Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th July 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a very short debate; in fact, there has been an absence of debate. However, I am grateful to the Minister for meeting us prior to today to discuss the Bill; speaking with officials was very helpful. I offer the apologies of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who has an important committee meeting this afternoon and is unable to speak in this debate, but the House can be reassured that she will submit amendments to which she will speak in Committee.

I am grateful to techUK for its advice on this matter. The Bill looks very much like the equivalent of the United States Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data, or CLOUD, Act, which sets out how the US Government can access overseas data for law enforcement where an international agreement is in place. When the United States passed the Act, the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, was the first leader to indicate that the United Kingdom would be willing to establish an agreement with the US on the basis of its Act, which I presume is why we are bringing forward equivalent legislation here.

My briefing on the CLOUD Act is that it clarifies how and when the US and other countries can gain access to data stored in different jurisdictions, allowing bilateral deals with foreign countries on data sharing for law enforcement purposes. The legal clarity which that Act provides, which I presume this Bill will also provide, has been welcomed by tech giants such as Microsoft, Google, Apple and Facebook.

Noble Lords will know that we are part of the Five Eyes group of countries that share intelligence on terrorism issues, along with the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, so it is no surprise that we are looking through the mechanisms of this Bill to establish a reciprocal arrangement with the USA and presumably with the other Five Eyes countries in due course, in addition to other countries as we are able to strike arrangements with them.

It makes sense, rather than relying on mutual legal assistance treaties, to allow law enforcement agencies to apply to the British courts to access data directly from an overseas service provider rather than going through government channels, provided an international agreement is in place with the country concerned. Bearing in mind the vast volume of data handled by service providers based in the United States of America, America will obviously be a priority for the mechanisms in this Bill. I am grateful for the House of Lords briefing on this issue, which outlines the tortuous process of MLAT, which can take up to 10 months to complete, so the need for this Bill is clear.

There are issues of privacy here and therefore of compliance with the GDPR—the general data protection regulation that has recently been introduced—and the UK’s ability to secure a certificate of adequacy from the European Union if we were to become a third-party country after Brexit. Noble Lords will recall that the EU allows data exchange only with third-party countries whose data regulations and privacy laws are considered by the EU to meet EU standards. If the UK enters a bilateral arrangement with a non-EU country whereby it can apply directly to UK service providers to hand over sensitive personal information, presumably the EU will have to be satisfied that the safeguards in the Bill are sufficient for the EU not to withdraw any adequacy certificate for the UK. Perhaps the Minister can explain.

For example, in Clause 3 “excepted electronic data” goes beyond legal professional privilege to include confidential records such as medical records, evidence from the confessional—“spiritual counselling”—and welfare counselling, but in Clause 3(5) these exceptions do not apply to terrorist investigations. Noble Lords will recall that as a member of the European Union we have carte blanche to make whatever arrangements we want as far as terrorist investigations are concerned, but once we become a third-party country the EU will scrutinise those arrangements and take them into consideration in deciding whether an adequacy certificate should be issued: the devil will be in the detail of the Bill.

The European Commission in April 2018 published its own e-evidence proposals for European production orders, which is the EU version of the CLOUD Act. It sets out when law enforcement officers can request data and what the response times from the tech companies should be. These proposals will apply across all EU countries, whereas the US arrangements, which President Trump is said to prefer, deal only with individual countries—they are bilateral arrangements. How do these proposals fit with the EU e-evidence proposals?

As with all UK law that has extraterritorial effect, there are issues of enforcement. The Minister and her officials were good enough to explain to us that, clearly, if the international service provider has offices in the UK, sanctions could be applied, but it would be more difficult if the overseas company had no assets in the UK. One has to ask whether contempt of court is an effective enforcement process if that overseas service provider has no assets in the UK.

I shall very briefly outline some other areas where we may need to explore further. Clauses 4(5) and 4(6) say that the judge must be satisfied that some or all of the data will be of “substantial value” to the investigation or proceedings and that it is “in the public interest”. The judge will have to weigh the benefit to the proceedings and the circumstances under which the person came into possession or control of the data. This appears to be vague. How high a threshold is this for the applicant investigator to surmount?

In Clause 8, the order may forbid the person against whom it is made to disclose the existence or contents of the order without the permission of the judge or the applicant. This appears to have consequences for open justice.

In Clause 10, is the use of the data as evidence restricted to the offence for which the order is made? What happens if other offences are disclosed? Would a further application be necessary?

Overall, we welcome the Bill, but we will be probing to ensure that the rights of UK citizens are not infringed and that securing an adequacy certificate from the EU if we leave the European Union will not be jeopardised by these proposals.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, there have been so few speakers this afternoon that anyone would think there might be a football match on tonight. However, I thank both noble Lords for their very constructive comments and questions. I have been furiously writing everything down and I hope I also have the answers but if I have not, I will follow them up in writing.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether this could allow for an agreement with the EU. Obviously, we are going through negotiations with the EU on Brexit, but it is absolutely possible that we could eventually make an agreement either with specific countries or with multiple states in the EU. That is almost certainly a possibility. He also quite sensibly asked whether this will affect the adequacy judgment in the context of Brexit. It is about getting data from outside the UK into the UK, but UK providers responding to requests under any agreement would need to comply with data protection law, which is of course aligned with EU standards, as we saw when we were going through the Data Protection Bill recently.

The noble Lord also asked how the Bill affects the evidence proposal published by the Commission. EU member states and wider international partners are considering this very question of cross-border access to electronic data. The European Commission has published proposals on this issue which we are currently considering. The UK’s opt-in applies to the regulation and the Government are committed to taking all opt-in decisions on a case-by-case basis, putting the national interest at the heart of the decision-making process. We are currently scrutinising the regulation, and we will make a decision on whether to participate in due course. The proposed evidence directive could be implemented before the end of the envisaged implementation period.

The noble Lord also asked whether contempt of court is enough if the CSP has no assets in the UK, which slightly goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made about seizing assets. Both are a possibility, but we anticipate working closely with overseas providers to create a high compliance environment. Given the general support for this, we hope that is the case. It is possible that some providers may have no UK assets, but those firms are unlikely to be within reach of any enforcement mechanism. We can always resort to MLA in the case of non-compliance.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about what happens if you get more evidence than you asked for. The data received will be subject to the usual data protection laws and existing laws on data handling and retention. Law enforcement will be provided with guidance on how to handle data when using an overseas production order. I think he also asked about what happens if you need multiple different requests.

