Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 13th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, admit to being delighted to follow the noble Lord, Lord Evans of Weardale, and his insightful maiden speech. He has served with distinction for 33 years in the Security Service and was until just over a year ago its director-general. His early years in MI5 are shrouded in the appropriate cloud of mystery. It is said that he served in Northern Ireland, where he went under the soubriquet “Bob”. If he sidled up to you in a bar in Belfast, his code phrase was allegedly “Call me Bob”. I do not know if that was true and I do not suppose that he will tell us. I first met him when I had some responsibility for overseeing the police counterterrorism network and he was deputy director-general. Indeed, I once encountered him on a bus—yes, deputy director-generals do travel by bus—and inadvertently I broke his cover. I think that his mission was in fact Christmas shopping. I greeted him by name. I realise now that perhaps I should have called him Bob. However, he will bring much to this House’s deliberations and we all look forward to hearing many more contributions from him in the years to come.

I declare my interest as an adviser to Lockheed Martin and UKBN, who have some involvement or potential involvement in underpinning our national security.

This debate follows the events of the past few days in Paris, which make it particularly timely. But it would have been timely anyway because of other recent events, such as what happened in the Canadian Parliament only a few weeks ago, the murder of Lee Rigby and the recent arrest carried out by the police counterterrorist network. Andrew Parker, the current director-general of MI5, talked in his lecture last Thursday about 20 terrorist plots directed or provoked by extremist groups in Syria since October 2013 in Europe, Canada and Australia. He said explicitly that the same intentions are being displayed towards the UK. There are 600 extremists among the many Britons who have travelled there. Many have joined ISIL, some—we do not really know how many—have already returned. He also spoke about three terrorist plots in the United Kingdom being stopped in recent months.

It is worth considering how, over the past 20 years, there has been a significant change in the nature of terrorist attack. Those who recall, as most of us do, the IRA atrocities of 30 years ago remember that there were usually warnings. There was usually the desire by those perpetrating the atrocities to live and continue their activities. There was also an explicit political agenda and a recognition that too many casualties might be counterproductive to that agenda—a recognition that was not always accepted and followed.

Subsequently, we have had the al-Qaeda spectaculars: 9/11, Bali, 7/7 and the airline plot, which, thankfully, failed. There, the objectives were clearly mass casualties and involved martyrdom. The target was to cut off the head of the snake, by which they meant western civilisation. That remains an aspiration for some groups around the world. The difficulty with those plots was that, because they involved the intention to create enormous numbers of casualties, there was a need to intervene very early to disrupt them, due to the risks of those casualties taking effect—perhaps before a full evidential picture had been built up. That explains some of the debates that we had a decade or so back not only on control orders but on the length of detention while investigations took place.

More recently, we have seen a growth in the activities of lone wolves, most notably Anders Breivik in Norway in 2011 or, closer to home, Roshonara Choudhry’s attack on my right honourable friend Stephen Timms in 2010. Often these attacks were quite low-tech, with an expectation of capture and/or martyrdom. We have then seen the IS-inspired attacks of the last few months. Again, these are quite often low-tech and do not require a great deal of advanced planning and organisation. They may involve hostages. Certainly one of the objectives is publicity and the use of social media—YouTube, perhaps—to spread the atrocity that they have committed. It is important that our capacity, and the legal framework to respond, can change with those changes—indeed, to reflect the changing nature of technology itself.

If I was a cynical person—those who know me know that that is the last thing I ever am—I might be cynical about the fact that it has taken this coalition Government five years gradually to come to understand the threat. I resist the temptation to say that those on these Benches warned the Government, but the Government do now accept, in this Bill, that there needs to be the restoration of the power to relocate those subject to controls. Undesirable though that is and however difficult the individual circumstances, it is something that is, on occasion, necessary. Within government there is also now, at last, despite the extraordinary statements of the Deputy Prime Minister this morning, increasing recognition of the importance of communications data and the fact that our capacity to deal with that needs to reflect the way that communications data has changed.

The other lesson that we need to learn from the last few years is that there are no simple magic answers: they are not contained in the Bill and they have never been contained in any previous piece of anti-terrorism legislation. Each measure that such legislation contains must be assessed against a number of tests. The first is of effectiveness and necessity: does the measure proposed actually work and does it do what is necessary?

The second test is about proportionality in our framework of human rights and values. That includes who takes the decision and whether it is subject to review or appeal by an appropriate judicial authority. In my view, it remains right that the decision is taken by the Home Secretary, who is accountable to Parliament. However, for transparency, that decision should be—indeed, must be—subject to review and be seen to be subject to review by some independent judicial authority.

