Chief Scientific Advisers: S&T Committee Report

Lord May of Oxford Excerpts

Wednesday 17th October 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord May of Oxford]

I begin by saying that the UK probably handles these issues better than any other place I know. I part company with my long-standing good friend, the noble Lord, Lord Rees, in that I have lived 20 of my professional years in the United States and 23 here. I know the comparison between the resources, access and influence that I had as Chief Scientific Adviser to John Major and Tony Blair and what is available to the corresponding people in the States, one of whom was quite a good friend. They do not have anything like the same influence or contact, so the criticisms that I am about to make start from the position that we are doing well but could do much better.

I come to this in a rather different way. It is roughly half a century since, as a very young post-doc and newly arrived at Harvard, I had the privilege of hearing CP Snow give the Godkin lectures. These lectures are currently being republished by Cambridge University Press and I have just had the privilege of revisiting them to write an introduction. Snow’s “two cultures” theme runs strongly, if implicitly, through these lectures. He draws several lessons, all of which resonate with the recommendations of our committee, from two critical events in World War II, in which he was an observer as a senior civil servant.

In the first event, in 1935 when war seemed increasingly likely, the distinguished scientist Tizard was asked how best to defend the UK, particularly against bombing from Germany. He promptly put together a committee of real experts: Blackett, Appleton, AV Hill and others. They came forward with a bold and emphatic recommendation that essentially all resources should be concentrated on what we now call radar. This, mark you, was before we knew it worked. The Labour Party was in government then and Churchill was on the outside. Churchill’s adviser, Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, who was an indifferent scientist but a skilled social climber and courtier, consistently gave Churchill the advice he wanted to hear. He was very much against radar and produced an amusing concatenation of silly ideas as alternatives.

In retrospect it was very fortunate that Churchill was not in a position of influence at that time, because it is generally agreed that radar played a decisive role in Britain’s survival in the 1940 Battle of Britain. By 1942, however, with the war in full swing and with Churchill in power, Lindemann was enthroned as the sole source of scientific advice. There arose a second major row around the question of the effectiveness of the massive bombing of German cities. Lindemann was entirely in favour of this bombing, and one must have sympathy, in the light of what happened in Coventry and London, for doing this. In fact, Tizard made an estimate and suggested that Lindemann’s cost-benefit analyses were out by a factor of five, Blackett said that it was a factor of six, and post-war estimates suggest that it is closer to wrong by a factor of 10. The strategy was not particularly effective and hugely costly both in British lives and in resources, but the Cabinet had heard no advice other than from the egregious Lindemann.

Is this relevant to today’s debate? I think that it is, because the recommendations in the Select Committee’s report are essentially very much along the lines of how Tizard went about handling things. I regret to say that the Government’s response, which is not the Minister’s fault, is essentially in the idiom of Lindemann. If we listen carefully we can hear Snow rotating in his grave.

It will be helpful to sketch briefly the evolution of science advice and policy-making in the UK since World War II, because for several decades after the war, although science people were seen as so important—from the initial people I talked about through Bletchley, and so on—the status of science adviser that persisted as an ad hoc appointment drifted down until it was a sort of one day a week pop-in to talk with the policy unit in No. 10. The really major change that we have almost forgotten and which we take now for granted began in the 1990s and emanated from a grey eminence behind the scenes in the Labour Party, Jeremy Bray, whom some noble Lords will remember. He convinced Neil Kinnock that one of the manifesto commitments for the Kinnock/Major election should be the creation of an office of science and technology, headed by a distinguished scientist and appropriate person brought in at the mandarin, Permanent Secretary level. He would go along to the Wednesday morning meetings of all the other Permanent Secretaries and be given an adequate star.

William Waldegrave persuaded John Major, who won the election, to implement the Kinnock manifesto commitment, and I was the first such person appointed in that wave in 1995-2000. I was succeeded by David King and then by John Beddington. I found it fascinating and challenging, although it was also an experience in the cultural anthropology of the Civil Service. I had always thought that “Yes Minister” was a sitcom, but I discovered that it was a documentary. I had great good fortune; I was really lucky. I had better fortune than some of my successors. Both my Prime Ministers—first, John Major and then Tony Blair—were people who sought informed and honest rather than comfortable advice, and I had direct access to both of them. The two Cabinet Secretaries—Robin Butler and Richard Wilson—could not have been more helpful.

