Lord McKenzie of Luton
Main Page: Lord McKenzie of Luton (Labour - Life peer)Localism Bill
Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts(12 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I was intending to comment on only one of the noble Lord’s amendments. I agree very much with the thrust of his comments but I would simply take up with him whether at this point we should be dealing with Clause 98. I am concerned about applying the general points that he has made at this stage to a very contentious part of the Bill. As he said, Amendment 204 would delete the provision for statutory guidance about the duty to co-operate, which is, in full, a:
“Duty to co-operate in relation to planning of sustainable development”.
One would have had to be in a very faraway country to be unaware of how contentious “sustainable development” and its application have become—interestingly, led by the Daily Telegraph—over the last two or three weeks.
I find it difficult to make a judgment about the need or otherwise and the desirability or otherwise of statutory guidance without debating the substantive duty. I have always had a concern about legislation purporting to tell local authorities how to co-operate—I share that very much with my noble friend—but without discussing the whole substantive provision, I find it difficult to come to a view as to whether or not statutory guidance is desirable. It is very difficult to take this proposition along with the others and, as I say, I very much agree with the points that he has made where they arise in other parts of the Bill.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on this point. Your Lordships’ House should give the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, great thanks for the diligence with which he has pursued this issue right from the start of the Bill. He has been consistent in challenging the unnecessary powers that have littered the Bill and, going through the list before us tonight, I do not have any problem with the amendments, with the possible exception of Amendment 204. As the noble Baroness says, planning has become, almost overnight, incredibly contentious. We are not now going to reach the substantive provisions until October and I think that it would be better to view them in the round and as a whole. It would be quite difficult to see the lack of guidance somewhere in the system relating to the duty to co-operate. It is a departure and a new issue in planning. It is the replacement of regional planning. It is very important that we get it right.
I accept the noble Lord’s point that when an individual authority is going to consult it does not need guidance on that. Local authorities are well experienced in doing that, but this is guidance in the context of some new planning requirements and it would be premature to do away with the prospect of government having some guidance on the generality; not just bilateral consultations and relationships between authorities, but multilaterally and where the sub-region fits. The guidance that might flow from this could be really helpful in that regard.
I do not wish to detract from the fantastic job the noble Lord has done in leading the charge on these issues. That is the only issue I take with the list that is before us.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I warmly congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, on his numerous amendments, particularly those he has moved this evening, with the possible exception—I agree with my noble friend Lord McKenzie—of Amendment 204. It is not that I wish to see detailed prescription about how the duty to co-operate should be exercised. My concern has been about what will happen in the event that local authorities do not co-operate. I have voiced that concern on previous occasions. There are cases where there are difficulties on land allocation for housing and that kind of issue where there needs to be some mechanism to resolve a dispute or to be available when co-operation is not forthcoming. That apart, I certainly endorse the noble Lord’s view about the highly detailed prescription around referendums. Indeed, one could go further. I notice in new Section 9MC, for example, that regulations include,
“the manner in which a petition is to be presented to a local authority”.
That is presumably on one knee, held up on a cushion or something. It is bizarre. There is far too much of all that.
I also cannot understand how anyone can believe that a change of governance in the town hall is going to excite the local electorate. It is just arguable that the mayoral referendum might, although as I indicated, turnouts would not suggest a huge demand. But if an authority chose to go from a committee system to a leader and executive system, I do not think that that would be much argued about and discussed in heated fashion in the ward that I represent, the one represented by the noble Lord, Lord Shipley, or frankly anywhere.
This whole referendum process, which we will debate in a different context later on, is going too far. It may be that the Secretary of State now fancies himself as Napoleon III—possibly not. But it is too easy a device to resort to. God help us if we have a series of referendums about this at great cost with very little participation. It is the wrong mechanism. Councils should be trusted in ordinary circumstances—I take the point about a change to the mayoral system—to come to their own conclusions about the form of governance. It is not a matter about which the electorate is in the least concerned. If people were, they could exercise their views at the ballot box in the ordinary way.
I am very much in sympathy with the noble Lord’s amendments and when we return to referendums in a different context later I hope that there will be some cross-party support. I agree with my noble friend Lord McKenzie that we need to look again at the issue of the duty to co-operate, which is in a different category.
“( ) The provisions of this section are without prejudice to the general obligation of a decision-maker to maintain an open mind in considering the issues relevant to the decision.”
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 165B. The purpose of Amendment 165A is to clarify whether the provisions of Clause 14 change the basic position that, in exercising discretion in making decisions, a councillor must not have a closed mind. This is especially relevant to, but not limited to, matters of planning. It is understood that the purpose of Clause 14 is to seek to clarify the position of councillors who, despite guidance from the Standards Board—which will now disappear—have considered themselves constrained in offering views on matters for fear of invalidating a decision or themselves being subject to challenge.
