Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

The Government respond by saying that their first responders will be able to spot people who are, for example, subjected to modern slavery. However, anyone who has worked in that field knows that it is not just a simple, very short interview that enables people to detect whether someone is subjected to modern slavery. There is a screening process, but how well equipped is that screening process, such that first responders are able to determine that someone is a potential victim? That remains an important question, and this lacuna should be filled by this amendment being supported.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, can I begin by setting the record straight? On Monday, I implied that no noble Lord had mentioned the precedent set in 2004 by the Blair Government in creating an unrebuttable presumption that a list of countries is safe. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who is in his place, for alerting me to the fact that he and the Constitution Committee did refer to this precedent. I apologise to him for not having mentioned that. Both he and the committee excused the precedent because it was a requirement of European law, and it was replaced in 2022, so it would appear that removing such a bad precedent was a Brexit dividend, although I am not conscious that anyone has mentioned that.

The most reverend Primate rebuked me for citing this precedent on the grounds that

“two wrongs do not make a right”.—[Official Report, 4/3/24; col. 1336.]

Of course, neither do two rights make a wrong. I do not recall him, any right reverend Prelate or any lawyer, over the many years that that Act was in place, ever decrying it in the way they decry this proposal. What is the difference? The first is that, in those days, the list was all of white countries, and now we are dealing with a black country. I warn the most reverend Primate that he had better check his white privilege and his colonial assumptions, or he might find himself in trouble with some of his bishops.

The second difference is that this changes a court decision, whereas the 2004 one did not. I remind the House of something that I may, of course, not have heard other noble Lords mention: the advice of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, who said that

“if a judge makes a policy-based decision with which the legislature is not happy, the remedy in a system with parliamentary supremacy, such as we enjoy in the UK, lies with Parliament. Any decision made by a court can always be reversed by the legislature”.

That is what the Bill does, and I hope we will pass it.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

I rise in response to a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who referred to an article in today’s Times written by a Member of the other place, Joanna Cherry. She is, of course, the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, on which I sit. I attended the same meetings as she did with members of the LGBT community in Rwanda and with the chairman of the Legal Aid Forum. I must tell your Lordships that I do not agree with the views that she expressed in the Times. She obviously comes from a political party that disagrees with this policy, and I am afraid that that has coloured her judgment in this regard. I do not find that the evidence that we heard sustains her conclusions.

We heard that Rwanda is a leading light in the region—east Africa—for the LGBT community. As we heard from the noble Baroness during the previous day of Report, this is a country that does not discriminate against LGBT activity and has very strong general protection against discrimination in its constitution. For those reasons, I am afraid I have the misfortune to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Cashman.

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[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose this group of amendments on two grounds. I too want to promote the best interests of the child, but it is not in the interests of the child to be sent on dangerous journeys by land and sea, and in small boats, or to be removed from the care of family, relatives, friends, and a familiar home, to a distant country, to be brought up in care by strangers, where public authorities are stretched to the limit looking after their own children. I hope that the deterrent effect will be taken seriously by parents contemplating sending young children.

Many of the children are discovered, after scientific age assessment, not to be minors. I will not discuss the findings, and there are many different views about the validity of age assessments in this country. But I will take an impartial view from a neighbouring G7 country: that age determination tests have been used and have revealed that many who claim in a sample—I think one of the samples was for 2019—were not so. I draw attention to the analysis of age based on bone age, where radio- graphical evidence suggested that 55% of those claiming to be minors were over the age of 18. In fact, the average age of that 55% was found to be 29.

So, for two reasons, I oppose any change to the Bill, which will weaken the deterrent effect, as these amendments would. First, it is not in the interests of the child to be removed from their family, and not in the interests of the parents. I agree that nobody in this Chamber would probably contemplate doing it, and I do not think we should encourage parents overseas to contemplate doing it. Secondly, without tough conditions on age assessment, people might be encouraged to make false claims.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, makes an important point that provokes in me a question. I understand why the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford and others—all of us, I hope—have the interests of children at heart. I answer her question, “Would we send our child to Rwanda?” by asking her, “Would she send a child in a boat from France, a safe country, to the United Kingdom?” I hope she will answer that before the end of this section. I do not think she would.

