Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Lea of Crondall Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

My Lords, I very much appreciate the initiative of the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, in tabling this debate. It has attracted the attention of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, who is making his final speech, as, we find with some regret, he described it. I, too, would like to mention not only the noble and learned Lord’s distinguished record from the D-Day landings through to being Chief of the General Staff at the time of the Falklands, but the fact that he is a neighbour in Crondall. One day he said to me, “I don’t know. You’re called Lord Lea of Crondall. Why aren’t I Lord Bramall of Crondall?”. I think the answer is that no one else around the place has a name like “Bramall” but there are plenty of Leas around, and that makes me Lord Lea Crondall, so I am sorry about that.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, has been on a sort of odyssey, if I may call it that. I will not say that it was a conversion on the road to Damascus, because Odysseus had to deal with new changes in the climate on his way back to Troy or wherever he was trying to get to. It is interesting how someone can be a senior serviceman and Member of this House for 25 years and still be fresh for new analysis. We all know the relevant quote from John Maynard Keynes in the economic field: “When the facts change, I reconsider. What do you do?”.

In many ways the noble and gallant Lord’s odyssey was paralleled by someone who influenced me very much. I refer to Lord Garden, a former nuclear bomber pilot and the author of a book on nuclear strategy, who sadly died some years ago. He made an analysis in a publication by the Royal United Services Institute when he was Liberal Democrat defence spokesman in the Lords. He was arguing for leaving the decision on replacing Trident as late as possible. Incidentally, he attracted me to become involved in the group that he set up and chaired for some years, the All-Party Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, which is now chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, who we look forward to hearing from later in this debate.

I shall refer to three points made by Lord Garden. First, he noted rather ruefully that the UK retains some leverage in the process of non-proliferation while it has some weapons, so you have to have some weapons to be involved in non-proliferation. I say “ruefully” because he was more than hinting at the Alice in Wonderland quality of the logic that we are all trying to grapple with.

Secondly, he noted that the opportunity costs of other conventional capabilities are considerable and that the lack of knowledge about conventional needs and available resources so far in advance argues for decisions at the latest possible stage. In a week when we have seen what has happened in Algeria, I think that the truth of the trade-off of conventional, non-nuclear ways of dealing with threats could not be better put.

Thirdly, he noted:

“Nor is it clear that such systems could contribute to our security needs beyond deterring indeterminate future nuclear threats. The constraints of the NPT would cause further complications”.

I find it hard to disagree with that and I cannot think of anyone in this House who would disagree with that. That shows that we have come a long way in the thinking of two very distinguished former military people from the rationale that we bomb Moscow and kill 10 million people as long as they bomb London and can kill 10 million people here.

The Trident replacement study clearly has to be distinguished from the main gate study. Sometimes I wonder whether there is confusion in some minds over what the Trident replacement study is. It certainly does not mean, “Do we replace Trident?”. I think that people are confused about what it means, but it just means looking at what the alternative ways are of delivering nuclear missiles. I can put both the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, right. It is partly my fault that I did not draw this to the noble Lord’s attention. There is nothing wrong with what the noble Lord said about the Written Answer in December but it was only late last week that ordinary mortals saw the text of the coalition agreement, which refers to a decision to publish the report of the alternative review. It was not in the public domain before then. It was announced separately in the House of Commons, even later than the coalition mid-term review at the end of last week, that the review will be published in May this year.

We know that there is a double meaning of “alternatives to Trident”, but at some point we must turn to seeing how this relates not just to alternative ways of using a nuclear warhead but to alternatives to Trident itself. The question arises of how this fits in with multilateral disarmament or a multinational contribution to the non-proliferation process. Common sense would suggest that a contribution to a multilateral process would be along the lines of, “If we do this, will you do that?” That is what normally happens, from being at school onwards. That is what a trade-off is. However, I have not seen any sign of such a proposition, let alone a trade-off in practice. We are told that it is perfectly logical for there to be twin tracks: the track of the nuclear powers looking at their weapons systems and the track of non-proliferation. The trouble is that the non-proliferation industry has become exactly that—it is self-perpetuating and could quite happily go on without anything much being done.

The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, tried to make the case for saying that quite a lot was being done under the treaty and that it was not just a question of people flying around to conferences. The fact is that there is a great danger in letting the present position drift. I refer to the case of Brazil, which has forgone nuclear weapons on the grounds that it believed what it was being told—that we would respect our commitments under article 6 of the non-proliferation treaty. If it thinks that it has been duped and that its agreement was not worth the paper it was written on, that will be very bad for world relationships.