There has been a series of legal decisions which have sought to draw the line between legitimate predisposition and unlawful predetermination. The courts have accepted that councillors are likely to have, and indeed are entitled to have, a disposition in favour of a particular decision. An open mind is not an empty mind; it is ajar. Contrast that predisposition with circumstances where a person has closed their mind to all considerations other than an already held view—predetermination. The courts have recognised two types of predetermination: actual predetermination and apparent predetermination. The latter, apparent predetermination, is where a fair-minded and well informed observer, looking objectively at all circumstances, considers that there is a real risk that one or more of the decision-makers has refused even to consider a relevant argument. These matters have previously been commented on also by the Standards Board for England, including how the code might be impacted. Obviously, this all falls by the wayside subject to the outcomes of deliberations that we may have on this issue in due course.
When we debated this in Committee, we took it that Clause 14 was not intended to change the law and that decision-makers remain required to maintain an open mind in considering views relevant to a decision. Perhaps the Minister could confirm that that is the Government’s position. This is what Amendment 165A seeks to put on the face of the Bill. Assuming we are at one on this issue, what is the position on apparent predetermination? It would seem that Clause 14 changes the law because it precludes a fair-minded, well informed observer from looking objectively at all the circumstances. So can the Minister say what type of evidence would be taken into account when determining whether a person had a closed mind?
We do not oppose provisions which seek to enshrine in primary legislation the protections for councillors associated with predisposition—if the noble Lord, Lord Newton, were here, I would say that we accept the Lady Newton test in that regard—and we remain unconvinced that in doing so the Government have not opened the door to undermining the protections of probity long afforded by the concept of predetermination. Of course, this is happening when the Standards Board for England is disappearing from the scene.
In view of the uncertainty created by what is happening, Amendment 16 simply calls for the Secretary of State to review the consequences of this clause and to report to Parliament within three years. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 165A. I share the concerns that have been expressed by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie of Luton. This is not the ideal time of day to discuss the intricacies of local government law, but there are three points that I want to make.
First, existing case law makes it very clear, and rightly so, that in the context of local government, a predisposition to decide an issue in a particular way is lawful. There is nothing unlawful in a councillor saying to constituents that he or she agrees with or disagrees with a planning proposal, and is minded to support it, or indeed oppose it, in the planning committee, provided that the councillor adds that he cannot commit himself and that he must consider all the points that are raised before he decides how to vote.
What is unlawful is for the councillor to have or give the appearance of having a closed mind. That is predetermination of the matter, such that he or she will not listen to the arguments that are advanced in favour of or against the planning or other proposal put before the council. The Court of Appeal set out these basic principles very clearly indeed, in 2008, in the case of the Queen on the application of Lewis v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council [2009], Volume 1 of the Weekly Law Reports, 83.
Lord Justice Rix stated at paragraph 94 to 96—and the other two judges adopted the same approach—that local councillors who are deciding a planning matter, or any other matter, are not required to be impartial in the sense required of a judge. The law as it is recognises that local councillors have political allegiances, that they have politics, and that their politics involve the adoption of policies. There is nothing wrong with that, and it is highly desirable that it remain the case, so long as there is no closing of the mind before the planning or other committee decision and the vote. The law strikes the right balance.
Secondly, although I think the law has the balance correct at the moment, I have no objection to legislation setting out this position and clarifying the matter, removing any doubt. However, it is vital that the legislation must get the balance right. My concern is that Clause 14 as currently drafted does not make it clear that although predisposition is permissible—indeed, may be desirable—predetermination is not permissible. Clause 14(2) is too broadly drafted.
Suppose the councillor says publicly, a month before a controversial planning application is considered by the planning committee, “I am going to vote against the proposal for the bail hostel. I was elected on a platform to oppose this planning development, and I am simply not interested in the arguments that may be advanced in favour of this proposal.” That would be a clear case of predetermination. Clause 14(2) would appear to make such a statement irrelevant in law. If we enact this legislation in this current form, such statements would be said to be, for the purposes of Clause 14(2)(a), something previously done by the decision-maker which,
“directly or indirectly indicated what view the decision-maker took, or would or might take, in relation to a matter”.
I hope that Clause 14 is not intended to exclude reliance in court on such a statement as evidence of impermissible predetermination. If it were intended to have that effect, it would be a substantial change in existing law and would be very much a change for the worse, because it would allow councillors to predetermine issues.
