Lord Jenkin of Roding
Main Page: Lord Jenkin of Roding (Conservative - Life peer)My Lords, the description of the Bill by the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, bears no relationship to what I and many others understand to be its nature. It is a curious document that is suffused with the free-market ideology that accompanied the privatisation of Britain’s energy industry in the latter years of the Thatcher Administration. The Bill contains evidence of the dangers of global warming and the effects of carbon emissions associated with fossil fuels, which have been well understood. However, notwithstanding its pieties in that respect, the Bill does very little to promote the cause of climate protection. It poses some ineffective and non-binding constraints on the rates of emission and, in truth, will not help in reaching the targets set out in the Climate Change Act 2008.
The truth is that the Bill is attempting to appease a powerful faction within the Conservative Party that is strongly opposed to any measures that might be taken to staunch the emissions of greenhouse gases. There is solid and highly disturbing scientific evidence that should alert every one of us to the perils that we face through global warming. However, many in the Conservative Party believe that they are as entitled to their own contrary opinions on such matters as any of the scientists are to theirs. The climate change deniers have a powerful ally in the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne. He envisages a dash for gas based on fuel that might be conjured up by fracturing the ground on which we stand. This vision has strongly influenced the Bill. Such a dash for gas would utterly negate the purposes of the Climate Change Act 2008, which proposed that the emissions of greenhouse gases in 2050 should be 80% lower than those in 1990.
The Labour Party brought the matter to a head in the Commons by tabling a reasoned amendment declining to give the Bill a Second Reading in the absence of a decarbonisation target. In the absence of full support from the Liberal Democrats, the amendment was defeated by 279 votes to 206. Perhaps now we can trust that the Liberal Democrats are not bound by whatever agreement it was that made them adhere to the Government’s position on the amendment, and that they will support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, which surely accords with their natural instincts. There is clamorous support from industry for a binding emissions target. A target somewhere between 100 grams and 50 grams of CO2 per kilowatt hour, to be set in 2014, would indicate that the UK Government are genuinely committed to their climate change obligations, and give much needed confidence to investors.
The privatisation of the power industry, according to the nostrums of free-market economics, has given rise not to a competitive market but to a dysfunctional oligopoly consisting of six big companies. On the sidelines are a few small independent companies specialising in renewable power generation. Given adequate protection, the independent companies could be expected to provide a large proportion of the new investment in renewable power generation. At present, there is a danger of their being squeezed out of the market by the big six, who are intent on fulfilling their renewables obligations with their own power plants. The Government and the Department of Energy and Climate Change have paid scant attention to the plight of the independent generators. They need to act with urgency to protect these players.
The Government’s free-market ideology and aversion to government sponsorship and national ownership have severely prejudiced the prospects for nuclear energy in the UK. It is an outstanding irony that in their pursuit of a free-market ideology they have bequeathed our nuclear future to two foreign state-owned monopolists, Électricité de France and the China General Nuclear Power Company. These suppliers are expecting a rate of return in double figures as a consequence of a high price for their electricity that is guaranteed for a period of 35 years. This return is supposedly justified by the risks inherent in the project and the difficulties of raising the necessary finance on the open market.
However, in their attempt to attract firms to undertake nuclear projects, the Government have provided a so-called infrastructure guarantee that guarantees 65% of the necessary funds. Surely under such circumstances, it would have been appropriate for the Government to raise the necessary funds by selling bonds and to commission the building of the nuclear power stations directly, thereby taking them into national ownership. Such a course of action would have given the Government powers to ensure that native suppliers would be fully exploited and that our nuclear industry would stand a good chance of revival. Instead, foreign suppliers will predominate and Britain’s taxpayers will have the burden of supporting a much troubled French nationalised industry.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, has posed a fairly simple question to the House. There is widespread agreement that we are aiming for a very substantial reduction—80%—in carbon emissions by 2050. There is also wide agreement, embodied in the Bill, that we should have a considerable measure of decarbonisation by 2030. For the most part, there is no dispute about that. When I have discussed this with some of the companies outside, they all accept that that is what we are heading towards. The question is whether we set the figure for 2030 now or wait until 2016, as the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, suggested at the end of his speech, a bit to my surprise. The argument for 2016 is really quite strong. Under the Climate Change Act, this is all administered by the climate change committee, of which my noble friend Lord Deben is the chairman, and which is engaged in setting a series of five-year ceilings as the measure of decarbonisation, leading to an 80% cut by 2050.
