Continuity Agreement: Kingdom of Morocco

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Monday 9th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Stevenson on getting the opportunity to debate this, and I particularly congratulate him on his initiative in making a very interesting constitutional suggestion. A lot of colleagues will probably have seen the Order Paper and thought that this subject was slightly technical and esoteric, which may be why the Chamber is not in danger of bursting its seams, but my noble friend has raised a very general point, which is that we are bad in this country at ratifying treaties. It is an important legislative role in other countries and, of course, the United States does it with great thoroughness—with such thoroughness that the executive branch tries to avoid any ratification process starting in the first place. Nevertheless, that is democracy, and I think there is a great lack of democracy here, where the bureaucrats negotiate these agreements and there is no opportunity at all to call them to account, or for Parliament to express a view on the content of these agreements. So I thought it was a very good suggestion, and I know my noble friend Lord Stevenson is a serious and determined colleague. When he makes a suggestion, it is not just intended to be a nine-day wonder. I am sure that he will continue with this and take it further, and he will certainly have all the support I can personally give him.

The agreement with Morocco carries forward our market access which we currently have as members of the European Union—I say “currently have”, but that means only long as the transition period lasts. I have to make a confession: during the debates on Brexit over the past four years—we had an awful lot of debates in the media, in this House and in public meetings, and I have taken part in all three types of debate—I quite often attacked the Government, and indeed tried to mock the Government. I said how utterly absurd it was for the Government to say that they wanted to sign more free trade agreements with more countries around the world and to go ahead with Brexit, which involved us overnight losing our access to about 45 different trade agreements that the EU already has with these countries. In actual fact, I must congratulate the Government on having, in this particular case—and one or two others, such as with Jordan—managed to agree in principle to carry forward the existing EU agreement without the discussion breaking, as I suspected it would, into completely new fields, with new demands for new concessions that would make this a very long-winded process. So it is only fair to say that I congratulate them on making that progress.

However, I very much retain my view that it would be a great mistake to open negotiations on new free trade agreements with countries where we are not just carrying forward an EU agreement and with those with which we do not currently have a national free trade agreement before we have concluded the negotiations with the European Union or the United States. When I say “before we have concluded”, I mean before we have either concluded them or have determined that there is no purpose in pursuing that particular subject with those countries for the foreseeable future—which of course is another possible outcome.

My reason for saying that is that, whereas in an agreement like this, which carries forward the terms of the existing EU-Morocco agreement, there is no change in the competitive position of exporters from the United States or the European Union—they pay duties at the present time, if there are duties and tariffs, and they will continue to pay them, and they are not a party to this particular deal, so their position is unchanged—if you started to negotiate a new agreement with another country where there are tariffs and quotas, we may find ourselves in a position where perhaps we can negotiate a position in which British exporters will not be paying them while, presumably, exporters from other countries will. British exporters would then gain an advantage in that particular market vis-à-vis exporters from those other two countries—looking at the EU as a country. The EU and the US might be less than pleased, although of course the amounts involved may be tiny. I think that Morocco accounts for less than 0.5% of our exports, but this could happen on several occasions in several different places. It is possible that this could be a considerable factor in the negotiations we might have with the EU and the US.

Goodness knows, those negotiations are going to be complicated enough, and there is no way that the Government will achieve their aim of concluding them by the end of this year. Given that, importing this new complication would be completely crazy and really would be very foolish because, after all, the EU and the US account for three-quarters of our exports. We would be threatening their position, or at least making life more difficult in the context of those important negotiations, for the interests of our exports to countries that represent perhaps less than 1% of our trade. That would not make any sense. I therefore retain my view about the tactics of this, despite recognising that the Government have actually succeeded in carrying forward the EU agreements in these cases in a way that I did not anticipate. I hope the Minister will agree with that apologia on my part.

Before I finish, I have another question to ask. It is clear that on the last occasion, the Foreign Office did not anticipate that the Polisario Front would wish to litigate in order to try to stop the entering into force of an EU-Morocco trade agreement. It has done so and it has succeeded, so it has held up the whole process and we will see what happens. I am told in the briefing which has been produced for members of the European Union Committee:

“We note that FCO officials have told us that they are confident the UK Agreement is consistent with EU law and the Government’s position on the status of Western Sahara.”


It may be that they are confident and that they are right. Last time, they were confident, but they were not right; they were wrong. My question to the Minister therefore is: what confidence does he have, and why does he have it, that on this occasion the FCO officials have got it right and that we will not go back to where we started and find ourselves entering into further litigation?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I would very much like to hear the Minister explain the legal basis on which this matter rests, in view of the issues that have been raised in relation to Western Sahara. The issues raised are quite important, but at the moment I do not see exactly what the answer in which the Foreign Office will be confident is. I am willing to agree that I may be utterly wrong and that the noble Lord may be able to convince us all.

[Viscount Waverley (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, made an important general point in his opening remarks. I want to take this opportunity to turn to the subject in hand. My only regret was not following through on a visit when I was in the region, particularly as the opportunity was presented to meet all the parties at the table.

The situation in Western Sahara rumbles on with all its complexities. There are suggestions that Western Sahara is a proxy arena for others. The Sahrawis are living in appalling conditions in Tindouf, with the Polisario Front criminalising any ability to leave the camps in favour of a return to their homeland. Various states are now opening consulates either in or in close proximity to Laâyoune and Dakhla. The UK High Court has implemented the ECJ ruling which recognises the self-determination rights of the Sahrawi people, this following that the EU partnership with Morocco should not include fishery grounds off the coast of Western Sahara. Mauritania has professed neutrality, while Spain’s Foreign Minister, Arancha Gonzáles, has reaffirmed the exclusivity of the UN-led political process. Additionally, the inadvertent words of the then UN SG in March 2016 that Western Sahara was “occupied” were inopportune and may haunt reconciliation, particularly as the issue evokes less emotion for Algerians than Moroccans as Algeria has no claim to Western Sahara.

President Bouteflika was considered too set in his inflexible ways, doing, some suggested, the army’s and deep state’s bidding. There has been hope and indeed expectation in certain quarters that, with the advent of President Tebboune’s quest for a “new Algeria”, change to his country’s foreign policy stance towards Morocco could be afoot. It is interesting to note that the former SG of the National Liberation Front party has recently intimated that the borders be opened, but went surprisingly further by advocating that “Sahara is Moroccan”. This may become relevant in that he might be being primed for high office, given that his coming from the same tribe as the President could have connotations in the preparation of the internal landscape, with a plan of strategy on the chessboard.

Across the way, I have been encouraged by King Mohammed’s indications of reconciliation through dialogue leading to the normalisation and opening of borders. His country rejoining the African Union will certainly have garnered momentum for this. It is to nobody’s benefit that the borders remain closed. Solution can be found when all sides adopt compromise, although attention might be given to the role played by Morocco subsequent to Spain’s withdrawal from the region.

Infrastructure investment, provision of basic services and economic and social development projects, which often go unrecognised, have improved the lot in many quarters.

We are not here to debate the benefits that can stem from tariff exemptions that can come only when Western Sahara’s status is determined. That discussion is in a different context, and so for another day. It is inconceivable that the UK’s position can differ from that of the UN and ECJ ruling. While ongoing aspects remain for consideration, this continuity ratification as presented is necessary.