Syria and the Middle East

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 1st July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, the opportunity to debate events in the Middle East could not be more timely or more necessary. I fear that this will not be the last occasion on which those words or their equivalents will be uttered, given the near certainty that we face a long period of instability in the Middle East region. The rumbles of thunder from Tahrir Square last night are a reminder of that.

While it may indeed be true, as a number of commentators have observed, that Britain’s capacity to wield influence in the Middle East is on the decline, and while it is certainly true that our capacity to exert influence there by acting alone has all but disappeared, we should not ignore the uncomfortable reality that the Middle East has a continuing and perhaps growing capacity to influence us, whether in respect of our energy security, the threat of terrorism, the rising flow of refugees and asylum seekers or the risk of spreading hostilities on Europe’s doorstep. Neither complacency nor hand-wringing inertia is likely to be the best way to promote and defend our national interests.

I will focus my remarks on three topics: the civil war in Syria, the prospects for negotiations with Iran following its recent presidential election, and that well known oxymoron, the Middle East peace process. During the two and a half years since Syria began its slide into civil war, no party has emerged with any credit, and none has achieved any of its objectives in a sustainable way. While the regime of Bashar al-Assad has hung on by the skin of its teeth, it has lost all legitimacy and has committed horrendous war crimes, for which one must hope that it will one day be held to account. The insurgents, while controlling substantial parts of the country, have not yet rid themselves of the Assad regime, have not achieved a convincing degree of unity and have not reassured minorities that they would be secure in a post-Assad Syria. The insurgents have also undoubtedly committed a number of human rights abuses themselves.

The international community has been prevented by a series of Russian and Chinese vetoes in the UN Security Council from fulfilling its responsibility to protect Syria’s civilian population from a regime that has seen fit to bombard them with Scud missiles, cluster bombs and, in all probability, poison gas. It is frankly a sorry story, and one that should discourage us from thinking that more of the same policies will bring about results. Having listened to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Truro speaking about good and evil—about which I am sure he is a better judge than I—I still assert that what the Assad regime, father and son, have done to Syrian civilians is evil.

The longer the civil war continues, the worse the outcomes are likely to be for all concerned. Signs of regional instability spreading beyond Syria’s borders are there for all to see, in particular in the Lebanon. It is in that context of abject failure that one needs to judge the Government’s decision to prevent any extension of the EU’s arms embargo on Syria. I think that they were entirely justified in doing so. The analogy is not so much with Bosnia in the 1990s but—as the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, said—with the Spanish civil war of the 1930s, when the democracies, Britain and France, imposed an arms embargo while the dictators, Germany and Italy, poured in arms and soldiers. Now, Russia and Iran play that role, and Russia is preparing to send to Syria the S300 weapons system, which will have major regional destabilising results. The Spanish story did not end terribly well, and nor would an extension of the EU’s arms embargo on Syria have done so.

Since the decision was made to drop the EU arms embargo, a debate has raged in this country—and in this House this afternoon—over whether or not to arm the insurgents. The debate has focused on that issue almost to the exclusion of all other aspects of the Syrian crisis, when we should surely be taking a wider look at the challenges we face. Amid all the denunciations of arms supplies, the gold medal for hyperbole and opportunism must surely go to the Mayor of London. Not all the arguments deployed against supplying arms seem terribly convincing. Will refusing to supply weapons make us less vulnerable to terrorist attacks in future? I doubt it. Will the likelihood that some of the weapons will fall into the wrong hands put us directly at risk? Our soldiers in Afghanistan are not being killed by arms that the West supplied in the 1980s but by improvised explosive devices. Is enabling the insurgents to hold their ground better against Assad really contrary to our interests? I doubt that, too.

Here, then, are three elements of a wider strategy, which we might consider pursuing. First, we should put much more effort and emphasis into the earliest possible convening of a negotiating conference and seek to underpin that conference with a robust UN Security Council resolution based on the ideas of Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi for a transition. Secondly, instead of haggling with the Russians over whether Assad’s forces have already used sarin and other poison gases, we should concentrate on preventing any further use of it by tabling a UN Security Council resolution requiring Assad to admit UN chemical weapons inspectors and give them unfettered access to any sites where past or future allegations of use are made. Thirdly, we should seek to agree with the Russians and Chinese that none of the five permanent members of the Security Council would send any weapons or ammunition to Syria during the period up to and including the negotiating conference—a self-denying ordinance that could be extended if all parties were negotiating a transition in good faith. This would underline the crucial role of the conference in future decisions about the supply of weapons.