The fifth carbon budget comes up in 2016. It seems to be of the highest importance that the figure agreed for 2030 should be consistent with what the climate change committee comes to in 2016. I think that the effect of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Oxburgh, would be to set now what the figure would be—which would seem to make that extremely difficult if not very doubtful. The noble Lord, Lord O’Neill of Clackmannan, said, “Let it be done by regulations and then you can change it”. I am not sure that is not exactly where we are anyway. The climate change committee will be setting a fifth carbon budget in 2016, which will of course be part of the then Government’s policy. The question is whether we do it now or wait until then.
I have attended a number of meetings in the past two or three weeks on this subject but will just mention, in passing, one thing that disturbs me. I read the short report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The report of the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change also came into my possession, which takes the view that the intergovernmental panel is completely wrong. What disturbs me about these two bodies, and I will leave it there, is that they do not argue with each other—they abuse each other. One side calls the other climate change deniers and that side calls the others back a bunch of government stooges. I find that a very tiresome argument. If one is going to have an argument about something, one should have a proper one, not one that just descends into abuse.
One of the most interesting meetings that I attended was the one chaired by my noble friend Lord Deben and also, I think, by the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington. One of the points that my noble friend made was that the climate change committee has always been determinedly technology-neutral. It does not seek to identify how a particular target should be reached. It accepts the international figures and then sets a British target for that. I have found that the people I talk to are worried that this is all very well for this country but that Europe has gone and set a technology target, with a figure for 2020—I cannot remember the exact figure—that has to be covered by renewables. The companies who are having to invest and develop their investment programmes say, “Which are we to believe? Are we free to work towards the 2030 target or do we have to pay attention to this?”. The one thing I agreed with my noble friend Lord Lawson about was when he quoted from that extremely interesting Financial Times article and said that if one thinks there is something wrong—as I think there is with this technology target—the right answer is to renegotiate. One of the questions that I therefore ask my noble friend is: what are the chances of our going to the European Union and saying, “Look, this 2020 target for renewables is really quite inconsistent with the much broader target, which will lead on to our 2050 target”? It seems to me that it is an aberration, and that is unfortunate. We should renegotiate that directive.
My Lords, this amendment stands in my name and those of my noble friends whom I shall mention in a moment.
The House will realise that this is an exceedingly complicated Bill. Anyone coming to it for the first time would recognise that. At the heart of it are the Government’s proposals for electricity market reform. The objectives were mentioned in the previous major debate. They are security of supply—the lights must not go out—support for low-carbon generation and affordable prices for consumers. From the outset, Ministers have been determined to say that to achieve these objectives, tougher competition is going to have to come. It is true that the regulator, Ofgem, has had some responsibility for this, but the general perception has been that it has not been as effective as it might have been.
My right honourable friend the Secretary of State, Ed Davey, mentioned a problem on “Newsnight” the other day. He said, “We need more competition … We think the big six have been a real problem”. I have the figures. The big six have no less than 92% of the supply to consumers. The remaining small companies have a mere 8%. Generation is nearly as bad. It is an oligopoly. That is what we are faced with. I do not believe that existing arrangements for dealing with competition are strong enough, so there was a very positive welcome when my right honourable friend the Prime Minister said in the Commons the other day:
“So I can tell the House today that we will be having a proper competition test carried out over the next year to get to the bottom of whether this market can be more competitive. I want more companies, I want better regulation”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/13; col. 293.]
And so say all of us. That is obviously necessary. We await with interest what my right honourable friend the Secretary of State is going to say in his statement later this week, or perhaps even tomorrow. What is this review going to involve? It is already clear that it is likely to take some time and involve not only Ofgem, the regulator, but the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition and Markets Authority. I will return to this towards the end of my remarks.
Three amendments in this group are tabled in the names of my noble friend Lord Roper, the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Cameron of Dillington—a very cross-party group—and me. Our purpose is to make the determination to have tougher competition explicit in the legislation and that it should apply, where appropriate—it certainly is to the bit of the Bill I shall be coming to—to the Minister as well as to the regulator.
The part of the Bill with which I am chiefly concerned is Chapter 3 of Part 2, which introduces the capacity market. I briefly describe that as a managed-auction system to give clear incentives to generators to invest in new capacity. This can mean keeping open plant that might otherwise have been closed, bringing into production plants that have been mothballed—there is a good deal of that at the moment—or building new plant. It can also include measures to reduce demand.
