Lord Kerr of Kinlochard
Main Page: Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (Crossbench - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Kerr of Kinlochard's debates with the Wales Office
(12 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is the amendment that I was speaking to previously. It is a device that provides for a referendum in England on Scottish income tax powers. I tabled the amendment in order to discuss the letter that my noble friend Lord Sassoon circulated, following our debate on the Bill on 15 March.
I suggest that the English should have a say on this because of the extraordinary revelation in Committee on the position of the Scottish Parliament if a change in taxation policy were to be introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer—as has happened today, for example, when he raised to just over £9,000 the allowance before people pay income tax. The no-detriment principle is not in the Bill but has, as I understand it, been agreed between the Government and the Scottish Government, or has been proposed as part of the arrangements. I see that in the Written Statement today concerning the negotiations on legislative consent—which we can debate at a later stage—those arrangements go even further.
The idea is that Scotland would benefit from the reduction in income tax that people paid as a result of the increase in allowances, but that England would send a cheque to compensate for the reduction in the tax revenues in addition. The argument for having the 10p tax is that it will affect only a small proportion—by the way, Ministers keep saying that it is 30 per cent; I think we were told today the precise figure by the Office for Budget Responsibility. Hitherto, the assumption has been that about £4.5 billion would be raised by the 10p rate of income tax and that if the Scottish Parliament wanted to spend more it could put that income tax up. The proposition that, because the 10p rate does not raise £4.5 billion any more because people in Scotland are paying less tax, people in England should have to pay more tax to send an addition to the Barnett formula-determined part of the block seems to me to drive a coach and horses through the whole argument of accountability.
If my amendment were accepted and the proposition was put to people in England by a referendum that the Scottish tax powers should operate in that way, I think that there would be an overwhelming rejection, because it is completely unfair and unworkable and will create great difficulty.
In his letter to me, which has been circulated to Members of the Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, goes on to deal with another issue, which is benefits. If, as has happened today, the Chancellor raises the thresholds at which people pay tax, that means that there will be a change in their entitlement to benefit. There is a requirement here for changes in people’s eligibility for benefit and the effect that that has in Scotland to be compensated for by taxpayers in England. In his letter, my noble friend says that I should not be too worried about that because the costs are likely to be low. I hope that this letter will be put in the Library or in a form which people outside the House can access.
In the annexe to the letter, my noble friend sets out a little flowchart, which starts with the Scottish budget being £28 billion and Scottish income tax receipts being £4.8 billion. Then, the Scottish block is adjusted downwards by £4.8 billion to create headroom for the Scottish rate of income tax, which means that the Scottish budget is £28 billion, and the block grant is £23 billion because the Scottish income tax receipts would be £4.8 billion. The UK Government raise the personal allowance UK-wide, estimated by the OBR at £3.5 billion. The OBR forecast of the impact on Scottish income tax receipts is a reduction of £100 million. Therefore, receipts from the Scottish income tax are expected to be reduced to £4.7 billion. Therefore, the Treasury adds £100 million to the Scottish budget to offset the impact of what is called UK policy change and the outcome is that the Scottish Government’s budget remains the same.
This is “Heads you win, tails you win” economics. It is completely unfair. It is just reinstating the block grant. I am no advocate of this policy, but if the Government want to go down this track the sensible thing to do would be to give the Scottish Parliament control over the allowances and the rates. This is nonsense. It also applies to changes in the benefit position, because people’s entitlement to benefit will be altered by their net income. If the Scottish Parliament were to put up tax, which it will certainly have to do, and Scotland becomes the highest-taxed part of the United Kingdom, as it certainly will, that means that people’s entitlement to benefit will increase. The cost of that will fall on the English taxpayer. I raise this because, if my noble friend accepts my amendment, which is to give the people in England a referendum on this scheme, I do not think these proposals will stand the test of time. If, as I suspect, he will not accept my amendment, then I urge him to abandon this ridiculous no-detriment principle. The no-detriment principle is a no-accountability principle. It drives a coach and horses through the whole philosophy and thinking of the Bill. I have no idea where it came from. If he is going to maintain this no-detriment principle, then it ought to be written on the face of the Bill. It should not be the product of a quiet deal that no one knows anything about, which flies in the face of what was said in the manifestos of those parties that committed themselves to introducing the Calman proposals. I beg to move.
