Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Lord Morris of Handsworth Excerpts

Monday 4th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brinton]

My Lords, I, too, support the sentiments and comments made by all noble Lords who have spoken. I will add one further point. The distinction between compliance and a general duty implies that there is no need for anything until the point of compliance. However, many issues that relate to people with protected characteristics are often cultural, and may not get to a point where compliance is necessary straightaway. It would be much better for that culture—for example, the treatment of adults with learning disabilities, perhaps in one or two homes before it starts to gather momentum—if there were a general duty on the sector, and if the commission could go in, offer support and start to change the culture before a crisis develops that requires compliance. I echo the sentiments of others who have spoken before, and very much hope that the Government will reconsider the deletion of Section 3.

[Lord Morris of Handsworth]

My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. Section 3 represents more than a statement. It represents a commitment to the principles of equality—equality of opportunity, equality of dignity and the responsibility of the state to its citizens.

The EHRC needs a benchmark, a flag, by which it can promote the principles on which it was founded. It needs to be measured, not against the principles of race, disability or gender, but in a much wider context, because it makes a statement about the sort of society we are, the aspirations that we hold for ourselves, and the signals that we send far and wide.

In that context, if the amendment before this House is not embraced, we will be sending a negative statement. We will be saying that after all that we have achieved over many years in terms of race, gender, disability and children, we have turned around and are heading in a totally different direction. It is not my belief that that is the Government’s intention: I believe that the Government’s intention is to continue to improve the standards and opportunities of all their citizens. However, in any journey, we all sometimes take a wrong turn; I genuinely believe that on this occasion, the Government—with all their good intentions—have got it wrong. It is for those reasons that I ask the Minister to look again and to say to the Government that so much depends on their credibility with a vast swathe of this nation and its citizens that to take this wrong turn would be an inevitable downgrading of the concept of equality of opportunity for all. We all believe in that principle and it is in that spirit that I support the amendment, but more importantly, I ask the Government to think again.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I cannot begin to emulate the eloquence of the speech that we have just heard. I too regret that I was not present when this matter was discussed in Committee on 9 January but, after reading Hansard, it is clear to me that the debate was of an exceptionally high standard, particularly the contributions of my noble friends Lady Campbell of Surbiton and Lord Low of Dalston. Unfortunately, my noble friend Lord Low cannot be here today; I cannot begin to take his place, but I agree with everything he said in that debate.

There is another person who cannot be here today for a different reason. He was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, as one of those who led the way in this area of the law in the 1990s and long before that. I refer, of course, to the late Lord Morris of Manchester. It is not difficult for me—or I suspect, anybody else in the House today—to imagine what Lord Morris’s reaction to the proposed repeal of Section 3 would have been. I do not doubt for one moment that he would have regarded it as a serious backwards step, and he would have said so in his usual trenchant terms.

I want to deal first with the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, as a lawyer—I am sure that his heart was not really in it—that if we leave out Section 3 we are losing nothing. Secondly, I want to comment on the reasons given by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, at the end of her reply for the Government’s decision to repeal Section 3. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, gave two reasons for his view. The first was that Section 3 was purely aspirational, so it would make no difference if it were repealed. It contained nothing, he said, that could be enforced in a court of law.

However, if that argument were correct, it surely proves too much. If Section 3 is purely aspirational, so, surely, are Sections 8 and 9. How would the noble Lord enforce in a court of law the duty under Section 8 to promote understanding of the importance of equality and diversity? How would he enforce in a court of law the commission’s duty under Section 9 to promote understanding of the importance of human rights? If the legal argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, were correct, it would surely mean that we should repeal not only Section 3 but Sections 8 and 9, which would leave us with absolutely nothing. Of course, the truth is that the argument is misconceived. Recent legislation is littered with examples of duties which cannot be enforced in a court of law but serve, nevertheless, a very useful purpose. For example, Section 1 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides that:

“This Act does not … affect … the existing constitutional principle of the rule of law”.

How is that to be enforced in a court of law? However, it serves an extremely useful purpose.

Another example that occurred to me is Section 1 of the Climate Change Act, which provides that:

“It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline”.

How—perhaps I should say, when—is that duty, clearly stated by Parliament, to become enforceable: in 2048, 2049, or when? Therefore, with respect, that argument carries very little weight. For all those reasons, I suggest, with the utmost delicacy, that the legal argument of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, should not deter us in any way from supporting this amendment.

However, the noble Lord had a second argument. He said that there is nothing in Section 3 which is not also contained in Sections 8 and 9, so Section 3 is in effect otiose. I suggest that he is wrong, but suppose for a moment that he is right: if Section 3 adds nothing to Sections 8 and 9, how is that consistent with the Government’s argument all along that Section 3 is too broad? As the noble Lord, Lord Low, pointed out, the Government simply cannot have it both ways. I suggest that he was right. In truth, Section 3 does indeed add something which is not in Sections 8 or 9, and something of the very greatest importance. It provides for the first time in legislation the unifying link between equality and other fundamental human rights. This was the point made by Sir Bob Hepple in his memorandum, which I hope the noble Baroness has read, and which has already been referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. That deserves an answer and I hope that it will get one. Indeed, the assertion of a unifying principle in Section 3 was surely one of the main objectives of the 2006 Act, as the noble Lord, Lord Lester, himself pointed out when he was promoting the Bill. Therefore, I again suggest, as delicately as I can, that the noble Lord might in this instance have done better to follow his heart than his head.