Health and Social Care Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Owen
Main Page: Lord Owen (Independent Social Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Owen's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the amendment spoken to very ably by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. The case is utterly convincing in every respect. The use of the word “mandate” is strange in parliamentary terms. It presumably owes something to the idea of legitimacy. We talk of a mandate coming from the electorate. If the Bill is to use this term, I imagine that it is in the belief that it is a mandate from the Government. It has always been recognised that if there is a mandate from the electorate going to the Government then that mandate from the Government must be checked by Parliament. It would be extraordinary if there was any period when the mandate could not be discussed. It has been widely said that the mandate will last for a year, although that has not been officially confirmed. It is essential that we hear from the Minister how long the mandate will run. But with a period of even six months it would be irresponsible for Parliament not to comment on it and have the facility to debate it.
Here we come to the nub of this whole question. We have already been there on the question of the Secretary of State’s powers. Are we really considering putting this vast block of government expenditure out into the void with no requirement or capacity for the Government to be held to account by Parliament? This is an absolutely essential amendment. Were it to be rejected, we would have a very clear idea of what the Government’s views are about the role of the Secretary of State. I have said before that I call this Bill the Abdication of the Secretary of State Bill.
We can argue about this but the Government have a majority and are going to push this legislation through. For all the balmy words and the assurances we hear, this legislation will, I am sure, near the end of the day, emerge very much as it was originally presented. There is a logic to it and there is no doubt that the Secretary of State has not come to his position lightly or without thought. He was in opposition for many years and is very knowledgeable about the health service. He has a philosophical position. He wishes to take the NHS out of politics—the old slogan of the BMA for years and years. However, that position was rejected by every single Conservative Government since the Act was first introduced because they believed it was impossible to take such a large sum of money out of the realm of politics. It seems amazing that we have not yet had a single, serious argument as to why this strange new philosophy should be introduced. Where there is substantial government expenditure, which comes from taxpayers and is not owned by the Government, there should be accountability throughout the process.
I have also raised another, and, I feel, much deeper, issue. The British people, over all these years, have accepted that our spending on health—which is actually less than that of many other comparable nations—is rationed. It is no use us ducking the fact that we are making massive changes to an institution that has extraordinary levels of public support and has had such support ever since it was introduced. The fundamental reason—I can find no other justification—is that there is a sense among the British people that they have had their say in this rationing process. They have had a mechanism for feeling that the choices and distribution of finances have been debated and that therefore it is a choice they can support. If we tamper with that process, we tamper with a very serious element—this acceptance of the rationing process and this support for the NHS.
Some measure of parliamentary accountability has to be written into the Bill at every juncture where it makes sense. This will come up in the debates on the Secretary of State’s powers, which are still to come, but many of us have expressed the view—I have certainly written about it—that the health service is overcentralised, that a degree of decentralisation in decision-making is necessary, and that there needs to be less micromanagement. These issues are broadly accepted. But we come now to this mandate. I would have chosen a different word and a different mechanism. However, if that is the only mechanism we can amend, how can we reject the idea of some measure of parliamentary accountability, of writing in some other priorities and of questioning the decisions of the Minister?
Amendment 98, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, is very necessary. He and I may remember a day when the Secretary of State at the time was intent on the policy of pay beds. I was fully associated with the policy, even though I am not so sure it was the wisest policy in retrospect. It was very interesting that the then Permanent Secretary exercised his responsibility and came in and argued against the proposition. We claimed we had a mandate from the electorate as it had been in the Labour Party manifesto in the 1974 election. He nevertheless produced a rational argument why that should not be done at that particular time, following the reorganisation of the National Health Service. The noble Lord will remember this very well because he was on a committee that was looking at this very issue. The Permanent Secretary said that it was the wrong timing quite apart from the issue of principle as to whether the measure constituted the right politics. I should say in fairness to the then Secretary of State, Barbara Castle, that she gave him a proper hearing, questioned him and explained the situation. He said at the end of the day, “If you decide to go ahead with it, that is your choice and we will loyally support it”. I think that few people who dealt with those officials had any belief that they had anything other than 100 per cent commitment to the measure. They had fulfilled their constitutional responsibilities and there would have been much merit in the issue being forced out and discussed. People should have known that opinion. In our present system these opinions do not often come forward.
