Brexit

Lord Howarth of Newport Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, let us remind ourselves that the case for leaving the European Union is to reclaim the legislative sovereignty that we lent to the European Communities in 1972—and that is a prize of great value. The delegation of so much policy and legislative responsibility to the democratically defective institutions of the European Union has been, I believe, a powerful factor in the growing disaffection with parliamentary democracy that we have witnessed in our country. To take back these responsibilities gives us an opportunity to renew our democracy.

Our country is indeed “full of passionate intensity”; that is not surprising, because Brexit is a struggle for the soul of the nation and the future of our democracy. When people were asked in 2016 to vote to leave or to remain, they were in effect asked, “Do you wish to preserve the status quo?”. That question prompted an outpouring of long pent-up anger against elites and a howl from those who had been failed by the neoliberal orthodoxy practised by all parties in government. Many leavers now take the view that their Parliament is intent on cheating them, while many remainers are fearful of the mob. This is a dangerous state of affairs and we urgently need an access of moderation and reason.

To resume self-government in the sense that Brexit would permit is not to consign our nation to Faragism, to reaction, to racism and to xenophobia. It will be open to us to choose to be a liberal and internationalist society, and that is what I believe people will want to choose. For the centre-left, so unconfident about a post-Brexit future, the challenge is to put forward a vision of a sustainable economy, social justice and policies for climate change, and to win elections.

It is hard to see how compromise between the leave and remain positions can be achieved. Leavers see the Brexit issue in terms of freedom and democracy; remainers choose to frame Brexit in terms of the economy and standards of living. These two sets of considerations do not engage. The withdrawal deal, which I believe was an honourable attempt to find a compromise, was rejected vehemently by both sides of the argument on three occasions.

Is the present condition of our politics therefore a massive failure? There is certainly immense frustration in the country and a paralysis of decision-taking. The parties appear to have descended into chaos. There is too much excessive language, whether of surrender or of catastrophe, in our political discourse. Abuse and threats abound. It was very wrong for the Prime Minister, in a system of parliamentary government, to rouse the people against Parliament. He should desist from the use of populist language and seek to speak for the country as a whole. Among the many divisions in politics is that between those politicians who seek to appeal to,

“the better angels of our nature”,

and those who conjure demons.

On the other hand, it could be said that what has been happening in our politics is rather admirable. There is a mighty contest between politicians who have passionately held but conflicting views of what will be for the good of the country. When the Government have been unable to advance, Parliament has chosen to take the initiative; the Speaker has upheld the right of the House of Commons to do so; politicians have worked across party boundaries and some have been willing to sacrifice their careers for their principles; and the Supreme Court has proved an effective check on arbitrary government—the Prime Minister should never have made that stupid and improper attempt to prorogue Parliament for five weeks.

Whichever view noble Lords may take, we now need as quickly as possible a resolution to the essential Brexit issue of whether we leave or remain, and we need a return to mutual respect and reconciliation. But I fear that neither a referendum nor a general election will produce those outcomes.

Meanwhile, as we look at the time horizon between now and 31 October, it is I suppose possible, although it seems unlikely, that the Prime Minister will negotiate a deal with the European Union. If he does, that deal will presumably be the withdrawal deal with the backstop tweaked. But for many leavers that will be viewed as Brexit in name only.

I will quote Professor David Collins, professor of international economic law at City University:

“We must keep in mind that there are many features of the Withdrawal Agreement which are just as bad as the Backstop, but which have received far less attention, notably from our Prime Minister. The Withdrawal Agreement would maintain the supremacy of EU law over the UK, including new laws created by the EU over which the UK would have no voice. This means that UK courts would be required to strike down Acts of Parliament if they are determined to be inconsistent with EU law. Worse, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice would be retained, either directly or through a dispute settlement system modelled on the one the EU has with the Ukraine through which a notionally neutral tribunal would be bound on issues of EU law by decisions of the ECJ. Since the UK would have no judge on the ECJ, it would effectively be under the jurisdiction of a foreign court”.


Have we come this far for that? What kind of sovereignty is that? There will be anger if that is the nature of the deal, and it is very questionable whether the House of Commons would vote for it.

Alternatively, we may leave with “no deal”—I use that as a term of art; the noble Lord, Lord Lilley, explained that there are many deals that mitigate the notion of an absolute no deal—should one of the member states of the European Union veto an extension. I believe that that would not be a catastrophe. We would of course have been much better prepared for such a contingency had the previous Chancellor, Mr Hammond, not forbade further public expenditure on preparations for no deal at a crucial phase—but the present Chancellor, Mr Javid, is seeking to make up for lost time. Yes, we would go through choppy waters, but we would go through no hurricane. We could come through, as we have come through many periods of economic disruption and difficulty before. Then, as we worked towards a free trade agreement, we would be doing so with our heads held high as a self- governing nation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Davies of Stamford (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to begin by commenting on two of the speeches made earlier on by the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Howarth. They were both very original speeches; those Members of the House always make original speeches. Both were the subject of considerable reflection. Nevertheless, I detected in those speeches a considerable degree of complacency about the threats facing us. I believe that complacency is such a danger in economics and in politics, in business and generally in life, that it needs to be commented on if it arises. I may say that both noble Lords have been long-standing personal friends of mine for over half a century, and we have been arguing about politics and economics together since we first met at a university in the Fens, 55 years ago. I hope that this is not the end of a beautiful friendship.

