Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Mitochondrial Donation) Regulations 2015

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Tuesday 24th February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

The real issue is whether we are going to abrogate our own responsibility. Is this something which we should ask an outside agency to do? Should we make a decision where we cannot come to a fully informed and articulated decision ourselves? If we are left in the position of saying, “I am not entirely sure about the research or the sagacity of the legal principles being advanced that enable me to pass this”, surely we should wait until that is clarified. If the House believes that it wishes to abrogate that responsibility because the nature of the issues we are dealing with are such that we feel comfortable about doing that, then of course that is always a matter for us. But I simply argue that what is being asked for is what I hope to be a relatively short period for these matters to be fully considered and fully put to rest.

I am very conscious of time but there are a number of arguments that we could put forward on the law, which would help to further exemplify that this matter is not easy. It is complex. The reason I emphasise that the law officers are disagreeing is the following. All law officers are in the same position. We are not here to tell people what they want to hear; we are here to tell them what they need to know. That should be valued by the House and I am sure that the House would want to be confident that doing this, which everyone hopes would be a good thing, should be lawfully done, too.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, one of the bases of my noble friend Lord Deben’s amendment to the Motion is this question of whether these regulations are lawful. I have studied quite carefully the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, with a junior. I have seen other opinion as well but I am thinking now only of my own analysis of what the noble Lord and his junior said.

The first point is: is this lawful under the domestic law of the United Kingdom? My answer is that it is clearly lawful because, in 2008, this Parliament passed an amendment for the purpose of allowing such regulations to be made. That is as clear as it can be, and you do not need to be a lawyer to think that it is possibly quite a good point. The result of the opinion that the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, has given on this point is that that amendment would be held to be pointless. The courts are not very keen on reaching a conclusion that a deliberate action of Parliament is without point, so I feel very strongly that these regulations in draft are lawful, within the domestic law of the United Kingdom.

Now we come on to the complexities of the European law. Like the noble and learned Baroness, I have had some experience, now long past, of appearing before the Court of Justice in Luxembourg. Masters of complexity are very difficult to find at a greater level than it has. The essential point about this, however, is very clear. If the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, is right, it is not a question of these regulations being wrong; it is that the whole procedure that they are aiming to do is unlawful according to European law. That is fundamental. I do not believe that it is correct, because I do not think that the European Union has a treaty basis if we are dealing with medical procedures in the member states. The regulations that are referred to in great detail—huge definitions and all the rest of it—are intended to deal with the furtherance of the common market. Therefore, if you get a tablet in Germany that is supposed to be suitable for you, then it would be equally suitable in this country—

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

Can I just help the noble and learned Lord by saying that the thing that concerns me is Article 6.3 of the treaty and the way in which the charter has been incorporated to consolidate all the other European laws that were there before the making of the charter? It was the charter itself, and the way in which it has changed things, which makes the difference. I am not focusing primarily on the issues that have been referred to by my noble friend Lord Brennan in his opinion. I am really looking at those issues that arise as a result of the charter. I do not believe that their proper interpretation has been dealt with. I know that the House will not like me very much if I go through the whole charter, but I am very happy to share the issues which really concern me with the noble Earl, Lord Howe.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

So far as I have understood the European treaties, they do not confer an authority as yet to interfere in the medical procedures within the member states. That is basic, and means that they cannot interfere or render unlawful a medical procedure such as the one proposed in these regulations. I could go into the detail of it—I am sure that would not be very acceptable—but I have two principal reasons for thinking that that is right. The first is that no challenge, so far as I know, has been offered by the European Commission to the provisions in the 2008 Act—which of course would be the right place to challenge this, if it were unlawful. This provision was definitely intended to make these regulations possible. The second reason that I advance is that in the opinion of the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, a reference is cited to a treaty dealing with these matters which is outside the European Union. It has a number of members of the European Union as signatories, but it has not been signed by the United Kingdom, nor ratified of course by the United Kingdom, so it is not part of our law. That is the kind of law that deals with embryology in a way that might have been difficult for us if it had been part of the European Union.

These are simple reasons why I think this situation is reasonably clear. Of course, I accept that the law officers have taken a different view. We have not had a chance of discussing it in detail with them. The other point I have to make is that no amount of discussion in a Joint Committee can settle this matter. The only place it can be settled is in a court of law, either the domestic courts of the United Kingdom or, if necessary, the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg. In a sense, if that is a real point, the sooner the regulations are passed the better so that they can be tested.

So far as the point made by the right reverend Prelate is concerned, I understood that the research that the HFEA was asking for has been done and is in the process of publication. It just does not happen to have completed publication. As he was speaking I was reminded that when I had the responsibility of taking the 1990 Act—the original Act in this area—through this House, the then Bishop of London took quite a prominent part in the discussions. His watchword was caution—and he thought that that amount of caution had been built into the procedure by having the HFEA examine individual cases and be in charge of the licensing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords, before the noble Earl starts his speech, may I apologise to the House? The noble Lord, Lord Alton, has clarified the fact that it was the Lord Chancellor and the current Attorney-General who voted against this measure in the House of Commons. I was told that two Law Officers had voted against, and I assumed that the two Law Officers must have been the right honourable Dominic Grieve and the current Attorney-General. It was not: it was the Lord Chancellor and the current Attorney-General. I should apologise for that; it was a misunderstanding of the information that I was given.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

It would be right to say that the Lord Chancellor is not a Law Officer of the Crown.

[Baroness Scotland of Asthal]

My Lords, that is why, having been told that it was the two Law Officers, I came to the conclusion that the Lord Chancellor was not among them.