Security in the UK

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 10th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by referring to my interests in the register—in particular that I chair the independent reference group of the National Crime Agency and co-chair the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Policing and security. I and the whole House are grateful to the Government for giving time to this important debate and to the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, for outlining the terrorist attacks that have taken place against this country in the last few months.

It was against the background of the series of murderous terrorist incidents across western Europe from the beginning of 2015 that Sadiq Khan, the Mayor of London, shortly after his election in May 2016, asked me to conduct an independent review of London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. While I am tempted by the full range of issues that the noble Baroness outlined in her introductory statement, I will confine myself specifically to how the nation should respond to the fact of terrorist attacks.

My immediate focus in conducting that review was on London’s ability to respond speedily and effectively to a marauding terrorist firearms attack. However, the review looked at a range of possible attack scenarios, including vehicles used as a weapon, as in the Nice and Berlin attacks and subsequently seen on Westminster Bridge and London Bridge. I have previously been heavily involved in this field when, on behalf of successive Home Secretaries, I had oversight of policing work on counterterrorism and security from 2004 until early 2012.

The headline conclusion of my review was that preparedness had improved substantially compared with four or five years earlier. In particular, the emergency service response would now be much faster than it would or could have been in 2011. This was demonstrated during the course of my review by a stabbing incident in Russell Square on 3 August last year. This turned out not to be a terrorist incident, although the response was triggered as though it might have been. An individual, whom the court was subsequently told was suffering from,

“an acute episode of paranoid schizophrenia”,

attacked passers-by, tragically killing an American tourist.

The time that elapsed from when the first emergency calls were received to the control room being informed that an individual had been subdued and arrested—and not shot dead, which might have been the outcome elsewhere—was less than six minutes. This was a fast response by any standard. As the noble Baroness, Lady Vere, outlined, the Westminster Bridge incident—of which, regrettably, we were all observers—lasted precisely 82 seconds from the point at which the terrorist drove his vehicle on to the pavement until he was shot dead: just 82 seconds from start to finish. Again as the Minister outlined, in the London Bridge/Borough Market attack on 3 June, the police were on the scene within two minutes and paramedics from the London Ambulance Service within six. The three terrorists were shot dead less than eight minutes after the first emergency call. In all those incidents, the emergency response was rapid. However, it is an important and salutary lesson that even those fast response times would have appeared far too slow to those caught up in the incidents concerned.

Moreover, the London incidents involved individuals carrying knives rather than guns or bombs. Had they involved multiple assailants armed with automatic weapons or explosive devices, the death tolls in such crowded places would have been far higher.

It is of course theoretically possible further to increase the armed police presence so that those response times could have been shorter. However, we should be clear: that would not eliminate the risk or necessarily prevent fatalities. People armed with powerful guns could kill a lot of people even if the emergency response time was much faster. As we saw in the Manchester Arena, it is the work of a moment for a suicide bomber to blow himself up.

So the issue is what level of risk is acceptable. Doubling or quadrupling the armed police presence would obviously have a financial cost—even if it were practically possible to recruit, train and equip the officers required—but it would also have a profound impact on our way of life. How far are we prepared to go to change the look and feel of our cities to reduce, perhaps only slightly, the number who might be killed in such an attack? That is the dilemma: whatever we do, we, government, can never guarantee safety.

During my review, I was impressed at the huge amount of thought and analysis that has gone into planning and exercising for a wide variety of attack scenarios. There is necessarily a constant need to consider developing threats and evolving attack methodologies, and I watched this in action by sitting in on the fortnightly security review committee when, among other things, the implications of the Nice attack and an incident at RAF Marham were being considered.

This sort of preparation is essential. It has to be remembered that new attack methodologies can be spread via the internet within seconds. However, while it is imperative to have as good an intelligence picture as you can, planning should also be on the basis of expecting the unexpected. That something has never happened before does not mean that it will not happen tomorrow.

