Nuclear Safeguards Bill

Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 7th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord O'Neill of Clackmannan (Lab)]

My Lords, the purpose of this Bill, Brexit notwithstanding, is to try to sustain the confidence of the public in the nuclear industry in the United Kingdom. It is fair to say that, since the non-proliferation treaty of 1968, there has been a growing awareness of the split between civil and military nuclear activity. Indeed, the opposition to nuclear power had begun to dip—although there have been periods of increased popularity—and, since 1968, a lot of the misgivings about nuclear power have been reduced. This is because there have been, in varying forms, regimes that would look after civil nuclear power in its various manifestations.

Prior to Euratom, that was done by the IAEA, which in those days was probably not the most rigorous of organisations. Indeed, when one looks at the record of the nuclear industry—for example, the way in which it stored and dealt with nuclear waste for many years—it was somewhat haphazard. However, this is now very rigorously addressed and it is fairly successful, although the enormity of the task at Sellafield means that it is slow and, by necessity, exceedingly fine in the manner in which it is dealt with.

When we are confronted with the departure from a regulatory organisation such as Euratom, we have to cast around to find a means to deal with it in a way that will not undermine public confidence. It is significant that we no longer refer to the Office for Nuclear Regulation as the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, because it is now a somewhat different organisation and enjoys a degree of financial independence, which enables it to employ and retain an inspectorate. Prior to the changes, the old inspectorate had terrible leakage problems. It had some of the most capable nuclear physicists in the country, but for understandable reasons they went elsewhere to work—they were paid far more by the private nuclear companies. Without Euratom, the work of the Office for Nuclear Regulation will become that much more critical.

It would be wrong to suggest that we can just stand by and take the IAEA standards. The IAEA covers the whole of the world’s nuclear-generating capability. Not all countries that are members of the IAEA have the capability, or indeed the desire, to achieve the standards of performance that we regard as essential for the safety of our public and for the acceptance of nuclear power.

In examining the Bill, we must first look at the capability of the Office for Nuclear Regulation to replace the staff who will be lost because of the absence of Euratom’s officials. That is probably the first priority. We have to make sure that the necessary money and resources will be made available, and that it is not done at the expense of an industry undergoing a lot of difficulty one way or another.

Secondly, we have to explore how we can realistically maintain a relationship with Euratom that is capable of sustaining those high levels of safety. Euratom will have the means to explore what is required in a way that an individual country cannot do. If we are talking about an organisation that sits alongside Japan and Canada, we need to be in that kind of position. In a number of areas our withdrawal from Euratom may not be quite the national tragedy that some people suggest, but we need to work a bit harder at getting that brought across. So far, the Government have not given a convincing explanation of our future relationship with Euratom.

On the medical issues and whether they could be the subject of an additional clause, I think that would probably be difficult, given the Long Title. However, those issues need to be addressed for obvious reasons.

Lastly, one of the problems faced by the nuclear industry in the round—that is, civil and defence—is that there has been a tradition of secrecy and a desire not to let anybody know what is going on. As regards health and safety, one could argue that in the civil field people should not necessarily have to be preoccupied or concerned with what is going on within the industry. However, I am not certain about that argument. I tend towards the view that transparency can be a high-risk issue but it is one that we need to address. I am not sure whether the Clause 2 provisions, which are drifting towards the character of Henry VIII provisions, are necessarily the kinds of things that need to be hidden away or carried out by executive order. Beyond this legislation, when reporting is carried out and changes are proposed, the widest possible consultation should be available and the opportunity for this House and the House of Commons to debate any changes should be made available.

I recognise that this legislation is, unfortunately, necessary. If we were not in Brexit mode, we would probably not need to have it. However, I would like to think that it is one of those pieces of legislation that could become irrelevant because we could stay on. But until such time as we know that for sure, it is essential that we give the Bill the closest attention. I hope that we can produce something a wee bit better than what we have. It is not a terrible Bill that we will spend our nights awake over the Recess worrying about. However, there is scope for improvement, and it is incumbent upon us to improve it when we get the opportunity to do so.