During my time, the Permanent Secretary for trade and industry, where OST was housed, changed. At first it was Peter Gregson and then Michael Scholar. At our first acquaintance we had lunch together and Michael said, “How do you think you are doing?”. I said, “Well, I’m really enjoying it and I feel that I am being moderately effective, but the one thing that is clear is that had I pursued a career in the Civil Service, I would never have made it to the grade of Permanent Secretary”. Michael, with characteristic honesty and the right words said, “That is absolutely right. How shall I put it? You don’t have the courtier skills”. I was confronted, as successors have been, by the kind of resistance to outsiders that we see subtly expressed in the failure to accept so many of the recommendations that have been written by civil servants. Civil servants are not bad people; like everywhere else there are good and bad people, but they have a culture that is not well suited to the sort of things we are talking about.

Let me give noble Lords a very quick sketch of some of these issues. In the early 1990s, the apparent peace dividend—the end of the lunacy about the end of history—meant that the Ministry of Defence had to take big cuts. What did it want to do? It did not want to get rid of its civil servants and so thought that the best thing to do was to spin out the whole of the research enterprise. This would have been a disaster because it would have impaired all relations with the Americans, among other things. This is the first time I have ever claimed this in public, but I think that my biggest achievement was that I kept a big chunk of that. QinetiQ was spun out, but the defence science and technology labs in Porton Down are still in the public sector and still interacting with the Americans. I could not possibly have done that if I had not had the status—four star—and direct access to the Prime Minister and Ministers. I could multiply such examples.

On JASON, given the way the MoD is now, I do not think that JASON is quite appropriate. One of the conclusions that came out of the defence science and technology labs is that we should have more interaction with academia and more attempts should be made to bring in that kind of free-ranging and great strengthening dialogue. The one bee in my bonnet throughout my entire tenure as a non-exec there was to build up the social sciences in the research part of the MoD because then, as you began to go into Iraq, you could ask questions about what was going on in Iraq and what were you going to do when you had won. I was told consistently by people in the MoD that they were too busy to think about that.

I could multiply this endlessly and give you examples that we have already heard, but I will not. After the war, the chief scientist in the MoD, the very distinguished Hermann Bondi, a hugely important person, fought off repeated efforts, one of which I fought off during my brief tenure, to downgrade the post or capture it for a civil servant, but that is what has now happened. It is a real loss. I could multiply these examples more or less indefinitely.

I cannot resist mentioning that the story of FMD and what happened was not quite as rosy and simple as the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, portrayed. To begin with, it was not Dave King who put together the committee but John Krebs. When he put together the committee of experts on epidemiology—I forget whether it was under MAFF or Defra at that time—not a single one turned up, but Dave did. Dave then took it over and did a super job.

In retrospect, it is clear that if we had been able to use bigger and wider firebreaks and vaccination, we would have stopped things by June. However, that was thwarted by the farmers’ union. The most satisfactory thing took place at the post mortem, where the Royal Society recommended that next time vaccination must be used. Defra had clearly forgotten this, but the Royal Society reminded the Government, and I have a letter signed by Tony Blair apologising for their oversight and saying that it would not reoccur. There is now a rule that if there is another outbreak and vaccination is not part of the strategy, the Permanent Secretary must give reasons in writing to Parliament before abandoning the measure.

Against that background, I conclude by strongly urging the Minister to sweep aside the objections, denials and equivocations that constitute the present Government’s response to this report. It will require a certain amount of courage to go up against them, but I am willing to be as helpful and to enlist people if he wishes. I particularly emphasise the following six recommendations in the following order of importance. The first is recommendation 10: that all CSAs must have a seat on the departmental board. The current response contains some weasel words about the need for flexibility, but flexibility has nothing to do with it. It is another expression that means that we want to put these guys on tap, not on top. The issue here is getting the job done.

The second is recommendation 9: that CSAs must be grade one or at least grade two. Here, again, in wonderful Civil Service double-speak, the Government replied:

“The precise grade of the position should remain a matter for the Permanent Secretary in managing his or her department”.

It has nothing to do with managing the bloody department; the grade has to reflect the importance of the person so that they have the clout to be heard. To accept that recommendation is a no-brainer.

On recommendation 7, on direct access to Ministers, the response does not say that it does not accept it but it uses weasel words to that effect. Again, there is no alternative to an unequivocal agreement to direct access. I know examples—and other people have given them—of chief scientists who just have not had direct access, as they are carefully managed and encapsulated.

