Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to be the back-marker on Report. Amendment 59 inserts text into the schedule that sets up the process for appointments to the Trade Remedies Authority, so that the chair can be appointed by the Secretary of State,

“following a report from the International Trade Committee of the House of Commons”.

In effect, this includes the chair of the Trade Remedies Authority in the list of appointments that are subject to pre-appointment scrutiny.

I do not do this lightly. There are about 1,000 senior public appointments, only 50 of which are subject to pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees. The Cabinet Office guidance on this was amended then reissued in January. Paragraph 8 sets out three criteria, the first of which says that such appointments should be for,

“posts which play a key role in regulation of actions by Government”.

This clearly must be satisfied as it determines one of the essential roles of the Department for International Trade in investigating and recommending trade remedies. Secondly, the appointments must be,

“posts which play a key role in protecting and safeguarding the public’s rights and interests in relation to the actions and decisions of Government”.

This instance may not be about the public, but certainly it ticks the box for the business community, which would regard the TRA as one of the most important bodies impacting on its interests in relation to the actions of the Government. Thirdly, the guidance says that appointments subject to pre-appointment hearings must be,

“posts in organisations that have a major impact on public life or the lives of the public where it is vital for the reputation and credibility of that organisation that the post holder acts, and is seen to act, independently of Ministers and the Government”.

Noble Lords will recall that, at a much earlier stage, we debated whether this body should be independent. The Government, having looked around the world, decided that the Trade Remedies Authority should be independent, and seen to be independent. We have three ticks in the box. This is clearly an important appointment; for the Department for International Trade, it must be regarded as the most important appointment. I do not know of any other posts that it is presently asked to scrutinise prior to appointment. This seems a perfectly reasonable way to proceed; nor does it constrain Ministers too far, as we have discovered. Ministers have to consult and liaise with Select Committees, respond to them and take account of what they have said, but they do not have to do what a Select Committee says and in quite a number of instances have not done so. Ministers can still make the appointments that they consider to be the right ones. I do not feel that I am holding the Government back from doing what they need to do. I am just encouraging them to include this appointment in that list. I beg to move.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I support the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, and congratulate him on the succinctness with which he has made his point. I have been confused for some time as to why the department might resist this. He has made the points exactly as I would have done. This is a key role with a public-facing responsibility and will hold the Government to account on issues of great importance. Indeed, it is the only body that the DIT will have as a marker; it behoves the department to raise the TRA to the appropriate level so that it is seen to have the importance that the department claims for it. For these reasons, it is absolutely right that we have an established routine that the person selected by the Minister to be the chair of this body—we are not expecting the same to happen for the chief executive or more junior staff, just the chair—should be seen by the International Trade Committee. As he says, it is a courtesy in some senses because the Minister can still appoint should they wish to do so. I support the amendment.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lansley]

I am glad to have the opportunity to speak to Amendment 9 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Amendment 9 follows our constructive discussions in Committee and outside the Chamber with the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and his colleagues on the question of the trade preference scheme, typically referred to as the generalised scheme of preferences in the European Union context.

A generalised scheme of preferences or the trade preference scheme established by this country would be one intended to give unilateral access to our markets for the products of some of the least and less-developed economies, assisting in their economic progress.

In so far as we have been discussing continuity, the intention is for the United Kingdom to maintain some continuity between the European Union preference scheme and a future preference scheme in the United Kingdom. However, I want to talk about where there may be scope for differences. If noble Lords want to look at the measure, it can be found in Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. That is why the amendment amends that Act, not to interfere with its revenue-raising functions but in relation to the scrutiny to be applied to regulations to establish a trade preference scheme.

Under that Act, when the Government bring in a trade preference scheme, the first such regulations will be subject to an affirmative procedure. As I understand it, the scheme may be established in line with the existing European Union preference scheme. However, it will be helpful for me to raise a number of issues with the Minister to give him a chance to put the Government’s intentions on record—as he helpfully did on the last group—about the character of the regulations and the extent of detail to be provided.

