Gambling (Licensing and Advertising) Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Tuesday 17th December 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, the stated intention of this Bill, namely that all online gambling providers wanting to access the UK market, no matter where they are located in the world, should be required to get a UK Gambling Commission licence, is to be welcomed. However, detailed examination of the actual provisions in this Bill has led me to feel that, on balance, the Bill makes matters worse not better. Indeed, in wrestling with this question one is left with a more fundamental question: what is the real purpose of this Bill?

In the other place the Government claimed, as they have today, that this Bill is all about consumer protection. It was suggested from other quarters, however, that the real guiding principle at work was a desire for greater taxation revenue for the Exchequer. The notion that all online gambling operators seeking to access the UK market should get a UK Gambling Commission licence certainly seems like an attempt to protect UK consumers from providers that do not make the grade. In the first instance, we should surely stop depending on the regulatory frameworks of the European Economic Area and the so-called white list jurisdictions, and regulate providers seeking access to the UK ourselves. In the second instance, we should certainly do more to protect UK consumers from providers whose regulatory regimes do not make the grade, rather than simply putting them on a theoretical black list.

However, trading lazily on the regulatory frameworks of other jurisdictions has had an unintended consequence. It has meant that online gambling providers based in the UK could move to the EEA and white-listed jurisdictions, yet still be deemed to be sufficiently regulated to advertise in the UK. In this context, all but one online gambling provider relocated to white-listed jurisdictions where they could pay less tax.

Noble Lords will be aware that alongside the Bill there is a separate proposal that henceforth all gambling providers with a UK licence must pay UK tax. The idea is that we move from regulation and taxation at the point of supply to regulation and taxation at the point of consumption. Of course there is no reason why the interests of robust regulation and robust tax legislation should not go together. I have nothing against making sure that online gambling providers accessing the UK market are properly taxed. My concern, as I shall explain, is that the weakness of the regulatory framework proposed by the Bill is such that it causes me to wonder whether its primary purpose is not actually being a means to the end of providing a framework on to which the new taxation regime can be hung.

Before I look at what I regard as the three main regulatory failings of the Bill, I shall pause to reflect on the sad reality of problem gambling in the UK today, the reason why robust regulation of online gambling is so important. Some people almost dismiss problem gambling as unimportant—this point has already been made by others today—on account of the fact that in 2010 the problem prevalence figure was 0.9%. The truth, however, is that that accounts for approximately 451,000 people in the United Kingdom. Moreover, if we are to compute the real significance of the problem, it is crucial to understand how one person’s problem gambling affects others. Last year the Gordon Moody Association, which treats the most serious addicts, estimated that each addict,

“will have severely affected the lives of at least 15 others in order to support their gambling”.

We have to understand that gambling online has a significantly higher problem prevalence figure than gambling generally, another point that has been made today; the problem prevalence figure for online slots is actually over 9%.

These statistics, though, are all a bit abstract. When I think of problem gambling, I think of people such as Lisa Carville, an accountant from Northern Ireland who stole some £50,000 to feed her online gambling habits between March 2010 and September 2011. I also think of Michael Garner, a financial adviser who stole almost £1 million from friends, a charity and investors to feed his online gambling habit between December 2011 and May 2012. Anna Mackenzie, defending Mr Garner, told the court that he was remorseful and understood that his actions had devastated the lives of himself, his family, his friends and his victims. She added that his marriage appeared to be over and that his matrimonial home, his only asset, had been sold to help to pay off the civil claim made by the investors against him. These are just two examples of the terrible social devastation that can be left in the wake of online gambling habits. Let me be very clear: I am not trying to argue for a split-second that this always happens or that it usually happens. My point is simply that it does happen and that there is a very serious obligation on us as legislators to make sure that the online gambling industry that this Bill addresses is robustly regulated.

With this in mind, I suggest that the Bill has three major weaknesses. The first problem is that this legislation provides no credible enforcement mechanism. You cannot say on the one hand that we want to protect British consumers and so require all online providers that want to access the UK market to get a UK licence, and at the same time do nothing to prevent those who do not have a licence accessing the UK market. Such a strategy is nothing more than an exercise in wishful thinking.