Recommendation 1 lists a catalogue of desired qualities. Again, there are weasel words in the response, but they are obviously the things that you want. Recommendation 2 is one of the trickiest. It says that, given that these are the qualities that are wanted, recruitment “necessarily excludes internal candidates”. That is an awkward thing to do. I would recommend that one does not just say that they cannot be internal candidates but rewords it to say, first, that there is a very strong presumption that the appointment will be from outside and, secondly, that if it is not, the Government Chief Scientific Adviser should have a veto and justify it.

Finally, recommendation 8 concerns the formal protocol designed by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser for CSAs when they disagree with Ministers or civil servants about policy decisions that are contrary to scientific advice. I am not going to talk about that because, in the week when badgers are in the news, we do not need to.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

My Lords, first, I thank noble Lords for their kind remarks. I congratulate those noble Lords who have participated in this debate and those who have supported this inquiry, both here today and through their work in the committee. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, and the committee for such a thought-provoking inquiry. I am conscious that, as the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, mentioned and to the disappointment of my noble friend Lord Willis, I am a non-scientist replying to so many eminent scientists. Having read the report, its quality is self-evident. It recognises the value and the standing of the current CSAs and the achievements of Sir John Beddington.

The Government are committed to ensuring that all policy is underpinned by the best science and engineering evidence. The many significant challenges we face in the world today can be addressed only by the implementation of robust and effective policy, applying the best knowledge. CSAs are crucial to delivering this. As the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, rightly pointed out, this must be drawn from all sources—from government agencies to abroad. The enhancements to the CSA network over the past few years demonstrate the commitment to continued improvement. The present GCSA, Sir John Beddington, deserves considerable credit for the effort and expertise he has invested in building and supporting the CSA network over the past five years.

The committee made 19 recommendations, several of which have already been acted on. The report is already a key guiding document for the GCSA, the Government Office for Science and the CSAs. This has been acknowledged by the head of the Civil Service, who, as noble Lords know, recently responded to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs. While not all the recommendations could be accepted in full, the Government are committed to further continued development of the CSA network. The challenge for the future is to deliver effective, excellent policy yet we will have to do so with fewer resources. There are cost implications for departments arising from many of the recommendations made in the report. Very careful attention will have to be given in balancing these against the many competing needs that each department faces. I can reassure your Lordships that, none the less, the Government are committed to delivering the CSA influence that the report aims to promote.

I will now explain the steps being taken to implement some of the key recommendations. First, on the characteristics of chief scientific advisers, the report identified a number of personal characteristics necessary for an effective CSA and made recommendations on the terms and conditions for appointment. The Government agree with the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, on the three criteria of authority, independence and access. The Government consider that the characteristics set out in the report, as emphasised by noble Lords today, are a relevant, appropriate and very useful guide for departments to use in recruiting a CSA.

The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, raised issues relating to recruitment. I can confirm that the GCSA will be closely involved in advising Permanent Secretaries on all CSA appointments. He will also expect to sit on the selection panel and will encourage departments to seek additional external independent advice in the recruitment process.

Turning to the appointments procedure, I want to reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, that the default position will be to advertise all appointments externally in open competition. However, under the rules of open and transparent appointments, internal candidates cannot be excluded.

Moving on to the issue of the right grade for a CSA, again the Government agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, and my noble friend Lady Sharp that these are important roles that must have suitable status in their department. As I said earlier, these are difficult times. Departments have gone through restructuring and downsizing at all levels, which has led to a significant reduction in the total number of directors-general and other senior grades across Whitehall. It is simply no longer feasible for there to be an expectation for the CSA always to be at Permanent Secretary or DG level. The Government have agreed that departments should not appoint CSAs below director level and have already held a department to this.

The noble Lords, Lord Rees and Lord May, referred to the position in the MoD. I can assure noble Lords that the post remains one of the most influential within the MoD and a distinguished and respected engineer, Professor Vernon Gibson, has been recruited to this important role.

My noble friend Lady Sharp also raised the issue of the DCMS. As your Lordships will know, the DCMS has been without a CSA for a few years. The department is now very small, with very few senior staff at all, and is unable to appoint a CSA at the level agreed to. The DCMS has appointed a head of analysis who is linked into the network of deputy CSAs and who will receive support from the CSAs in other departments as well as the advisory committee referred to by my noble friend Lady Sharp.

