Legal Services Act 2007 (Approved Regulator) Order 2020

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Chakrabarti

Monday 9th March 2020 Grand Committee

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree that this is straightforward, uncontroversial and a perfectly appropriate exercise of the relevant power. I am afraid that I have no anecdotes, questions, guineas or shillings, or any other contribution.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am most obliged to noble Lords, if only for their brevity. I am not certain what happened to the shilling or the guinea, but I understand that the practice remains that, where the oath is to be taken, it is taken by a lawyer in a different firm or entity.

The noble Lord referred to the administration of oaths by accountants. That is not necessarily the case. The institute will be the regulator, but it will regulate, in due course, alternative business structures that will include lawyers. Generally speaking, it is to enable those lawyers to be engaged in this reserved activity that this order is being made.

Legal Services Act 2007 (Chartered Institute of Legal Executives) (Appeals from Licensing Authority Decisions) Order 2020

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Chakrabarti

Monday 9th March 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)]

My Lords, I support the order. I declare an interest in that a close family member is a judge in the First-tier Tribunal—but not, I believe, in the General Regulatory Chamber.

I have been a strong supporter of CILEx from its inception. Indeed, I addressed some of its early conferences due to, as I mentioned in relation to the previous order, my experience 50 years ago of the integrity and probity of legal executives who needed a body to represent their interests in the way that that has happened. I am delighted to see that it has been given this particular power. The strange thing is that there was a temporary appeals provision with a panel set up by CILEx itself; clearly that was unsatisfactory. Far better that it should go through the tribunals system. What are the fees of the tribunal likely to be? Will they be more expensive than the present appeals system, unsatisfactory as it is?

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, again I will be completely uncontroversial, and I can be very succinct: the First-tier Tribunal is undoubtedly more appropriate than the interim arrangement.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I agree with the observations of the noble Lord as to the importance of CILEx as an institution. I recently met with its representatives, as I do on a regular basis; they bring to regulation a degree of innovation and forward thinking that is to be welcomed.

On the potential cost, fees will be set by the Courts Service. Generally, there are only about 10 of these appeals each year. I do not anticipate the level of fees being an inhibitor to the discharge of these functions.

Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, not for the first time. I particularly want to associate myself with the very humble reflections of the noble Baroness, Lady Burt, and the unparalleled expertise of the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. I do not want to repeat what has been said. However, I might shorten what I say about other amendments if I make a few comments now, because I think the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is broadly right: this is a good Bill that will generally not benefit from much amendment, subject to concerns of the Delegated Powers Committee.

As was rehearsed by many in your Lordships’ House at Second Reading, divorce is not generally a happy matter. I suspect that it is mostly in Hollywood cinema that people celebrate and have parties upon divorce. I have heard of such things, but they are perhaps the exception and not the rule. This is therefore an unhappy subject and an unhappy moment in lots of people’s lives—as it happens, a very significant portion of the population. For some people, it is a story of liberation after trauma; for others, it will be a matter of loss and trauma. It is not a happy matter. The law should be about legal protection and not legal fiction.

I understand the sentiments of noble Lords who would like people to reflect before they put themselves through this trauma. But I would have more in common with that sentiment if we were seeking to provide counselling for every adolescent and adult in the country, or, indeed, if we were seeking to reinstate the availability of legal aid for people contemplating and going through divorce. In my experience, good family lawyers will always go through a process of reflection with their clients before advising them to go through this traumatic process. Those matters, unfortunately, are beyond the scope of the Bill—I know this because I had a go. I am told by the Public Bill Office that reinstating legal aid for people with contested contact matters is also unfortunately not in the Bill.

In the future, I would happily talk to any noble Lords who want to persuade the Government that legal aid should be reinstated, at least for matters concerning the children. That would be a very good thing. As I said to the Minister, who very kindly met me yesterday, it seems perverse that if the state seeks to take your children you have access to a lawyer, but if your ex-partner is depriving you of contact you do not. That is a real concern, as are the issues about adequate provision for counselling, mediation and so on; provision is needed. I do not see how people will reflect and reconcile when they have extra hoops to jump through by way of legal process. For that reason, I hope the noble Lord, Lord McColl, will think again about this amendment.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, just as he did at Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, has expressed his desire to ensure that those intent on divorce should have the opportunity to consider reconciliation. Of course, we agree with that, which is one reason we are building in a statutory pause: the new 20-week period between application and conditional order. It is also why we are retaining the two-stage order, as well as the bar on divorce applications in the first year of the marriage.