The capacity market offers a real opportunity for Parliament to give the industry the opportunity to get more competition. That is what the Prime Minister was talking about when he said he wanted new companies—he was absolutely right—new entrants and smaller independent generators. They struggle to compete with the big six. Unlike the big six, which have strong balance sheets, smaller companies have to raise funds from the market for their investment. Unless they can see a reasonable prospect of a decent profit, they will not be able to do so. Investors will not come forward. That is the purpose of the capacity market; it is to give them the incentive to do that.
One would have thought that if everyone really wants more competition, it would be in the Bill. Yes, it is; there is quite a lot in the Bill. When you look at other clauses in the Bill—in particular Clause 47, dealing with power purchase schemes, Clause 127, dealing with the strategy and policy statement and Clause 132 on the modification of supply licences—they are specifically for the Secretary of State, and in all that, he has to promote competition. But when the Bill comes to the capacity mechanism, for some reason—and I have to confess that I had some difficulty understanding what it is—the competition duty does not apply to his role as the official with responsibility for the capacity market. That is the only instance in the Bill where there is no obligation on a Minister to be responsible for promoting competition. Yet the Secretary of State is in overall charge of the capacity market. Why? What is the difference?
The Government have done very well trying to spell out to the industry the complex details of the structure of electricity market reform: the contracts for difference, the capacity market and all the other features. They are not all quite there yet, but they are nearly there. The object of the exercise is quite clearly to create conditions where investors, particularly smaller and independent investors, can raise money in order to invest in the additional capacity which we certainly need and which will help consumers because it will bring more competition. It is not quite true that they have yet succeeded in doing that. The terms set out for the operation of the community charge—I perhaps do not need to go into detail—have been described to the Minister, who has been very good and met the people concerned, but they are not yet sufficient to enable them to do that. They will have the objective of doing it, but nothing will be achieved. Therefore, there have to be changes.
I have heard it said that the changes will have to be for the regulations, but as the House well knows, if regulations come before the House, they cannot be amended. They can be either rejected or accepted. That is not very satisfactory. Therefore, we must have clear authority imposed upon the Secretary of State to run the regulations in such a way that they generate the competition they want. That will require some changes in what has already been distributed and made clear to the industry. Ministers must be under a clear statutory duty when exercising their responsibilities for the capacity market to do so positively to promote competition. That is the simple purpose of Amendment 4, which adds to Clause 5 a sixth duty to promote effective competition in the several activities set out in the amendment. The other two amendments we have tabled, Amendments 42 and 43, specifically make this duty effective for the purposes of the capacity market set out in Chapter 3 to make it explicit that the duty for promoting competition covers Ministers as well as the regulator, Ofgem. Taken together, these amendments would enable potential investors to insist that the regulations and rules are drafted so they really will enable independent generators and new entrants to raise the funds they will need to invest in the new capacity in competition with the big six. Last week, the Prime Minister said he wanted new companies. This is the way to get them.
I referred a moment ago to the proposed high-level review. The first auction for the capacity market happens next year. For that to go ahead, the regulations have to have been finalised and approved by Parliament, and must be in force. The review we have heard about will be over the next year and it will be too late. I hope that when my noble friend replies to this debate, she will not take refuge in the review as a substitute for what we are asking here; it is not. I suspect that my noble friend, who is very bright on these things, has fully taken that on board.
We need these amendments now. I ask my noble friend to accept the amendments as they are tabled, or undertake to bring forward her own amendments, which have the same impact, when we reach Third Reading. I beg to move.
My Lords, I wish to speak in support of this amendment. I recognise that the noble Lord, Lord Jenkin, is applying it mainly to the capacity issue. I wish to address a very specific, simple point with respect to the operation of contracts for difference. In order to attract investment, this Bill allows—almost encourages—electricity suppliers to pass on to consumers the difference between the strike price and the reference price should the strike price exceed the reference price. However, there is nothing in the Bill to ensure that the suppliers return money to consumers should the reference price exceed the strike price. This might well be the case should the price of gas continue to rise, as several noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Oxburgh, have suggested it may.
The Minister kindly discussed this with me and said it was the Government’s position that intervention was unnecessary as the market should ensure that suppliers reduce their charges in order to remain competitive. I am not fully convinced of this and favour a specific requirement that suppliers should return what might be described as a windfall profit to consumers if the reference price exceeds the strike price. The noble Lord’s amendment at least requires the Secretary of State to have regard to the desirability of promoting effective competition wherever appropriate. In this case, it would surely be appropriate. How else can we protect the consumer?