Then there is the argument that we cannot really do anything much of substance. That means that we independently put our nuclear weapons system on the table but the French will not do anything at the same time. This is tantamount to saying, “If the French have got one, we’ve got to have one too”. I can understand our friends across the Channel needing a Gallic symbol—I nearly said a phallic symbol, although it may be that as well. As with two tribes in the South Sea Islands some years ago, it is there to be worshipped. It is never to be used, of course, but it is nice to be seen dangling from the long room roof. However, that is not satisfactory in the present world as a rationale for having Trident.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, who is the chairman of the All-Party Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation, is a great expert on this issue. He will no doubt tell us about the non-nuclear zone in the Middle East. In all of this, that is where I would put my finger on something being very urgent. Huge importance should be attached to the problem of inspection within the regime and the role of the IAEA. When some of us were in Vienna—I have got a long history of being involved with the IAEA for various reasons—and were discussing Iran, it seemed to me that the nuclear powers wanted to push the IAEA procedures to one side. However, we have to recognise the use of the proper procedures in the treaty obligations to which we have signed up and not make things up as we go along.

I look forward to consultation on the main gate decision. Can the Minister say what kind of timescale for consultation there will be on that decision? I do not think anyone in the Chamber would happily contemplate that decision being taken by default.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, on securing this debate on a hugely important issue. We have benefited greatly from the noble Lord’s expertise and, indeed, from that of all those who have spoken today, and none more so than the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall. I take this opportunity to express my sadness at his announcement that today is the last time he will speak in the Chamber. However, I hope we will continue to see him. I am privileged to respond to him in his final debate.

I must admit that I feel very much like my noble friend Lady Miller in responding to a debate surrounded by many speakers with so much expertise, some of whom have been involved in negotiating many of the treaties about which we have spoken and in preparing many of the documents that have been referred to today, and who have great expertise on the battlefield. My own lack of expertise in this area made me question my ability to respond to noble Lords today, but I will try to do so. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Wood, for the work that he has done in government in moving down this path and for acknowledging the role played by this Government in that area.

The UK has long been committed to the goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Successive Governments have played, and continue to play, an active role in helping to build an international environment in which no state feels the need to possess nuclear weapons, but, sadly, we are not there yet. While there continue to be significant risks of further proliferation and other states retain much larger nuclear weapons arsenals, successive Governments have been clear that the UK will retain a minimum credible nuclear deterrent as the ultimate guarantee of our security. I thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, for his supportive words, and my noble friend Lord King for his wise words.

In 2007, Parliament debated, and approved by a clear majority, the decision to continue with the programme to renew the UK’s nuclear deterrent. We set out in the 2010 strategic defence and security review that the Government will,

“maintain a continuous submarine-based deterrent and begin the work of replacing its existing submarines”,

which are due to leave service in the 2020s. This remains the Government’s policy. The Trident Alternatives Study referred to by my right honourable friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury is intended to help the Liberal Democrats to make the case for alternatives to this system, as agreed in the coalition programme for government. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, asked whether we needed a successor to Trident. It is too early to speculate about the conclusions of The Trident Alternatives Study. The study is ongoing and is due to report to the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister in the first half of this year. As we announced in the Government’s mid-term review, an unclassified document will be published in due course.

The current international environment raises—

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

I am sorry to have to ask the Minister to clarify a point, but the interchange with the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, was not based on the supposition that the review was a review of alternatives to having Trident at all but was, rather, a review of alternative ways of delivering a nuclear warhead. The noble Baroness has just implied to the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, that it is also open to looking at alternatives to having a nuclear capability. I do not think that that is quite right. Perhaps she will consider that part of a later consultation on the main-gate decision as to whether we will go ahead at this point with a total replacement of Trident.

[Baroness Warsi]

I think those considerations will probably take place after the next election.

The current international environment raises significant challenges for global disarmament. The greatest barriers remain insecurity and uncertainty, both of which, sadly, there is no shortage of in many parts of the world today. The risk of proliferation, in particular—in North Korea and Iran, of course, but there are also the implications of the technological and information advances that make the spread of knowledge and materials easier—has been a growing concern.

We have heard during this debate some grounds for pessimism but also, I hope, some grounds for optimism. We have moved from living in a world of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, standing to fire at a moment’s notice during the Cold War, to a world in which the major nuclear weapons states have significantly reduced their arsenals, have stopped targeting them at anyone and have reduced their operational readiness. More recently, in 2010 we saw the signing of the new START agreement between the United States and Russia, holders of the largest nuclear stockpiles by far. Under that treaty, both countries agreed to reduce the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers by half and to limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a figure nearly two-thirds lower than that agreed in 1991.

In the same year we saw the agreement of the first ever Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty action plan, in which all 189 signatories reaffirmed their commitment to the treaty and committed to making tangible progress towards our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons. Under that plan, nuclear weapons states all committed to making concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, including reducing the overall global stockpile and reducing further the role and significance of nuclear weapons in our military doctrines. Next year we will set out publicly how we have made progress on this action plan.