At least under the system in place at that time there was constant scrutiny of the Secretary of State through Parliament. In this situation where the Secretary of State, having issued his mandate, will pull out of any form of day-to-day accountability in Parliament, scrutiny becomes ever more necessary. The transparency has to be on both sides. The officials—in this case, the Commissioning Board—have a perfectly reasonable right to make clear to Secretaries of State that they think the mandate that has been pushed on to them is not deliverable. That should then be made known to the public. Similarly, the commission and the Secretary of State should know what Parliament’s view of the issue is. I await the Minister’s response, which will flavour a lot of one’s attitude to other important debates about the powers of the Secretary of State which we have still to resolve. The Government should indicate whether this is a totally “geek” Bill with the strange philosophical position that Parliament must never put its dirty fingers on any aspect of the National Health Service. Are we to have a grown-up, adult debate about the degree of decentralisation and the degree of management that will be devolved, or are we going to have a clear-cut line whereby Parliament in effect has no responsibilities at all?
My Lords, I confess that I am something of a cynic about some of the proposals in the Bill. I am a great believer in the principle of localism, the local determination of services and local decision-making. Therefore, in principle I would applaud any Government—even this Government—who desire to devolve responsibility for various things to local authorities and, in this case, local commissioning groups.
However, my cynicism kicks in because what I suspect is happening here—I suspect that it will happen in other service areas—is that Ministers are cynically saying, “We are leaving these responsibilities to you, the local bodies concerned. We are very happy for you to make all these decisions. The snag is that we will not provide you with the resources to meet all the expectations that the public, who rely on those services, might legitimately have hoped to be provided. However, we are not taking these decisions. We will not be involved. It is a matter for local determination”. To be honest, I think that is what underpins much of the localism, devolution or autonomy agenda that we are seeing.
However, the experience of all previous experiments of localism is that while Ministers say, “Yes, this is a wonderful idea. We want to do it”, pressure starts to be applied to particular things. They want to have a mechanism whereby they can say, “It is, of course, your decision. However, we want you to make sure that these things happen”. Gradually, the list of the things that must happen gets longer and longer and the list of areas of discretion gets shorter and shorter.
When I saw the proposal for a mandate to be in the Bill, I thought that that was the mechanism whereby on the one hand Ministers will proclaim that they have no involvement in these decisions and say that they are all local decisions, but on the other hand this will enable them to ensure that certain things still happen because they are being subjected, as elected politicians, to pressure to make sure that they happen. That is why the amendment of my noble friend Lord Warner, which would restrict the extent to which this could be done, is very important. If we do not have an amendment of that sort in the Bill, I can tell you now what will happen; every single pressure group, voluntary organisation and lobby will say, “We want included in the mandate”, which is being issued to the national Commissioning Board, “the following service. We will want to see it there.”
For any sensible Minister the simple answer to all this is to write an extremely long mandate that covers all those points rather than sticks to them. If they were obliged to be limited to just five or six or another small number of issues, that would be extremely salutary. It would stop the creep that would happen. However, I suspect that the Government are not going to say suddenly, “My goodness, the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has come up with an excellent idea. Why didn’t we think of that? We must accept it, of course”, because unfortunately that is not always the way in which government Ministers react. They will stick to the letter of the Bill without those specifications. They will say, “Well, why five? Why not 10? Why not 12? What about three?”. All these different things will be argued as an excuse for not doing it. You will then get the drift and the pressure to say that more and more things must be added.
Amendment 100A is so important because there must be parliamentary scrutiny of what is happening, because this will be the mechanism that drives decision-making in the NHS. It is not going to be a pure version of devolution, localism and autonomy; this is going to be done through the mandate. The mandate is then going to be the most important document that drives the NHS at any one moment. That is why parliamentary scrutiny is essential. Parliament must have the opportunity not just to see it and to know what is being done in the name of the public but to comment, amend, or put forward amendments and have the Government respond to them.
I therefore hope that when the Minister responds he will accept not only the principle of my noble friend Lord Warner’s amendment but the principle of detailed parliamentary involvement in this process in the amendment of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Kings Heath.
It could do. However, that is to be determined. I would welcome the views of the noble Lord on that, if he has particular examples in mind.
This brings us to the question the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, asked about the period which the mandate will cover. It will be a multi-year document, updated annually, which is intended to provide a stable policy context for the board. There may be circumstances which call for the mandate to be updated in-year, including after a general election, to ensure that an incoming Government could start to implement their manifesto commitments for the NHS in-year. Any revisions to the mandate will be open and transparent. If the mandate is revised, it must be published and laid before Parliament with an explanation of the changes.