First, when we looked at Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, we found it very difficult to relate that directly to what is in the EU’s preference scheme. That is mostly because the EU’s preference scheme does not include those countries with which it has association agreements that effectively supersede and replace the unilateral preferences. They have entered into bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

Whereas “least-developed countries” corresponds directly and derives from a UN classification, the list of “other eligible developing countries” is referenced to a World Bank classification, “among other things”. It is not the same as the classification by the World Bank. In particular, it would be helpful if my noble friend would confirm whether it is the Government’s intention to follow the EU practice and to identify in that category a sub-category of “vulnerable developing countries”. I think the intention of the unilateral scheme of preferences is to support economic development in circumstances where they are not the poorest countries of the world but none the less have significant issues—often they are structural or governance issues—that require additional preferential support.

Secondly, can access to preferences be suspended or withdrawn, as Section 10 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act makes clear, in recognition of or in consequence of human rights abuses in those countries or in relation to United Nations sanctions? Will the regulations make that clear?

Thirdly, what is the situation where the availability of this unilateral system of preferences none the less gives rise to dumping? I remember way back in 1981 that I was responsible in the Department of Trade and Industry for the generalised scheme of preferences as it applied to chemical products. The dumping of petrochemicals produced in Middle Eastern countries illustrated this point: the fact that one is a developing country does not necessarily mean that one does not have the ability to have serious competitive issues with producers in this country.

Where preferences might lead to dumping, or to subsidy, or to an increase in imports that could give rise to injury to markets and producers in this country, will the Secretary of State under the regulations be required to ask the Trade Remedies Authority to investigate any such complaint? As is the case elsewhere in the Act, will the Secretary of State be required only to act and to implement remedies in so far as the Trade Remedies Authority itself determines that there is a need to act and in line with its recommended remedy? It is not clear in the 2018 Act that the Trade Remedies Authority is required to be used by the Secretary of State in relation to the preference scheme.

Will the first set of regulations make clear the overall structure of the preferences scheme? Will it also make clear the structure in relation to specific products from developing countries, which are not to have the unilateral nil duty of tariff but are to be treated as graduated products? This sometimes happens for reasons of relative competitiveness or due to the need to protect industries in this country—as might, for example, be the case with textile imports from India or Bangladesh. Will the availability of the preferences for those graduated products be specified in the regulations, so that the two Houses can look in detail at the way in which the preference scheme is to vary in relation to certain sectors and certain countries, which might give rise to differences between the EU scheme and our scheme? Clearly there are graduated products, particularly in the agricultural sphere, where the protection afforded is to southern European producers for certain agricultural products that have no relevance in the United Kingdom. This could be true for industrial products as well.

As was said in the previous group of amendments, that is my list. I hope the regulations will include—but not necessarily be limited to—those details. There may be other issues that noble Lords will want to make sure are set out by the first regulations. It will be helpful for us to have an idea because, depending on circumstances, it may not be long before the shape of the trade preference scheme becomes clear in detail, not just in its overall application, as was set out in the 2018 Act.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I rise briefly to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which I have signed up to. The meeting that he referred to was extremely helpful in drawing out some of the confusion that emerged during our first debate in Committee. The issues of how countries get on to the lists, how the lists get managed and shaped, and how the changes might come forward were all explored carefully; we now have a much better understanding. In these lists, there are bound to be curious decisions which do not seem to match up to one’s perspectives. I was in Tanzania on holiday recently and it certainly did not come across as one of the least-developed countries, although clearly there are issues around how it will progress and develop its own trading arrangements.