My Lords, it is déjà vu all over again. I supported the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, the last time he raised the matter. Although I do not agree with this amendment, I am very glad he has moved it, because it enables us to discuss it again. I had not understood the no-detriment principle. It was painstakingly explained to me by the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon. I have not been favoured with the letter of the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, so forgive me if I am behind with the debate. As it was explained, it is indeed exactly as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, says. However, look at it the other way round. It would be paradoxical if the basic tranche of income tax, before the Scottish tax is added in on top, was reduced. The Scots would receive a cheque from the United Kingdom Exchequer. That seems to be very odd. However it is politically even odder, and possibly unsustainable, if it is the other way around. Supposing Chancellor Balls had decided that we needed a higher level of spending, and therefore a higher level of taxation. The Scots would have to send a cheque and they would have paid the higher level of taxation, so would have had less to devote to the higher spending which the proceeds of the tax would have brought in. I do not understand this no-detriment principle.
I draw from that unsatisfactory example exactly the opposite conclusion from the one the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, draws. I go with the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood. It seems that we need more but I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, as he was saying much the same today. The trouble with this Bill is that it is a Sir Clive Bossom Bill. Sir Clive Bossom calls on the leader of his party, then the leader of the Opposition, when he joins the House of Commons. The only sentence he gets out of Mr Churchill is, “Bossom, eh? Neither one thing nor the other”. That is what is wrong with this Bill. It is not actually devolving real accountable taxing authority to the Scots. It is still the block grant system with a little add-on which is presentational rather than substantive. I would much rather see a genuine devolution of taxing power. I would start with indirect taxes. Then you will not have any of the problems of defining who the taxpayer is, residence and so on. I would start at that end. I would concede from this Parliament to the Parliament in Edinburgh much greater power in order to deal with the real deficit, which is the accountability deficit. I accept that as a consequence of that, one would have to have a rather strict control on the macroeconomic effect of a degree of fiscal autonomy, so that we did not see a repetition of what we see in continental Europe right now. I accept that that follows.
However, it would be better to get into that area than to pretend to do devolution of taxation and end up with this rather miserable little measure. I understand its logic; I used to work in the Treasury. It is the logic of the Treasury office of accounts. It is the logic of the public expenditure side of the Treasury. It is a book-keeping logic. However, if you think of its economic effect—if you think of it in economic terms—it is absurd.
This is where there is a misunderstanding. This is about making a shared tax base work in a way that is fair and revenue neutral to both jurisdictions. My noble friend Lord Caithness said that if the Scottish Parliament chose to change the allowances, it should bear the responsibility. The whole point of these proposals is that it cannot change the allowances. The personal allowance is determined by the United Kingdom Government. That is the nature of a shared tax base. The argument is that if that tax base is changed, there ought not to be detriment to the Scottish Parliament.
Let us look at this the other way around and think about the ease and the political acceptability in Scotland of making the case that if the Chancellor decides to put taxes up, not down, the Scots, in addition to paying the taxes, should send a cheque to London. It is the reverse of the case that the noble and learned Lord has just been discussing.
It is very unlikely to happen, but let us say that the personal allowance had gone down rather than up. It would have been a windfall to the Scottish Government. The argument therefore is that on a no-detriment principle, it should operate both ways. I shall come on to explain that.
I shall try to make this as simple as possible, but it is not readily simple. From April 2016, the income tax base in the United Kingdom will be shared between the United Kingdom and Scotland. With 10p from all rates in Scotland expected to yield between £4.3 billion and £5.6 billion over the OBR’s forecast period, the Scottish Government will receive around 3 per cent of UK income tax receipts. The Scottish Government will be responsible for setting their rate of income tax and the United Kingdom Government will be responsible for everything else, including, for example, personal allowances. In such a system, the UK Government must be accountable for decisions that they take on the structure of the tax. Conversely, the Scottish Government must be accountable for the decisions that they take in respect of the rate.
I shall give an example—the example seen in the letter from my noble friend Lord Sassoon, but seen the other way. Last year the United Kingdom Government decided to raise personal allowances from £6,475 to £7,475. This decision cost the United Kingdom Government approximately £3.5 billion across the United Kingdom. Since the proposal in the Bill is to devolve around 3 per cent of income tax, the cost to the UK Exchequer from raising personal allowances would reduce to 97 per cent per cent or around £3.4 billion. The remaining £100 million would fall on the Scottish budget. It would be a cost as a result of a decision for which the Scottish Government were not accountable.