As recommended, the Government have also agreed that the GCSA should contribute to the CSA’s annual performance reviews and a mechanism for this will be in place from this year. The Government also agree with the committee that the CSAs must have the necessary resource, both budget and staff, to carry out their role effectively. Your Lordships acknowledge in your report that departments vary greatly in size, scope and type of evidence they need. It is not therefore sensible to be too prescriptive on what that resource should entail. Governments, with the advice of the GCSA, must be free to balance the many competing needs for limited resources.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, I would like to confirm that Sir John Beddington wrote to Permanent Secretary colleagues last month to start discussions on the implementation of all the recommendations to which I have just referred. Professor Sir Bob Watson, until recently the CSA in Defra, presented the issue well. He said, in relation to CSA policy processes, that policy proposals should,

“point to these questions: what do we know? What do we not know? What is controversial? What is uncertain? What are the implications of the uncertainties?”.

If CSAs have any concerns that these questions are not routinely being answered in policy submissions to their Ministers or that they are not sufficiently engaged in the process, they should raise the matter with their Permanent Secretary and with the GCSA. We also accept the importance of CSAs, like other officials, offering challenges to developing policies. I know that my noble friend Lord Jenkin referred to this.

The Government have well-established routes for raising concerns about the policy-making process. These are enshrined in the Civil Service Code by which CSAs are bound for the duration of their appointment and, in turn, Ministers are bound by the principles of scientific advice to Government which are enshrined in the Ministerial Code. I am conscious of the controversy and indeed the specific case of bovine TB as referred to by the noble Lords, Lord Krebs and Lord Mitchell, and my noble friend Lord Selborne. The GCSA is content that the evidence base, including uncertainties and evidence gaps, has been communicated effectively to Ministers.

On the issue of CSA membership of departmental boards and access to Ministers, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord May, knows of the respect that I have for him—indeed, he and I sat on a Select Committee for a year—but, after the greatest consideration was given to these recommendations, it was concluded that the departmental boards did not meet frequently enough, and indeed were not involved in the day-to-day policy process, for them to be the best mechanism for policy to be influenced in the department.

[Lord May of Oxford]

That is a typical Civil Service response. One has to enter the mindset of this devious subculture. Does the noble Lord really take that as an argument?

[Lord Gardiner of Kimble]

I have not yet attended a departmental board. Perhaps I will be better able to tell the noble Lord when I have. It is fair to say, though, that this is not considered to be the best mechanism to deal with the point that he wishes to affect. While we expect that CSAs should have regular and frequent interactions with Ministers, I am bound to say that not even Permanent Secretaries have access on demand.

My noble friend Lord Willis referred to government policies and the need for them to be underpinned by relevant research. I agree with him that R and D budgets should not be seen as a soft touch when overall departmental budgets come under pressure. Indeed, the Government have affirmed the requirement that departments should discuss in advance with the GCSA and Her Majesty’s Treasury any planned reductions in research budgets or expenditure. Sir John Beddington has recently written to all departmental Permanent Secretaries to remind them of that point.

I turn to science advisory councils. Indeed, the noble Viscount, Lord Hanworth, gave an appropriate reminder of the importance of the advisory system. While the Government do not feel that a full review of science advisory councils is necessary, it is acknowledged that there are some specific concerns. The Government Office for Science will therefore be looking at the way in which these bodies identify and prioritise issues for consideration and how their advice is fed back to the department. The GCSA continues to discuss with all departments the benefits that can be gained from having a council. However, we are committed to funding the best evidence from all sources. The noble Lord, Lord Parekh, referred to national academies as important partners, and indeed we need to build on links with industry too.

The noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Parekh, referred to the recommendation for the appointment of a chief social scientist. I assure noble Lords that the Government recognise the importance of the social sciences and are giving careful consideration to the recommendation.

It remains for me to thank all those who have participated in the debate today and to thank the members of the committee again for their extremely valuable report. The recommendations of the report have been taken very seriously and of course I have studied the letter that the head of the Civil Service sent to the noble Lord, Lord Krebs. I hope that that letter reaffirms that, although I understand there may have been disappointment in the early stages, the Government take seriously all that the committee has said, even where we could not accept the proposals in full. That many have been acted on confirms Her Majesty’s Government’s commitment to strengthening their science advisory systems. As so many noble Lords have referred to, with all their expertise, strengthening those advisory systems will benefit the whole nation as we meet the challenges of the future.