My Lords, while I wait for some inspiration to wing its way down to me, I will continue and respond later to the noble Baroness. I recognise what my noble friend Lord Jenkin and others have said about how liquidity reforms benefit consumers. These reforms make it easier for independent suppliers and new entrants to access the wholesale market. They will increase competitive pressure in the retail market, which will benefit consumers in terms of downward pressure on bills, greater choice, and better service, which is what I know all noble Lords want.
My noble friends Lord Deben and Lord Jenkin, and others, mentioned Ofgem’s liquidity proposal. We want to make the energy market as competitive as possible. An increasingly level playing field for independent suppliers and generators is precisely what will help drive competition, which delivers better value for consumers and business. Ofgem’s proposal to increase transparency in the way electricity is traded will give independent generators a foothold in the UK market and encourage new players to invest.
While I am waiting for inspiration, which has not quite arrived yet, I will touch on the proposals the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, has mentioned on the price freeze. We cannot see the Labour Party’s proposals solving the problems of competition. What we see is that we will get price hikes before and after the freeze. What we need is to get a better understanding of where the Labour Party is coming from when it says that it wants to reset the energy market, because we do not know whether that is just jingoistic terminology or if there are some proposals in place.
The inspiration I was waiting for has arrived. We are engaging with industry. It said that it was pleased with our proposal for a higher cap in the first auction. I suspect that does not quite answer the noble Baroness’s question, so perhaps I will come back to her on that.
I am listening with very great care to what my noble friend has said because this is all very important. She says that she has met the representatives of the industry and of their bankers and funders. Is she now saying that she will take account of what they said and of the three points they raised? My noble friend has mentioned the length of the contract; they say it must be not less than 15 years. There is the question of the penalties, which the noble Baroness, Lady Worthington, has mentioned. There is then the question of a cap. All three have to be right or, however much the noble Baroness, Lady Verma, says she wants competition she will not get in the new entrants and the independent generators.
My Lords, as I have said, I have taken very seriously what the independent generators and others have said to me, as well as what noble Lords have said. I think, however, that what our proposals are laying out answers many of these fears and the concerns of those generators. We of course agree that there needs to be greater competition. That is what I think this Bill will help to achieve.
I return to the penalties that the noble Baroness and my noble friend have mentioned. We have proposed cutting penalties between 101% to 149% of capacity payments in any year. We are aware of concerns from independent generators at the level of penalties, but it is crucial to balance investability against protection for consumers. The right thing is to focus our efforts on concrete actions that will make a difference by enabling low-carbon generation to compete, by helping gas-fired generators and other reliable capacity providers to remain economic and compete, and to bring reforms to the wholesale and retail markets.
I therefore urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment. I hope I have demonstrated that the Government are taking clear action to increase competition at the same time as actively reviewing what more can be done.
My noble friend went very fast, and at my age it is not always easy to hear everything that is being said. The Leader of the House is waiting to make his Statement about the European Council. I have the impression that she has been impressed by the people whom she has met and the discussions that she has had with me and others on this matter. She has given me every impression that she understands that, if these people are going to compete effectively, they have to be able to raise the finance in the market to do it.
The initial terms which the Government pointed out, as originally indicated, would apply to them would have made them say, “Well, we cannot raise it. We only have 10 years? It is impossible”. There are various other things, and we have mentioned the penalties and the cap. I understand that my noble friend has given an undertaking—perhaps she will deny me if that is not right—that she will consider very carefully what those independent generators have said and the terms and conditions that they will have to have if they are going to enter the market. If they do not, whatever my noble friend has said about competition, it will not happen.
My Lords, I do not want to leave my noble friend in any grey area. I have listened very carefully to him, as I always do, but I think that the proposals I have laid out will respond to him and to those independent generators. I think the proposals and the Bill and what I am taking forward do answer those concerns.
My Lords, I am going to take my noble friend’s word as what I think she is intending to mean. She is not giving any guarantees, but she does apparently understand the case that has been made if the competition is going to work through the capacity market in the way in which the Government have said it would. She has been told very firmly that unless she changes the conditions it will not work. She has given me the impression—and, I hope, other noble Lords as well—that she understands that and will continue talking with a view to getting acceptable conditions. If that is the case, it would seem to me to be quite wrong that I should take the opinion of the House. In those circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.