If the Scottish Government had set a budget and a rate of tax and had planned their public expenditure on that basis, and then, some four or five months later, as the result of a decision for which they had no responsibility or accountability, they suddenly found that their budget was £100 million short, the no-detriment principle is intended to make up that difference because it is a decision for which the Scottish Parliament will not have had responsibility. That is why I believe that it is important for accountability, because not to do so means that suddenly a Scottish Government perhaps have to carry the can for particular expenditure to which they were committed but could not longer afford, not through any decision that they had made, but through a decision made by the United Kingdom. The obverse is true; for example, if the Scottish Government get a windfall because the tax base has changed, it is only right that that windfall is recovered by the United Kingdom Government.
Under the no-detriment principle, the UK Government would compensate the Scottish budget for any cost that led to a reduction in the tax, but at the end of the day the cost to the United Kingdom is exactly the same as it would be if this Bill were not implemented—that is, the £3.4 billion that it loses in revenue because of the increase in the personal allowance and the £100 million that it then gives to the Scottish Government.
My Lords, I cannot accept that last comment, but I can now see where my noble friend is coming from. I welcome anyone who wishes to express the case for going further. Of course, he is well aware that what has been presented to Parliament here is something that was worked on over a long period of time during which a consensus was achieved. There was never likely to be a consensus in favour of devolution of the whole tax base, as opposed to the tax rate.
My noble friend is basically saying that it should never be the case that a change in the tax base—for example, the increase in personal allowances—should benefit taxpayers in Scotland. He is saying that if the UK Government, who are still responsible for a substantial level of services in Scotland, take tax from the Scottish people, the Scottish people should never be allowed to take the kind of benefit that I believe they should—and I think that he once wrote a pamphlet on the benefit of raising the personal threshold—and the Scottish Parliament should raise its rate of tax to account for that. That is not accountability; that is a decision taken by the UK Government to bring benefits right throughout the United Kingdom.
It would seriously undermine the United Kingdom if Scottish taxpayers were not allowed to receive the benefit of a change to the UK tax base. It could mean that the tax change would reduce the amount of money available to the Scottish Government, so that budgetary considerations and calculations that had been put forward and might well have been voted through by Parliament would no longer be sustainable because of a decision taken by a body other than the Scottish Parliament. That is the essence of the no-detriment rule, and something that lies at the heart of the statement of funding policy.
I will read out the statement of funding policy, because the noble Lord, Lord Browne, might find that it echoes the passage from the Holtham commission that he read out. It says:
“Where decisions taken by any of the devolved administrations … have financial implications for departments or agencies of the United Kingdom Government or, alternatively, decisions of United Kingdom departments or agencies lead to additional costs for any of the devolved administrations … the body whose decision leads to the additional cost will meet that cost”.
That is where accountability properly lies.
This is not something new that has suddenly been dreamt up. There are probably people in the House who were involved at the beginning of devolution and this principle has been in the statement of funding policy since then. I believe that it is fair that Governments —be it a UK Government or a Scottish Government—should be accountable for the decisions that they make, but they should not be able to export some of the implications of their decisions on to another Government, who should not be held accountable for the decision of another Government.
I understand the Minister’s logic, which seems to depend on the control total being the block grant. The block grant is what matters. All this stuff about tax is for perception and presentation at the edges. The block grant has to be maintained. Apparently the example in the Sassoon letter, which I have not seen, concerns a case where the Scottish economy would have benefited from the additional buoyancy and spending power of a reduction in the level of taxation paid by Scotland. However, because we are seeing everything through the prism that the block grant is the control, it needs to be maintained in Scotland, so the Scots need to be compensated for the additional buoyancy in the Scottish economy. That is quite difficult politically. The reverse case, which the Minister prefers not to talk about, is almost impossible to present politically in Scotland.
The trouble is that these tax revisions are neither fish nor fowl; they are only a good red herring. We are not addressing the real issue on taxation. I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton, that accountability is accountability for spending and for raising the money which you spend. Until we get that and get away from having the block grant as the control, we will have a continuing unsatisfactory situation.
My Lords, I certainly agree with the final point that accountability is as much about what you raise as what you spend. The point at the heart of the statement on funding and the no-detriment principle is that one should not be accountable for consequences which you as a Government would have to see through but which are the result of a decision that you have not made. Having to say why a certain project does not take place—following not a decision that you have made but a decision made by another Government—is not accountability. That is what one is seeking to address, and it links in with what has been said about the Holtham principle. Again, there is an intention there that, if the Scottish Government’s tax proposals promote buoyancy in the Scottish economy, that should be to the benefit. Likewise, if they have tax proposals which have an opposite effect—they drive away enterprise and reduce revenues—there should be a negative consequence. A letter is not necessarily the best way to go through this issue but I am certainly open to ways in which we can go through it in more detail. This point links to the Holtham point made earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Browne.