The point behind the amendment is to get on record some further points that have emerged. The noble Lord was kind enough to suggest that we might have further questions, but his all-encompassing knowledge and brilliant, incisive questions are quite enough for me.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 4th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

We can be relatively brief on these amendments; they are substantial in their drafting, and the points have been made so we do not need to repeat them. We have been dealing until now with the procedures and set-up of the new body. These are proposals for guidance on some of the ways in which future policy might be developed and taken forward. Having said that, Amendment 85 follows an exchange in the other place, where it was confirmed that there would be an appeals mechanism, but there is still no reference to that in the Bill, as far as I can see. This is a suggestion for a way in which the appeals mechanism—which should be there or, as agreed in principle, will be there—against decisions by the TRA and the Secretary of State might be set out. I offer it to the Government for their consideration.

[Lord Lansley]

I am not clear. Is the noble Lord’s intention behind the amendment that the Upper Tribunal would look at the merits of the decision or simply at the processes? Are we simply talking about a judicial review process?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I will get through this very quickly and then questions can flow in. Amendment 85, which has already been accepted, therefore sets out an appeals process for the Government to respond to. Amendment 86 relates to how these are disposed of and the procedures for that. The two go together and will be difficult to separate, but again the Government must take that forward.

We have already had reference to how recommendations from the TRA for action or no action would be based on two issues—an economic interest test and a public interest test—but we do not have any definition of those. They are obviously good ideas and sensible approaches, around which decisions can be placed, but the narrow question of what they constitute and, more importantly, how they would be kept in scope with how people’s views change over time, is not dealt with in the Bill. Therefore, Amendment 87, which deals with the public interest test, and Amendment 88, which deals with the economic interest test, set out not so much the detail of what they consist of but the process under which they might be organised.

[Lord Lansley]

I agree that the public interest test is not defined anywhere, but is the economic interest test not defined in paragraph 23 of Schedule 5 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act?

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for his interventions, which are always helpful, but I was going on to say that the economic interest test is different from the public interest test because some aspects of it are fleshed out. But the intention of Amendment 88 is to extend that slightly to ensure that two things happen. The first is that there should be a consultation about what the economic interest test is among those whose interests might be affected by it. Those involved in,

“employment, economic health and prosperity, and productivity”,

which includes trade unions, businesses and consumers, should be consulted on how one constitutes the economic test.

Secondly, it is important that the test must reach not just for a national economic view but down to a regional, or even sub-regional, point of view. The suggestion would be for the devolved Administrations and for the various regions of England to be parts of a group that could respond on things. Clearly, an economic test dealing with a small aspect of the ceramics industry based in a particular area will be different from one dealing with a major national employment issue.

Again, these amendments are not meant to be accepted as written, but they are probing suggestions to get the Government to flesh out in more detail their thinking behind this.

We always talk about what is in the public interest but never define what that means. I am not trying to define it. I am saying that it would be useful to have a process under which, from time to time, a Secretary of State who wished to employ that as part of the process for the TRA had to consult and then come forward with proposals through Parliament for what that constituted. That is what these amendments are all about.

Finally, Amendment 89 in my name suggests that TRA investigations can be considered complete only when they involve the devolved Administrations and the devolved authorities. I hope that will also commend itself to the Government. I beg to move.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 23rd January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara (Lab)]

My Lords, I sense there has been a bit of a change in the composition of the House—I cannot imagine why, because we have reached some of the more interesting elements of the Bill. Had the noble Viscount, Lord Ridley, who is absent, been present, he might have learned quite a lot. That will help me avoid the more sharply put questions.

Amendment 27 is a probing amendment in the sense that it is there to invite the Government to set out their plans, should they be necessary, in relation to GSP, the EU’s generalised scheme of preference. It is open to a wider range of issues, and in his dual capacity as Minister responsible for development, the noble Lord, Lord Bates, might well have a view that will add to our overall understanding of where we are. The noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has a similar amendment, although it is much more detailed and sharply drafted than mine is, and I look forward to hearing his comments.