The UK continues to lead from the front. We take this issue extremely seriously. First, having led by example through our own actions, we are working to help build the trust and mutual confidence between states needed to achieve multilateral disarmament. We play a leading role across efforts to put in place the practical building blocks that will support that disarmament. Secondly, we are working with the international community to make it as hard as possible for others to develop, produce or acquire nuclear weapons. The UK’s own record on nuclear disarmament is strong.

The noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, is right to say that fewer nuclear weapons must surely be better for all. We have greatly reduced the number of our nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War. For almost 20 years now, our nuclear weapons have been de-targeted and placed on several days’ notice to fire. We have built on that strong record, announcing in our 2010 strategic defence and security review that we are reducing our requirements for operationally available warheads from fewer than 160 to no more than 120, reducing our overall stockpile to no more than 180 and reducing the number of warheads on board our submarines from 48 to 40 and the number of operational missiles to no more than eight. I can assure the noble Lord, Lord Judd, that our policy is to have the minimum credible deterrent and that the UK would consider using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO allies.

We have shown considerable leadership in reducing our nuclear weapon holdings and in increasing the transparency around them. We have demonstrated what is possible. This is a key part of our contribution towards building the right environment for multilateral disarmament. But of course unilateral actions will not produce the results that the world expects and demands. It is only through moving forward together, through balanced and reciprocal disarmament, that we will achieve a world without nuclear weapons. We can achieve this only by building trust between states that will convince all of them that they can safely disarm.

That is why the UK instigated a dialogue among the P5 states in London in 2009, when we reaffirmed our unconditional support for the non-proliferation treaty and engaged in meaningful dialogue—as mentioned by the noble Lord opposite—aimed at building the mutual understanding needed to help us take forward our shared disarmament commitments. Since then, we have held further dialogues, in Paris in 2011 and Washington last year, and met in between to discuss disarmament issues.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, asked what future plans we have. The P5 will hold a fourth conference, hosted by Russia, in April this year. In the NPT preparatory committee, discussions as to its format are ongoing. In order to maximise the value of this ongoing dialogue, it will be important to maintain momentum at that next conference. We will need to be able to demonstrate progress across a range of issues, especially on our plans to report on the commitments we all made in the 2010 NPT action plan. It is an issue on which the international community is looking to the P5 to provide a lead, and the UK will be at the heart of the efforts to achieve this.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, also asked what Her Majesty’s Government were doing to help achieve the Middle East weapons of mass destruction free zone. The Foreign Office Minister, Alistair Burt, made a statement on this issue on 24 November last year, in which he said:

“The British Government supports the objective of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East. We regret that it will not be possible to convene a successful conference to be attended by all states of the region as planned in 2012. More preparation and direct engagement between states of the region will be necessary to secure arrangements that are satisfactory to all”.

He continued:

“We support the convening of a conference as soon as possible. We endorse fully the work of the Conference Facilitator … to build consensus on next steps ... We will continue to work with our fellow convenors (the US, Russia, and the UN), with the Facilitator, and with countries of the region, to meet our undertakings to convene a conference on this important issue, as soon as possible”.

Building confidence between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states is equally important if we are to find a realistic route towards global disarmament. To that end, we have been conducting groundbreaking work with Norway on the verification of warhead dismantlement, which will be a crucial aspect of any future global disarmament regime. This initiative has been the first time that a nuclear weapons state has engaged in such an open way with a non-nuclear weapons state on such a sensitive issue.

Both we and Norway have learnt a huge amount through this initiative about how nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states can work together effectively in pursuit of our shared goal. We have shared what we have learnt so far with the P5, and with a range of non-nuclear weapons states, and we will continue to share developments as we move forward. Building on this first, we are also working with Brazil to develop a disarmament-focused dialogue. The UK is unique among the P5 in launching such initiatives with non-nuclear weapon states. It is a crucial part of our contribution towards building the right environment for multilateral disarmament.

As well as improving collective trust and understanding, we need to continue our efforts to make it as difficult as possible to develop and produce nuclear weapons, particularly by those who pose a threat to global security. On this the UK is making a strong contribution. We have signed and ratified the comprehensive test ban treaty. Indeed, we were, along with France, the first to do so. We are vocal campaigners for the entry into force of the treaty, and we will continue to take every opportunity to urge all those who have not yet signed and ratified it to do so. We continue to actively support the need to negotiate an international fissile material cut-off treaty, which would put an end to the future production of the material needed to make nuclear weapons. We are firm supporters, too, of nuclear weapons free zones, which literally shrink the geographical space within which nuclear weapons can exist.

