Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Bill

Lord Keen of Elie Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, very much for moving her amendment. In Committee, I supported the amendments. I also echo the support of the noble Lord, Lord Bradley, who contacted me personally to say that he very much wishes he could have been here to support the noble Baroness’s amendment.

It must be said that a number of extremely eminent lawyers have, in essence, spoken against the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull. My response to those eminent contributions was best articulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker. My experience is that many different parts of the criminal justice system do not understand mental capacity legislation properly and that, even if they do, it is often not used to its full extent. That is because such a large proportion of the people we deal with in the criminal justice system as a whole have mental capacity issues.

I support in principle what the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, has said; I understand that she will not press her amendments to a vote. I hope that the Minister will say something more constructive about addressing the perceived gap in the legislation regarding further review by the Parole Board and the practicality of a possible remedy through judicial review. These are all active issues which have been explored in our debate. The Minister should acknowledge that the concerns raised are real and explain to the House why it would not be necessary to meet them in the Bill.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, and other noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. Perhaps I may reiterate the position of the Government, which is that we consider that the amendments would unnecessarily fetter the discretion of the Parole Board. I do not accept that there is a gap in the legislation, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead.

I shall initially address Amendment 1 and related Amendments 5, 8, 11 and 14, which would ensure that the Bill’s provisions applied only to prisoners who are, or have previously been, “able” to disclose relevant information but have not chosen not to do so.

The Bill affords the Parole Board wide scope subjectively to consider the circumstances of a prisoner’s non-disclosure. The test is broadly drafted to give the Parole Board, which is after all an independent judicial body with experience in assessing risk and evidence, sufficient flexibility to take all relevant circumstances into account when making a release assessment.

The board must be satisfied that the offender no longer poses a risk to the public, and this high bar can be met only after it considers all elements of an offender’s case. This already includes an offender’s current and past “ability”, whether mental or physical, to disclose such information. The Parole Board may already consider all possible reasons, in its own view, for any non-disclosure, including historic refusals.

There is some uncertainty as to the meaning of the term “able” in these circumstances, and it would be unclear what criteria the board would use to make their determination. In many cases, there are varying degrees of ability, or varying degrees of information, that the prisoner can disclose, and the interpretations of ability in each case will differ—a point made by a number of noble Lords. The Parole Board in its current practice uses a flexible approach to take into account all elements of a non-disclosure. To use “able” in a determinative and inflexible way would cause unnecessary confusion and potential inconsistencies in its application. That has the potential unfairly to prevent the board when applying the Bill’s provisions from considering a non-disclosure by an offender in many circumstances; for example, the case of an offender who had rendered themselves “unable” to disclose due to illicit drug use in prison. There are clearly other examples of how that difficulty could arise.

By specifically avoiding reference to particulars in the Bill, we are deliberately not limiting the board’s ability to use its expertise in how it approaches such cases. I say in response to a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, that the Parole Board is possessed of considerable expertise in these areas, including that of mental health.

That leads me on to Amendments 2, 6, 9, 12 and 15, which would explicitly direct the Parole Board to take into account one possible reason for non-disclosure; namely, whether the prisoner has or had the mental capacity to disclose information. The Bill places a broad statutory duty on the Parole Board to take into account non-disclosure on the part of a prisoner and, in doing so, it must consider all the reasons for such non-disclosure. It is therefore for the board itself, as now, to take a subjective view of what those reasons might be, and then it is for the board to decide what bearing this information may have on its subsequent assessment of suitability for release. I remind noble Lords of what is provided for in Clause 1(2)(b), which states:

“When making the public protection decision about the life prisoner, the Parole Board must take into account … the reasons, in the Parole Board’s view, for the prisoner’s nondisclosure.”


That wide remit clearly would embrace all the issues that have been touched on in the debate.