It can be said in very few words that one of the things that one gets by being part of the EU is participation in schemes of the type that is being discussed here, which is an attempt to try to bring some sort of structure and order to the way in which trading relationships can sometimes impact on development activity and vice versa, by recognising that very often a good trading opportunity in a developing country is perhaps going to do more than any amount of aid, however well delivered and whatever focus it has. On the other hand, the impact of either favourable tariffs, reduced costs or support for various aspects of work on the trading side of that relationship can have quite a devastating effect.

It is to the credit of the EU—and I am sure that Ministers have been heavily involved in the shaping of the way this goes—that the GSP arrangement is being set up so that it is constantly monitored. We have recently seen the interim relationship of that. In short, the results are broadly supportive of the way the EU has taken forward this programme, with some reservations in the sense that it is probably too soon to say quite what some of the outcomes will be. It is recognising that there are longer-term benefits that will not be picked up by short-term measuring techniques, and of course there are dangers that come in relation to trying to focus too narrowly on some of the econometric figures without thinking about some of the wider social issues.

The GSP relationship, combined with Everything But Arms arrangements, is a way of seeing development happen in a constructive and progressive way, which is something that we support. In moving this amendment, I invite the Government to respond to the thoughts behind it. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, in following the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, I am grateful for his kind remarks about my amendment. I was not required to produce any amendments and I produce relatively few but, by virtue of his responsibilities, he has to produce quite a lot of them so I think we will forgive him for the sighting shot that, in a sense, many of these amendments are at this stage.

The generalised scheme of preferences, for those who are reading our debate afterwards—I am sure that many will do so—is about giving preferential tariff reductions to developing countries to stimulate their economies and their exports to the European Union, as one of the world’s largest potential markets. It can be fairly said that it is something that we subscribe to and that we encourage. For that reason, in the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018, the Government and Parliament have already legislated for a preference scheme in the future. Therefore, that is not the issue, which is why my amendment is structured in the way that it is. The issue is: how do we go about this? That is the point of Amendment 27. How far should the United Kingdom’s preference scheme—that is, the unilateral preferential tariff rates that we offer to developing countries—be structured in such a way as to correspond directly to what is presently the generalised scheme of preferences as reflected in EU regulations?

The starting point for this is that the EU regulations will last until the end of 2023. For the purposes of this debate, I am going to assume that we are not in a customs union with the European Union, because if we were that would automatically solve this problem. Therefore, we are outside the customs union and we have to make our own decisions about to whom we give a preferential tariff rate and when we vary from it. We did not have a debate here on the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act because it attracted financial privilege, so we are getting the benefit of that now. Quite a lot of the debate on the relationship with developing countries focuses on tariff reduction. That is important but, for the least developing countries, the objective is nil tariffs on—as it is expressed—everything but arms and ammunition. That is reflected in Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act. For the other developing countries—the eligible developing countries, as they are known—there is an objective to try to reduce tariffs to the fullest extent possible. That is already in there.

But of course the issue then is: under what circumstances do we depart from that? The fact that the GSP says nil tariffs does not mean that in all circumstances that is maintained. The European Union has not done this, but the regulation would permit the European Union to suspend the nil tariff, or indeed to withdraw the preferential rate, in respect of transgressions on the part of other states. That is a possibility where a country has flagrantly been abusing human rights. If a country chose to produce large numbers of goods for export to other countries on the basis of a flagrant disregard for child labour laws, for example, should one continue to offer a preferential rate? Many of us would say that we should not necessarily do that. We should then suspend the preferential rate in some circumstances where human rights abuses and the rule of law have ceased. The European Union has not permitted countries to be in the Everything But Arms GSP, so we have to make those judgments under those circumstances.

The point of my Amendment 65 is to say, as we proceed, that we should start with a scheme that conforms to the structure of the EU regulation, because everything is starting from the position of continuity—that happy word—but we would have the ability to move on. We may make our own judgments about the circumstances in which we would suspend or withdraw the preferential rate. It might apply in the circumstances I described. It might equally apply if we had to safeguard the industry of the United Kingdom. The same would be true in the EU, but we might choose to do it in different circumstances. For example, last week the EU applied a safeguard measure in relation to imports of rice from Cambodia and Myanmar. That may not be something that we in the United Kingdom would choose to do because we do not take the same view about rice production in this country as, for example, they do in southern European states. There will be differences and we will have industries to protect, but we do not necessarily have to follow the same approach as the European Union.