I will now comment on Amendments 98 and 100, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, and Amendment 100A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. These rightly highlight the importance of transparency and parliamentary scrutiny of the mandate. I completely sign up to transparency as a principle. In the first place, there will be a public consultation. Alongside that, we will engage with stakeholders, including the board, to ensure that we set ambitious but achievable objectives. It is essential that the Government hold the board to account for objectives that are achievable. It is not in anybody’s interests to set the board up to fail. At the same time, where there is scope for improvement in the health service within the resources available, the mandate should and will ask the board to drive such improvements.
Ministers have a legitimate right to be ambitious on behalf of citizens and taxpayers, but we know that getting the balance right and setting objectives that are affordable and ambitious will not be straightforward. Much of the answer lies in transparency. There will be open public consultation on the Government’s objectives for the NHS. I can assure noble Lords that the process of developing the mandate will be open and consultative, including a formal 12-week public consultation. We intend to publish a consultation response as well as a summary of the responses we receive.
I point out that the Bill places a duty on the Secretary of State to consult the board and HealthWatch England before specifying the objectives and requirements in the mandate. We should be clear about how that changes the current arrangements. At present, decisions about the Secretary of State’s priorities for the NHS can be decided without reference to, or consultation with, anyone, as we saw under previous Governments. Top-down targets can be set without consultation. The priorities for the NHS are issued around this time every year through an operating framework without any need for consultation. Under the Bill, for the first time parliamentarians and the public will have the opportunity to consider and challenge the Government's objectives for the NHS every year. No previous Government have ever allowed this. It will highlight and reinforce, year by year, Ministers’ overarching responsibility for a comprehensive National Health Service free at the point of need.
The consultation will provide a period in which Parliament will be able to scrutinise the Government's proposals—as will the Health Select Committee if it chooses. It is appropriate that this consultation should take place before the mandate is published. We must provide clarity of purpose for the NHS. A period of additional parliamentary scrutiny after the mandate is published, which is what the amendment proposes, would be disproportionate and very disruptive. It would reduce the time the NHS has for planning and would create uncertainty in the service.
There will of course be formal parliamentary control over any legal requirements set for the NHS through the standing rules and any other regulations. The Bill not only gives Parliament an unprecedented role in setting out the roles and responsibilities in the NHS but increases parliamentary scrutiny by requiring detailed parameters and requirements to be set in regulations rather than in ministerial directions that have no scrutiny at all. I hope that noble Lords will give the Government credit for that package of proposals.
In addition, we have accepted the recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the requirements in the mandate should have the force of legislation and should be in an instrument subject to the negative procedure.
It sounds very reasonable, but effectively the pre-consultation period will involve the board, HealthWatch England and such other persons as the Secretary of State allows. Parliament will not always be fobbed off with the answer that the Minister is still considering the issue. That is perfectly reasonable; we all know that a normal consultation period is required by all ministries, and certainly the Department of Health has observed this over many decades. It is when the Minister makes up his mind that Parliament will know what the policy is—and if it is in legislation it will be at that stage that there will be an intervention from Parliament with the right to challenge it. Therefore, it is perfectly reasonable to ask Parliament to come in after the consultation period because then it will know what the Secretary of State is proposing.
Of course, Parliament is the sovereign body and can do whatever it chooses. Nothing will prevent it commenting on the mandate once it has been published. No doubt the Health Select Committee will wish to do this. My point is that to expect the process to feed into a regurgitation or reformulation of the mandate would be unfair on the NHS. The opportunity for Parliament to have its say should surely be during the normal consultation period. Parliament will be able to see the extent to which the Secretary of State has responded to whatever comments it has made.
The noble Baroness knows that I have undertaken to engage in discussions outside this Chamber about Clauses 1 and 4 and their relationship with Clauses 10 and 20, and that is what I intend to do. There is a broader question here. My point to the noble Lord, Lord Owen, and the noble Lord, Lord Warner, who suggested in his opening speech that somehow the Secretary of State would detach himself and say, “Not me, guv” about anything that happened in the health service, is that they are mistaken because Clause 49 requires the Secretary of State to keep health service functions under review—in other words, not just the functions, but the effectiveness of the exercise by the bodies of those functions in relation to the health service. That is a very powerful duty. It is not a signal that the Secretary of State can just detach himself from what is going on in the health service. If he is holding the board to account, it involves him doing what Clause 49 requires, and I do not think that anything in the Bill negates that.
The procedure in another place is deliberately very limited in terms of getting to a legislative change. This mandate has many of the qualities of legislation. It lasts for a year. It is going be a fixed statement. Is the Minister really telling us that the Secretary of State will not be saying that, because the mandate has been given, this is a question for the commission or the board—one which he would normally accept on the Floor of the House? Past experience is that he will pass that responsibility on the Floor of the House to, in this case, the commission. This is what concerns many people: there will be a change in procedure in how questions are answered in the House of Commons. The Minister has still not answered the question. This amendment allows a substantive change in the mandate that would stay for a year to be instituted by Parliament after it knows what is in the Minister’s mind, and he appears to be rejecting that. Is he rejecting that?
I am surprised that the noble Lord, Lord Owen, thinks that the health service should be run in that way; that is, Parliament in effect mandating requirements to the health service whenever it chooses. I do not think that is a helpful idea. I think it is helpful for the Secretary of State, as now, to take responsibility for the health service but in the future to take direct responsibility for what lies in the mandate. Should events during a given year raise questions about the performance of the board, the Secretary of State would be answerable to Parliament for whatever the event was, and he would indeed have to take the necessary advice from the board. What he would not be saying is, “This is not my concern, guv”. He is answerable to Parliament in the ways that I have indicated. There is obviously a need for the board to take responsibility for the day-to-day management of the health service. However, we are seeking to achieve a balance between the Secretary of State taking responsibility in Parliament for what is in the mandate and the outcomes that he has set for the health service.
This is a shift of responsibility, it is not an abdication of responsibility—that is the distinction. Power is a zero sum game. If you shift power from the Secretary of State down to the health service, you cannot at the same time expect the Secretary of State to retain the same degree of power. We are transferring power in two directions; from the Secretary of State downwards, and from the Secretary of State upwards to Parliament. That is the picture that I hope noble Lords will keep in their minds.
My Lords, I am seeking to set up something that would function in the early years of the national Commissioning Board. It would be independent in the sense that I did not want it to be dominated by NHS finance people. I want it to be a broader group of people than just those who have worked in the NHS. There is a tendency on the part of the NHS to think of itself as unique, special and different from other businesses, whereas it is a business which needs some business systems in it.
I am not someone who wants to keep bodies going in perpetuity. I am certainly open to negotiation on how long this one exists. I feel more strongly about the National Audit Office keeping an eye on this area. The national Commissioning Board needs some outside help to get this started, particularly in asset management, which is a long neglected area in the NHS, as I think the noble Baroness knows.
Some of the problems with PFI which she mentioned arise from the fact that the NHS has not had a track record of looking after its assets. It does not see them in the terms that a more commercial organisation would do. Many of the things that have gone wrong with PFI are not to do with there being anything inherently wrong with it, because it delivered a lot more hospitals more quickly and effectively than previous public procurement systems. What went wrong was the hubris in the NHS in many parts of the country about its ability to build a Taj Mahal district general hospital with some very dodgy income/revenue flows spread over time, most of the contracts being for 30 years. If one looks at the quality of some of the financial management in the NHS, it is not surprising that it could not do a very good job, even with some outside help, of getting a realistic idea of the revenue that it was likely to generate over 25 to 30 years to fund those projects.
My Lords, I had not expected to intervene in this debate, but some of the things that I want to say may fit more naturally under this issue. The idea of having a standardised method of comparison right across the National Health Service is a very good one and it has merit if it comes initially from an independent group.
The Government have a special responsibility here, because, very soon after taking office, they encouraged the noble Lord, Lord Green, to look at all these areas, of which land and asset management was a very important part. We all know that this has not been coherently done in the past and that there are substantial land assets throughout the NHS.
As we go to smaller and more fragmented units, it is even more important that there is some structure which looks at land management across the board; otherwise it will be seen in a very narrow context. There may be a sale of some land asset which might quite appropriately have been offered to a neighbouring organisation, whether it is a commissioning group or a foundation hospital. The proposed body would cover all aspects, not just commissioning groups but foundation hospitals as well, and so I am very attracted to it.
The report of the noble Lord, Lord Green, said that not only did government not utilise the efficiencies of having an overall look at land management but also that it had no coherent way of achieving its procurement gains. Any large organisation looks across these areas and maximises the advantages that are available. Procurement has not been done very well in the National Health Service, so there is room for improvement whatever structure is implemented. In the past, regional health authorities had procurement functions and were able to negotiate substantially improved contracts because of the size of the procurement agency. I do not quite know what is going to happen in the procurement field. I therefore put the matter to the Minister so that he can perhaps indicate where he thinks it would be appropriate to raise the issue of procurement in future. Again, I say that the work needs to be done by independent people. That was the advantage of the Green report: he got his people from many different fields and focused on government as a whole. He did not look very closely at the NHS, but there is merit on both these questions of land and procurement in seeing whether we can achieve some economies of scale and in taking a fresh and independent look, which we have not had for some time.