Wales Bill

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kinnock (Lab)]

My Lords, in a tiny way this is a historic occasion: it is the first time in my recall that I diverge ever so slightly from the view of my noble friend Lord Morgan, and it is on the issue of the relevance and applicability of referendums. It is clear from what several noble Lords have said that bruises are borne as a result of the fact that we in this country having recently been through a referendum—indeed, I have not only bruises but scars to show for the experience. Nevertheless, the reality is that in a parliamentary democracy referendums are justifiable when there is a proposal to change the way in which we are governed.

That was the basis for the justification of the 23 June referendum, just as it was for those of us who campaigned for a referendum on entry to the European Communities and those of us who campaigned for referendums on Scottish and Welsh devolution back in 1979 and greeted with satisfaction the proposal in the 1990s that referendums should determine whether a Welsh Assembly and a Scottish Parliament were introduced. The same joy stirred our hearts when we saw an enacted proposal for referendums to determine whether major conurbations in England should have elected mayors. I use these references only to demonstrate the realism and the relevance of using referendums when there is a proposal to change the way in which a democracy or part of a democracy is governed.

Such is the case if there is a proposal to offer to the Welsh Assembly the power to levy income tax. That would profoundly change the way in which Wales was governed. It is on that basis that there is a straightforward justification for a referendum on such a fundamental constitutional and economic decision that has immense social, commercial and personal implications for every family, every community, every business and every employee in the whole of Wales.

Left at that, it could be dismissed as an academic, almost arcane argument—but it is not. It is much more prosaic than that. I join with my noble friends in objecting to the removal of the undertaking to give a referendum on the issue of the introduction of income tax-raising powers for the Welsh Assembly. That undertaking was not only given by several political parties representative of and represented in Wales, it was the subject of statute. It remains the subject of statute unless and until this Bill is enacted. For many years—indeed, decades—most political parties offered to the people of Wales the utter reassurance that they would have the final determining word on whether the elected Welsh Assembly is to have the power to levy income tax. Clause 17 should be removed from the Bill to ensure the continuity and integrity of those previous, voluntarily offered undertakings to the people of Wales.

There is a further consideration: we have a model to consider. It has been referred to already. It is, of course, the fact that the Scottish Parliament, from its inception, has had the power to vary income taxation in Scotland and has never seriously considered—let alone debated or proposed—in any formal manner such a variation. Why is that? Because of the utter unacceptability and impracticality of such an idea, even for a substantially devolved institution in a unitary state. I will certainly give way in a moment but will just finish this particular reference. The proposal that the Welsh Assembly should have this additional power in the absolutely certain and cynical knowledge that it would not be exercised is like offering me a car with the capacity to travel at 200 miles per hour and I buy it in the knowledge that the speed limit in the United Kingdom is 70 miles per hour.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

It might be helpful to recollect that when the referendum on devolution took place in Scotland, there were two questions. One was on the principle of devolution but the other was whether a devolved Assembly, as it was called in those days, should have tax-varying powers. That was separated out in the case of Wales but in Scotland, where I was, we had a vote on both at the same time. On exactly the point that the noble Lord was making, we had the democratic decision with a substantial majority that the Assembly, as it was then called, should have tax-varying powers. We got it all achieved in one.

[Lord Kinnock]

I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. At the time, I almost rejoiced in the full implementation of the long-standing Labour Party policy—developed under my leadership, as it happens, on the basis of continued representation from my comrades in Scotland—that a specific opportunity should be given to the people of Scotland to decide on that issue. Equally, and with substantial force, there were representations from Wales that that offer should not be made. Influences, parties and opinions in Wales suggested that that should not be the case. But their views were set aside—while undoubtedly being recognised and respected, as is our manner in Wales—and the issue was never put, and it never generated the merest scintilla of a spasm of objection.

Almost on the contrary, at that time in the 1990s and at this time in the second decade of the 21st century, there was and is no evident support among the public for the idea of income tax-raising or income tax-varying powers to be allocated to the Welsh Assembly. In this era, when all of us, if we have any sense at all, must be aware of the feeling of distance that exists between the general electorate and those who are elected to govern them, we should be sensitive to the idea that when there is no measurable support for a proposition that is as significant as the varying of taxation powers, and yet the recognised elected authority and the Executive go ahead and grant that power, on the best day it will be greeted as an irrelevance. On a less good day, it will be greeted with cynical dismissal.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hope of Craighead]

Perhaps I might correct the noble Lord on a point of slight detail. The Scottish National Party, which is the governing party in Scotland, has made it clear that it intends not to follow the Chancellor of the Exchequer in England on the level at which the 40% tax rate comes in. I think that the proposal in England, and indeed in Wales for the moment, is that there should be a rise of that level at which 40% becomes payable. The Scottish Government have said that they are not prepared to go along with that, so for the Scots the level will remain as it is at present. I grant the noble Lord that this is under a different power which has been given in a later enactment but to say that there is no desire by the governing party to make changes is a little excessive, with great respect.

[Lord Kinnock]

I accept the point entirely. I can respond to it only by saying that I await, without bating my breath, for the implementation of this proposition. I can see the attractiveness of it, especially to a party which is self-confessedly populist and has gained great strength by means of offering simple answers to complex questions. That has served that party well for several years—astoundingly well. I await that exercise of the variation under the supplementary powers granted to them and on that occasion, I will withdraw all speculation about Scottish inclinations to vary taxation powers.