Draft House of Lords Reform Bill

Lord Howarth of Newport Excerpts

Monday 30th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, what are the failures and problems in our political system that most need attention? Are they in the House of Lords? Many of us might agree that relations between the media and politics, the financing of our politics, the debilitated condition of local government and the relation between Scotland and the United Kingdom and its implications for Parliament are major and urgent issues to which reformers should soon apply themselves. There are problems about the lack of public trust in Parliament and the domination of the House of Commons by the Executive, but would an elected second Chamber make a useful contribution to the solution of either of those problems? What is the problem that the proponents of the draft Bill purport to solve? The Government tell us that it is a flaw in our democracy. In their foreword to the White Paper, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister said:

“In a modern democracy it is important that those who make the laws of the land should be elected by those to whom those laws apply”.

The Prime Minister has added that the Bill would strengthen Parliament. The first of these propositions is based on a misrepresentation of fact, and the second is a rhetorical and unsubstantiated assertion to which the Joint Committee gave short shrift. As a matter of fact, the House of Lords does not make the laws of the land. The House of Commons decides what is to be the law. The House of Lords advises and influences, but in the event of disagreement between the two Houses, ultimately the appointed House defers to the elected House. Our parliamentary system is, after all, democratic.

What if the second Chamber were to be elected? The Government say that we should not worry because the Parliament Acts, perhaps revised in consequence of the advice on this matter received by the Joint Committee, and financial privilege guarantee the primacy of the House of Commons. If so, what gain would there be in an elected second Chamber expressly designed to be powerless? What candidates of quality would stand for election to it? Why would voters bother to vote in elections to it? I anticipate that there would be low turnout and that rather a lot of voters would cast their votes frivolously and in protest. I fear that we would see BNP and Respect senators elected, who would then be in the reformed second Chamber for 15 years. I do not know whether noble Lords on the other side of the House would contemplate with equanimity a state of affairs in which a UKIP block vote were to determine the outcome of votes in the second Chamber for 15 years to come.

What would be lost in such a change? As the alternative report grasped clearly, we would lose the representativeness that the present House has of the diversity of the professional, cultural and ethnic make-up of our country, and we would lose the gender balance that we have, which is at least better than that of the elected House of Commons. We would lose the eminent professional ability that this House contains. Above all, we would lose the experience of Members of this House. I prefer not to make the case for an appointed House in terms of expertise, because expertise falls away but experience grows. Whether or not your Lordships are posh, you are not boys. You have seen a good deal of life and a very great deal of government, and it is for those reasons that you are qualified to advise Ministers and the other place.

I believe that the quality of our debates would be poorer, that there would be less shrewdness and persistence in scrutiny, and less candour in the advice offered by a House that was more tightly controlled politically. Whatever the quality proved to be of an elected second Chamber, the Joint Committee and the alternative report are as one in agreeing that it would challenge the House of Commons in new ways, and that Clause 2 of the draft Bill is wishful thinking. The Joint Committee anticipates that a new assertiveness would lead to clashes between the two Houses becoming routine, and I fear that the public would find that frustrating and distasteful and that their disaffection from politics at Westminster would be compounded.

As Professor Bogdanor put it in his evidence, the revising Chamber would become “an opposing Chamber”. If we have impasse and an inability to legislate, it would be a disaster. The courts would have to intervene to resolve the conflicts between the two Houses, as we see at the moment with the Supreme Court in the United States of America determining the legitimacy of legislation produced by the two elected Houses of the American Congress. Replicating such a situation in this country would be a constitutional disaster.

I fear that we would see a deterioration of our democracy, and the erroneous propositions of the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister should not be the foundation for massive constitutional change. Instead, we should address the modest reforms that are really needed and which have been put off for so long. We should improve the functioning of the existing Chambers. The House of Commons should remember itself and resume the practice of thorough scrutiny of legislation. The House of Lords should be allowed to pursue the agenda of reforms set out by the noble Lord, Lord Steel, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman: the establishment of a statutory appointments commission tasked by Parliament, and provisions for disqualification, limitation of tenure and the end of the hereditary by-elections.

Constitutional change and reform in our country have been continuous, but the British tradition has been to be cautious, pragmatic, respectful of the inherited constitution and conscious of the distinctive history of United Kingdom; to address significant problems in due time to build the maximum consensus; to pause at each stage to see what the effects of reform prove to be; and to proceed incrementally.

The authors of the alternative report propose a constitutional convention on the future of the House of Lords. I rather think that this is a sensible proposal in all the circumstances. Certainly, if the membership as they recommend is broadly drawn, their terms of reference enable them to consider all the relevant issues because so many constitutional issues are inter-related and the work is not rushed. Most valuably, as the alternative report recommends, the convention could consider the implications for the Parliament at Westminster of the Scottish referendum on independence.

There is no sense in undertaking radical reform of the House of Lords at a time when the Scots are about to force huge constitutional issues affecting the role and the structure of Parliament upon us. The political developments that have occurred in Scotland are a complete game changer and they have happened while the enthusiasts for an elected second Chamber were not looking. It would be particularly valuable if a convention was therefore able to head the parties off from leaping into the dark with ill-considered manifesto commitments for devo-max with incalculable consequences.

Finally, the proposal from the alternative report is that the recommendations that emerge from the constitutional convention should be put to the people in a referendum. Reluctantly, I accept the principle that major constitutional change should be subject to a referendum. But let us be careful: let the debate run; let the issues clarify; and let understanding mature first.