The noble Lord expressed concern, as did others, that the Government’s statistics give the impression that a significant number of divorce petitions never reach decree absolute. There is, however, no evidence that these represent cases of reconciliation. Indeed, analysis of court data by the Nuffield Foundation, referred to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, shows that the majority of non-completions are due to the technical difficulties of the legal process for unrepresented parties, the obstruction of respondents and, in some cases, protracted negotiations over finances. Indeed, a sample of 300 undefended cases were analysed, in which 51 were found not to have completed. Only one of those cases was identified as having ended in an attempted reconciliation. It is not only the recent Nuffield research that indicates this. Research undertaken by the University of Newcastle, following the Family Law Act 1996, also found that the decision to divorce was not taken lightly or impetuously; it was typically a protracted one based on months, if not years, of painful and difficult consideration.

I appreciate the intention behind the amendment; the noble Lord, Lord McColl of Dulwich, spoke of the profound importance of marriage to society and I could not possibly disagree with that. However, we believe that this amendment would have the potentially perverse effect of encouraging speculative applications. Someone facing marital difficulties might file an application saying, “I think my marriage may be over, though I’m not sure. I can always make my mind up after 20 weeks, or after as long as it takes.” As the noble Baronesses, Lady Burt and Lady Shackleton, observed, that is not the process that parties go through in reality. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, observed, it is inconsistent with the idea that you are applying on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown.

Applying for divorce should, of course, always be a last resort; certainly, we have seen no evidence that it is anything else. In the vast majority of cases, the applicant reaches the decision after considerable soul-searching and, indeed, after attempts have been made to mend difficulties in the marriage. It should never be seen as a warning shot. Divorce is not a remedy for marital difficulties; it is a remedy for a marriage that is no longer functioning because it has irretrievably broken down. It is right, we suggest, to continue to demand irretrievable breakdown at the point of the initial application as the grounds on which decree could then proceed. Of course, divorce should never be automatic, but again neither this Bill nor any other is going to make divorce easier for those affected by it.

We consider that the existing ground for divorce, namely irretrievable breakdown, should remain, and I urge the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

My Lords, as I said, it has taken decades of distinguished professional experience for some noble Lords to make the contributions they are making to this debate. However, I have no doubt that it has taken a mountain of courage and not a small amount of eloquence and self-possession for the noble Baroness, Lady Meyer, to make her contribution—for which I am sure we all thank her. I thank her and the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, for giving us the opportunity to talk about children with what I hope will prove to be a probing amendment that puts the interests of children into this discussion.

However, for the reasons stated by other noble and learned Lords, the place and moment for a court to consider the best interests of the child—for example, under the Children Act—should be in matters of contact and finance. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, I say once more that the place for your Lordships’ House to consider what we should do ought to be in putting back legal aid for such contested family matters.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin by correcting a misapprehension disclosed by a number of noble Lords. We have produced a family impact assessment in respect of the Bill. Indeed, it was published with the Bill and can be found on GOV.UK. I invite those noble Lords who expressed an interest to have regard to that.

I have no doubt that this amendment is well intentioned, but its effects could be quite draconian. It would in effect require the court to weigh up whether the interests of the marriage’s children should override the autonomous decision of one parent—or indeed both parents, in a joint application—to seek a divorce. It could result in a parent being trapped in a failed or even abusive marriage. It could also reintroduce contested divorce in cases where there are children, because it would allow a parent to put forward arguments that divorce is not in the children’s best interests. It is difficult to see how this would serve the best interests of the children or even the parents. Indeed, this amendment could cause a worsened parental conflict through the legal process of divorce, with further damaging consequences for the children involved.

I understand why some may regard it as important for the court to consider the impacts on children of the decision to divorce, but that ought not to be a matter for the divorce process. The decision to marry or divorce is an autonomous one. It is not for the law to stand in the way of one or both parties who no longer wish to be in a marriage. The legal process of divorce should focus only on ending the legal relationship between the adult parties. Issues that may arise from the divorce, such as disputed arrangements for children, can and are dealt with now under separate statutory provision.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chakrabarti]

My Lords, I am so grateful to all noble Lords who spoke about this group. We do not support families by lecturing them, hectoring them or even creating obstacles to divorce. We support families with fellowship, with community, with solidarity and with social infrastructure. As I have said, I would like people to have access to lawyers—we wicked lawyers, but when you need us we are not so wicked—in time times of trouble, but also to counselling and relationship support long before there is trouble and, indeed, all through their lives. I really have taken on board the points that were made by two noble Baronesses at least about timing, because this support should be available very early in life and, as noble Lords opposite have said, perhaps even before people entertain the idea of marriage. That was the reason for supporting the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, in Amendment 3, although I take the points about timing and do not want to delay noble Lords further on this.

I hope the Minister will take the opportunity, in responding to this group, to set out what the Government propose more generally by way of this kind of provision for counselling and relationship support, because it seems, to me at least, all-too scant at the moment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I will begin with Amendment 3, moved by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries of Pentregarth. I am grateful to the noble and right reverend Lord, not only for his thoughtful contribution to the debate and the scrutiny of the Bill but for meeting me to discuss his proposals.