The third test—one which is very difficult to determine and measure—is the extent to which the measures being brought forward are likely to lead to potential alienation within individual communities and the likelihood that the measures may aid the narratives that lead to radicalisation. Will it reinforce the myth or story that is told that the West and western society are somehow out to get people with a particular religion or something else? Are the measures contained in this Bill or any other piece of legislation going to produce blow-back? Do the benefits outweigh the risks and can the measures be used sufficiently sparingly to remain proportionate?

The final test is not quite of the legislation but of the Government’s intent: crucially, is the infrastructure in place to use the measures effectively? Are MI5, MI6, GCHQ and the police service resourced adequately to do what is necessary to make use of these measures?

The question that your Lordships’ House has to consider is: how does the Bill meet these tests? Obviously we will look at the various elements in the Bill over the next few weeks. There certainly is not time in my contribution—noble Lords will be relieved to know—to consider all the measures in the Bill; I understand and fully support most of their objectives. I want to pick out just one to indicate how these tests should be used.

Clause 2 gives the Home Secretary the power to impose a temporary exclusion order on an individual where there is a reasonable suspicion that the person has been engaged in terrorist activity outside the UK and that the exclusion is reasonably considered necessary for protecting the public from the risk of terrorism. I am very clear that the Home Secretary needs to have suitable measures available to deal with returning individuals who are reasonably believed to be a threat to the public’s safety. The question is: will these measures work? As a non-lawyer, it seems to me that the measures have the effect of rendering the individual stateless, certainly for a period and potentially indefinitely, as the temporary exclusion order can be renewed time and time again. I leave it to others—I am sure that there will be others—to argue the international legitimacy of this and its relationship to the clause of Magna Carta that says:

“No free man shall be … outlawed or exiled”,

or otherwise destroyed. Instead, I want to focus on what it means and the practicalities.

So, an individual arrives at a point of entry and is served with a TEO. What happens then? Are they returned to the country from whence they came? What if that country says, “Her Britannic Majesty does not recognise these people as safe and does not see them as currently under her protection”, and sends them back to the UK? What happens then? Are they going to shuffle backwards and forwards? Incidentally—this is just pure curiosity—who pays for the air flights? I am sure that that is a minor detail.

Alternatively, the country from which they come takes them back in, but they are immediately arrested. They are clearly a threat because the United Kingdom Government say that they are a threat. Do those individuals then have consular protection? If they are tortured, does this make our Government complicit? We will not deport other countries’ nationals to their home countries if we think that there is such a risk, yet we are happy to do so if it is one of our nationals to whom a TEO applies. Maybe I have misunderstood how this proposal will work, but I would like that question answered.

What is their status in the country that they are in when the TEO takes effect? Do they have UK consular protection? This is in circumstances when they are stopped from boarding the plane. Is it not a reasonable assumption by the country concerned—which may not have our own respect for human rights, or whose understanding of what human rights amount to is subtly changed by the way that we treat our citizen in this particular case—to say that this person is now a threat to their national security? Can they take whatever measures they feel appropriate?

If that person does go somewhere else and is not arrested by that country, what happens then? Is it not more likely that the security agencies will lose track of them, enabling them to re-enter the UK by another route, perhaps under a false name? So, how well will these arrangements work in practice? Presumably the real problem is that we are admitting that we do not have the resources to manage them adequately.

That brings me to final point: are the resources adequate? On 25 November, the Prime Minister announced that an extra £130 million would be available to combat terrorist activity. This money is to be spread over two years, so £65 million per year. However, it was reported at the same time that the Metropolitan Police, for example, assessed that an additional £30 million was needed for the police counterterrorism network. I understand that the bulk of that £65 million is, in fact, going to the agencies and I do not begrudge that, but I am concerned that the police service needs to be adequately resourced for what it will need to do, particularly at a time when policing is generally being cut—affecting, for example, the policing presence in local neighbourhoods. My specific question to the Minister is: how much additional funding is being made available to the police counterterrorism network during 2014-15, and is that still regarded as adequate in the light of recent events? Incidentally, this figure is not secret because the accounts of police bodies have to be in the public domain.

I have a separate question about policing. Is the Minister satisfied that the level of police firearms capability is sufficient in terms of the current threats? Other areas, too, need to be adequately resourced. London Councils tells me—as it did the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—that there is a shortfall in the money being made available to set up the systems required under Clause 21. Are all the overall costs necessary to underpin this Bill really being met?

These measures will fall or amount to nothing unless they are appropriately resourced. This Bill seeks to address important questions and I am under no illusions about the scale of the terrorist threat, but if the measures it contains are to be effective and effective without further alienating that small minority who are already so far alienated from our society that they may contemplate taking part in terrorist activity, the tests of effectiveness, proportionality and consequence must be considered carefully. I am confident that that is what your Lordships’ House will do over the next few weeks.