Human Rights Act 1998 (Remedial) Order 2019

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Thursday 3rd September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but we are quite tight on time and we are close to time already.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, this is an important application and I think it is right that I should refer to a very interesting paper by Professor Richard Ekins, who is professor of law and constitutional government at the University of Oxford. He argues that this order is ultra vires and unconstitutional. On the first point, he argues that the provisions of Section 10 of the Human Rights Act are of a type that should be construed strictly, and so construed do not allow amendment of the Human Rights Act. On the second point, his argument is that this order amending the Human Rights Act is an unusual and unexpected use of the Section 10 power, and accordingly it is inappropriate.

It will be seen that these two arguments are closely linked. While I see how the argument has been skilfully deployed, I think it construes the power of Section 10 too strictly, since the Human Rights Act is primary legislation and makes no exception of itself. Indeed, the power is contained in the Human Rights Act perhaps because that Act is so closely related to the convention that some incompatibility within it was foreseeable. This incompatibility is the source of the trouble that appeared here.

In my view the situation is such that Section 10 applies. I agree that the constitutional position of judges must be carefully taken into account, but it is fair to say that the Court of Human Rights really depended on the nature of the procedure, which had resulted in the then accused being sentenced for contempt of court to imprisonment. It was—I hope—a very exceptional case, but one which could arise in the circumstances, creating an incompatibility between the right to damages on the one hand and the failure to give the right of damages on the other, except in a case to which the section exempting the judicial honesty from such a result may apply. It was thought, correctly I think, that the amendment proposed here kept in place that judicial immunity while at the same time compensating the accused person—the applicant—for what was construed as a procedural error.

It is quite a tricky position. When the original application was put in, I am told that the then Lord Chancellor considered the matter with the judiciary and concluded that it was right to apply for the order. I support that judgment now and would support the grant of the order in the circumstances.