As a way of proceeding, my amendment would insert into the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, under those circumstances, that the Government should come forward to Parliament, make a report and seek views before proceeding down the path of suspending or withdrawing this preferential rate, because we should be participants in that discussion.

There should also be an intention before January 2024—when the EU regulation expires—to look independently from the European Union at what our future structure on preferential rates should be. In my amendment I suggest that the Government should report to Parliament by the end of 2022 on their proposals, with a view to legislation being passed by the end of 2023 for introduction from 1 January 2024. Of course, EU competence has dominated this area of policy, but the time will come for Parliament to think about what our trade policy looks like in terms of unilateral preference rates for developing countries.

It is quite difficult even to work out the relationship between our structure of preferential rates and the EU’s. Simply to say continuity is probably misleading because I cannot actually find absolute correspondence between the benefiting countries under the EU’s standard generalised scheme of preferences, or what it calls its GSP+, which is for eight vulnerable countries. I cannot even find that we can correspond between that and what is set out in Schedule 3 to the Act. For Everything But Arms, the list is the same, so we know where we are with that. I think I found 28 EU countries that benefited from the standard GSP or the GSP+, but 43 countries that are intended to benefit from what is referred to in Schedule 3 to the Act as “other eligible developing countries”. The difference is obvious: the EU does not include formally the GSP countries which, by virtue of other agreements, have access to tariff reductions that are at least as good as would be available under the GSP—for example, it has association agreements with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and so on.

For us to replicate the EU’s GSP would mean significantly fewer countries having access to the GSP and to those preferential rates than would be the case in the European Union. I just say gently to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, that that is another reason why he and I will have to go away and think about our amendments again. It is not about reproducing the GSP regulation or the EU’s list. It is about ourselves arriving at a full list of the developing countries, particularly those which are not the least developing but countries eligible for the GSP that should get preferential rates but at the moment get them through other EU agreements. Those are not necessarily free trade agreements that will get rolled over. I am not aware that this is necessarily the case for all these association agreements; it may be for some, but not necessarily for all of them.

Therefore, I commend Amendment 65 to the extent that it raises the issue of having our own scheme, consulting on it and asking Parliament when we have to change the preferential rates. I do not commend it to the extent that I think it can be adopted at this stage, but I think we should come back to it. I hope Ministers will be willing to look at that and how they would go about managing the preferential scheme in the future.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord Lansley and Lord Stevenson of Balmacara

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansarad): House of Lords
Monday 21st January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

My Lords, the previous debate was about process and how approval mechanisms were in play. This amendment has been grouped with Amendment 5, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which I support.

Amendment 4 shows the sorts of arrangements and concerns that we might have in trying to ensure that procurement works more generally in favour of social objectives—a point made earlier by my noble friend Lord Monks about the work he did in Europe in relation to trade Bills and discussions on these areas. We do not need to spend much time on Amendment 4. The list that appears in it is a familiar one to anyone involved in policy on business during the last three or four years. There has been a sense of the Government beginning to emerge from a period of non-engagement with many of these issues into having similar concerns to those on this side of the House about the way in which it is occasionally necessary for government to raise standards, by making it clear that certain behaviour within business is not acceptable. For example, many Members of the House present today will be aware of the long-running saga over the maximum periods for payment of invoices. Over the years, we have tried to get some movement; yes, there has been some, but it would be nice to see the Government pick up and run with this issue for a change.

The list in the amendment is variable in what it does. There are some high-level issues, for example, to do with,

“the transparency of laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement”.