When presented with a proposal for financial transaction blocking or IP blocking in another place, the Minister rejected both, at least for now. I found her approach profoundly unconvincing. In the first instance, the Government seem to conflate IP blocking and financial transaction blocking as if they are the same and have the same results. Let me be very clear: they are not and they do not. Evidence suggests that financial blocking is significantly more robust. Indeed, it works well, as has already been stated, in places such as Belgium, Estonia, France, Hungary, Israel, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway and the US, which deem it worth while.

In the second instance, I find the notion of mixed success in the context rather troubling. I assume by this the Government mean that it does not always work, which is certainly true, but if in this imperfect world we rejected all public policy solutions that were not always successful we would greatly restrict what we could do. The world would be much poorer on account of the misguided commitment to make the excellent the enemy of the good. If we had a mechanism available that could protect UK consumers from 50% of transactions with unregulated websites, it would be a significant step forward—one we should take.

Moreover, it is important to remember that financial transaction blocking is likely to be more successful in the UK than anywhere else, because in other jurisdictions where there is a closed market with a limited number of licensees or a semi-open market that allows any number of licensees but only for some forms of gambling there is a great deal more that needs to be blocked than in the UK. In these environments, gamblers have incentives to try to bypass blocking to access forms of gambling that are not permitted. However, that would not be the case here in the UK where we do not prohibit any form of gambling and allow anybody who meets our regulatory standards to access our market.

If we do not back up the licence requirement with financial transaction blocking, the simple truth is that the primary implication of the Bill will be simply to allow more gambling providers to advertise in the UK. All those located in EEA and white-listed jurisdictions can currently advertise, but after this Bill all providers that get a licence will also be able to advertise regardless of whether they are based in what is currently an EEA white-listed or black-listed jurisdiction.

It is concern about the implication of the Bill for advertising in the absence of a credible enforcement regime which takes me to the second major worry about this Bill. While it proposes making problem gamblers in the UK more aware of online gambling opportunities that can get them into difficulty, it introduces no compensatory measures to provide problem gamblers with additional help in the context of the new environment. To really understand this deficiency in the Bill, however, one must understand the problem with the current system.

One of the key accepted mechanisms of helping problem gamblers is through the provision of self-exclusion. Put simply, self-exclusion allows someone with a gambling problem to take control by self-excluding from gambling providers for a certain period; say, five or six months, or whatever it might be. This mechanism is credible in an offline environment. It recognises that people suffering from a gambling addiction will have days when they are stronger and able to take steps to try to break free. On such a day it would be possible for a gambler to visit all five betting shops in his town and self-exclude for five months, providing him with an opportunity to get help and to try to put his life back together.

This, however, simply does not work in an online environment because, after you have self-excluded from five online gambling websites, hundreds if not thousands of sites are equally available. Denying online gamblers a credible self-exclusion mechanism is, I believe, a matter of discrimination, one that exists without the Bill before us today. Mindful of this current injustice, I find it quite inconceivable that the Government should consider introducing the Bill, which proposes widening the scope for problem gamblers to be made aware of online gambling opportunities, without at the same time providing any compensatory help for online problem gamblers. We should, at the very least, provide online gamblers with a credible self-exclusion opportunity.

When the Minister in another place was confronted with this idea, she had nothing of any great substance to say. She suggested that the industry was doing a good job and that she wanted to give it more time, although she failed to outline what it needed time to do. She did not say that she had asked the industry to introduce a one-stop shop for self-exclusion. The Minister also made the assertion that introducing a one-stop shop would be complicated. I have no doubt that introducing a one-stop shop would present some challenges, but I do not believe that there is any evidence that they cannot be dealt with. The question that we have to ask is: can we be bothered to do the additional work to protect online gamblers? One would hope that the answer to that question, in considering a Bill that the Government say is all about consumer protection, would be a positive yes, but apparently not, at least in the other place.