The noble Baroness correctly identified that a prisoner’s mental state is likely to be a significant factor in assessing reasons for non-disclosure. However, we do not believe that there is any material benefit in referring to this as a possible reason for non-disclosure in the Bill, as the Parole Board will take all relevant factors into account when assessing a prisoner’s suitability for release. If one factor were to be explicitly stated, it could be asked why other reasons for non-disclosure are not also placed on a statutory footing, such as a geographical change that prevents the location of a victim’s remains being identified or circumstances where mental impairment does not amount to “mental capacity”. As one noble Lord observed, there may be cases where people have simply forgotten or decided to blank matters out of their mind over a period of many years. Clearly, the noble Baroness does not wish to preclude any other relevant factors, but any delineation of what the reasons for non-disclosure may be in order to preserve a flexible approach takes away from the subjective approach that we invite the Parole Board to take. This approach is expressed in Clause 1(3), which states:

“This section does not limit the matters which the Parole Board must or may take into account when making a public protection decision.”


It is for the board to take these matters into account when conducting its assessment.

There are significant practical difficulties in attempting to give examples on the face of the statute, which could lead to unnecessary confusion. That is why a decision as to mental capacity is one of many that would have to be considered. However, the board is bound by public law principles to act reasonably in respect of all decisions it makes. A decision where a relevant mental capacity issue was not taken into account would clearly be amenable to challenge by judicial review. That is why we believe that the more sensible approach is to leave these matters to the considerable expertise and experience of the Parole Board and not to attempt to take one or two factors out of context and place them in the Bill.

I say in response to one or two points raised in debate that the Parole Board already has expertise available to it in dealing with matters of mental capacity. We are not moving away from the current guidelines; we are essentially expressing in statutory form that which can be found there already. The noble Lord, Lord Balfe, asked whether the matter would go to Strasbourg. I simply draw his attention to the certificate given by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice pursuant to Section 19(1)(a) of the Human Rights Act 1998 that, in his view, the provisions of the Bill are compatible with convention rights.

I acknowledge the concern expressed about mental capacity. I reiterate our view that that is well embraced by the broad terms of the Bill. I therefore invite the noble Baroness not to press her amendments.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede [V]]

My Lords, this is an interesting group of amendments, and my party will abstain if a vote is called. I listened carefully to the argument from the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lords who have spoken in this debate. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, summarised the situation clearly from my perspective: Newton hearings are, in any event, the least common form of determining facts. The determining of facts is most often done by judges when summing up the case and, if there is a basis of plea, that would be the basis on which the sentence is made. If it is not accepted, there could be room for moving to a Newton hearing.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, Newton hearings occur throughout the whole of the English and Welsh system. As noble Lords may know, I sit as a magistrate in London and we occasionally do Newton hearings. They are used as a method of resolving the seriousness of the offence in some cases, but it seems we are talking about a very narrow set of circumstances here. In particular, the judge will have sat through the whole trial in the first place, and it will be for the lawyers on both sides to go through all the aggravating and mitigating factors, including the non-disclosure of a body. Of course, if the judge is not satisfied that that has been gone into sufficiently, they themselves can ask questions of clarification, if I can put it like that, of any witnesses giving evidence. It seems unlikely that this procedure would ever be used, and as such it should not be in the Bill.

A number of noble Lords spoke about calling witnesses again. It could be an extremely traumatic event for some people to have to be called twice to establish the facts of the case. Surely, it would be far better if all the facts—including the reason for the non-disclosure of the body or of the identity of children who have had sexual images made of them—were established in the trial itself, rather than elements of the trial being repeated in a Newton hearing. I will abstain on this amendment for the reasons I have given.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. The Government remain of the view that these amendments would place too much emphasis on findings of mental capacity at a Newton hearing, particularly the findings made for the purposes of sentence.

In sentencing an offender, it is for the court to consider the punitive element of an offender’s sentence and, in doing so, to take into account the failure to disclose information in setting the tariff. By reflecting this in the sentencing remarks, victims can be assured that due consideration has been given to the non-disclosure. Tariffs must be served in their entirety and irrespective of any disclosure of information after a trial, so the tariff cannot be reduced because of subsequent disclosures. This is an entirely sensible approach, as I believe the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, acknowledged when we discussed this matter in Committee. The trial judge is more able to determine the appropriate weighting with regard to non-disclosure when setting the tariff.