The UK has signed and ratified the protocols to three nuclear weapons free zones, in South America and the Caribbean, in Africa and in the South Pacific. We support the objective of a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, as I have already mentioned, and we continue to push for the convening of that conference. The UK is also active in seeking to reduce the risk of proliferation from the civil nuclear sector, and strongly supports a universal safeguards system to uphold the NPT’s non-proliferation regime. The IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol should be the universal verification standard for all NPT state parties. We continue to urge all those who have not yet done so to sign and ratify it.

The risks of proliferation are all too real. The international community was reminded of this following North Korea’s most recent satellite launch on 13 December, which enabled it to test ballistic missile technology and violated two UN Security Council Resolutions. Its continuing efforts to sell dangerous proliferation-sensitive technology to other countries must also be a focus for our efforts. We, with our E3+3 partners, continue to pursue negotiations with Iran. We remain fully committed to the ongoing diplomatic process and to finding a peaceful, negotiated solution that leads to full compliance by Iran with UN Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors’ resolutions. Urgent, concrete steps need to be taken by Iran to allow progress. In 2012, the E3+3 met Iran four times to discuss its nuclear programme. Despite frank and lengthy discussions, significant differences remain and the Iranian position remains intransigent. We hope that Iran comes to the next round of talks ready and willing to take the steps needed to address the international community’s serious concerns.

The risk of new states acquiring nuclear weapons is grave—but so, too, is the risk of sensitive knowledge and materials falling into the hands of non-state actors. The UK played a key role at last year’s Seoul nuclear security summit and remains committed to shaping the direction of global nuclear security. Our G8 presidency will see us chair the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. This 25-country partnership channels around $2 billion per year to programmes to counter proliferation risks. In 2012, UK contributions helped secure 775 bombs’ worth of fissile material in Kazakhstan; create new jobs for 3,000 former Soviet Union weapon scientists; and, through collaboration with the IAEA, deliver physical protection upgrades and nuclear and biological security training around the world.

The noble Lord, Lord Wood, referred to the CTBT and asked about our campaign for the entry into force of the treaty. We will continue to take every opportunity to urge all those who have not yet signed and ratified it to do so. We continue actively to support the need to negotiate an international fissile material cut-off treaty that would put an end to the future production of the material needed to make nuclear weapons.

The noble Lord, and my noble friend Lady Williams, referred to Pakistan. I assure them both that we continue to press Pakistan to end its block on the start of negotiations in the conference on disarmament, and will continue to work with partners in the conference to find a solution that will allow us to take forward our commitments under the 2010 action plan. The UK remains committed to shaping the direction of global security. We fully recognise the importance of the nuclear security summit process and are working closely with local partners in laying the groundwork for what we want: an ambitious 2014 summit.

The noble Lord, Lord Wood, also asked about CASD. The Prime Minister made it clear that CASD remains the backbone of our deterrence posture. It ensures a constant, credible and capable deterrent against threats to the UK’s vital interests and to our NATO allies. As my honourable friend Philip Dunne stated in the Commons last week, by being continuously at sea the deterrent maximises our political freedom of manoeuvre in a crisis.

The noble Lord, Lord Lea, asked about the main-gate decision. I note his point, but a decision on this has not been made. I will write to him if we have any further information.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, asked about the relevance of a post-Cold War nuclear deterrent. There are still substantial nuclear arsenals, the number of nuclear-armed states has increased rather than decreased, and there is a significant risk of new nuclear-armed states emerging. Several countries that either have nuclear weapons or are trying to acquire them are in regions that suffer from serious instability or are subject to significant regional tensions, so there is still the potential for a new nuclear threat to emerge despite the end of the Cold War.

We have never claimed that our nuclear capability is an all-purpose deterrent. The UK has a wide range of policies and capabilities to deter the range of potential threats that it might face, including terrorism and cyberattacks. Not all capabilities are relevant to all threats.

The UK strongly supports the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and is active in helping to build the international environment that we hope will deliver this. We have shown considerable leadership in reducing our own nuclear weapons capabilities and in offering reassurances about the very limited and discrete circumstances in which we may contemplate their use. We have been instrumental in efforts to build the trust needed between nuclear weapons states to make progress multilaterally; we have led the way among nuclear weapons states in engaging with non-nuclear weapons states to try to take positive, concrete steps forward; and we are firmly committed to putting in place the practical building blocks that will support multilateral disarmament by making it as difficult as possible to develop and produce nuclear weapons. The CTBT, a fissile material cut-off treaty and the strengthening of non-proliferation and nuclear security regimes are all areas in which we work. Our contribution towards the goal of multilateral disarmament is and will continue to be strong. We will take every opportunity to pursue our resolute commitment to a world without nuclear weapons.