As others have noted, Dr Sally Gainsbury, author of Internet Gambling: Current Research Findings and Implications, published by Springer in the SpringerBriefs in Behavioural Medicine Series 2012, states: “Significant limitation”—of self-exclusion, that is—

“is the lack of collaboration between different online gambling sites and venues so that excluded individuals may find it easy to gamble at other sites or venues”.

Gainsbury follows through on this by making two important subsidiary points. First, she argues that the UK system particularly lends itself to the provision of a one-stop shop because of our licensing framework:

“It is a UK licensing condition to maintain a register of self-excluders, including an appropriate record of identification details and payment cards. Although care must be taken to protect customers’ identity, data encryption programs can be used to protect sensitive details, and it may be possible to encourage operators to share details to enable wider self-exclusion programs”.

Secondly, Gainsbury is very clear that the technology is present to deliver a one-stop shop. She cites a program called VeriPlay.com, already referred to in this debate, developed by Bet Buddy, which allows the secure exchange of anonymous data. It allows operators to check whether a player is on a central list of players who have self-excluded.

Gainsbury also argues that collaborative efforts would help strengthen self-exclusion and that,

“regulatory efforts may be required to prompt operators to enact such measures”.

A one-stop shop amendment was tabled in the Commons in Committee and on Report in the other place. Although both were defeated, the majority was not great, and the Government did not seem to have compelling arguments with which to oppose them.

I very much hope that the Government will reconsider and recognise that if their claim to have regard for problem gambling and the suggestion that this Bill is about consumer protection is to have any credibility, they must, at an absolute minimum, ensure that the core advertising proposal in this Bill is complemented by a strategy to help online problem gamblers in the form of credible self-exclusion.

My final problem with this Bill relates to the detail of the general UK regulatory framework. If this legislation becomes law, those websites currently supplying UK customers that are subject to the regulatory regimes of the EEA or white-listed jurisdictions will instead be subject to UK regulation. At the moment, if they decide to relocate back to the UK, player protection will in some cases be eroded. It is therefore important that our licensing is amended to provide the same level of regard for the problem gambler as the licensing regimes of the best EEA or white-listed jurisdictions.

Alderney, a jurisdiction to which some UK online gambling providers relocated, offers player protection that is superior to the UK licensing regime. The Alderney Gambling Control Commission gives any player the right to tell a company the limits on their gambling that they want to set themselves. This means they can inform a company that they wish to set such limits to the amount that they can deposit during a specific period, or to how much they may lose by reference to a number of gambling transactions or a period during which the amount can be lost. Setting such personal limits is one way in which gamblers can ensure that they gamble within their means, without chasing their losses and without spending too much time gambling. Those are all signs that a problem is developing.

Just last week, I visited Sweden on a different matter altogether, but I want to draw the House’s attention to what happens there. Players in Sweden are given the option to make use of a technology called play scan. This helps and guides players in their gambling activity, warning them about increased addiction or significant changes in their behavioural activity. The prompts are in the form of green, yellow and red-light indicators. When a player’s behaviour changes, a message informs them immediately.

A further example is in the area of online poker, a style of gambling which the Swedes have designated as being particularly related to problem gambling. In Sweden, a player needs to apply for a card, which has a specific number associated with it. Gamblers authorise the transfer of funds from a linked account to the card, and any winnings are paid automatically into the gambler’s account. To play, customers are required to set time and money limits. The setting of limits is the main function of the card, but it also offers play management features—including a summary of player history for the previous 12 months—allows for a “time out” and offers risk assessment.

In October, the Prime Minister said that he wanted,

“a fair and decent approach that prevents problem gambling”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/13; col. 299.]

But the approach given in this Bill is neither properly fair nor decent. I very much hope that it will be amended to deliver financial transaction blocking, a one-stop shop for self- exclusion and a regulatory framework that is at least as good as the best EEA or white-listed jurisdiction with respect to care for online problem gamblers.