On the other hand, the Parole Board’s role is in relation to the preventive element of the sentence. The consideration that the Parole Board must make is whether there should be a continuation of custody or a release on licence if the offender’s risk can be safely managed in the community. The Bill places a statutory duty on the board, when making that wider assessment, to consider the non-disclosure of information by an offender and the possible reasons for it. The board will take a subjective view of what those reasons might be, and what bearing this information may have on the subsequent assessment of suitability for release. When it comes to consider these matters, it must of course take account of the judge’s sentencing remarks. Those, in turn, will be informed by such issues as non-disclosure. I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for his detailed analysis of how the court approaches these matters in practice and why, in the context of the Bill, it would not be appropriate to simply import the notion of the Newton hearing for the purposes of the Parole Board’s determination.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has correctly identified that a prisoner’s mental state may be a significant reason for non-disclosure—a point made earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Bull, when she spoke to her own amendments. But to limit this to the specific context of a Newton hearing, and to place that in the Bill, appears to us to be too narrow an approach. The Parole Board should be free to consider all reasons, including those that may arise as a result of a Newton hearing—unusual though they may be—and we should therefore avoid any specific delineation in the Bill.

As new subsection (3) in Clause 1 makes clear, the breadth of matters which the board may take into account is, essentially, as wide as possible. In addition, the board is bound by public law principles to act reasonably in all decisions, so a decision where a relevant Newton hearing or an issue of mental capacity was not taken into account could be subject to judicial review. I venture that this is not the Bill in which to approach the whole issue of sentencing guidelines or findings of fact for the purposes of those guidelines. That is already accommodated, and it is in these circumstances that I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford [V]]

My Lords, it is clear that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, does not like the system of Newton hearings, but the fact that the defendant has refused to disclose is not necessarily part of the offence. The reasons for his refusal to disclose the whereabouts of a body, or the identity of a child involved in indecent images, may not emerge in the course of a trial and may not be discussed before the jury. A jury listening to a case may not investigate the mental capacity of the defendant before them. If that is not an issue in the trial, examined on both sides, then the judge would have difficulty in forming a view of his own without hearing evidence.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, referred to the basis of plea as being the more usual way in which these matters are sorted out. I am completely familiar with the formation of the basis of plea, and the arguments that go on as to whether an agreement can be reached between the defence and the prosecution. However, if a person pleads guilty to murder or manslaughter and there is no trial, and there is a disagreement between prosecution and defence, how is the judge to come to a conclusion as to the degree to which the refusal to identify where a body is buried is to be part of his sentencing process—that it is an aggravating factor which he is to take into account? He has not heard any witnesses. He has just heard that the counsel disagree on what the basis of a plea would be.

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[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede [V]]

My Lords, I support the amendment and I support my noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley. She set out very clearly the reasons for the amendment, and the majority of speakers have supported her. I found the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, particularly moving. She spoke from the heart, as always, and, sadly, she spoke from bitter experience. It was particularly interesting that she talked about the practicalities of getting information from the Parole Board, even when you are very well known to the board as a victim.

My noble friend’s amendment would put in place an opt-out rather than an opt-in system, and the various elements of that are specified in the amendment. The arguments against the amendment made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, was: that is all very well, but why are these victims different from the other victims within the whole of the criminal justice system? The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, made the point very clearly: the reason they are different is that they continue to be victims because of the non-disclosure of the information.

There are roughly only 100 such victims in the country. I hope that any review of the work of the Parole Board will look at making a much wider opt-out system available in the future, but, now, we have the chance to legislate to address the concerns of this very particular group. The Parole Board has a heavy weight of responsibility but this is an opportunity for the House to make a tangible difference to these victims’ lives, and it should seek to do so. I support my noble friend.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I quite understand the concern that has been expressed about the victims of crime and the victims of these particular crimes.

Perhaps, first, I may make a number of rather technical points in relation to the scope of the amendment. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause does not apply to those receiving a determinate sentence for the offences contained in the Bill. However, I am confident that the amendment was meant to apply to all sentence types, and I will proceed with my remarks on that basis. Additionally, “relevant persons”, as defined in proposed new subsection (5), would include offenders beyond the scope of the Bill—namely, all those convicted of murder or manslaughter—rather than being restricted to the circumstances set out in the Bill. Again, I will proceed with my remarks on the basis that this was intended to be confined to offenders to whom the Bill applies.