On Iran—I hope that the Minister will fill the lacuna in her opening statement about that country when she replies to the debate—it is no doubt wise to be cautious about overstating the significance of last month’s presidential election. We have yet to see what sort of negotiating hand the new President will be given by the supreme leader, but the fact that an election with genuine elements of democracy occurred and was accepted in place of the travesty of 2009 must surely be welcome, as must be the shift from the raucous populism of Ahmadinejad’s public pronouncements. So when negotiations with the 3 plus 3 resume, there could be a genuine opportunity—and it could be just about the last one on offer as Iran’s nuclear programme advances.

That grand master of modern diplomacy, Henry Kissinger, advocated that, in negotiations with obdurate adversaries—he was, of course, talking about the North Vietnamese—it worked better to put a substantial package of compromises on the table rather than to proceed with an incremental approach of small steps, which is what the 3 plus 3 have tended to deploy up to now. That would seem sage advice at the present juncture with Iran. Should we not now be ready to accept that Iran can continue with a programme of low-level enrichment so long as intensive international monitoring through the IAEA’s additional protocol, and probably other special inspection mechanisms, are put in place? Would it not be wise for us to encourage the US to open up in parallel a direct channel of communication with the new President of Iran?

In conclusion, and very briefly, I shall say a word about the Middle East peace process. However discouraging the auguries, this is surely no time to subject the new US Secretary of State, who seems to be rolling up his sleeves with a will, to a deluge of cynical disparagement, as so many commentators are doing. Rather, we, too, should be thinking of ways in which to help the process forward. Should we not be thinking of imaginative ways in which Israeli settlements on the West Bank could remain within a Palestinian state and Israeli Arab citizens could find a more secure place within an Israeli state? It is a long time since any new element was introduced into that longest running dialogue of the deaf, and I wonder whether it is not time to think a bit wider than we have done hitherto.

Central Asia

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 24th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

Central Asia is a wide region and I would have to take it country by country. A lot of the work that we have been doing in Kyrgyzstan on support for civil society means that there is an incredibly vibrant NGO sector there, and many in Turkmenistan are feeling the benefits of the work that we are doing on Turkmenistan’s economy. I have no doubt that the work we are doing in central Asia has a positive impact.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, the Minister obviously recognises that these countries of central Asia have great potential to do each other harm, but also potential to do each other good. Should the Government not encourage some form of sub-regional co-operation of the countries around Afghanistan, in which undertakings against interference were given and economic co-operation was given a boost?

[Baroness Warsi]

The noble Lord may be aware that the Istanbul process, which involves the regions as well as other countries, deals with a number of confidence-building measures that are all about securing regional stability and involving central Asian states. The latest meeting took place in Almaty. We are involved in both the counternarcotics and counterterrorism parts of those confidence-building measures. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord that it is important that countries in the region work together on regional stability, but it is important that they work on other issues as well.

Iran: Election

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 17th June 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that it would be a bit unwise if we were too effusive about the outcome of this election but that nevertheless we should all say that we welcome that such a high proportion of the Iranian electorate turned out to vote, and that they voted for a candidate who was not the one recommended to them originally by the supreme leader? I have two questions. First, can the Minister confirm what I thought I heard that any willingness by Iran to resume the discussions with the E3+3 would be met by a warm welcome and would be unconditional—that no new conditions would be set for that? Secondly, do the Government feel that it would be helpful if the US Administration made it clear that they would be prepared to talk directly to the Iranians in addition to the E3+3 negotiations, if that was the wish of the new Government in Iran?

[Baroness Warsi]

It would be wrong for me to speculate as to what offer may be made by the Iranians and how the US would respond in relation to that. However, I can assure the noble Lord that the E3+3 negotiations have been held in an open and frank manner. A number of matters are on the table. I am not sure what the current conditions are in relation to those negotiations so I cannot answer his question directly in relation to whether any further conditions will be set before further discussions take place. However, I welcome, with the noble Lord, that over 70% of the Iranian public took part in these elections, that Dr Rouhani was elected with over 50% of the vote, and that he described his win as a victory over extremism and unethical behaviour. This is a moment when Iran could choose an alternative course.

UN Arms Trade Treaty

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2013 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what arrangements they are making for the signature, ratification and implementation of the new United Nations Arms Trade Treaty.