The principal point is that this is not an issue of the Scottish Government getting two bites of the cake. It is to ensure that where a tax decision is made regarding the UK tax base by the UK Government, all taxpayers throughout the United Kingdom are treated in the same way as a result of that decision. It means, too, that if that decision has consequences—either inflating the money coming into the Scottish Government or reducing it—a rectifying amount is paid back or perhaps withheld from the block grant or, alternatively, is paid in addition. I regret that it is not the easiest thing to explain and there may be another way of discussing it other than across a Chamber. However, I emphasise that it is not a question of having your cake and eating it; ultimately, it is a question of ensuring accountability and making sure that the Scottish Government do not become accountable for a decision that is not their own. I cannot put it more simply than that. Although we may well return to this issue, on that basis I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.
I do not think that that is the way to transfer backwards. That may be possible; I will have to check. It may be possible to go in the opposite direction. I am trying to think whether that has ever actually happened. When the Arts and Humanities Research Council was established, because it had not hitherto existed and because under the scheme of devolution it was a devolved as opposed to a reserved matter, an order had to be brought forward to establish that it would be a UK parliamentary responsibility. I am not sure that it was a Section 30 order. The noble Lord, Lord Sutherland, may have been involved at the time. I certainly was, because I took the order through the Scottish Parliament.
The important point is that it changes the devolution settlement. It changes the boundaries between devolved and reserved powers. That is why it requires the consent of both Houses of Parliament and the Scottish Parliament before it proceeds to Her Majesty in Council.
I hope that I have shown that there is a distinction between that and a legislative consent Motion, which is by its nature a convention. On the basis of those explanations and the undertakings that I have given to try to identify ways in which we can discuss the matter in more detail—
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, raised one other question in his reading of the Statement. I am very grateful to the Minister for his Statement, and I feel much less pernickety about it than the Committee as a whole seems to do. It is a good thing that this agreement has been reached. A number of demands from the north have been dropped. A number of changes that the Government propose to make seem to me perfectly earnestful. The reason why it has been possible to negotiate this successfully is that everyone has decided that it is de minimis—it really does not change the price of fish. That is the trouble with the Bill: it does not attack the real issues.
The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, referred to the sentence in the Statement in which we are told:
“The Government is open to considering what further powers might be devolved after a referendum on independence”.
The noble Lord asked how we should construe that sentence. Scots are good at punctuation. There is no punctuation in that sentence. That, I take it, means, “We are open to considering now, today”. It does not mean, “We are open to considering what further powers might be devolved, after a referendum”. The Minister had a good Scottish education, so I am convinced that I am reading this correctly. That seems to me to be a move from the porridge oats speech, where I think the punctuation included a comma. Am I right? Am I reading this correctly?
Secondly, what mode are we in? The porridge oats man is very muscular. He is very active.
“The Government is open to considering”,
suggests to me a rather passive role. The Government will sit there and if anyone turns up with an idea, they may look at it. Are we active or passive? I think that the porridge oats position, the punctuated position, is impossible—after there has been a referendum, then we will consider what more you might get. Scots have long memories. It will not work; that is an unsustainable position. Therefore, I am very glad to see no punctuation in that statement. Are we actively to define what further measure of devolution would be feasible, or are we to leave it to others to devise devo-maxes, devo- pluses and devo this, that and the other? I feel that there is a strong case in logic for being clear before an independence referendum about what would be on offer after it.
They may be very unfair on themselves but officials say, “Blame officials for poor punctuation”. I think I will reserve my position on that. I apologise for forgetting to pick up the point raised by my noble friend. As he and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, correctly identify, the Statement says that the Government will consider further devolution after a referendum on independence. I believe that that is consistent with the position set out by the Prime Minister and with the evolution of devolution to date. It has involved a careful assessment of the evidence.
One could go back to the constitutional convention or the Calman commission. It has involved consideration of its implications across the United Kingdom—it is important to remember that any devolution has implications for other parts of our United Kingdom—and it has generally proceeded with cross-party agreement. Those are all essential ingredients, perhaps not of porridge oats but for moving forward. The Government are committed to continuing to consider amendments to the devolution settlement on that basis. My party and others are doing their own thinking on what that might be, but, as we have seen to date, any substantial progress has been made on the basis of cross-party agreement. That is important.
I make one further point for clarification. My noble friend the Duke of Montrose is right: the word “modify” means to decrease or extend the subject matter of Schedule 5, and I am advised that the order which I took through the Scottish Parliament with regard to the Arts and Humanities Research Council was indeed a Section 30 order that added something to Schedule 5.