Parliamentary Privilege

Lord Hope of Craighead Excerpts

Thursday 20th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, like others who did not have the privilege of serving on the Joint Committee, I congratulate that committee and all its members on an excellent and eminently readable report. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon of Tara, for initiating this debate and providing me with the opportunity to contribute to it, which I greatly welcome.

I should like to concentrate simply on the relationship between Parliament and the judiciary. In R v Chaytor, the case to which reference has been made, the late Lord Rodger of Earlsferry said that an invocation of parliamentary privilege is,

“apt to dazzle lawyers and judges outside Parliament”.

I think that his point was sometimes simply that the invocation of the words is regarded as a sort of red light—“Keep off the parliamentary lawn”. However, as Lord Rodger noted, Lord Brougham, when he was Lord Chancellor, cautioned against that approach. His advice was that the courts should not accede to claims of privilege,

“the instant they hear that once magical word pronounced”.

The issue requires to be addressed with more care than that and with a greater regard to the context. Article 9 of the Bill of Rights must, of course, be respected. However, as Lord Brougham said, it cannot have been intended to apply to a matter for which Parliament, especially its individual Members, cannot validly claim the privilege of exclusive cognisance at all. That was indeed what Chaytor was about.

I have to confess that I was surprised to read in paragraph 32 of the Joint Committee’s report the proposition that the courts can only interpret and apply the law, and that making law is for Parliament alone. That, with great respect, is not entirely accurate. There are many areas of the common law that have been developed by the judges with which Parliament has not dealt at all. In those areas, as was explained by the then senior Law Lord, Lord Reid, in 1972, the judges do indeed make law. It is true that they do not have the last word. It is always open to Parliament to reverse the position if it thinks that the judges have got the law wrong, or if the law declared by the judges is not something with which it agrees. However, as the Lord Chief Justice, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, ultimately it is Parliament that is sovereign. However, much of the law that is applied day and daily in our courts is law made by the judges. That is one of the great strengths of our legal system. After all, legislation is inevitably a rather blunt instrument. The virtue of our common law is that it can be adapted to fit precisely to the facts of each case.

Leaving that minor criticism aside, however, I welcome the way in which the report deals in chapter 5 with the important issue of judicial questioning of proceedings in Parliament. The Government refer in their response to what they describe as the continuing good relations between the judiciary and Parliament. The relationship is indeed a good one. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, that the atmosphere is one of comity rather than conflict. In my experience, both sides are careful to respect the boundaries between what is and what is not permissible. That is certainly so of the judges.

The case of R v Chaytor obviously helped a great deal in clearing the air on this subject, which was causing concern when the idea was promoted of engaging in this report in the first place. I had the advantage of sitting in the court, together with my noble and learned friend Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. We and, indeed, all members of the court were very conscious of the need to respect the privileges of Parliament, which the appellants—parliamentarians all of them—had invoked. In the event, it was relatively easy for the court to conclude that there was nothing in the allegations against the appellants that related in any way to the legislative or deliberative processes of either House or their Members. As the noble Baroness, Lady Healy, said, a crime is a crime. It was relatively easy to reach that conclusion and the court held that the prosecution in the ordinary courts for the parliamentarians’ crimes of dishonesty was not precluded by Article 9. It is worth noting, as my noble and learned friend Lord Brown said, that nine justices rather than the usual five sat in that case. That was in itself recognition by the court of the importance of the issue that it had to address.

Like my noble and learned friend, I believe that the Joint Committee was right, in a later part of its report at paragraph 229, to criticise the decision in Rost v Edwards. It is worth remembering that that case was decided as long ago as 1990. The judge in that case allowed questions to be put to the Member as to his reasons for not registering an interest in the Register of Members’ Interests. However, I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Brown that this was simply an aberration. Quite a lot of water has flowed under the bridge since then, and I should have thought that it was now clear and beyond dispute that all questions as to a Member’s reasons for declaring, or failing to declare, an interest for the purpose of proceedings in either House must be a matter within the exclusive cognisance of Parliament.

It is worth noting that in paragraph 23 the Joint Committee says that it would expect the two Houses to intervene should such a case arise in the future. I should add a footnote to that important point. The absence of such an intervention was noted in the Chaytor case. It was also noted much more recently in the HS2 case, on which the UK Supreme Court delivered judgment on 22 January this year. The point was picked up by both the president, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, and by Lord Reed. There would be no difficulty in making an intervention should the Houses wish to do so. The rules of the court enable any person with a sufficient interest to intervene in an appeal. The court itself, if so minded, can ask for submissions to be made, and it might take that step itself if it felt that it needed to know what Parliament’s position was if it was in doubt. However, it would be best, as the report suggests, if Parliament itself were to take the initiative.

