Non-Contentious Probate (Fees) Order 2018

Debate between Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Tuesday 18th December 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Wirral]

I can think of many other court situations; I anticipate that the Minister will have a great list for my noble friend Lord Deben. There are many occasions on which you pay a fee; at the end of the day, it is intended to cover the costs of the system. This goes slightly further, I agree, but within a ring-fenced system—if I could have my noble friend’s attention—the money cannot go just anywhere. It has to go toward enhancing the Courts & Tribunals Service. I think this is the right way forward to ensure we have the access that I described earlier. I warmly commend my noble friend the Minister and I support his order.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, this order relies above all on Section 180 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. As that name perhaps suggests, it was a great Christmas tree of an Act. One recalls its passage all too well; it occupies no fewer than 231 pages of the Queen’s Printers’ copy, with 186 sections and 11 schedules.

This House discharges its scrutiny function very carefully, with great conscientiousness, but perhaps, just occasionally, Homer nods; did we perhaps nod here as we reached towards the end of this mammoth Bill? Of course, we must now construe and apply Section 180 as enacted. That said, while Section 180 contains apparently no limits whatever to the extent of its permissible use, provided always that the excess funds raised are devoted to the efficacy of the Courts & Tribunals Service, ought we not to construe it somewhat fastidiously so as to guard against its use for what is essentially a tax-raising exercise?

Of course, cross-subsidisation is permissible, but is it no less obviously the case that a point will come at which what is purportedly an enhanced fee with a view to cross-subsidisation becomes truly a tax, improperly raised without primary legislation? Suppose that the proposed maximum here of £6,000 were, not the £20,000 suggested last year but, say, £60,000 for estates over £20 million. What would we say? We know that £145 million is to be raised by this order for cross-subsidisation, but why only £145 million? The deficit in the service is something like £1 billion, so why should £500 million not be raised for cross-subsidisation?

Is the proposed schedule truly a schedule of fees or does it at some point, disguised as such, descend in reality into a schedule of taxes? That, I would suggest, is the question for your Lordships. I shall listen carefully to the Government’s arguments—indeed, to all the arguments. Only at the end of the debate shall I decide how to vote. I recognise that that may be regarded as a somewhat unusual approach in this House, but I have a certain nostalgia for my earlier occupation.

Domestic Gas and Electricity (Tariff Cap) Bill

Debate between Lord Hunt of Wirral and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 11th June 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to support my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern in his amendment, and in doing so I declare my interests as set out in the register, in particular as a partner in the global commercial law firm, DAC Beachcroft LLP. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has pointed out—we enjoyed his journey through history— this amendment will ensure that the Bill meets the Government’s ambition to have a cap in default-rate energy tariffs in place by the winter while also ensuring that the correct scrutiny of such a major intervention in the energy market will be in place; namely, the CMA being able to review and improve the methodology if an appeal is brought.

I want to put forward three core reasons why the Bill in its current form does not provide appropriate scrutiny. First, setting a price cap that maintains competition and innovation will be extremely difficult. Competition is improving and a range of important policy costs such as the smart meter rollout and subsidies for renewable and vulnerable policies are included in energy bills. There are material risks to consumers if the methodology is not correct, and I welcome the amendment proposed to Amendment 5. The CMA clearly possesses the necessary expertise to hear an appeal on the cap, and there is no better source in support of that than the Government themselves. I shall quote from their recent Green Paper, Modernising Consumer Markets:

“We have an independent expert competition body, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), to promote competition in the interests of consumers and business across the economy … The work of the CMA from 2014-2017 is expected to achieve benefits to consumers well in excess of £3 billion”.


I agree with this endorsement and I believe that appeal rights to the CMA will provide a reassurance to consumers and the industry alike.

