European Union Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, in this group is Amendment 59, to which I have put my name along with distinguished colleagues, including the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, to whom I shall refer in a moment or two.

We have had an excellent introduction to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, and I am very grateful to him for that. My view is that Clause 18 is unnecessarily vague when it talks about “an Act of Parliament”. It states:

“It is only by virtue of an Act of Parliament that”—

and so on. The Act of Parliament that does that is the European Communities Act 1972 and its amendments, all properly described in a Bill of this kind as the European Communities Act 1972. Our amendment substitutes that absolutely clear and positive statement for the rather vague statement in the Bill. I cannot understand the advantage of vagueness in this context, when precision is possible without any difficulty.

Secondly, I do not regard this as of no value. There is a view in some quarters that when you join the European Union treaty, the legal order of the Union has the effect of making directly effective Union laws in all member states. We in this country have taken the view that it is the Act of Parliament, not the European Union order itself, that gives the Union legislators, particularly in relation to directly effective law, authority in our country. Parliament gave that authority and, as long as Parliament continues to give that authority, that is the basis on which the law is applicable in our country. There is no threat in this to the sovereignty of Parliament, as is sometimes suggested. Parliament, the sovereign Parliament, introduced that Act, and the sovereign Parliament is keeping the Act in position. That is a perfect authority for the legislation from Europe to be given its effect according to European law in this country.

The alternative view that the Union by itself has a legal order which effectively reaches down into the legal systems of member states without further legislation in the member states is, possibly, not all that different in effect from our view, except that I think that theoretically we have the right position here, and I would like to adhere to that.

The difference, although it is a rather narrow one, can have an effect, particularly in relation to the clauses which are called passerelle causes in the Lisbon treaty, where some extension of a European treaty is brought into being by the operation of those provisions. There was a debate in this House some time ago about those in relation to the ratification of the Lisbon treaty. My personal view is that in that situation, the ultimate decision would rest with the courts of this country on whether a particular treaty was binding here. The other point of view would say that the ultimate decision rests with the European Court of Justice. Therefore, Clause 18, stating our position as the basis of the constitutional arrangements for European legislation to be effective here, has importance. I would certainly not like to see it dropped, as long as it is clarified in the way that our amendment suggests.

My noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who is unable to be here tonight because of a long-standing appointment to which he was committed, was kind enough to say, having heard in advance what I was going to say, that he agreed with it. He also wanted to make the point that there was some discussion on the original Explanatory Notes about the basis on which parliamentary sovereignty has been established in this country. He wanted to say as an addition, slightly aside from the substance of the matter, but still with reference to the Explanatory Notes, that the authority for the sovereignty of Parliament in our country is the decisions of the courts, who recognise that authority. There is no possible question about that. I do not see how Parliament itself can establish its own supremacy without it being recognised by the courts of law. That is where the doctrine came from. That is the additional point that my noble friend Lord Lester would have made if he were here, and I am trying to make it for him.

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

When I read Clause 18, I took the view that it corresponds to what is our practice in this country, as explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. That approach has been confirmed in at least two judgments in the courts, as well as in our general practice and how we describe the question of the status of EU law. Why is it here? I understand that clearly. There has been considerable discussion about parliamentary sovereignty, so I understand why the Government have proposed this. Discussion in the House of Commons confirmed that concerns over those issues and whether that should be covered in statute remain. The Government have put it into statute. That does not change the substance, but it must change something, because it is here for the first time in statute; whereas before it was the practice of the courts based on the European Communities Act 1972. That is how it worked. I fully understand all that.

Here we have two amendments. One would leave the text exactly as it is but add something which comes from the Explanatory Note. That point could be looked at carefully, but it does not change Clause 18 as presented by the Government. It is not being changed; something is being added to it. The other amendment, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, changes to a modest degree the text which has been put on the table. It changes it by making explicit that it is by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 that we have recognition of availability in law of EU legislation. It is explicit on that point. It avoids the initial phrase in the Bill, which states:

“It is only by virtue of an Act of Parliament”.

It is a clarification of that point. However, it does not change the basic structure of the way in which we deal with Community legislation. We deal with it by the authority of an Act of Parliament. That is how we operate and it is absolutely imperative to stick to that. It is how we have operated ever since we have been in the European Community—or, now, the European Union—and recognition of that in statute is perfectly reasonable. There are two amendments but, in particular, we have to decide whether the wording of Amendment 59, which makes the situation explicit with the words:

“By virtue of the European Communities Act”,

and does not include the specific phrase:

“It is only by virtue of an Act of Parliament”,

is clearer and more likely to avoid misinterpretation. I tend to favour Amendment 59 for that reason.