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said that we may go through some choppy water if we have a hard Brexit, but that is all right; we will get through that okay, with the help of the Bank of England, fiscal spending and so forth. I have to tell him that fiscal spending is not a cost-free policy. As you build up your debt—and public debt in this country has risen from less 20 years —you are gradually reducing your capacity to intervene in the future. We learned in the 1970s where that can eventually lead, and it is not something that one should do lightly.

The noble Lord, Lord Lilley, managed to make out that in fact there would be no increase in customs checks as a result of our leaving the European Union. That seemed to me inherently implausible; but he completely left out the subject of the longest delays in any border checks, which is the issue of certificates of origin, which is extremely complicated and a nightmare for those who are organising international logistics. I think that should be taken into account. I have to tell him, too, that the continental customs authorities do not share his very optimistic view. In June I happened to be in the Netherlands, with two or three colleagues who were equally interested in the subject. We were very kindly received by the head of the Netherlands customs in Rotterdam; we saw the port there and met many of her leading staff. They told us that they have taken on about 900 new employees, simply to deal with additional UK business after Brexit. The Dutch are serious people; they do not hire 900 people just to watch the traffic and do nothing. Noble Lords can make the arithmetical calculations as easily as I can, but you can imagine, if there are 900 people who intervene with a lorry every hour or two hours, for two minutes, three minutes or five minutes, how much that will induce delays in the process of clearing trucks through Rotterdam that are destined for the United Kingdom. There is clearly a material change happening there, and the same thing is happening in other ports and suppliers. Rotterdam is of course the major port that supplies us. I do not think that complacency is in order there, either.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I am most grateful to the noble Lord and very much appreciate his kind personal words. If he would be good enough to look at Hansard and see what I said, he will not find that I mentioned either the Bank of England or the Treasury. What I do believe, though, is that our businesses in this country have a great deal of resilience, a great deal of power and a great deal of creativity, and they will be able to weather the transitional difficulties. I do not think that that is complacent, but a reflection of reality.

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I must apologise to the noble Lord for adding words that he did not pronounce. I got the distinct impression that what he was talking about by way of remedial action was monetary or fiscal spending. Fiscal spending would have had the consequences that I have just outlined. I apologise to him and hope that I have not unduly traduced the message he was delivering to the House. I feel very strongly on this matter of complacency, faced with a possible recession. I know that the noble Lord will agree with me on this: recessions are very unpleasant things. They destroy businesses, they destroy jobs, they destroy the jobs that people might have had and will never have. They destroy the economic sense of security of families. A lot of the human destruction and economic destruction takes a very long time to repair. It is not something that we should walk into lightly. I am very worried indeed and I hope that he understands why that is—that we may be heading in that direction.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I very much agree with the noble Lord about the damage that recessions cause. Does he have any reflections on the fiscal policy of the Government, which has now become quite explosive and puts the country at very great risk, of exactly the nature he has been describing?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I am so glad that I am once again in thorough agreement with my noble and long-standing friend. Of course, I am very worried about that; I mentioned it in our debate last week, so I will not go into that subject now, but I could not agree more on that subject.

I must turn to the proposal that the Government made today to the European Commission. It seems to me to be a thoroughly dishonest and disreputable document. It is exactly the sort of document that one would expect our Prime Minister to deliver and was probably not one where there was any expectation that it would be accepted. I suppose that Mr Johnson wanted to be in a position where he had made some offer, so that he could then say that it was all the fault of the European Union for not accepting it—albeit that he did not produce anything until a month before the deadline. The document does not address at all the matter that is of greatest concern to the Irish, which is the long-term avoidance in Ireland of an internal border or frontier. A border, in my definition—and in the definition of most reasonable people—is an administrative line on the map which, if you cross it, has practical and probably financial consequences. That does not mean that the border has to have an infrastructure at any particular point. It means simply that if you cross this line, you will be deemed to be liable in one way or another. That is exactly what we must avoid in Ireland, if we want to respect the Belfast agreement. It is what the Irish are determined to avoid. That is the position at present: there is no internal border on the island of Ireland. You can go between any of the 26 counties and the six counties, any time you want, with no consequences whatever of an administrative or practical kind. That is what we need to preserve. That is not achieved by this proposal and I imagine that for that reason alone it will and should be rejected.

The contradictions have already been pointed out by my noble friend Lord Adonis. They are quite serious because they have completely devalued the document. On page 3, the document says:

“This is entirely compatible with maintaining an open border in Northern Ireland”.


In the next paragraph, it says that,

“all customs processes needed to ensure compliance with the UK and EU customs regimes should take place on a decentralised basis”.

If there is an open border in Northern Ireland, why do you need customs processes and regimes? That is completely contradictory. I am taking a little more time, but I had two interventions.

The other notable contradiction in this document is on page 2, where it says that the proposal,

“provides for the potential creation of an all-island regulatory zone on the island of Ireland”.

Two paragraphs later, it says that under these arrangements,

“Northern Ireland will be fully part of the UK customs territory”.

These are blatant contradictions and devalue the whole document.