European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill Debate

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Department: Department for International Development

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts
Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 14th January 2020

(4 years, 3 months ago)

Lords Chamber
Read Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 16-II Second marshalled list for Committee - (14 Jan 2020)
It is important to note that the power is restricted to making provisions which implement, supplement or deal only with matters arising out of the relevant sections in the agreement relating to social security co-ordination; I reassure the House on that point. That is why we cannot accept this amendment, which would sunset the powers to make regulations only two years after the end of the limitation period, whereas the withdrawal agreement social security co-ordination provisions have no such sunset and potentially may last decades for many people. To put an expiration date on the power could therefore prevent the UK ensuring—
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
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I understand the point the Minister is making and that the scope of action is limited to the areas covered in the withdrawal agreement—I understand all that. However, would it not be more reassuring to recipients if the sunset clause were there, and if changes could be made only after the expiry of the period by primary legislation? I understand the argument, but if the argument is reassurance, surely it is more reassuring to people that changes could be made only by primary legislation than that they could be made using these Henry VIII powers laid out in these provisions.

Lord Bethell Portrait Lord Bethell
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My Lords, the point is well made, and I understand the desire of the Houses to keep scrutiny on measures, which is entirely fair. However, in this case, confidence, solidity and a sense of commitment can be promised and delivered by the Government only if they do not have the fear that the pipeline of legislation going through the House might delay important technical changes and hold up the delivery of these benefits. It would put a huge pressure on these Houses of a kind that is not realistic or reasonable to have the entire legislative timetable of our proceedings held hostage to the microchanges and small needs of EU social security regulations and improvements, which may in decades to come affect only hundreds of thousands of people and require small administrative changes in regulations.

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Lord Keen of Elie Portrait Lord Keen of Elie
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I am obliged to all noble Lords who have contributed. Like many noble Lords who have already spoken, I am conscious of the sensitivities that surround the devolved settlement that could impinge upon its success in the future.

Let us be clear: Clause 15 is essential to implement our international legal obligation under the withdrawal agreement and under the EEA-EFTA separation agreement, which requires that we establish an independent monitoring authority. I hope that it also demonstrates our commitment to protecting the rights of those citizens covered by the agreements. Therefore, it is necessary for Clause 15 to stand part of the Bill.

Of course, the IMA will offer an important layer of additional protection over and above the wide range of complaint and appeal routes that already exist for EU citizens in the United Kingdom. However, expanding the IMA scope through Amendment 57—as proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves—would, I fear, divert the body’s resources from its important role monitoring citizens’ rights and obligations. Therefore, I would resist such an amendment. It also risks creating unhelpful duplication, with all the confusion and wasted resources that could accompany that, so I invite the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, to withdraw that amendment.

The withdrawal agreement requires that the IMA be established by the end of the implementation period; that is the goal. The appointment of an interim chief executive to the IMA—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Greaves—is considered vital to meeting that deadline, as it will be essential from the point of view of staffing and procurement decisions that will need to be taken in advance of that date. Indeed, there have been other examples of interim chief executives being appointed to such bodies in order that suitable preparation can be made for them to be up and running at the appropriate time. Removing that provision through Amendment 47 would jeopardise the timely establishment of the IMA, and risk putting us in breach of our international law obligations. I hope that I have explained the rationale for that approach.

In order to give full and proper effect to our obligations in international law, we have designed the IMA to be robust and independent, in line with the best practice for the establishment of new public bodies. While I understand the intention behind a number of the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, which he perceives as strengthening the independence and robustness of the IMA, I hope I can assure him that they are unnecessary. I appreciate that they are essentially probing amendments in order that we can explain the position.

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Portrait Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
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Perhaps I may probe a little further. The independence of this authority is important—important because we have agreed to introduce an independent authority and important to those whose affairs it will be keeping an eye on.

When I was a Permanent Secretary, I would have had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that a number of non-departmental bodies could be abolished and their functions transferred elsewhere because it would be more efficient, effective and economical to do so. The test in paragraph 39(2) of Schedule 2 is not hard for the Executive to meet. Does the Minister think that the body is more likely to be independent, feel independent and be seen as independent if it is continually under the threat of the sentence of death in paragraph 39(1), which says that its powers can be transferred? I agree that it is a habit for quangos to survive long beyond their natural useful lives, but what is the rationale for this power transfer by regulation? Is the Minister convinced that the test of efficiency, effectiveness and economy does not slightly conflict with the requirement for independence?