Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill

Lord Judge Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 21st September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, we are all agreed that terrorism has the most dreadful consequences and we all feel a deep sense of compassion for the victims of terrorism and their families. It has a societal impact too, beyond the suffering of individuals and their families. One of the societal consequences is highlighted in the Bill, in the proposal that we should have legislation leading to a reduction of the freedom of individuals on the basis of suspicion alone. That is a grim consequence. It may have to be faced, but we should recognise it. And when we face up to it, we also have to address another simple fact. I suspect that all noble Lords know of cases—I certainly do—where individuals have been arrested with reasonable grounds for suspicion, who have turned out to be completely and utterly innocent. It is something worth bearing in mind.

Your Lordships have addressed all the issues, so I am not going to repeat them. I will merely say thank you very much and think of something new to say. It concerns the sentencing decision. Anybody who has had to pass a sentence will know that a sentencing decision is not as easy as it may look on paper. You are dealing with a human being who has upset, offended, injured, damaged or murdered another human being. Everybody is involved. A judge facing a sentencing decision—and this is no time for a lecture on it—has to balance a series of factors, some of which are totally contradictory.

Related to that, fixing different aspects of the sentencing formula is dangerous, but we have decided to do it by having a provision that enables the defendant who indicates an immediate intention to plead guilty to the crime with which he is charged to have a discount against his sentence of one-third. I can argue with you about the wisdom or unwisdom of that, but it is what we have. The Bill proposes, in exactly that situation, to reduce the discount to 20%—from one-third to one-fifth.

This matters. It is easy to say that it is just paper, but let us think of the value of an early guilty plea. The victim of the crime knows that that part of this awful process is over. He or she will not be challenged about his or her evidence. It will not be suggested to a woman who says she has been raped that she consented. It will save the victim a huge ordeal to know for certain that that is now over. It also saves the time and trouble of police officers who have to give evidence, forensic scientists and the whole process of the court. It also saves the court’s time, so that it can move on to deal with the huge backlog of cases that there currently is. It knows that that time will be available.

So when we talk about the sentence being reduced or a discount for a guilty plea, we should remember the value to the victim of closure: the fact that the problem can now be addressed and that the long uncertainty will not be hanging over him or her for 12 or 18 months; and the value to the public interest, which means that that is the end of it, apart from the sentence. In terrorist cases, that value is just as great as it is in any other. I know I will be told by the Minister that there is a precedent for this. It is a bad precedent. It is illogical and it should not be followed in this case. You cannot increase sentences for those convicted of terrorism offences, which I support, by devaluing the guilty plea of those who are willing to admit from the outset that they are guilty.

I have one other tiny observation. Can we be careful not to assume that the Newton hearing, which gets a mention in the Explanatory Note, is an answer to the potential danger of finding that somebody is being treated as though he has committed a criminal offence for which he has not been tried, let alone convicted?