[Lord Paddick]

The question was: if you identify further offences from the information that you have requested, would you then need to go back to a judge to enable that evidence to be used?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My view would be that, yes, you would because it would be a new request, but I will confirm that in writing. I would not wish to give the noble Lord misinformation at the Dispatch Box.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how the US or other countries will be able to get information from the UK. The proposed agreement will be reciprocal and we would expect any country with which we have an international co-operation arrangement also to benefit from this more streamlined process for data and evidence gathering. The condition for any international arrangement or future arrangement is that each country recognises the other’s rule of law—that is an important concept for the Bill—due process and judicial oversight for obtaining and dealing with information and evidence with regard to serious crime. Each agreement will be specific in scope in respect of the circumstances in which it can be used. Section 52 of the IP Act 2016 will be used to designate international agreements, and that will be the basis for another country to request information from UK service providers. The Secretary of State has the power to impose additional conditions when designating an agreement under that section.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what would happen if the other country had a lower threshold for what is regarded as reasonable belief. What do we do if this arrangement is all about the mutual recognition of legal systems? The UK would not agree to any arrangement where the threshold for obtaining data did not provide similarly protective standards to those in the UK. The agreements will recognise a shared acceptance of the laws in another country with which we are entering into an agreement. It will recognise the other’s rule of law, due process and judicial oversight for obtaining and dealing with information and evidence with regard to serious crime.

Under any proposed agreement the UK would require the other country to set out the powers it intended to use in pursuance of requests made under the agreement. The UK would also ask the other country to commit that it would not rely on another power unless agreed by both parties. In addition, it would specify the evidential standard required before requests were made and ensure that the UK was satisfied with those standards before designating an agreement for incoming requests.

The noble Lord asked which countries we are negotiating agreements with. We expect the first relevant international arrangement to be with the US, unlocking the potential for streamlined access by UK law enforcement, but any future international arrangements would, like the agreement with the US that we have been discussing, be based on the recognition that robust protections for privacy are present in each country. Of course, not every country would meet those high standards, and any agreement that we reached with another jurisdiction would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way. As discussed, that usually involves laying the agreement in Parliament for 21 sitting days without either House having resolved that it should not be ratified.

The noble Lord asked what powers exist to nullify incoming requests. The Bill is about requests from the UK rather than to the UK, but UK-based providers will not be compelled to comply with overseas orders and, if they do, must comply with data protection law. The agreement itself will be subject to the usual scrutiny by Parliament, as I have said.

The noble Lord also asked about the timescales for production orders versus MLA. Under an overseas production order, the standard time for compliance is seven days. However, the judge may shorten or extend this time depending on the circumstances of the case. Therefore we expect this to be a much quicker process compared with MLA, which can take up to 10 months unless there is a particular urgency. The noble Lord asked how many we were anticipating. We anticipate approximately 40 to 50 outgoing requests for electronic data. I will write on the other point regarding MLA numbers. I am guessing that there are more because it has a broader scope, but I will write to the noble Lord.

I have tried to cover every point; I am not sure that I have but I will of course follow up in writing any that I have not. In the meantime, I beg to move.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 5th September 2018 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

3: Clause 1, page 1, line 19, at end insert—
“( ) The Secretary of State may not make regulations designating an international co-operation arrangement with a state which is a party to or participates in it which has not abolished the death penalty unless the agreement provides that it will apply only if the other party or participant has given assurances that the death penalty will not be imposed in any case in which or in whose preparation electronic data obtained under this Act has been used.”

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 3 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to Amendments 4 and 7 in our names. I will also mention very briefly Amendment 8 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy of Southwark.

Before I launch into the meat of the amendment, I hope the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, does not mind me mentioning that, on the way into the Moses Room, he said that he enjoyed reading my amendments. I am extremely grateful for the extensive work carried out by my noble friend Lady Hamwee with regard to these amendments—if you know what I mean.

As we have heard, the purpose of the Bill is to allow UK law enforcement agencies to more easily obtain electronic evidence when it is sought outside the UK. Of course, evidence so secured would be subject to safeguards in the UK, but presumably the countries that enter into international co-operation agreements with the UK—a prerequisite for the operation of overseas production orders—will expect their own law enforcement agencies to be able to apply through their own domestic courts for equivalent orders that would allow them to seek stored electronic data directly from service providers based in the UK; the reciprocal agreement. Amendments 3 and 4 seek to probe how legal and human rights concerns over privacy and the security of personal data will be addressed and the issue of such evidence potentially resulting in the death penalty being passed on a subject. Amendment 3 requires that the Secretary of State may not make regulations entering into an international co-operation agreement in relation to states where the death penalty can be imposed unless the agreement restricts access to UK-held data to cases where an assurance has been given that the death penalty will not be imposed.

Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights—together with Protocol 13, of which the UK is a signatory—provides for the total abolition of the death penalty. My recollection of a meeting with the Minister on this very issue is that the UK would not hand over evidence in the knowledge that it would result in the possibility of the suspect being executed. However, since that meeting, noble Lords will recall the case of two former British citizens accused of being members of an ISIS cell. In a leaked letter, the Home Secretary apparently agreed to co-operate with the United States by sharing evidence but said that he would not seek a death penalty assurance. In an apparently totally inconsistent statement, he went on to say that,

“it is the long-held position of the UK to seek death penalty assurances, and our decision in this case does not reflect a change in our policy on assistance in US death penalty cases generally, nor the UK government’s stance on the global abolition of the death penalty”.