[The Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government & Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Warsi)]

My Lords, the United Kingdom welcomes the adoption of the arms trade treaty on 2 April. We spent seven years working for this treaty. Its adoption is a victory for government, Parliament, civil society and industry. The treaty opens for signature on 3 June. The United Kingdom will sign and ratify it as a matter of urgency. We will also encourage other states to sign and ratify to ensure that the treaty enters into force as soon as possible.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I trust that it will be in order to ask that congratulations be passed to Alistair Burt and his team at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office for their skill and perseverance in achieving a more robust treaty than might at one time have been anticipated, and to the Foreign Secretaries, from Jack Straw onwards, who gave them their full support. Can the Minister say who is going to sign on behalf of the UK on 3 June? It is surely important that the signature be at a level that indicates the importance that we attach to it. Can she also say what consideration will be given in future, when granting an arms export licence, to the status of the importing country under the arms trade treaty—whether it has signed and ratified and is implementing the treaty? Would not that be a more effective way of encouraging the widest possible acceptance of its terms?

[Baroness Warsi]

I think the noble Lord asked three questions. Yes, I can absolutely add my support and congratulations to all the Foreign Secretaries, and indeed all Ministers, many from the Opposition, who have worked over seven years to make this happen. Of course, my congratulations go to my right honourable friend Mr Burt, who handled this towards the end, and to Alan Duncan. Negotiations went on long into the evenings to make sure that it happened—and, of course, it has been a huge success.

The treaty will be signed as soon as possible. We are hoping that it can be done by the Foreign Secretary, and we are looking at opportunities for how that will happen. It is really a matter of getting a balance to make sure that it is as near to 3 June as possible as well as at the highest level.

I missed most of the noble Lord’s third question, but I think it was in relation to getting the broadest support from member states. Of course, this treaty will come into force only once 50 states have signed it and 90 days thereafter have passed. So we will do all we can to encourage that.

EU: UK Isolation

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 22nd April 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, it would be idle to pretend that Britain’s always turbulent relationship with the other member states of the EU is not currently going through a more than usually troubled phase, and for that reason, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dykes, for his initiative. The misguided attempt to veto a fiscal union treaty in December 2011, the balance of competence review, whose purpose often seems obscure to its authors, let alone to most of the other member states which treat it with deep suspicion, and the Prime Minister’s reckless commitment, in my view, to an in/out referendum in 2017 all contribute to a negotiating climate that could easily end up negating the objective of establishing a more settled relationship for a Britain firmly engaged as a full and fully participating member of the European Union.

How is such an outcome, which would be so damaging to Britain’s national interest, to be avoided? First, we certainly cannot afford to sit around waiting until we see the result of the 2015 general election before embarking on a process of reform. Nor can we afford to found such a process on the entirely false premise that the other member states, particularly the members of the eurozone, are poised to embark on an overall rewrite of the treaties, which would provide the opportunity for us to put forward a wish list of our own. That will simply not happen any time soon, and certainly not in the timescale envisaged by the Prime Minister. Nor can any such process of reform afford to be based on a purely British list of vetoes, red lines, no-go areas, items for repatriation or renegotiation. We need a positive reform agenda which takes proper account of the wishes and interests of other member states, and thus has some chance of enlisting their support. That positive agenda needs to enlist cross-party support in Britain; it must not be a ragbag of items designed to appease the unappeasable in UKIP and the wilder shores of Euroscepticism, neither of which forces has the slightest interest in an approach that would leave Britain inside the European Union.

Can such a reform agenda be put together? I believe that it can but it would need to move beyond the comfort zone of Britain’s traditional EU agenda—completion of the single market, with stronger provisions on services and a digital market, further enlargement and freer and fairer world trade, valuable though those components continue to be. It will need to include a more wholehearted embrace of a common foreign and security policy and it should surely include, too, some strengthening of the common security and defence policy to face up to the impact of austerity on defence budgets. It should be focused on policy reform rather than on institutional reform. There will, of course, need to be some areas of increased flexibility in the operation of an EU moving beyond the soon-to-be 28 member states. Variable geometry is alive and well—here I rather disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Giddens —and has been operated successfully in Brussels since the end of the 1980s. We need only look at Schengen, the eurozone, justice and home affairs opt ins and opt outs. There will probably need to be more of that as the eurozone moves to a more integrated economic and monetary union within a European Union where there is still likely to be a substantial number of member states not yet within the eurozone, nor likely to be so in the near future. What needs to be avoided is making such a variable geometry the main operating principle of the European Union—that would be to sound the death knell of the single market; and to avoid, too, any fixed group of inner and outer circles of member states, which would be inherently unstable and unsustainable. It makes no practical sense anyway, as Britain is an essential leading player in any strengthening of common foreign security and common defence policy.

