EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Kerr of Kinlochard
Main Page: Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Kerr of Kinlochard's debates with the Cabinet Office
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberWhen Donald Trump was elected in 2016, EU Foreign Ministers met to consider the implications. Given our inside track in Washington, they looked to us for a steer, but our Foreign Secretary did not turn up. He said that it would only be a “whingerama” and that President Trump would be just fine.
Previous Foreign Secretaries valued these meetings. Some dominated them—Carrington, Hurd, and, on his day, Robin Cook—but Mr Johnson did not. Perhaps that explains why this treaty contains no provision for political dialogue. Such a provision was on offer; it was in the 19 October joint declaration, which spoke of an association agreement for dialogue on foreign policy, security, defence and wider issues of co-operation. But Mr Johnson changed his mind and said that association agreements were for accession candidates—not true; Chile has one—and that an overarching treaty architecture would permit cross-sectoral sanctions, which is exactly what we have now, of course, in this treaty, minus the upside.
The institution set up by this treaty, the joint partnership council, and the innumerable committees listed by noble Lord, Lord Hain, and the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, deal only with the new trade rules, monitoring our compliance and tying up the loose ends. Crucially, these committees and the council exclude the 27. Across the table from us will be the Commission, not the member states. So we have no one to consult, nowhere to consult our neighbours on COP 26, pandemics, Russia, migration and terrorism, and no regular high-level meetings. Turkey, Norway and Iceland have them; we do not.
Of course the association agreement ship has sailed. I recognise that, but I worry that isolation in Europe may not prove splendid. So I urge the Government to pour no more concrete on their feet and to authorise early in-house thinking on how best to recreate the consultative network that most member states and all Foreign Secretaries but one have found useful since the first oil shock in 1973. I think that we will need—