Scotland Bill

Lord Maclennan of Rogart Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Maclennan of Rogart]

My Lords, as the first Member of your Lordships’ House contributing to this debate who has not held a ministerial office peculiar to Scotland, perhaps I may be forgiven for beginning by raising a question on the impact of the Bill in the wider constitutional context of the United Kingdom. If the Bill is to be a success it has to face up to the needs of balancing equitable distribution of our resources with devolved autonomy. The Calman commission did not attempt to do that. I defer to the five members of the commission present in the House today but it dealt with Scotland. In the very changed political circumstances that we face today, we cannot simply confine our discussions to those issues.

The financial austerity that we currently face in this country puts pressures on our constitutional arrangements which could lead to a fissiparous consequence—one certainly never considered likely when Calman sat and even less likely when the Scotland Act 1998 was considered. It follows that we must consider not only whether Scotland is being fairly treated with respect to other constituent parts of the United Kingdom such as Wales or Northern Ireland but also focus on what the consequence of the specific measures in the Bill—I do not intend to go into them in detail today because we shall have a plenitude of opportunities in Committee and on Report—will be upon the sense of well-being of our citizens. That is something rather different from the sense that they are masters of their own destiny. Both are requirements.

The consideration of the matters in the Bill is also enlightened by reference to another commission which has not so far been referred to in the debate. I refer to the Holtham commission on Wales. There are differences of approach in the report of that commission which should be considered in the context of what we are doing for Scotland. One of the reports from the House of Lords Select Committee on the Barnett formula stated:

“On every funding decision the Treasury is judge in its own cause”.

I have to ask whether anything in the Bill really alters that. We need to recognise that in this carving up of the resources of the country the Treasury voice is strong. In the intergovernmental arrangements I hope that the Scottish voice will be strengthened and also that the voices of other parts of the country will be heard in these deliberations as well as the voices of other devolved governments.

There are some matters to which the Bill, as I have read it, does not refer although I am not yet a master of it. For example, the Treasury controls the year-end flexibility of expenditure. Is that a satisfactory arrangement? The limitations of revenue-raising which will flow from the Bill will be substantially reduced upon the present situation. That is welcome. However, I am bound to say that in the current circumstances I have a strong inclination to agree with my noble friend Lord Forsyth about the likely way that this power will have to be used. It is hard to believe that in the austere circumstances in which we live—it is optimistic to believe that in five years’ time we will have completely resolved our current economic problems and that circumstances will have changed—we can foresee cuts in public spending.

It is somewhat surprising that the opportunity has not been seized to go for a system which distributes the central government grants more fairly. The Holtham committee in Wales and our own House of Lords Select Committee on the Barnett formula both indicated that that could be done without enormous difficulty. Without addressing that—and of course it has been deliberately excluded from the discussions—we are not looking at the economic situation of our United Kingdom in the round and we will create growing discontent with which I think it will be hard to battle. I am not suggesting that the Bill should have in it a formula in place of the Barnett formula, but I am suggesting that serious consideration should be given to the many views that have been expressed in academic circles, such as those of Iain McLean and a number of other very careful voices, as to how this should be tackled. Postponement will not cure the growing sense of injustice.

The extension of fiscal autonomy, which the Calman report recommends, does not go even half as far as we see in a number of other federal countries. Australia, which is one of the more centralised federal systems, has up to 55 per cent of its spending raised by devolved governments, so we are not actually doing something which is profoundly revolutionary when viewed in a global context. Other federal countries have even higher proportions of locally raised expenditure. But if we are going to do that we have to accept the consequences of the lower tax base of certain parts of our country and we must come up with equitable solutions to these problems if we are not going to a see a deepening of disquiet and discontent in the poorer parts of our United Kingdom.

There are many other matters that are worthy of deep consideration, but I will confine myself to what I think is intended to be the central issue of the Bill. I refer to the economic balance and the change in the direction of responsibility. My noble friend Lord Forsyth had a number of very good points to make about the sense of responsibility and the limits that the Bill has imposed on the process. I hope that in the time which will now elapse before we get down to considering these things in detail we will look at these measures in the context of the circumstances in which we are considering them, which are very different from those circumstances on which the Calman commission reported.