In this Bill, we are trying to deter them from coming. I understand the collective view of the Bench of Bishops is that we should not deter but prevent them; we should make prevention—the actions taken by the French police force, the interruption of the people smugglers and so on—effective. If that is the case, will she confirm that it is the policy of the bishops to stop any children getting to this country? If prevention is made effective, they will not be able to—and nor will gay people or pregnant women or the other groups we are concerned about. They will all be prevented. Is that the view she is espousing?

[The Lord Bishop of Chelmsford]

My Lords, I will rise just to answer the question that was put to me. First, I do not speak on behalf of the Church of England; I will be quite clear on that. We are not whipped on these Benches; we speak individually. There happens to be a great deal of agreement among us on these Benches on these issues, but we do not speak with one voice. The question I posed about whether any one of us would want this situation for our children was actually around age assessment. If we found our child or grandchild, or anyone we knew, in this situation, would we want them to be assessed in this way?

As to the question of whether I would ever put a child on a boat, I think that is the wrong question. The point is that, behind every one of these figures, there are individual stories of enormous amounts of trauma that most of us cannot even begin to contemplate. I do not want to make a judgment about what goes on before somebody gets on a boat. I do not know whether it is necessarily parents putting children on the boats; we do not even know what has become of the parents of the children who end up here. I would not want to make a judgment on that.

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[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, there are three amendments in this group, and they are all directed to the provisions of Clause 5 as to how interim measures of the European Court of Human Rights under Rule 39 of its rules are to be dealt with. None of these amendments is to be pressed to a Division, and so, following the example of the noble Baroness, I can be fairly brief.

My Amendment 36 seeks to replace the direction in Clause 5(3) that a court or tribunal of this country

“must not have regard to the interim measure when considering any application or appeal which relates to a decision to remove the person to … Rwanda”

with the provision that a court or tribunal “may” do so.

I have also added my name to Amendment 37, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, which would require a Minister of the Crown to consult the Attorney-General before deciding whether the United Kingdom will comply with the interim measure. Amendment 38, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, deals with the problem that Clause 5 creates more directly, in that it seeks to leave out the clause altogether.

Although we deal with the clause in different ways, we are united in our belief that Clause 5 provides for what will be a plain breach of international law. I do not think that I need to say much about that at this stage, because it was very fully debated in Committee. There are two different views, one way and the other, but I believe that, while that difference of view may remain, it can really be regarded as academic when one has regard to what happens in practice.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said in his contribution to our debate on 19 February that:

“International law has, therefore, reached a settled state of practice and agreement between member states and the Strasbourg court”.—[Official Report, 19/2/24; col. 468.]


That agreement is that interim measures are treated as binding. The United Kingdom has contributed to that settled state, not only by always complying with such measures until now but by calling on other states to do so when it suits our interests.

It is well recognised that custom, such as that in which this country has participated, is a source of international law. That has a long history; much of the civil law system, before the adoption of codes in the time of Napoleon, was built on custom and is still part of the law in certain respects in Jersey. The fact that states act in a consistent manner, as the United Kingdom has done and has called on others to do until now, can be seen as a good indication that member states are under an obligation to do so.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

Will the noble and learned Lord comment on the decision of the French Government to ignore Rule 39 rulings and, in particular, to send someone back to Uzbekistan?

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I was trying to explain that I am not getting engaged in that kind of debate. We have discussed the issue very fully in Committee —this is Report, and I have stated my position. I hope that the noble Lord, who has spoken now, will be content to accept that I can proceed and present my position.

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

But your position is that this is now settled and that member states all agree, when they patently do not.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am not going to respond. As I say, this is Report, and I am adopting a very particular position on settled practice, which the United Kingdom has participated in without exception, ever since the matter first was put into the rules. That being so, the idea that this country can simply unilaterally depart from that practice when it suits it is contrary to international law and is misconceived. My amendment, therefore, seeks to avoid that position and would allow the courts of this country to play a part in the procedure.

The Constitution Committee said in its report that Clause 5(3) raises “serious constitutional concerns”. I agree with that. As the committee put it:

“It is conceivable that a person may bring legal proceedings in the UK to compel a minister to adhere to an interim measure”.


Clause 5(3), as it stands, would prevent our courts giving effect to an interim measure in that way. The committee regarded that as a breach of the principle of the independence of the judiciary, which all Ministers of the Crown are under a duty, under Section 3 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, to uphold.