Modern Slavery Bill

Lord Hylton Excerpts

Monday 1st December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I am grateful to noble Lords for tabling amendments relating to the offence of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour in the Bill, and raising the issue of whether a wider offence is needed. I reflected, ahead of Committee, on the definition of this offence and I will move government Amendments 4, 7 and 101 to clarify the offence and ensure it can clearly be used in cases where the victim is a child or vulnerable.

This offence will replace the existing offence of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour set out in Section 71 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This is an important offence which captures grave and often degrading behaviour. Under the Bill, the maximum penalty will be increased to life imprisonment. A person commits this offence if they hold another person in slavery or servitude or require another person to perform forced or compulsory labour. These terms are defined with reference to Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Through its decisions, the European Court of Human Rights has provided clear guidance on the meaning of these terms.

I am particularly concerned that our offences should be effective in the case of child victims, who are often very vulnerable. That is why, following the pre-legislative scrutiny report, we clarified the Clause 1 offence to make it clear that, when deciding whether an offence has been committed, the court can consider someone’s personal circumstances, including their age. Following Second Reading, I have considered the issue of child victims and very vulnerable adults further and I have tabled amendments that do more to ensure that the offences clearly cover their specific circumstances.

Government Amendment 4, for which I am grateful for your Lordships’ wide support, makes it absolutely clear that, when assessing whether an offence of slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour has taken place, the police, prosecutors and the courts can look at the particular vulnerabilities of children. I have also reflected on concerns that the Bill is not yet sufficiently clear on the meaning of “child”. For the avoidance of doubt, I have tabled government Amendment 101 to make clear that “child” refers to a person under 18, a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, and very much part of the recommendations made by my noble friend Lord McColl and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss.

I also understand the concerns expressed at Second Reading in another place, and during the pre-legislative scrutiny committee’s inquiry, that there may be a perception that to achieve a successful prosecution will require evidence that a person has not consented to being held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced or compulsory labour. That is a point that my noble friend Lady Hamwee made. In cases of children, there may not be clear evidence of lack of consent because adults often control children in subtle ways, and children may not even realise that they are victims. My noble friend referred to that often very complex relationship between the perpetrators and their victims. I want to ensure that law enforcement, prosecutors and the courts are clear that, in accordance with existing case law, the lack of consent is not an element of the offences in Clause 1 that has to be proved to secure a conviction, and therefore a person’s consent does not prevent a finding that the offence of slavery or servitude or forced or compulsory labour has been committed.

Government Amendment 7 makes sure that, even where a victim consented to the situation they were placed in, the court can find that the situation amounted to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour. This applies explicitly to both children and adults. We want to protect children and very vulnerable adults from modern slavery. This is a point that my noble friend Lord McColl referred to in highlighting some of the circumstances, particularly debt bondage, that people are in.

I understand and share the sentiments behind the alternative Amendment 8, which was spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, and would make consent simply irrelevant when determining whether a Clause 1 offence had been committed. However, we have not chosen to take that approach, for two reasons. First, in our view it would be inconsistent with the European Court of Human Rights case law, which is clear that consent can be considered when assessing overall whether forced or compulsory labour has taken place. Secondly, this approach could inadvertently actually make it harder to secure convictions, which none of us wants. In some cases the victim will clearly have refused to consent to their treatment in some way. In those cases their lack of consent will be relevant evidence for the court to consider, and may well help to demonstrate that the offence has been committed. This amendment would prevent a court from considering this evidence—something that none of us wishes.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked a very pertinent question, which sent a flood of notes back and forth to and from the Bill team, on whether the strategy document, on which the ink is yet to dry, is open to amendment. You could see officials wincing at the prospect, but this is something that needs to be kept under review. I refer my noble friend to Clause 42, which refers to the role of the anti-slavery commissioner and his requirement to produce strategic plans and annual reports; those reports will come before Parliament and we will have an opportunity to discuss them. I hope that in some way that goes to answering her question. I am grateful to her and my noble friend Lord Dholakia for tabling amendments that have allowed me to test out whether the wording in the offence around considering a victim’s circumstances and vulnerabilities works in the way that the Government have always intended.

I turn to a specific question asked by my noble friend Lady Hamwee. In Clause 1(4) we use the term “may”, and she asked whether it should be “may” or “shall”. “May” was carefully chosen in this context to give the courts the flexibility to exercise their judgment appropriately. There will be many circumstances in any case and some will not be relevant as to whether a Clause 1 offence was committed. The term “may”—rather than, for example, “shall”—was used to avoid a court having to consider every single circumstance in every single case, whether or not they are relevant. That was the purpose behind that.

Amendments 2, 3, 5 and 6 all relate to Clause 1(4), which specifies that, when determining whether a person has been held in slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour, regard may be had to any of the person’s personal circumstances which may make them vulnerable. I can reassure noble Lords that the subsection gives a non-exhaustive list of the kinds of personal circumstances that may be considered to make someone more vulnerable than other persons. This list is just to offer examples. The clause specifically states that,

“regard may be had to any of the person’s personal circumstances”—

some being mentioned in parenthesis—whether they are on that list of examples or not.

With this in mind, we do not think that we need to add further examples to that list which could risk creating the impression that it is supposed to be comprehensive. We are also confident that the phrase “such as” is sufficient to make it clear that this is a non-exhaustive list of examples, and have made this point clear in the Explanatory Notes.

The proposed new clause in Amendment 100 suggests that we place in statute a requirement for a review of a number of Acts of Parliament to look specifically at whether existing offences adequately protect victims of exploitation. We will turn to the detail of the Bill’s definition of exploitation in a later group. I welcome the sentiment behind this amendment. I have been looking carefully at the detail of the offences, as has the Minister for Modern Slavery and Organised Crime. We have been asking if there are examples of potential gaps in the law where conduct that amounts to modern slavery might not be appropriately criminalised. I must say that we have not yet identified substantial gaps, but I want to get this Bill right and remain very keen to hear about any problems which have been highlighted. The examples given by my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lord McColl are very helpful in this regard and we will reflect on them.

I am also committed to keeping the effectiveness of this Bill—including the offences—under review after it becomes an Act. This will happen both through the work of the Independent Anti-slavery Commissioner and through post-legislative scrutiny. For this reason I do not believe that a review of the Acts listed in the amendment is necessary at this stage. However, I place on record in this House the Government’s commitment to providing post-legislative scrutiny on the Bill in the usual way within three to five years of Royal Assent, an issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, at Second Reading. The Government will consult the Home Affairs Select Committee on the timing of publication of the memorandum. In light of this assurance, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment and that noble Lords will support the amendments in my name. I beg to move.

[Lord Hylton (CB)]

The noble Lord has helpfully mentioned the issue of vulnerability. In relation to Clause 1(4), does being tied to one single employer not necessarily involve vulnerability?

[Lord Bates]

We will come back to this excellent question from the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. I will get some more guidance but I know we will be coming back to discuss this very issue on a later grouping—in fact, on some of the amendments which he has tabled. I will make sure we have a response to that by then.