Probation Service Debate

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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)

Probation Service

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts
Wednesday 16th October 2013

(10 years, 8 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
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To ask Her Majesty’s Government what is their assessment of the impact of the proposed provisions for the supervision of offenders by the private and voluntary sectors after the proposed reorganisation of the probation service.

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Portrait Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
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My Lords, the probation service is facing fundamental changes, yet during the passage of the Offender Rehabilitation Bill through this House, there was very little chance to debate these changes in any depth. The central issue I wish to explore in this debate is how far, when these changes are made, can we maintain and even improve the quality of probation services for the rehabilitation of offenders?

That issue raises a number of questions. First, can we retain our existing probation officers within the new structure when the bulk of the service is in private ownership? Secondly, how do we maintain the standards, morale and ethos of the probation service? Thirdly, how can we maintain the high quality recruitment and training in the future? Fourthly, will the new structure deliver the promised new services we all want to see: the through-the-gate supervision, and supervision for offenders on release from short sentences? Fifthly, will the reorganisation genuinely lead to more diversity, more innovation, and better results or are we heading, as some fear, for low-cost uniformity, led by commercial organisations with bad records of failure which will be of no long-term benefit? Finally, will payment by results actually deliver results or will the targets be either too hard to reach to make them worth aiming for or insufficiently challenging so that they make no difference?

It might help if I set out my understanding of how the proposals stand now. On 1 April next year the probation service is to be split. The existing 35 probation trusts will be wound up, the new National Probation Service will be charged with looking after offenders classified as high risk, with providing advice to courts, with conducting the risk assessment of new clients and with handling cases of breach. They will have a clear responsibility for public protection. The NPS will look after 20% of the probation trusts’ current case load, while 21 new community rehabilitation companies will take over the remaining case load. It is intended that existing staff will be reassigned between the NPS and the CRCs.

Initially, each of the CRCs will be wholly owned by the Ministry of Justice. They will cover England and Wales split into areas and each will be charged with delivering the relevant orders of the court in its own area, including community payback, unpaid work, curfews and drug rehabilitation. The CRCs will generally be located in the same premises as the NPS and, initially at least, those will be the existing probation trust buildings.

Starting in late 2014, the intention is that the CRCs will be taken over by the successful bidders in the competition which is being organised. The bids will be judged on which provide the best package within what the department calls an affordability envelope. So there is a slightly uncomfortable compromise between competition on price, which risks reducing quality, and competition on quality. However, in this area, of course, an objective comparison of quality is very difficult because bidders are expected to propose a range of different ways of delivering the orders of the court.

In the first stage, following 1 April, the probation services will look to their clients and to the public much like the services provided by the existing probation trusts; the same staff doing much the same work in the same premises, though with some change in the allocation of work. However, after the new contracts are let, the shape of the probation services is going to be much more difficult to predict. The new through-the-gate resettlement and supervision following short sentences will only be implemented at this second stage, so the CRCs’ contractual obligations will then have to change. What other changes will there be in the obligations of the CRCs under their new ownership and will they vary from one CRC to the next?

These substantial changes take place against a background of considerable success for the probation trusts. Reoffending rates have been steadily falling for all offenders apart from those serving short prison sentences and they, to date, have had no contact with the probation service anyway. The trusts’ performance has generally been rated by the Ministry of Justice as good or excellent. The Merseyside Trust was last year the first public sector winner of the British Quality Foundation’s UK Excellence Award. All this has been achieved within a falling budget. It is therefore unsurprising that there is some bewilderment among the probation services as to why they need such reorganisation at all.

Against that background, I turn to my first question on the retention of existing probation officers. We currently have a highly professional, skilled and committed body of probation officers who are an asset of great value, impossible to price but once lost very difficult to replace. My concern is how far the new owners of the CRCs will in the medium and long term retain the staff they take over. Will they be required by their contracts to involve qualified probation officers in the delivery of their services?

My second question concerning the standards, morale and ethos of the probation service is closely linked. My concern is not for the new NPS. Indeed, as a national service, the NPS may develop more influence within the criminal justice system than could the individual probation trusts. However, how far will standards be safe under the umbrella of the new providers? Who are they likely to be? What mix will there be between commercial and voluntary sectors? What role will there be for mutuals? How will performance be monitored, and will that monitoring be effective?

My third question concerned recruitment and training. In relation to all these questions so far, one hopeful development is the proposed establishment by the Probation Association and the Probation Chiefs Association, with government approval, of an institute to be known as the “Probation Institute”. Such an institute could offer accreditation of courses and qualifications. It could maintain a register of qualified probation officers, and could ultimately take on the role of monitoring and enforcing professional performance standards. That would assist providers when recruiting, and probation officers when seeking new employment. The institute could also act as an information exchange on innovation and best practice and would be a valuable resource if it did so. The proposed institute might one day apply for charter status, and would establish probation officers as a strong and independent profession. In a world of diverse new providers, this would be a significant benefit.

My fourth question concerned the delivery of the new services. How confident are the Government that satisfactory bidders will commit to supplying through-the-gate resettlement and the extra supervision, within the same overall price package as we pay for current services? If the bidders do not emerge, the CRCs will stay with the Ministry of Justice and the reorganisation will have failed to achieve its object.

My fifth question was on diversity of provision. Will we genuinely secure more voluntary sector involvement—more local partnerships between smaller local organisations and the main contractors? Will we secure the special arrangements we need and which have been promised for women and young offenders? Finally, will payment by results lead to improved reoffending rates? Was the Social Market Foundation right or wrong to conclude, as it did in its report this summer, that the extra payments would not make it worth while for providers to pay the extra money to improve the service? Will the payment by results provisions affect the prospect of more partnerships, even if main contractors cannot pass on the risk—as they should not be able to do—to their smaller providers?

I am not opposed to these reforms in principle. If they go well, they could lead to more diversity, to more imaginative and effective rehabilitation, to the provision of the new services, to lower reoffending rates, and to the prospect of fewer people in prison, with improved lives and substantial savings of public funds. However, I am concerned that there are many pitfalls on the road to these desirable outcomes. Perhaps some further time might be desirable for the transfer to private ownership. I look forward to hearing other contributions to this debate and to the response from my noble friend the Minister.