If I had one immediate plea, it would be for the Government to jettison their silly and untrue slogan of wanting less Europe—untrue because the Government’s policy is for more single market, more European trade agreements, and more new members of the European Union. Who are they kidding? The slogan is silly and counterproductive because it separates us from our natural allies in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and in central and eastern Europe, who will never march into battle under the banner of “less Europe”. Shaping and beginning to negotiate with our partners and with the Commission over such a positive reform agenda is the right way ahead, and a far better option than preparing to play a game of Russian roulette in 2017.

Syria

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 31st January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

As noble Lords will be aware, I try whenever I come to the Dispatch Box to provide as much detail as I can in relation to any Question that is asked. It is important to be as open and frank as possible with your Lordships’ House. Unfortunately, in relation to this matter, we are still looking at these reports. It would be wrong for me to speculate about the implications of what may have taken place and of what has in fact taken place.

However, I note the point that my noble friend makes in relation to the arms embargo. We have taken the position that there should be flexibility in the arms embargo both in relation to the period of time that it operates and to its specifics. That does two things. It sends out a clear message to Assad that we intend to keep the pressure on him to try to resolve this crisis. It also gives us flexibility, as part of the wider EU, to ensure that we can respond appropriately to the situation as it changes on the ground.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, will the Minister inform the House as to whether, if it turns out that the Syrian regime was transferring arms or military material to any organisation in Lebanon other than the state armed forces, it would have been acting contrary to Security Council resolutions?

[Baroness Warsi]

I do not want to answer the noble Lord’s supplementary question by speculating. I can say that on two occasions we have had specific questions on the issue of chemical weapons and their transfer. I said on those occasions that we had made clear to Syria what its obligations were in relation to any chemical or biological weapons that it had. We have also made it clear that we have worked with the regional powers in the area to make sure that the borders around Syria are properly protected to ensure that there is no movement or transfer of biological and chemical weapons. Of course, we have made clear our views to the Syrian authorities, who have sent back some reports that they do not intend to use chemical and biological weapons. But we will continue to make our concerns heard.

EU: Prime Minister’s Speech

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 31st January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I suggest that the Prime Minister's speech is a curate's egg—some good some bad. I include among the bad elements, the commitment to a referendum on a fixed timetable many years ahead on what may well turn out to be a false premise; namely, that wholesale treaty reform will be called for by others in a federating sense. That is not likely. They are more likely to go for rather modest changes to meet the requirements of the eurozone, so I regard that as unwise.

In one speech, the Prime Minister created a whole string of known unknowns. He should not have been playing Russian roulette with major national assets such as membership. I entirely see what the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes—I welcome her initiative in choosing this debate—said was not the end of the world. But nothing done by politicians has ever been the end of the world, yet. That does not mean that they have not done some damn stupid things.

It was wise of the Prime Minister not to choose a long laundry list of things that he wanted changed. Much more careful thought is needed as to how to approach this. I suggest three criteria are needed to be applied to any such changes. The first is: are the changes necessary for Britain's national interest and are they, at the same time, good for the EU as a whole? If the second condition cannot be met, they will not be agreed. The second criterion is: are they negotiable? The third is: do they match the Prime Minister's laudable objective of Britain staying in the European Union and influencing EU policy? The proposals published by the Fresh Start Group, which I would rather characterise as the false start group, would not fulfil any of those criteria.

However, we do need a positive agenda and we need that now. We do not need it in 2015 or 2016. We should be pursuing that now and be prepared to go outside the normal British comfort zone of single market completion, enlargement and freer world trade, although those are excellent things that we should be pursuing. But why are we not thinking more actively and intelligently about defence? The effect of austerity on defence budgets is surely pushing us all closer together.

My final word in the brief time that we have been allotted in this debate is; tactically astute, strategically reckless.

Nuclear Disarmament

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 24th January 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, the topicality of the subject we are debating today can surely not be doubted. The re-election for a second term of President Obama, who so electrified a global audience with the vision he set out in his Prague speech of a world eventually free of nuclear weapons, together with the changes in the top leadership of three of the other four officially recognised nuclear weapons states—China, France and Russia—present an opportunity as well as a challenge to those who wish for progress along the road towards multilateral nuclear disarmament.