We now appear to be in a situation where government policy is to ensure that evidence does not lead to the suspect potentially facing the death penalty and to encourage the global abolition of the death penalty, except when the Home Secretary decides otherwise. How can the Government advocate the abolition of the death penalty globally on a case-by-case basis? Amendment 3 seeks to put into the Bill that an international co-operation agreement cannot be entered into with a state unless there is an agreement that the sharing of evidence would not lead to the imposition of the death penalty.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I understand the point that the noble Lord is making. I, not least, look forward to the discussion that we are going to have.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the comments of all noble Lords on this group of amendments. I do not want to prolong the agony; I accept that the Bill is about outgoing requests but in order for outgoing requests to be complied with, there would be an expectation by the foreign state that a similar application to the UK would be met. We are potentially talking about UK service providers providing evidence to a foreign state that would enable that state to carry out the death penalty on a suspect. Having agreements based on trust and mutual respect, rather than a legally binding agreement, where if there are differences of opinion about what particular terms mean there would be some form of dispute resolution—no more reassurance than that—while the IP Act 2016 could impose restrictions, but might not, all seems rather vague and general. When we are talking about someone’s life potentially being ended, we would seek more concrete reassurances that evidence provided by the UK is not going to lead to that.

I understand that the intention is to have an agreement with the United States of America as a whole. However, bearing in mind that the death penalty is an issue in some states but not others, and that other agreements would be on a case-by-case basis—presumably on the basis of the human rights record of the states that the agreement was entered into with—it seems odd that a blanket agreement could be entered into with the USA when there is that crucial difference between states as to whether the death penalty could be carried out. Obviously, we are in Committee, which is about understanding concerns and the Government’s position. We need to further develop that in meetings and on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

9: Clause 2, page 2, line 25, after “person” insert “exercising law enforcement functions”

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, the amendment is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I shall speak also to Amendment 10.

Clause 2 lists appropriate officers who can make an application for an overseas production order. The list clearly indicates what this legislation is about: securing evidence to present before a court. It is not, for example, a search for intelligence; intelligence officers are not listed. Clause 2 is a list of law enforcement officers and, as such, subsection (1)(a)(vii) and (b)(v), which allow the Secretary of State by regulation to specify others as appropriate officers, should be restricted to specified law enforcement officers and not simply be left open to any person of a description specified in regulations. Our amendments would place such a restriction on the regulating powers of the Secretary of State. I beg to move.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, the noble Lord raises an important point. In response, I am sure that the noble Baroness will explain to us why the Government deem it necessary to take this wider power and not restrict it, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has sought to do, to officers from wherever who are actually enforcing law enforcement functions. On the face of it this seems a very sensible amendment, and I look forward to hearing why the Government think they need this wider power in this context.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I hope that this amendment will not require any further meetings or probing on Report. The Bill provides that an appropriate officer is able to apply for an overseas production order where an indictable offence has been committed, where proceedings in relation to that indictable offence have been instituted or investigated, or where the order is sought for the purpose of terrorist investigations. Therefore, the clause is already limited to officers who are exercising law enforcement functions. In fact, the clause already makes clear that where a listed appropriate officer has functions other than for law enforcement purposes, it is only where the appropriate officer is exercising functions in relation to the investigation or prosecution of criminal conduct that they may apply for an overseas production order. For example, a person appointed by the FCA can conduct both civil and criminal investigations and the clause ensures that they can apply for an overseas production order only in connection with criminal investigations or prosecutions. I hope that that provides reassurance.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am very grateful for that explanation provided by the Minister. The meeting of 20 minutes we have scheduled before Report will not be further extended as a result of this amendment and I beg leave to withdraw it.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

11: Clause 3, page 3, line 32, at end insert “but not bulk data”

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, Amendment 11 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We debated long and hard in this House about when and how law enforcement agencies and the security services can secure authority to access bulk data. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016—not to be confused with the investigatory powers Act 2018, which exists only on BBC1 on Sunday evenings—contains some safeguards against state access to bulk data and it is essential that those safeguards are not circumvented by the Bill. The Government will no doubt say that accessing bulk data held overseas is not the purpose of the Bill, but what other reassurances can the Minister give that the powers under the Bill will not be used inappropriately by law enforcement agencies? Amendment 11 seeks to achieve this by amending Clause 3(2), changing the definition of “electronic data” to exclude bulk data. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Again, I hope that I can provide clarity on the noble Lord’s amendment. When applying for an overseas production order an officer must specify or describe the electronic data sought under an order. In addition, the judge must be satisfied that a number of requirements are met before making an order under Clause 4. These include that the judge must be satisfied that the person against whom the order is sought has possession or control of all or part of the data specified in the application; that the data requested is likely to be of substantial value; and that it is in the public interest for all or part of the data to be produced. It is very difficult to see how a judge could be satisfied that these requirements are met if they were considering an application for an order seeking bulk data.

The reason is that bulk data requests are for sets of information, often about a large number of individuals who may or may not be known to law enforcement agencies. The Bill has been drafted to require appropriate officers to consider carefully what data they are targeting—which, of course, is not the case with bulk data—and where the information is stored, in order to help with the investigation and prosecution of serious crime, in addition to demonstrating that the data will be of substantial value to the investigation and in the public interest. It feels to me that there are sufficient safeguards in place, because of the processes I have outlined, and I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. I am not sure that it entirely satisfies us about the potential for misuse of the legislation, but we will reflect on what she said and perhaps discuss it with her before Report.

[Lord Rosser]

If there is any doubt in this matter, as I understand it from the briefing that we had from the House of Lords Library, the UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, giving testimony to the US House of Representatives’ Judiciary Committee in June 2017, said that the UK Government were “in full agreement” with the US Department of Justice that a UK-US bilateral data sharing agreement should limit access to targeted orders for data and not bulk access to data.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord because that underlines my point.

[Lord Paddick]

If that is the case, there is no reason why it should not be stated in the Bill.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sorry, but I think I need to intervene. All sorts of things could be stated in the Bill, but given its purpose, I do not think it is necessary. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed that out.

[Lord Paddick]

With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, he is talking about a bilateral agreement with United States of America and not a global reassurance given by every country with which we might enter into an agreement. Therefore, my concerns remain but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 11 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

19: Clause 4, page 5, line 19, at end insert—
“( ) The judge must be satisfied that the electronic data specified or described in the application is not confidential journalistic data.”

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 19 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, I will speak to our Amendments 33 and 34 in this group.

Journalistic data of any kind is not excepted electronic data as set out in Clause 3, despite representations made by media organisations that it should be. Instead, under Clause 12 the application for an overseas production order, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data specified or described in the application consists of or includes journalistic data that is confidential journalistic data, must be made on notice. Confidential journalistic data consists of data created or acquired for the purposes of journalism and in circumstances that give rise to an obligation of confidence that continues or is held subject to a restriction on disclosure or an obligation of secrecy.

This begs the question: how does the judge make a judgment about whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that confidential journalistic material is involved? Does the judge take the word of the applicant? If the judge determines that confidential journalistic material is involved, how will notice be served on the parties concerned and how will those parties make representations? To probe these issues, Amendment 19 inserts the requirement that:

“The judge must be satisfied that the electronic data specified or described in the application is not confidential journalistic data”.


Clause 13 prohibits the overseas parties from concealing, destroying, altering or disposing of the data, or disclosing the application to anyone else, once they are given notice of the application. What sanction can be imposed for failing to comply? Can it be contempt of court, bearing in mind that at that stage the judge has made no order, only given notice that an application for an order has been made?

Amendment 33 provides that Clause 12(1) should specify that the notice should be served on the data controller and the data subject specifically, as well as anyone else the judge considers necessary. Amendment 34 amends Clause 12(4) to specify that notices should be served on a person R, referred to in Clause 12(3): that is, the person who receives electronic data from another person who intended it to be used for journalistic purposes. I beg to move Amendment 19.

[Lord Rosser]

I referred to the general issue that is the subject of the amendments spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, when I spoke to Amendment 8. We share the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, subject to what the Minister may have to say in response, about the possible difficulties or issues that might arise.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his points and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his intervention. The effect of Amendment 19 would be to exclude confidential journalistic material from the scope of an application and order. I should first point out that Clause 4 reflects the position in the PACE Act 1984. Journalistic material can already be sought under Schedule 1 to PACE through special procedure, and under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when it is held by a company or person based in the UK. The Bill extends this to circumstances where the data is held by an entity based outside the UK and where a relevant international arrangement is in place.

I do not think that we should introduce in the Bill a difference between material that can be obtained—subject of course to appropriate requirements and safeguards—when it is held in the UK, as opposed to being held by an entity based on the country with which we have entered into an agreement. I should also stress that similar standards are set out in the Bill as already exist in domestic legislation, and that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” is readily used by our court system. Reasonable belief requires more than just a guess or a hunch. It will require the judge, marshalling all the facts before them, to come to an assessment on whether the information sought does or does not contain this type of data. It is not the first time that that standard has been used in legislation, and of course it will not be the last. Where confidential journalistic material is sought, the Bill requires that such applications can only be made on notice. That means that anyone put on notice, which can and may include the journalist whose data might be sought, has the opportunity to make representations to the court as to whether it is appropriate for the data to be obtained.

The effect of Amendment 33 as drafted would be that an application for an overseas production order that included confidential journalistic material had to be made on notice to a data controller and the data subject. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment but I do not agree that it is required, for two reasons. First, the rules of court will set out the process by which a judge can ensure that anyone affected by the order is notified of any given case. Consideration of notice by the judge relating to such a request is left to his or her discretion to allow for the circumstances where notice to a data controller, data subject or anyone else is deemed appropriate by the judge when granting an overseas production order. I think giving the judge discretion to determine which is appropriate in any given case is the right approach.

Secondly—this is a point that I have made before and will make again—we are providing in the Bill the means to serve an order on a company based outside the UK in a country with which we have a relevant agreement, in the same way as is currently the case with a company based in the UK. In those cases the respondent and any other person affected by the order would ordinarily be given notice and therefore the opportunity to make representations, unless under rules of court the judge is satisfied that there are good reasons for not doing so—for example, because of the risk of prejudice to the investigation. We are proposing that the same should apply to overseas production orders.

The intention of Clause 12 is to require an application for an overseas production order to be made on notice where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data sought consists of, or includes, confidential journalistic data. The effect of the clause as drafted is that notice should be served on the respondent—that is, the person who would be required to produce the data if the order is made. In most cases, this would be a service provider rather than the customer on whose behalf the data is stored. However, a requirement to give notice to the respondent under Clause 12(1) does not preclude the judge considering the application from exercising his or her own discretion under rules of court. Under rules of court they may require notice to be given to other persons who may be affected by an order requiring the production of confidential journalistic material, including a person who in his or her professional capacity has acquired that data. It will be a matter for the judge’s discretion, but he or she is likely to insist on notice being given unless the applicant can demonstrate that doing so would prejudice the investigation—for example, where the journalist himself or herself is the subject of the investigation or prosecution.

An example of where it might not be appropriate is where there is a hacking investigation and the journalist might actually be the subject of an inquiry. The judge may decide that putting someone on notice could potentially harm the investigation or risk the dissipation of the material. It is the Government’s intention, however, to ensure that where an application relates to confidential journalistic data, notice can and should be served on journalists and on whoever the judge deems appropriate given the circumstances of the application. The PACE Act 1984, for example, requires service to be made on the respondent only, otherwise notice requirements are set out in court rules.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point about sanctions to comply. It is difficult to construct a proportionate regime to ensure nondisclosure prior to an order being made and, in practice, law enforcement would not apply for an order where there was an unacceptable risk of damaging disclosure. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and I shall consider their comments before Report, if that is amenable to them.

[Lord Paddick]

I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanation and her offer to consider further the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and I have raised in connection with these issues. Obviously, Amendment 19 is a probing amendment, a mechanism by which to debate these issues, but with the promise of further discussions to come before Report—perhaps the Minister could also establish whether the Government have consulted the National Union of Journalists on these issues—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 19 withdrawn.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th September 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Rosser]

In the other direction, would an order made in an American court against a British provider that is not complied with lead to contempt proceedings in a United States court, and how would that court enforce it against a British provider?

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

While we are waiting, am I right in thinking that in the recent Facebook case it was not that the service provider did not want to provide the information that would be of use to UK law enforcement but that domestic law in America did not allow it to provide that information, and that in the overwhelming majority of cases to which this legislation would apply we anticipate that the service provider would be more than keen to provide the data, provided it can be done lawfully, and that this mechanism provides the lawful means of doing that?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I think the noble Lord is probably quite right. It goes back to what I was saying at the beginning of my response. If there were doubts about compliance, or that began to become apparent, MLA would be the process that we would revert to if this was not forthcoming. Ditto, the American side would probably institute the MLA process to ensure compliance.

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Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

39: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Priority
In the event of any conflict between this Act and the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the DPA”) or the General Data Protection Regulation 2018 (“the GDPR”), the provisions of the DPA or the GDPR shall prevail.”

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, Amendment 39 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. I am grateful for the briefing from techUK, which raises concerns about how this legislation might affect a deal between the EU and the UK on adequacy should the UK leave the European Union. We are unsure how to address those concerns and this amendment is very unlikely to be the means by which to do so, but at this stage it is a means of raising them. It is a bit of a Second Reading amendment, if noble Lords get my drift.

Throughout our debates it has been emphasised that the sole purpose of this legislation is to enable UK law enforcement agencies to find a faster legal means to secure data held overseas that may contain vital evidence in serious criminal cases being prosecuted in the UK than the current mutual legal assistance treaty process. Data handled in the UK is subject to the protections of the Data Protection Act 2018 and the EU general data protection regulations. Indeed, the Data Protection Act ensures that the GDPR continues to have effect, even if the UK does leave the EU.

Throughout our debates on this legislation we have expressed our concerns that the designated international co-operation arrangements that enable overseas production orders to have effect in the target state will give as much right to overseas law enforcement agencies to demand data from UK service providers as the right this legislation will give UK law enforcement agencies to demand data from a service provider in a foreign state. Those foreign states, such as the United States of America, are not bound by the Data Protection Act or the GDPR.

For a third country to exchange data with the EU it must persuade the EU that it has adequate protections for personal data equivalent to or exceeding the standards that EU countries have to comply with under the GDPR. Indeed, EU states are not bound by EU regulation relating to data used for national security purposes, but third-party states are. For the first time, if we leave the EU, the EU will scrutinise the way we handle data in relation to national security because we will become a third-party country, involving more scrutiny than currently takes place. I think that is called “taking back control”. Whether in relation to national security or not—we have already debated the weaker safeguards proposed in relation to terrorism offences—such arrangements could result in personal data from an EU country and shared with a UK service provider being passed to a law enforcement agency in a state that falls short of the protections provided by the GDPR.

In summary, our concern is that, by entering into international co-operation agreements enabling overseas law enforcement agencies directly to access personal data held in the UK by UK service providers, sensitive personal data will be accessed by overseas law enforcement agencies whose standards fall below those set out in the Data Protection Act and the GDPR, thereby jeopardising the EU granting the UK an adequacy certificate. Could the Minister explain what discussions have taken place with the EU on this issue and how the UK’s adequacy status will be protected? I beg to move.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

My Lords, I fully support the amendment moved by the noble Lord. I recall our debates in the Chamber on the GDPR and how important it is to get the adequacy certificate to make sure that we are compliant with all these regulations, and we cannot put that at risk in subsequent legislation. I am looking for the Minister to address that point. The noble Lord has raised a very valid point. We need to get this right before this legislation reaches the statute book.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, as the Minister is responding, it seems that this falls into a similar category to a point we raised last week about how one balances the different public interests involved. I think the Minister is saying that there is a public interest in the application of the Data Protection Act and the GDPR, which takes us back to the clause about assessing public interest. The Minister is nodding at that. Perhaps, before Report, we should go back and look at how that might apply in this context as well.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, and to other noble Lords, for their contributions. In essence, my question is: if the EU has to assess whether we are safeguarding its data, yet we are entering into agreements to give away that data to another country, will the EU need to be satisfied that that other country also has standards of data protection equivalent to or better than the GDPR? If not, we might be putting the adequacy judgments at risk. That is the essence of the amendment. I would be grateful for an opportunity to discuss this further with the Minister in the meetings between now and Report but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 39 withdrawn.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 22nd October 2018 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

2: Clause 1, leave out from beginning to “given” in subsection (4B) and insert—
“(4A) The Secretary of State may not make regulations designating an international co-operation agreement providing for the use of—(a) section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (interception in accordance with overseas requests), or(b) any other enactment which provides for the collection of electronic data,unless the condition in subsection 4B is met.(4B) The condition is that the states party to or participating in the international co-operation agreement have”

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, unusually, I shall be supporting Amendment 1 but I shall also speak to Amendments 2 and 3 in this group. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have added our names to Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, but we feel that the amendment to Clause 1 as drafted does not go far enough.

Before I come to that, however, I wish to say that I wholeheartedly support what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has said about the provisions of the Bill. Bearing in mind that they are likely to be mutual, in that similar provisions would be in a Bill in a country with which we are going to enter into a treaty, it is very important to have a death penalty assurance in that treaty, which is what the amendment seeks to do. In addition to what the noble Lord has said about UK Ministers saying that we in the UK are opposed to the death penalty, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, together with Protocol 13 to which the UK is a signatory, provides for the total abolition of the death penalty. In early meetings with the Minister, we were led to believe that that death penalty assurance would be part of any treaty. However, we feel we need that reassurance in the Bill.

As I say, we took the unusual step of both supporting and amending the Labour amendment on the basis that we both agree on the principle of Amendment 1— that the Government should not enter into a treaty that would require UK companies to provide electronic data to law enforcement in a country that had the death penalty unless the treaty contained assurances that the death penalty would not be implemented if data provided by UK companies was used. We believe that the prohibition on entering into a treaty with a country that has the death penalty should be broader than just the data covered by Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which is what Amendment 1 covers, because that provision covers only the interception of communications in the course of transmission—wiretaps, listening in to telephone conversations and that type of electronic data. A British company could hold personal information about an individual that could be crucial in an investigation for an offence that carries the death penalty in the country making the request. Such electronic data would not necessarily be in the course of transmission but held on servers in the UK.

Our Amendment 2 would therefore include,

“any other enactment which provides for the collection of electronic data”.

Amendment 3 makes it clear that the prohibition on entering into a treaty would not apply if an assurance had been given that the death penalty would not be imposed whether either intercepted communication or any other kind of electronic data had been provided under the Act. That amendment is consequential on Amendment 2.

We want to ensure that no UK company is complicit in providing electronic data of any kind that could lead to someone being executed. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for speaking to their amendments today and express my gratitude to all Members of the House for their contributions both in Committee and today on Report—I think it is the same two noble Lords, but perhaps there are one or two more.

I stress to the House the importance of the UK-US data access agreement. The agreement will allow the UK authorities access to valuable evidence and intelligence directly from US communication service providers. The House should be made aware that the vast majority of CSPs and their data reside in the US, not the UK. The Bill gives our law enforcement a strategic advantage in the fight against the threat we face.

Indeed, in almost every serious criminal investigation, we expect those we investigate to be using services provided by CSPs based in the US. The agreement will make a significant contribution to the detection, investigation, prevention and prosecution of serious crime and terrorism. The Government have been working towards the agreement with the help of US CSPs and the US Government for several years following the recommendation from the then Prime Minister’s data envoy Sir Nigel Sheinwald.

All Governments and any future Governments have the duty to put the security of their people first. It will always be in the public interest to ensure that our police and agencies have access to the necessary intelligence and evidence in order to fulfil that duty. Just as it was under the previous Labour Government and as it is today, Ministers must always be mindful of the current threat environment they find themselves in. That is why we believe that better scrutiny of these agreements and accountability for future treaties is the best way to ensure that the Government’s principles are tested, rather than prescribing a rigid format for treaties that have not yet even been mooted, let alone being currently under negotiation.

Of course, the Government’s objective is to obtain a satisfactory death penalty assurance, but negotiations are ongoing and not yet concluded. Playing the discussions out in public may make it much harder to conclude them effectively.

Let me be clear to the House: there will be an assurance in the agreement. We can expect it to rule out the direct use of information obtained under the agreement as evidence in a prosecution where the death penalty might apply. Parliament will scrutinise the final detail of any agreement and the assurance it contains. We have already tabled an amendment today clarifying that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 process will always apply to relevant international agreements, ensuring that Members have two opportunities to scrutinise a treaty.

But I am willing to go further. Noting the concerns that noble Lords have expressed, the Government will commit to bringing forward an amendment in the Commons. Such an amendment would not pre-empt negotiations with the US, or any future agreement with another country, but would instead absolutely guarantee that Parliament has the chance to conduct proper, thorough scrutiny of relevant agreements and death penalty assurances.

The amendment I envisage would ensure that Ministers cannot make regulations to designate any agreement with a country which retains the death penalty for incoming requests without first laying before Parliament the agreement and details of any assurances obtained. There would then be a defined period during which Parliament would have a chance to examine those details, and this could include scrutiny by any relevant committees.

Finally, the Secretary of State would be obliged to consider any recommendations made by a committee in relation to the assurances before laying regulations to designate the agreement. Of course, the regulations themselves would then be subject to the usual process of parliamentary scrutiny, during which time Members of both Houses could consider any recommendations and respond to them.

Ultimately, it is right that Parliament has a say on the difficult decision between not concluding negotiations on agreements and securing the death penalty assurances we would like. Both the amendments tabled by Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers could lead to our being unable to conclude a data access agreement with the US. If we find ourselves in that situation, law enforcement agencies and the UK intelligence community will continue to be denied timely access to valuable evidence and intelligence.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that Section 52 of the IPA covers only material intercepted in the course of transmission. That is not entirely correct. It can authorise obtaining stored communications as well as intercept. As I said, there is a balance to be struck here. That is why I ask Members not to tie the Government’s hands in negotiations. Instead I will commit to amending the Bill in the Commons to ensure that Parliament has ample opportunity to scrutinise any future treaty and, if relevant, its death penalty assurance.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. Unless she wishes to contradict me, I think she just said that these treaties are very important to the extent that the British Government are prepared to allow people to be executed on the basis of data provided by British companies to overseas law enforcement. The essence of these amendments is that that should not be allowed and we want that reassurance on the face of the Bill.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do contradict the noble Lord. I am asking noble Lords not to tie the Government’s hands in negotiation.

[Lord Paddick]

Forgive me, but I do not see the difference between what I said and what the Minister has just said, unless she wants to clarify further.

We are concerned about this because of the recent case of Kotey and Elsheikh, in which the American authorities asked for information from the British on two people who were part of an ISIS cell. The Home Secretary decided that the information would be provided without a death penalty assurance. We are concerned that what might considered a one-off case which contradicts the British Government’s usual global opposition to the death penalty is now going to be enshrined in treaties. I understand what the Minister said about Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act, but that is not our understanding and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 2.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

12: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Priority
In the event of any conflict between this Act and the Data Protection Act 2018 (“the DPA”) or the General Data Protection Regulation 2018 (“the GDPR”), the provisions of the DPA or the GDPR shall prevail.”

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, were we to leave the European Union, the EU would examine our data protection regime to satisfy itself that it would be safe for the EU 27 to continue to exchange electronic data with the UK. This continued exchange of data is essential not only for law enforcement and counter- terrorism purposes but for commercial transactions.

The Government have recently passed the Data Protection Act 2018, which not only provides the necessary infrastructure to enable the UK to comply with the general data protection regulation, a piece of EU legislation, but ensures that the UK complies with EU standards of data protection in relation to law enforcement and national security that are not covered by the GDPR. In other words, the UK is ensuring that it complies with all EU data protection standards, so as to guarantee that it will be issued with a certificate of adequacy that will enable continued exchange of electronic data if we leave the EU.

If, as a result of this Bill or the treaties associated with it, UK companies were required to provide law enforcement agencies in other countries with personal data covered by the Data Protection Act and/or GDPR, and those foreign law enforcement agencies’ data protection standards were deemed by the EU to be inadequate, there is the potential for the EU to withdraw its adequacy certificate from the UK. Basically, if member states of the EU share data with the UK, and the UK shares that data under this Bill with law enforcement agencies that have inadequate data protection standards, the EU might stop sharing data with the UK. This amendment is designed to ensure that this does not happen. I beg to move.