I turn to the substance of the amendment. First, it would require the Parole Board—I emphasise: the Parole Board—to create and maintain a database of victims’ family members in cases captured by the Bill. The board would have to remove a family member from the database if they did not wish to be included. Secondly, it would create an obligation on the Parole Board to provide information to certain groups of victims and, indeed, suspected victims and their families.

This amendment effectively replicates some elements of the victim contact scheme for a limited group of people, and places the duty on the Parole Board to administer it rather than the National Probation Service. With respect, the Parole Board is not equipped for such a function. There is already a well-established process delivered through the victim contact scheme to provide victims with information about the date and outcome of parole hearings, and they can request a summary of the Parole Board decision. This process also facilitates victims requesting the imposition of specific licence conditions for the offender’s release, such as exclusion zones, and assists them in submitting a victim personal statement which will be considered by the Parole Board panel. The Government see no justification for replicating the excellent service provided by the victim contact scheme for a particular group of victims’ families in a limited way.

Proposed new subsection (2) of the amendment proposes an unfettered right to

“information pertaining to the application”,

which may include confidential information relating to the offender, such as police intelligence, which may breach the offender’s confidentiality rights and put their safety at risk. The Parole Board must balance the rights of victims with the rights of the offender.

If there is any suggestion that the parole decision is legally or procedurally flawed, victims may ask the Lord Chancellor to consider making a reconsideration application on their behalf, and the Lord Chancellor can ask the Parole Board to look at the decision again. Victims will receive a detailed letter setting out the reasons why the request for reconsideration was successful or unsuccessful. The victim liaison officer will provide information regarding judicial review if requested.

There are significant practical difficulties in operating such a scheme on the opt-out basis suggested by this amendment. The Parole Board would need to ensure that the correct contact details for each victim are recorded; if a victim does not respond to the offer of contact, it would not be appropriate simply to send updates to a last known address, for example. This amendment would duplicate much of the work delivered under the victim contact scheme but could not replace it entirely. That means that victims would have to receive contacts from and share information with both the Parole Board and the victim contact scheme, which would in turn add to their distress at a potentially very difficult time.

We are currently trialling a new process whereby all eligible victims are referred directly to the National Probation Service, to ensure that they are all offered access to the victim contact scheme directly by it, thus ensuring that we reduce the risk of victims opting out before they are clear about the benefits of the scheme. The new process also incorporates a standard referral form that provides the service with the address, telephone number and email address of victims to allow for multiple methods of contact.

We recognise that receiving information about parole hearings is of great importance to many victims, and we endeavour to support them through the existing victim contact scheme. We consider that this support is far better delivered by the National Probation Service than by being placed on the shoulders of the independent Parole Board, which, as I indicated, is not equipped to carry out such a service.

The amendment also contains a requirement to review the database’s use within one year of its creation. However, as some noble Lords observed, cases such as those detailed in this Bill are extremely rare and it is unlikely that a review after one year could result in any significant, reliable findings.

I emphasise that we are concerned with the position of victims. They are provided with information under the victim contact scheme, which is administered by the National Probation Service. The victim liaison officer will provide information to those who wish to receive it. Where the Parole Board considers or reconsiders a case, victims will receive a detailed letter setting out the reasons why, for example, a request for reconsideration was successful or unsuccessful. We are ensuring that the victim’s personal statement comes before the Parole Board when it has a hearing. We plan to enshrine support for victims in a victims’ law, as we have indicated, but before we do this we will revise the victims’ code to give them more clarity on their rights around access to support and greater flexibility over when and how a victim personal statement can be made.

The noble Lord, Lord German, referred to engagement on this matter. I can indicate that my honourable friend Alex Chalk, the Minister with responsibility in this area, has been endeavouring to arrange a meeting with the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy and Lady Barker, to discuss this matter. I do not know whether they are aware of that, but I am advised that this is in train, if I may put it in those terms. In these circumstances and, in particular, having regard to the distinctive role of the Parole Board on the one hand and the National Probation Service on the other, with respect to the victim code, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw this amendment.