Turkey: Free Trade Agreement

Lord Kerr of Kinlochard Excerpts

Tuesday 27th April 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB) [V]]

I wanted to raise three points and one more general one. First, British goods exporters are now at a disadvantage compared to their EU competitors because we are outside the 1996 EU-Turkey customs union and hence European rules of origin cumulation. I understand that; what I do not understand is why in this agreement, unlike the original 1963 EU-Turkey association agreement, there is nothing on services. The balance of trade in goods heavily favours Turkey, and that is likely to worsen. Could we not have got something in exchange on services? Could the Minister say whether we tried and, if so, why we failed?

Secondly, the agreement contains nothing on human rights, as other noble Lords have mentioned. During our debates on the Trade Bill, the Minister assured us that human rights would be at the heart of trade policy. President Erdoğan’s Turkey, flouting ECHR calls for the release of civil society leaders, is surely a paradigm case, or at least should be. So why the lacuna in the agreement? Did we try to fill it? If so, why did we cave in?

Thirdly, I predict that the Minister will remind us that an enhanced agreement is to be negotiated and the gaps in this one can be filled then—but is that plausible? Precedent is a powerful weapon in negotiation. Passes once sold are not easily recaptured. Moreover, have not we missed the moment of maximum leverage? Precisely because the balance is in the Turks’ favour, they will have been anxious that we should not revert to WTO terms, bringing in new UK tariffs on their goods. Our hand was stronger in 2020 than it will be when negotiations restart. How come we missed the boat?

That brings me to my more general point. When roll- over agreements do not duplicate previous arrangements, they seem on the whole to make them slightly worse. The Mexico agreement is another which leaves UK exporters less competitive than their EU rivals will be. Did the department, in its rush to prove that it can negotiate agreements, sacrifice quality for quantity and content for quantum? Did we put ourselves under time pressure, and are there lessons to be learned from that—for example, for our negotiation with Australia? Are not we again risking seeming overly eager? I look forward to the Minister’s replies.