Chapter 5 dwells on the question of whether reference to proceedings in Parliament for the purpose of judicial review of governmental proceedings could be damaging. The suggestion is that this could lead to a blurring of the constitutional separation between the courts and Parliament because it would seek to question what was said. That point is made in paragraph 132. I agree with a great deal of what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, said. I see great force in the objection that he put forward because the risk of the courts going astray on this point is less acute than this part of the report suggests, although I should make it clear that I agree with the conclusion in paragraph 136 that legislation prohibiting the use of such material is not required. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Healy, that that should be resorted to only when absolutely necessary; and that situation has not arisen.

Perhaps I may say a little more about the HS2 case, which, because the judgment was delivered this year, was not dealt with at all in the report. Your Lordships may like to know that one of the questions raised in that application for judicial review was whether the Government’s decision to obtain development consent for HS2 by means of the hybrid Bill procedure in Parliament was compatible with the requirements for a strategic environmental assessment under the EU’s SEA directive. The Supreme Court asked itself whether it was appropriate for it to consider that question at all, as it would require an assessment of the effectiveness of the parliamentary procedure. Lord Reed, who delivered the leading judgment on this point, said that he was conscious of the importance of refraining from trespassing upon the province of Parliament, or of even suggesting that he should do so. The president, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, too, was careful to say that he recognised the importance of the principle. As it happened, the court was able, in the performance of its ordinary duty of construing the legislation, to hold that it could and should decide the compatibility issue itself. It rejected the invitation that it should evaluate the quality of the consideration that Parliament was likely to give to the relevant issues under the procedure selected by the Government. That was because the directive, properly construed, did not require that particular evaluation to be carried out. I dwell on the point because I suggest that one sees in that very recent decision the system working as it should, as well as the respect due to Parliament and its procedures being properly accorded by the Supreme Court.

It is worth noting just a little more about what was said in the case of Wilson v First County Trust, in addition to the passage from the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, quoted in paragraph 126 of the report. That case was decided in the early days of the development of our jurisprudence on the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998, and what was said in that case has never since been questioned. One of the questions was whether it was proper for a court to be referred to proceedings in Parliament when it had to decide a question of proportionality in relation to the convention rights. I take the liberty of referring to what I said, which was expressly agreed to by Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough. In my own speech, I said that a cautious approach was needed and that particular care must be taken not to stray beyond the search for material that will simply inform the court into the forbidden territory of questioning the proceedings in Parliament. As I put it:

“It is for Parliament alone to decide what reasons, if any, need to be given for the legislation that it enacts. The quality or sufficiency of reasons given by the promoter of the legislation is a matter for Parliament to determine, not the court”.

On the other hand, as I pointed out, proceedings in Parliament are replete with information from a whole variety of sources which are on public record, as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, said. The court would be unduly inhibited if it were to be disabled from obtaining and using this information for the strictly limited purpose of considering whether the legislation was compatible with the convention rights—that being a task which the Human Rights Act itself has given to the judges. The European court in Strasbourg might wish to do that, so our courts should feel able to do so when performing the task entrusted to them by Parliament, observing the boundary set by the case of Wilson.

I agree that questioning the conclusions of a Select Committee—that is, evaluating the quality of its conclusions or suggesting that they were in error—would be wrong. However, that is not what the passages in Wilson were contemplating. I suggest that, carefully read, that decision strikes the balance in the right place. I should add also for the avoidance of any doubt that the fact that the courts do not pay any attention to ministerial statements that the provisions of a Bill that they present to Parliament are compatible with the convention rights does not involve any infringement of parliamentary privilege. These statements in themselves are not questioned by the courts, nor is the extent to which, if at all, they are relied on in either House. They are simply disregarded as irrelevant to the task that the courts have to perform. The fact is that Ministers and the courts are performing entirely different functions, and it would be constitutionally improper for the courts to be told by the Executive what their decision on the compatibility issue should be.

For all those reasons, I welcome the Joint Committee’s conclusion that the problem is not sufficiently acute to require legislation. Of course, it is right that the freedom of speech in Parliament should be protected from judicial questioning, but I think that the risk of that happening is very slight. I think, too, that I can assure the noble Lord the Leader of the House that the justices in the Supreme Court are as anxious as anyone in Parliament that that should not happen. As for the Motion in the name of the Leader of the House, I endorse entirely what the noble Lord, Lord Brabazon, said about it.