I remain disturbed that, even now, not enough is being done to limit the availability of guns. We benefit from the fact that firearms are more difficult to acquire in this country than elsewhere in the world. However, there is almost a complacency about this, with an assumption that attacks such as those that occurred in Paris in 2015 would not happen to us. But London and other cities are by no means firearms free. During the July and August of my review, the Metropolitan Police recorded 202 firearms discharges compared to 87 in the same months of the previous year. These were criminal rather than terrorist incidents and, of course, there is clear evidence that some convicted terrorists have tried to obtain arms from organised crime groups or from other sources.

Our borders are not as secure as they should be—I have questioned the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, on this on many occasions. We have far from adequate coverage of our coastline by air and sea patrols: just three working vessels patrolling 7,700 miles of coastline, compared to the 16 that patrol the Netherlands coastline of 280 miles. Only a tiny proportion of vehicles crossing into the country through the Channel Tunnel or on ferries are ever searched, and the same is true for crates of goods arriving through our ports. The resources available to address this have declined in the last six or seven years. If there is complacency, it is misplaced and I fear that it is only a matter of time before we see a significant gun-related terrorist incident in the UK.

More generally, it is important to build a culture of resilience into the fabric of society so that risks can be mitigated. Some of that is about physical measures: bollards and barriers to limit the scope for vehicle-based attacks, and the capacity to close off roads to prevent cars and trucks entering areas where large numbers are gathered. Much more should be done to map crowded places and proactively install barriers to reduce such attacks. It is tragic that the barriers on the London bridges are being fitted only now and were not put up before the Westminster and London Bridge attacks.

We should use design to make new buildings harder for terrorists to attack and require that certain physical standards be incorporated to make attacks more difficult. When premises require licensing for public use or for specific events, there should be an expectation set as to their emergency plans and the extent to which their staff must be trained to manage certain types of incident. I hope that the noble Baroness, when winding up, will agree to look at these matters, particularly around the licensing of events.

The aim should be to develop a culture of security in all spaces where the public have access. During the review process, I was struck by how variable this was. I was particularly concerned about schools. Most schools have plans for evacuation in the event of fire. Very few had even thought about the need for an “invacuation” plan in the event of the school being under attack: what teachers should do, how pupils ought to be drilled and so on. Most have some rudimentary perimeter control system, designed to keep out predatory paedophiles, but are less well equipped to deal with a heavily armed marauder. I specifically recommended that each school should have a governor responsible for thinking about these issues and devising arrangements appropriate and proportionate for that school. The DfE was lukewarm about issuing any guidance, saying that it was a matter for individual schools. Of course I accept that each school is different—but surely they should all be encouraged to think about these things. Perhaps the Minister, when she replies, can reassure us that this attitude in the Department for Education has now changed.

Businesses have a duty of care not only to those who work for them but also to their customers and perhaps also to those simply passing by. Many employ security personnel. In London alone there are estimated to be some 100,000 such operatives registered with the Security Industry Authority; that is roughly three times the total number of police officers. Incidentally, I understand that the Home Office commissioned a review of the Security Industry Authority and has been sitting on the results of this for some 18 months. Perhaps the noble Baroness, when she responds, can tell us when we might learn the future of these regulatory arrangements. In the event of an attack, depending on the location, it is those security guards who may be first on the scene, and the public may look to them, as uniformed members of staff, for advice and protection. At the very least, they need to be adequately trained on how to respond in the event of a terrorist incident. At best, they are a massive resource to help protect the public.

Communication is key to all this. In the recent attacks, the Metropolitan Police used its Twitter feed to provide frequent, authoritative updates to counter what might otherwise have been misleading material on social media. However, there is much more that should be done, as has happened in a number of other cities, with the development of alerts directly to the mobile phones of everyone in the areas affected. The capacity to provide cogent, real-time advice targeted at different cell sites or different types of recipient is already available. I understand that the Cabinet Office has been looking at this for some time—three years—but has not yet reached a conclusion. Perhaps the Minister can tell us when it will do so.

Preparedness has to be proactive, and flexible enough to be relevant whatever the form of attack. We all must react seamlessly and effectively, whatever the nature of the incident. We all need a mindset of community security and resilience. Our cities and towns should have security and resilience designed in. They should be part of society’s fabric. Ultimately, it means that everyone should see security and resilience as their responsibility just as much as they are the responsibility of the emergency services and the civic authorities.