The Government share the sentiment underlying this amendment, and the observations of a number of noble Lords that couples considering divorce should have available to them information about the services in question, and that where reconciliation is still possible, the legal process should not dim that prospect. On the second point, the Bill introduces for the first time a minimum timeframe of 20 weeks from the application to when the court can be asked to make the conditional order of divorce. The Bill also retains the two-stage procedure for obtaining a divorce under the distinctive procedure of English law, so that each step on the way to divorce requires an intentional and, indeed, conscious decision to end the marriage.

The Government’s view is that best prospect of saving a marriage is when difficulties first arise, not much later when divorce proceedings have begun. In the University of Newcastle evaluation of pilots to test the information-meeting provision that was central to the no-fault provisions in the now-repealed Part II of the Family Law Act 1996, the report noted:

“If the objective of providing information is to facilitate marriage saving, the evidence suggests that it will be more effective if it is provided while spouses are still together and before they make the decision to live apart.”


The Government share the desire to encourage more couples to resolve any disagreements about children or financial arrangements through mediation, avoiding, wherever possible, the need to seek a court adjudication. For these reasons, the Government do not support this amendment but believe that its laudable ends can be achieved by other means.

Terrorist Offenders (Restriction of Early Release) Bill

Debate between Lord Keen of Elie and Baroness Chakrabarti

Committee stage & Report stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. I have listened to this debate and heard no compelling reason why this amendment has not been adopted by the Government. In answer to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, the difference between one aspect of the retrospection and the other is that one does not compromise public safety, pure and simple.

By accepting the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, nobody is let out, even with the administrative challenges of getting up a Parole Board under the appalling and savage cuts and debilitation to the system that I spoke about earlier, without Parole Board approval. That is the distinction between his amendment and the status quo ante, which is that people come out automatically, regardless of their risk, at the halfway point.

In answer to others, I have so much respect for the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, but his point was about people who are not even on the radar. That problem is ongoing and not dealt with by this Bill. Saying that people should be held for as long as possible is not an answer to the amendment in question now. By definition, those who are affected by this Bill are subject to finite sentences that are not always very long, because these are not by definition the most serious terrorist offenders, as the noble Lord understands. These are people who were subject to the regime that we have been examining because they were at the lower end of the scale. To quote once more the former Prime Minister, these people are coming out at some point, and there has to be some principle in the way that we engage with this.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, we all understand the purpose of this amendment and of the other amendments in the group, albeit that I will come on to deal with the point that arises with regard to the second amendment if I may. But I begin by referring to one or two observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. He observed that when sentenced these persons were not regarded as dangerous by the court, but I cannot wholly accept that proposition. Their offences may not have been part of the extended determinate sentence regime at the time they were sentenced, but of course a number of terrorist offences were added to the extended determinate sentence regime only in 2019. It cannot be assumed that these people were regarded as non-dangerous at the time they were sentenced, so I cannot wholly accept that.

The second fact that I have to raise concerns the suggestion that those due for release in coming days are past the halfway or two-thirds point. I am advised that the prisoners due for release shortly are approaching the halfway release point in their sentences. That is simply the advice that I have been given. Therefore, there remains an issue over their release. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said, “They can wait for the Parole Board to get its act together”, but I rather think that if that happened we would face a challenge under Article 5.4 of the convention, and therefore that is not a complete answer at all.

Indeed, the noble and learned Lord talked repeatedly about fundamental points. That leads me to fundamentally disagree with him on a primary point that he kept on making, which is that the legislation would change the sentence and that they should be sentenced by the court. The legislation does not change the sentence; they have been sentenced by the court. As I alluded to earlier, there is lengthy legal authority for the proposition that the court has regard to the appropriate sentence that should be imposed for the crime irrespective of what point there may be executive action for release during the period of that sentence. In other words, it does not distinguish between the custodial and non-custodial elements. That is why the provisions of the Bill are entirely Article 7 compliant apart from anything else.

I understand the concern that arises when we have to look at the presumption against retrospective operation of the law. One thing that the Bill does is to bring the earliest release point for the standard determinate sentence into line with the earliest release point for extended determinate sentences and therefore to produce, if nothing else, an element of consistency. We have been clear that terrorist offenders should serve time in custody that better reflects the seriousness of their offending, particularly in light of recent events, and the measures in the Bill are in keeping with that approach.

I repeat the point—albeit some noble Lords do not feel that there is much force in it—that applying these measures retrospectively will ensure that terrorist prisoners who are currently serving sentences are incapacitated for longer. There is a reason for that in light of what happened, for example, in November last year.

I want to raise one further point. As I read Amendment 2, it would apply not only to those serving fixed determinate sentences but would also reduce the release point for those who have been convicted and sentenced under the extended determinate sentence regime. I suspect that is an unintended consequence—it is not the primary grounds on which I resist the amendment. In light of this debate, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment.