Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 and Civil Partnership Act 2004 (Consequential Provisions and Modifications) Order 2014

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 1st December 2014 Grand Committee

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness) (LD)]

My Lords, in moving that the draft order laid before the House on 27 October 2014 now be considered, if it pleases your Lordships I will briefly put this Section 104 order in context before setting out what it does. The order is made under Section 104 of the Scotland Act 1998—indeed, in that respect it is similar to the first order that we debated in Committee this afternoon—which allows for necessary or expedient changes to legislation in consequence of an Act of the Scottish Parliament. The order is made in consequence of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, which I shall refer to as the 2014 Act.

The order is additionally made under Section 259(1) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Section 259 of that Act provides for subordinate legislation to be made in the United Kingdom Parliament containing provisions in connection with civil partnerships. The order cites this power because it adds some consequential references in legislation to civil partnerships that were missed when the Civil Partnership Act was being implemented. Picking up those missed consequential references is clearly not done as a consequence of the introduction of the 2014 Act in Scotland. That is why the separate provision—namely, Section 259(1) of the Civil Partnership Act 2004—is cited.

The 2014 Act introduces same-sex marriage and religious and belief registration of civil partnerships in Scotland. It also allows transgender people who married in Scotland to stay married and obtain a full gender recognition certificate, and it makes other changes to marriage and civil partnership law in Scotland. The order updates existing United Kingdom legislation to give the 2014 Act full effect and ensures similar treatment for Scottish same-sex couples and transgender people across Great Britain. Finally, it also allows for same-sex marriages solemnised in Scotland to be recognised as civil partnerships in Northern Ireland.

The 2014 Act is broadly equivalent to the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013, which introduced marriage of same-sex couples in England and Wales. That Act, which I shall refer to as the 2013 Act, is being implemented in phases. The first phase consisted of a number of instruments which came into force on 13 March 2014. The final phase of implementation consists of further affirmative and negative instruments primarily concerned with conversion of civil partnerships into marriage and enabling transgender people to remain married if they and their spouse wish. These will come into force on 10 December.

This Section 104 order makes very similar consequential provision for Scotland in relation to reserved matters, such as pensions, similar to that contained in both the first and second phases of implementation of the England and Wales legislation. This is because the 2013 and 2014 Acts enact similar propositions and give rise to similar consequential provision. The order makes consequential provision for same-sex marriages generally in relation to transgender people and provides for the changing of civil partnerships into marriages overseas.

The United Kingdom and Scottish Governments have worked very closely together on the implementation of the 2013 and 2014 Acts and the various subordinate legislation so that they work together as a package. For example, the orders which will implement the second phase of the 2013 Act also make certain consequential provisions for Scotland, including amendments to certain Armed Forces pension schemes, as well as the Royal Mail pension scheme and schemes relating to particular bodies carrying out functions in the area of transport.

Having set out the context and interaction with the implementation of the 2013 Act, I turn to the order itself and will say a bit more about its content. The order amends the Equality Act 2010 as it applies in Scotland to give protection to celebrants and others who do not wish to take part in same-sex marriage ceremonies and the registration of civil partnerships in a way that is appropriate for Scotland.

The order creates a statutory gloss which provides that references to “marriage” and related expressions in the reserved law of Scotland mean both opposite-sex and same-sex marriage, unless contrary provision is made. The order also disapplies that statutory gloss in certain circumstances and makes contrary provision to it.

The order makes provision for civil partnerships registered in Scotland to be changed into marriages overseas, either through UK diplomatic posts or through the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces. The order also makes provision so that same-sex marriages registered in Scotland are recognised as civil partnerships in Northern Ireland.

Moreover, with respect to provision relating to transgender people, the order establishes the alternative grounds for applications to the gender recognition panel by long-term transitioned people in a protected Scottish marriage or protected Scottish civil partnership who are resident in England or Wales. It makes provision so that the spouse or civil partner of a transgender person who is resident in England and Wales but who has obtained a gender recognition certificate under the 2014 Act can apply to the High Court in England and Wales or the High Court Northern Ireland to quash the decision to grant the application on the grounds that its grant was secured by fraud. It also ensures full recognition in England and Wales and Northern Ireland of transgender people who married or entered their civil partnership in Scotland and obtain a full gender recognition certificate under the 2014 Act.

The Scottish Government intend that their first conversions of civil partnerships into marriage will take place on 16 December; it is also intended that the first same-sex marriage ceremonies in Scotland will be able to take place on 31 December 2014. The order is part of the wider legislative programme to provide for the introduction of same-sex marriage in Scotland within this calendar year. In addition to the legislation taken forward in this Parliament, 11 instruments have been laid to date in the Scottish Parliament, and I understand that a possible 10 more are planned. As part of that programme, the order makes the changes to reserved law and the cross-border provision I described.

Yet again, and particularly in this case, the United Kingdom and Scottish Governments—Ministers and officials—have worked closely together to ensure that this complex programme of work has met its challenging timetable. The order demonstrates that the UK Government’s continued commitment to working with the Scottish Government to make the devolution settlement work is bearing fruit. I hope that your Lordships will agree that the practical result of this continued collaboration is to be welcomed. The other place considered the order on 25 November. I commend the order to the Committee. I beg to move.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his explanation. It is a very welcome measure, if I may say so, and I entirely endorse the point that the noble and learned Lord made about the degree of co-operation between those responsible for legislation north of the border and those responsible for legislation in the wider context of the United Kingdom. It struck me that the drafting, particularly of schedule 1, is of considerable interest—I think that part 1 has been very carefully crafted to make it clear that it deals with reserved matters only, in appropriate language, and does not encroach on matters that are the province of the Scottish Parliament. No doubt that is an example of the degree of co-operation between the two Administrations.

I also found it helpful to see the provisions in paragraph 3 of part 2 of schedule 1, which contains a set of definitions, particularly of the expressions “husband”, “wife”, “widower” and “widow” in the context of the measure. I think that the words as defined are now in quite common use, but it is helpful to see them set out in statutory form. I would be interested to know whether that has been done equally north of the border, but to see it in this measure, at least, is encouraging to those who wondered exactly how these expressions might properly be used.

For the main part, this is an excellent example of co-operation. I was going to ask whether the Scottish Government had been kept fully informed, but I take it from what the noble and learned Lord said that there is simply no question about it: they are well aware of this measure, and if further steps need to be taken by the Scottish Parliament or the Scottish Government to match what has been done here, they will certainly be taken.

Scotland: Independence

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 24th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, there is such a thing as the European Court of Justice, and anyone who attempted to fly in the face of what most people would think of as accepted European Union law may find that the law caught up with them.

My noble friend Lord Cormack and the noble Baroness, Lady Adams, talked about their grandchildren and how they do not wish to see opportunities cut off and cannot understand why we would want to build barriers. That has been reflected in many schools, where there have been substantial no votes. It shows that in an era when young people can communicate so easily, when the communication barriers have been broken down because of modern technology, the idea that you would start erecting barriers is something that many of them just cannot comprehend. That is a great strength for our union as we look forward.

My noble friend Lord Caithness asked about the draft Bill. I confess that we have not yet done any analysis of it. My noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, however, was telling me the other day that he has already identified two or three inconsistencies with the European Convention on Human Rights, and if my noble friend has identified them, that probably means that they are right. It is not a very good start for a constitution if it seems to fall foul of the European Convention on Human Rights.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, raised the question about whether it could be a Section 30 order. It is clear that independence cannot just be asserted. The terms of an agreement reached between the representative of an independent Scotland and a continuing UK would have to be that: an agreement. I have already indicated what the position would be with regard to the period between the date of a referendum if there were to be a yes vote and the date of independence, and all the responsibilities that the United Kingdom Government would have. The quote that I gave was a direct quote from the statement given jointly by both Governments to the Electoral Commission, so the Scottish Government themselves have signed up to that.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Cullen, made a point about how long it took to get that agreement, and that was just an agreement to make a statement. That might put into context how long it might take to negotiate an independence settlement. If Scotland chooses to leave the United Kingdom, it must be prepared to do so whatever the terms, because the terms cannot be known in advance.

As the report of the Constitution Committee indicates, there could be possible difficulties with a Section 30 order if it was challenged in the courts that the use of the Section 30 order had gone beyond what Parliament intended an order to do—if it were bringing in independence when in fact that was clearly never the intention of Parliament.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

To be clear, is the Minister saying that what is contemplated, at least by the Government, is that there would have to be legislation through both Houses of Parliament in order to facilitate the independence Bill that is now on the table?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I think I said in my evidence to the committee that there was a possibility of a Section 30 order but that there are difficulties with that. I indicated that there might have to be very limited legislation, if only to allow the Scottish Government to put together a negotiating team and enter into negotiations. As the noble and learned Lord probably knows better than anyone in the House, along with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Cullen, the propensity for some people to litigate in areas like this could be very great. If that were the situation that we were in, although we sincerely hope that it will not be, it would be important to put the negotiations on a proper legal footing so that they could not be subject to some further challenge.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, we certainly shall look at it, although whether we can have a debate between now and the House rising I just do not know. However, I hope we are not confusing two things. Of course, a constitution would be a matter for the independent Scotland. It would post-date independence. I think the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked about an interim Bill, and that was what was being discussed.

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

I simply adopted the language of the Scottish Government. They produced this draft Bill to carry the matter forward as from independence day on an interim basis until the new constitution forecast at the end of the Bill was passed. It is incredibly important to know what we are to make of the interim Bill. Among other things, it proclaims that every Scots person is to be a citizen of the European Union as from independence day, although we all know that Scotland will not be a member of the European Union. It is full of flaws of that kind and we simply cannot give them carte blanche to pass it through without discussion.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, what an independent Scotland does after independence day would be a matter for an independent Scotland. I think that is common ground. If it wants to legislate nonsense then it can. That would be the decision of an independent Scotland.

Immigration Bill

Debate between Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 1st April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I want to add just a word or two with reference to Amendment 16, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie, which would insert a new provision dealing with “the best interests of children”. In supplement to what he said, the Supreme Court has paid a lot of attention over the four years of its existence to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, to which this country is a signatory. Almost at every opportunity where the issue has arisen, it has stressed the need to promote the best interests of children in dealing with immigration issues, so the point is of some general importance.

The point I wish to draw to the Minister’s attention concerns proposed new Section 117A(2), inserted by Clause 18, which contains the phrase:

“In considering the public interest question, the court or tribunal must … have regard”—

to the provisions that follow. Those words remind one of the words in Section 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The noble and learned Lord may recall that there is some debate going on as to the extent to which the courts in this country must feel themselves bound by decisions of the Strasbourg court or whether in performing the Section 2 duty of having regard to—I think the wording of the Act is “take into account”—they can rate what they see and weigh it up but not necessarily feel themselves bound to follow it. The question is: which of these two alternative lines is the Minister contemplating by the use of the phrase “must have regard to”? Is this something that is in the form of a duty, which gives no leeway to the court and therefore it must follow the language precisely as it finds it in the succeeding subsections, or is it, as some people would say about the Strasbourg court, that one can see what is said but there is room for manoeuvre at the same time?

The noble Lord, Lord Watson, explained the point very clearly. When one is considering any public interest considerations that involve children, one will have regard to the existing jurisprudence, the convention rights and so on. The fact that children are not mentioned expressly, except in the very helpful new clause coming in via Amendment 58, does not mean that the court cannot have regard to their best interests. If the Minister would confirm that, that would be extremely helpful, given the nature of the language in proposed new Section 117A(2).

As I hope the noble and learned Lord will appreciate, there will be some read-across from the way the jurisprudence has developed with reference to the Human Rights Act to how one starts the whole exercise that this new clause is dealing with. It is really very important to be clear about how one approaches the entire package in understanding the various criticisms that have been made.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Wallace of Tankerness) (LD)]

My Lords, first, I thank not only the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, but others who have spoken to amendments in this group, because it is of considerable importance that in dealing with these important immigration matters, the interests of children are kept very much in our minds and that we give proper consideration to them.

The noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, raised a point about the withdrawal of assisted voluntary return for immigration detainees. In the short time since he spoke, the information I have received is that the Government prefer illegal migrants to depart voluntarily and go to considerable effort to help them to do so. Those who refuse to go voluntarily may well have to be detained and have removal enforced. Until 31 March, detainees could apply for an assisted voluntary return package. However, the evidence was that that increased delays and costs. I do not think that anyone believes that it is in anyone’s interest to have a drawn out removal process. I confirm that there remains the opportunity to depart voluntarily with assistance, but those who do not co-operate will not fall within that and will be removed. I appreciate that that is perhaps a sketchy answer, but I think that the best thing is to give further chapter and verse by writing to the noble Earl to explain in more detail precisely what are the policy considerations that have led to that provision.

The amendments raise important issues about the best interests of children and the proportionality of decisions under the qualified right to respect for private and family life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. I turn first to the amendment in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich. It is right that the best interests of the child in the United Kingdom should be a primary consideration in the certification process. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked me to confirm that. There will no doubt be cases in which deportation appeals are not certified because of the risk that serious irreversible harm may be caused to a child, but the amendment would make the best interests of the child a trump card over any other consideration, including the strong public interest in seeing foreign criminals deported quickly. Under the amendment, a foreign criminal or deportee would be able to use a child who may have been in the UK for a matter of only days or weeks—there is no definition of a qualifying child—to avoid certification of their appeal and an early departure from the United Kingdom.

The noble Earl asked about parents who will be deported before appeal. The test will be whether serious irreversible harm is likely to result from a temporary separation, pending an appeal on the particular facts of the case. The best interests of children in the United Kingdom will, as I said, be a primary consideration. The courts have reflected that in many cases. It is a primary consideration—not the overriding, trump-all-else consideration, but a primary consideration which they are obliged to take into account. That will be taken into account in the decision whether to certify as well as in making the original decision.

The other effect of the noble Earl’s amendment would be to rely on the presence of the child, even if the parent—the person subject to deportation—did not care for the child or had no relationship with the child. We do not think that that can be right. The certification power will be used only where an individual’s own conduct, such as criminality, leads the Secretary of State to consider that their presence is not conducive to the public good. The power is tightly defined to ensure that only those who have caused or are trying to cause us harm are deported from the country quickly. Its operation should not be impaired by the impact of the amendment.

I turn to Amendments 16 and 18, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Watson of Invergowrie. I readily understand the concerns that he raised about the best interests of children affected by immigration decisions. Amendment 16, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, also referred, would insert the words:

“The promotion of the best interests of children”,

as a public interest consideration applicable in all cases. I appreciate what lies behind the amendment and welcome the opportunity to reconfirm to the House how the best interests of children are and will remain a primary consideration in all cases concerning the ECHR Article 8 right to respect for private and family life. I believe that the Bill is consistent with our obligations towards children under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, usually referred to as the children duty. These provisions, as interpreted in particular by the Supreme Court in ZH (Tanzania), establish the best interests of a child in the UK as a primary consideration in considering proportionality under Article 8. This means that the Secretary of State must have regard to the best interests of the child as a primary consideration and ask whether any other considerations outweigh it. Clause 18 is compatible with these obligations and has been designed to take proper account of children’s best interests. It does not require the statement added by Amendment 16, which would also expand the extent of the consideration required by Section 55 to include children outside the United Kingdom.