I hope that that provision would be unexceptional. The amendment refers to,

“minimum employment standards, rates of pay and similar employment rights”,

which I think feature in the Statement that we are shortly to receive which was made in the other place earlier this afternoon. I have mentioned the payment of invoices and the scandal of late payment; the drag on the economy from that is now worth something like £40 billion. The list also refers to,

“environmental standards … human rights obligations … equalities legislation”,

and all those arrangements have been well worked through in terms of discussion. Would it be so difficult to require that anything done under the GPA in relation to Her Majesty’s Government’s work, or by those devolved authorities which are also involved, tries to ensure that we raise standards in the workplace? These proposals are worthy of consideration and I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, Amendment 5 is in my name. At the risk of being chided gently by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, to an extent I guess it must be regarded as moving from continuity. We will inevitably enter a series of such debates, but this Committee will be none the less useful for at least exposing some of the issues that policymakers will need to consider as they look at using the powers that we propose to give the Government.

Amendment 5 is intended to reflect that under the government procurement agreement, a number of other countries—not the European Union—take the opportunity to put in exceptions to their procurement arrangements that are consistent with pursuing objectives for promoting small and medium-sized enterprises in their own economies. I suppose that the most prominent such example is the Small Business Act in America. Those countries have done this because, in certain circumstances, it can lead to some discriminatory behaviour on the part of government entities undertaking procurement. I freely acknowledge that the European Union does not do this; essentially, because it takes the view that it has created EU public procurement rules that are intended to be wholly non-discriminatory. Those are non-discriminatory between all 28 member states and, by extension, the view the EU took was that it would be unreasonable for it to attempt to discriminate between EU and non-EU countries in taking advantage of the general procurement agreement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I fully accept what my noble friend has said, and I am sorry if I misrepresented him. I think he has the right point there. It picks up what I was going to say about the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, that contracting is often seen in terms of large contracts issued by central government to very large manufacturers, and of course it is not like that. The work of the BEIS department in setting up not only the industrial strategy itself but the way it will roll out to the smaller end of the market is a very important element of that. I am sure we all accept that there is a future there for a much broader engagement with big and small projects, but also for a wider range of activity where innovation, skills, flexibility of movement and the ability to adapt to new environments—such a hallmark of SMEs—are used and capitalised on for the benefit of our public good.

In a sense, it is good to hear from the Minister the progress in setting and achieving high standards in our procurement arrangements. The points that need to be brought forward are not just the range and need for these issues to be picked up in all our consideration of contracting; we must not be left behind if other countries are using the GPA, or indeed other measures, to achieve change in their environment and economies, and benefiting from it. We must not miss out on that; we need to have a strategy for it.

The points made about the SME end of the market, particularly in relation to making sure—

[Lord Lansley]

I am sorry for interrupting. It might be helpful to say that one thing it would be useful for the Government to look at is that, other things being equal, we want other countries not to put down exceptions or engage in any discriminatory behaviour and to be as open as we can possibly make them. We should therefore at least look at what a number of other countries seek to do by putting down their own exemptions—such as the US, in relation to the Small Business Act—and from that arrive at an understanding of what position we will be in relative to them. The GPA should be very much about reciprocal openness of markets, rather than discriminatory behaviour.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I absolutely agree with that.

My final point is to pick up on the SMEs and the need to consider them not so much as one amorphous group but to try to find ways of reaching out to them in terms of how they operate. I think there is a feeling abroad—it may not be correct—that the Government have a one-size-fits-all approach. That will not work when you are trying to look for innovation, change and the other points I mentioned. So, picking up the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Livingston, we should be very careful about how they can contribute and what will make them engage more than they currently do. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said we should make sure we have material help that is actually useful to them, rather than them having to fill in thousands of forms and go through impenetrable websites—I think we are all quite aware that that happens; indeed, we have had examples in this House. I think the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Risby— that there is so much there that can be done—was also well taken. It is an effort we all have to be engaged in if we are going to do it. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.