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, raised an issue about which Act would take precedence in the event of a conflict between this Bill—when it becomes an Act—and the Data Protection Act 2018. His amendment makes it clear that, in the case of a conflict, the DPA, along with the GDPR, would take precedence. That seems quite sensible: it gives us certainty on the matter, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord. I support his amendment.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank both noble Lords for their points. There has been nothing in our own domestic law that requires a UK provider to comply with an overseas order. There will therefore be no conflict with domestic law if a CSP decides that complying with a foreign order would put it in breach of its obligations under the GDPR.

The existence of any conflict with UK data protection law does not have the effect of making the order from the other country invalid. Equally, the existence of the order does not compel the UK CSP to ignore its data protection obligations under UK law. It will be for the CSP on which an order is served to reconcile and comply with all legal obligations it is under. It could apply for the variation or revocation of the order, or use the dispute resolution mechanism that we expect all specific international agreements to include. That said, we do not think that this is likely to be necessary in practice. The GDPR contains several “gateways” which permit the cross-border transfer of personal data, including in response to a request or order from overseas law enforcement.

I know the noble Lord’s concerns about data protection, and I absolutely sympathise with him. We have discussed this before, and I think that ultimately we all want the same thing: adequate protection for the privacy rights of individuals. I hope that my explanation will satisfy the noble Lord that the Bill does not in any way threaten data protection rights, which are robustly protected by existing legislation. UK CSPs will continue to be bound by the GDPR and the Data Protection Act. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw Amendment 12.

[Lord Paddick]

I am grateful to the Minister. I understand that she has just said that a communications service provider could refuse to comply with an order coming from overseas if the CSP believes that that would bring it into conflict with the GDPR and the Data Protection Act, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 12 withdrawn.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 20th November 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

I too take this opportunity to add to what the Minister has said. Despite the reality that the Bill has not exactly held this House in rapt attention, judging by the number of people who decided to participate in our debates, I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Manzoor, and the Bill team for their help and their willingness to meet to discuss the important issues that have been raised during the passage of the Bill. I also thank the members of our team who have provided such invaluable and vital support to me and to my noble friend Lord Kennedy of Southwark.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I too thank the Minister. I do not know whether I am speaking out of turn in saying that I think at times she has shared some of our concerns over the implications of the Bill, if not over the Bill itself. I thank the Bill team for engaging with us so that we got a better understanding of the formulation of the treaty, the process of negotiating the treaty and what the possible implications of that might be. Clearly we are now alerted to the fact that both Houses need to be very concerned in scrutinising any treaty that is developed that this Bill relies on. I also thank my noble friend Lady Hamwee, without whom I would be lost.

Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill [HL]

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 11th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 13A in this group is in my name. I make it clear from the outset that we support this Bill, which is why at Third Reading in the other place we did not vote against it. What we did—and what Labour did in the other place—was to vote against the Government’s Amendment 13 proposing a new clause after Clause 15, because it does not go far enough. It does not ensure that death penalty assurances are secured from foreign states to make sure that data provided by the UK, whether by law enforcement agencies or private companies, does not lead to someone being executed. The Government claim to have come a long way in their amendment, but it requires only that a Secretary of State seek death penalty assurances, not that any agreement is dependent on death penalty assurances being received.

The UK is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights, which is incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1988. It is also a signatory to Protocol 13 to the convention. Article 2 of the convention states:

“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which the penalty is provided by law”.


Article 15 states:

“In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law”.


Article 57 states:

“Any State may, when signing this Convention or when depositing its instrument of ratification, make a reservation in respect of any particular provision of the Convention to the extent that any law then in force in its territory is not in conformity with the provision”.


However, the UK is also a signatory to Protocol 13 to the convention, Article 1 of which states:

“The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be condemned to such penalty or executed”.


Article 2 of the protocol states:

“No derogation from the provisions of this Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention”.


Article 3 states:

“No reservation may be made under Article 57 of the Convention in respect of the provisions of this Protocol”.


In other words, there should be no death penalty in any circumstances whatever. That is our international legal obligation.

The UK has been clear—until this Conservative Government took office—that it will campaign to remove the death penalty wherever it exists in the world and will never facilitate the execution of anyone in any foreign state. The difficulty with the type of agreement covered by this Bill is that data provided by the UK to an American law enforcement agency, for example, could result in someone in the US being sentenced to death, contrary until recently to both the UK’s international obligations and its declared intention to do all it can to eradicate the death penalty wherever it exists in the world.

I say “until recently” because, in a High Court case in October last year, it was revealed in correspondence from the Home Secretary to the then Foreign Secretary that, in the case of two ISIS terrorists, evidence was going to be supplied to the US without a death penalty assurance. His letter said that,

“significant attempts having been made to seek full assurance, it is now right to accede to the MLA”—

mutual legal assistance—

“request without an assurance”.

The then Foreign Secretary replied that in this,

“unique and unprecedented case … it is in the UK national security interests to accede to an MLA request for a criminal prosecution without death penalty assurances”—

a unique and unprecedented case to provide evidence to the US that may lead to executions. The Bill as drafted allows the Government to enter into a data exchange agreement where potentially there would be no death penalty assurance in any case. The Government’s new clause requires the Secretary of State only to seek such assurances; it does not bar the Secretary of State from entering into the agreement without death penalty assurances.

The Government will say that not entering into an agreement with the US could potentially allow terrorists and paedophiles to be a threat for longer. We say that we will not stand in the way of such an agreement provided that it does not result in UK data resulting in people being sent to the electric chair. The first thing to say about what the Minister said in her opening remarks is that these agreements are about securing legal authority to enable data to be provided that can be used in evidence in criminal proceedings. It is about giving legal cover for the handing over of data. It should not prevent the arrest and detention of dangerous suspects while that formal legal authority is obtained, and it can still be obtained through existing MLA arrangements, as in the case of the ISIS suspects. It may delay the trial, but it should not prevent the arrest and detention. Even if there were circumstances that I cannot personally envisage where the arrest and detention of a dangerous criminal were delayed, if the US says it will not sign an agreement containing death penalty assurances then it is the US that is prepared to allow the threats from terrorists and paedophiles to go on for longer by having to rely on the current MLA system.