Secondly, removing the right of appeal to the CMA from the provisions of this Bill would undermine the established approach which has been in place since privatisation. Some noble Lords may remember that as a junior Minister I took through the Gas Bill in 1985 and I still bear the scars, particularly on setting up a system of regulation which at the time was quite innovative. Since privatisation there has been an approach that underpins investor and consumer confidence. Moreover, the CMA already has a track record of improving regulatory decisions. In 2016 it set out that Ofgem’s previous attempts to regulate retail tariffs in its retail market review had damaged competition and should be removed, while in 2015 the CMA heard an appeal, supported by Citizens Advice, on the level of the energy network price control. It found that Ofgem had made an error and £105 million was returned to consumers.

Thirdly, the Government have suggested that the courts, through judicial review, would be better placed to hear an appeal. I do not agree with that. JR is concerned only with the process for making a decision, not the substance. The CMA is a specialist competition body that is designed to look at these issues. It has teams of experts within the organisation and the Government announced in the Budget last year around £3 million-worth of funding to ensure that the CMA could continue to support competition and consumers. This makes the CMA better qualified and resourced than the courts to review a price control. I hope that noble Lords will understand that those are three very clear reasons in support of my noble and learned friend’s amendment.

Perhaps I may anticipate, if I dare, what the Minister may say. Looking at his initial response at Second Reading, I recall his main concern was delay. As my noble and learned friend explained, the amendment explicitly rules out the potential for a CMA appeal to delay or block the introduction of a price control. Delay is not usual anyway. In the past 11 price control decisions the CMA has not caused a delay and the amendment would now make that impossible.

My noble friend also may say we have concerns that a right of appeal could be used by certain of the major players to frustrate a price control. We know, however, that delay will not be possible via the amendment and the energy sector overwhelmingly supports CMA appeal rights, as do investors in the utilities sector. Furthermore, consumer groups would be able to exercise the right of appeal.

Thirdly, in the Official Report at col. 1018, if I recall, the Minister raised the fact that the Select Committee had considered the matter and recommended judicial review as an appropriate route of appeal. I believe there is a capability question here. However, I would also point out that judicial reviews actually take longer to resolve than CMA appeals—9.7 months versus 8.8 months. That is a comparison since the year 2000. As my noble and learned friend pointed out, the amendment would commit the CMA to resolve a case in four months. We rest our case.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, I regret I took no part in Second Reading. Indeed, I ought to say at the outset that I defer to no one in my claim to the profoundest possible ignorance about this area of the law and all the technical know-how that underpins it. As my noble friend Lord Carlile says, over the years I have had considerable experience of judicial review. My object is to support and echo rather than add substantively to the arguments already canvassed ably by all of the Lords who have spoken at Second Reading and again today. There are threefold basic advantages, which strike me as perfectly obvious, between the appeal sought in the amendment and judicial review, which, obviously, but for the amendment, would be the fall-back position of anybody wishing to challenge the authority’s decision.

First, there is the question of the expertise of the tribunal in question. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, said, judicial review judges have no more expertise in this area than I myself have already recognised I lack. In fact, the criteria by which this judgment falls to be made are, as set out in the statute, highly problematic and not obviously soluble by judges as opposed to an expert custom-built tribunal already in place to take appeals.

Secondly, there is the focus of challenge. As has been said, judicial review focuses essentially on the process by which the decision was arrived at. There is not a substantive challenge to the merits. As the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said, only perversity could allow a judicial review challenge on the substantive merits basis. That is not a likely or fruitful way ahead here.

Thirdly—this links with the second point—there is the form of relief. If you succeed on a judicial review challenge in this circumstance, you set aside the decision under challenge but remit the matter back to the body so that it can, without the deficiencies of the process that you have identified, or on a non-perverse basis, reach a different decision. It is not open to the judicial review court to say, “Well, this is plainly a wrong process. They didn’t take account of this, that or the other consideration. So we will impose instead a different cap”. That is not open to it so you simply have a further decision, with, again, all the problems and delays that that would bring in its wake.

Finally, on Amendment 6, I observe only that costs can be a useful sanction and it really should be left to the CMA itself—assuming there is to be a provision for an appeal to the CMA—to decide whether in the particular circumstances it can be empowered to provide, as the amendment would, that the costs should be borne by the Exchequer, but that should not necessarily be the outcome. There may be circumstances which make that inappropriate.