the United Nations convention definition, will the Minister confirm that that is the working principle for this Bill?

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House. I thank the noble Baroness for raising the point; clarity is always important, as we have learned, and she is right to put her finger on it. However, the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is correct.

We run the risk in this Bill of pouring fuel on an already raging fire: the more we try to focus on children as a group, the more we demonise and make difficult the Bill’s attempts—through an amendment we all supported on Report—to raise our sights and find a way of expressing how all people are dealt with in terms of internet access, with particular reference to those with developmental or other support needs to whom the word “child” could well be applied. But that does not mean that we want the more generic approach to fail because it did not mention vulnerable adults, the elderly who may be struggling with internet issues, those with special needs or others. These groups all need to be considered in the right way, and I am sure that, in time, “age appropriate” may not be the most appropriate way of dealing with it. It does get us to a particular point, however. It was a historic decision that we took on Report to do it this way, but we need to have an eye on the much wider case for a better understanding of under what conditions and with what impact those of us who wish to use the internet can do so safely and securely.