I shall summarise our position using someone else’s words:

“Our amendment would prevent authorities in this country sharing data with overseas agencies where there is a risk of the imposition of the death penalty. More than 50 years ago parliament as a whole passed a law which ‘opposes the death penalty in all circumstances’. That is the law of the land. It means we do not co-operate with any government if the consequence could be capital punishment. Parliament has for a long time believed that the death penalty is so abhorrent, and the risks of a miscarriage of justice so awful, that we outlaw it. Our ban applies to all countries where the death penalty is still on the statute books. But government Ministers are desperate to cosy up to Donald Trump’s administration in the US, where the death penalty is still imposed. Our amendment simply blocks data sharing co-operation with all countries if the death penalty is a risk”.


I have just quoted, word for word, the shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbott from her column in the Daily Mirror on 28 January this year about the Labour amendment that was replaced in the Commons by Amendment 13. However, Amendment 13A is designed to have the same effect as the Labour amendment passed by this House.

The opposition parties have worked together on this issue from the beginning, but this should not be a party-political issue; it is a question of fundamental human rights. Again, the Minister will correct me if I am wrong, but essentially this Government are willing to sacrifice people to the electric chair in America if that is what it takes to secure the kind of agreement that the Bill covers. Asking us not to tie the hands of those negotiating the deal really means, “Do not ask them to insist on death penalty assurances”.

The question is: do we stand by Article 2 and Protocol 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and do we oppose the death penalty in other countries, or do we not? If we are prepared to see people being executed on the back of evidence provided by the UK, then noble Lords should support the government amendment rather than Amendment 13A. This is a question of principle, a question of conscience and a question of human rights, and we should support it on all sides of this House.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I have been struggling to understand what the Government’s position might be. I think I picked up the Minister saying that the amendment concerns prosecutions in the United Kingdom only. With great respect, if that is right, I do not understand how that fits in with the language of the statute and the amendment itself. I will explain where I am coming from.

Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016—the section being amended—is headed “Interception in accordance with overseas requests”. We are contemplating a situation where a request comes from another country, presumably for prosecution in that country, on the basis of information that we have obtained via intercepts. The whole point of Section 52, without the amendments, is to authorise the making of interceptions in accordance with that request.

My understanding is that subsections (6) and (7) of Clause 1 deal with a precaution against the kind of point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was talking about—our international obligations. I agree almost precisely with the background which the noble Lord traced for us, set against Article 1 of Protocol 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights, which provides that sentencing to death is a violation of the right to life under Article 2 of the convention. If one applies Article 1 of Protocol 13, it would seem to be a breach of our convention obligations to provide information to a foreign country that would lead to somebody being sentenced to death. I do not know whether that has ever been tested in a court, because I do not think the issue has been brought before a court—I am not aware of that happening. However, there seems to be a strong prima facie case that if the Secretary of State was proposing to do that, he could be stopped on the grounds that it would be in breach of this country’s international obligations.

I am puzzled about whether the Minister is right that the purpose of this section is to enable us to prosecute in our own country, where we have no death penalty. The idea of an international agreement is, I think, that it should be reciprocal; it would be a bilateral agreement with a particular country—let us assume it is the United States—and there would be obligations on both sides. We would seek the benefit of the agreement to obtain information for us to prosecute cases of child abuse, which the Minister referred to; one would very much want to secure an agreement which would enable that information to come to us. However, in the context of Section 52, the thrust seems to be the authorisation of intercept information by us to provide for prosecution abroad. I am having difficulty seeing how that fits in with what the Minister said earlier.

Let us assume that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is right that this is really dealing with provision of information to go abroad. Then one comes right up against Article 1 of Protocol 13. What mechanism does one install to prevent a breach of the article? I think I am right that the mechanism of an assurance is well established in international law. In fact, in 2006 the United Nations produced a very helpful note, Diplomatic Assurances and International Refugee Protection, which traced the mechanisms that had been established to protect people who were being sent abroad by a country in answer to a request. The message in the United Nations paper is that one can protect oneself or one’s country against a breach of the international obligation by obtaining an assurance. However, the emphasis is on obtaining the assurance, because an assurance is given by the requesting country to the country from which the information to go abroad is being requested.

There was sometimes some doubt about whether that mechanism was reliable in a case where the threat abroad was of torture, because some countries are really not capable of preventing torture being perpetrated by all manner of officials, so an undertaking in that sort of situation is not really reliable. The paper goes on to say that if one is dealing with the kind of problem that we are contemplating—the risk of a death penalty being imposed—that is easily verifiable and an assurance could be relied upon as a secure protection against a breach of the international obligation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the central point here is whether or not we are in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. My view is that we are not. Article 1 of the 13th protocol does not prevent member states providing assistance to a third country, where that assistance contributes to the use of the death penalty by that country. Even if the amendment related to the use of the designation power, under Section 52 of the 2016 Act—which would be the gateway for the flow of information from the UK—it would still not prevent designation in the absence of assurances about the use of our material. That is not to say that we will be sharing information for the pursuit of the death penalty. Noble Lords have heard, on many occasions, that I am not going to pre-empt our negotiations with the US, but this shows that not only is the amendment unnecessary but it may not do what its sponsors hope.

The case of the foreign fighter, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about, shows that we are compatible with the ECHR, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that any agreement would have to be put before Parliament. That is absolutely the case. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked about this being the negotiation stage. I would put it further back than that: it is the pre-negotiation stage. It is a framework Bill, on the basis of which treaties would be negotiated and made.

[Lord Paddick]

My Lords, will the Minister confirm that, when a treaty is put to Parliament, if the House of Commons approves it, then it does not matter what the opinion of this House is; the treaty is ratified even if this House votes against it? I obviously agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that whether this is a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights has yet to be tested in court—certainly not at the European level. Will the Minister explain why the then Foreign Secretary had to say that seeking death-penalty assurances in the ISIS case was unique and exceptional, if the Government were not concerned about people executed on the back of evidence provided by the United Kingdom?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right. The treaty would be put to the Commons; the Lords could certainly have a view but that might not be taken into account by the Commons. That is nothing unusual. The Commons quite often exerts its supremacy.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Paddick]

13A: Line 19, after “sought” insert “and received”