My third point, therefore, is that Clause 14 needs revision to tighten the language and avoid the ambiguity that I have indicated. There are various ways in which this could be done. One is by Amendment 165A. I hope very much that the Minister—I think that it is the noble Lord, Lord Taylor, who will be responding—will tell the House that he will take this matter away and will, with his officials, give further consideration to this important question before Third Reading.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The test is that the decision-making process is key and the councillor demonstrates the ability to listen to the argument and to vote accordingly at the time of the decision-making. That is the current position in law. There is no suggestion that because somebody has campaigned on an issue they should not be free. Indeed, I think the House would acknowledge that people who have campaigned on issues should be free, as long as they demonstrate at the point at which the decision is being made that they have been prepared to consider opposing arguments. The fact that they have voted in accordance with their previous position does not necessarily mean that they predetermined the decision. That is precisely what this clause is designed to make clear.
I hope noble Lords will understand that this is a genuine attempt to provide clarification on a difficult area. To the extent that Amendment 165B has been tabled to suggest that this should be subject to review, it is unnecessary because, as we stated in our published impact assessment for this provision, there will be a post-implementation review to ascertain its impact. It will provide all the information that noble Lords have been seeking through presenting Amendment 165B. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Beecham for their support on this amendment. I am sorry if collectively—it is probably my fault—we have confused the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
I do not think the Minister’s response has moved us forward on this issue. If anything, I think it has moved us backwards. We accept that these are complex issues and that drafting legislation is difficult. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that he thought that the courts have hitherto got the balance about right. If the Minister thinks through the logic of what he has just said, if you can judge whether somebody had a closed mind only at the point of taking a decision, and if you have to leave aside and close your mind to all the previous evidence, even though any reasonable person might say that in particular circumstances it was abundantly clear that an individual had closed his mind, could that not leave the process open to massive abuse, because all somebody who wishes to thwart or support a decision needs to do is to behave sensibly and appropriately on the day at the point of the decision-making, even though he might have made his position absolutely clear before that? I am not a lawyer, although the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, certainly is, but it seems to me that the position he put in his example—that Clause 14(2) means that you have to exclude all that evidence when it comes to court, if that is where it arrives, and the Minister said that you do—must constitute a change in the law as it is at the moment. I do not think that the Government are in the right place. We are not trying to be difficult. This is not a party political issue, and I understand the Minister trying to get it right for councillors so that they are free of the fear that they may have been subject to to date, but I simply do not think that the Government are right. We are obviously not going to press Amendment 165A tonight, but I urge that we have the opportunity to have some discussion with officials between now and Third Reading—and I would welcome the input of other noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—with the right to bring it back if necessary. There is a risk that we are changing the law.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Of course we are always happy to discuss matters further, but I wanted to make the Government’s position quite clear. The clarification in Clause 14 is designed to make clear that there is a point at which predetermination can be adjudged, and that is the point at which a decision is made. To present any other points as being the point at which predetermination exists obviously becomes extremely complicated because you get involved with statements that have been made before the decision was presented before the member concerned.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
My Lords, I understand exactly that it is at the point at which the decision is made that people’s minds ultimately become closed, but that is where some judgment must be made. The issue is whether in making that judgment you ignore everything that has gone before. That is the point that we are struggling to understand.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I suggest to the noble Lord that the words which had initially confused me—making the decision “just because” of these factors—in fact answer his point. I think that those words “just because” mean that they are a consideration but they are not the only consideration. They are part of all the criteria that should be assessed when judging whether or not a mind has been closed. I can see that we are not going to take it further today. I just wanted to put that into the arena as well and assure the noble Lord that it was not he who confused me.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
I am grateful to the noble Baroness but I do not think it helps us. If somebody who has done something said something, just because they have said that, if the provision requires you to not focus on that, not to take that into account in making a decision, you can count that decision only once and this excludes it. Perhaps we ought to see whether we can make some progress on this outside of these deliberations, but I really do not believe that the Government are in the right place on this.
Lord Pannick
Does the noble Lord accept that the Minister is undoubtedly right that the question of whether or not the councillor has a closed mind must be assessed as at the date when the council takes the decision? My concern—I ask whether it is his concern—is that it appears from the Minister’s observations that he is suggesting that anything that the councillor says at an earlier date, however extreme it may be, is irrelevant to the question of whether the councillor had a closed mind as at the date of the council decision. That seems to be the issue.
Lord McKenzie of Luton
Yes, I am grateful to the noble Lord. That is exactly my concern and I honestly do not think we have had clarification on that. Perhaps we can take this forward by other means. With the leave of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.