However, we need to recognise that the landscape of 2012 was pretty bleak. There, I entirely share the analysis of the noble Lord, Lord Browne of Ladyton. The euphoria provoked by the Prague speech and the new START agreement between Russia and the US faded. Neither NATO nor Russia made any meaningful progress towards reducing and eventually removing tactical nuclear weapons from the front line in Europe. The failure at the end of the year to implement the agreement to convoke a conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone in the Middle East has merely stored up problems for the future. We are entering a new and extremely dangerous phase in the efforts to handle the attempts by North Korea and Iran to break out from their obligations under the non-proliferation regime.

There are lots more causes for alarm and concern than there are for complacency, which makes the initiative of my noble friend Lord Ramsbotham in obtaining this debate—I shared a little in the effort to get that agreed by our fellow Cross-Benchers— the more laudable. I also take this opportunity to thank the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Bramall, for his contribution to this debate and to so many other debates in this House.

As has invariably been the case so far, any further moves towards multilateral nuclear disarmament have to begin with the United States and Russia, whose arsenals still far exceed those of all other nuclear weapons states—both recognised and unrecognised—put together, and which also still far exceed any conceivable requirements to ensure their security.

The initial auguries are not good. The Russians, in particular, show little appetite for further reductions. Much, I feel, will depend on the first meetings—let us say, the next meetings—between Presidents Obama and Putin and whether they can find a way out of the impasse on ballistic missile defence, where the Russian position has often appeared to be as intransigent as it is unconvincing; but where President Obama was rather hamstrung on handling this matter in the period leading up to his re-election.

If those US-Russian difficulties can be overcome, the stage will have been set for a widening of the multilateral effort to include the other weapons states, including us. It is surely, therefore, high time now to prepare for that stage. In that context, the now regular series of meetings between the five recognised weapons states will surely need to assume a more operational significance and scope. I hope that the Minister can say something about the Government’s plans and aspirations in respect of the next P5 meeting. Surely the P5 offers the ideal forum in which to discuss the content of a fissile material cut-off treaty, which all five of those present have publicly supported. The P5 could also seek ways to get around the deadlock in the conference on disarmament over even starting negotiations on such a treaty, for which Pakistan alone is responsible.

The postponement of the Middle East conference on a weapons-of-mass-destruction-free zone may have been understandable, but simply to drift towards the next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in 2015 without holding such a Middle East conference is surely a thoroughly bad option, likely to please only those who covertly wish to see collapse of the NPT regime. Since such a collapse is very much contrary to our own national security interests, I hope that the Minister will be able to say how we, as one of the joint conveners of that middle eastern conference, are planning to proceed from now onwards.

The greatest immediate challenges in the nuclear field lie, of course, in the handling of the cases of Iran and North Korea. Neither presents any particular cause for optimism. The negative consequences of taking pre-emptive military action against either country still seem far to outweigh any conceivable benefits, whatever one’s view of the morality or international legitimacy of so doing. That points to major efforts being required to revive the search for diplomatic solutions, which will also require some willingness to compromise on both sides of the very tense relationships over those two countries. In the case of North Korea, the search for compromise would seem to require some meeting of minds between China and the United States. In the case of Iran, it seems that what is lacking is some direct channel of communication between the Iranian leadership and the US Administration. Do the Government share that analysis and, if they do, are they conveying those thoughts to those most directly concerned?

I wish I felt that the handling of these vital issues of nuclear policy came a little higher up the Government’s foreign policy agenda than they seem to do. When, for example, did the Prime Minister last address them in a major speech? I think the answer is that he has not ever done so. When did the Foreign Secretary last address them in a major speech? I think the answer is: when the Government published their Nuclear Posture Review in the summer of 2010. It surely is high time that that gap was filled.

It is of course quite correct to underline the fact that Britain has the smallest arsenal among the nuclear weapons states, but that is not an excuse for inertia. What thought are we giving not just to the size and configuration of our nuclear deterrent, but to its alert posture in the very different international circumstances from those for which it was originally designed? Here I join with all those in this debate who have questioned the validity of the “continuous at sea deterrence” doctrine, which so far has governed our nuclear policy. I, too, was dismayed when I saw the Government’s reply to the Written Question from the noble Lord, Lord Lea of Crondall, about the Trident review that is being undertaken and their intention not to publish any part of it. I was therefore delighted to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, drawing my attention to the fact that in the coalition’s mid-term agreement it seems to have moved on from that. I hope that the Minister will be able to make that very clear in her reply.

I have to say that for people like myself who support a continuing British nuclear deterrent, although not necessarily of the same nature and scope as the existing one, it is very disheartening if we are told that we are not grown-up enough to have a serious debate about this and to see what underpins the Government’s decision-making on it. Of course I understand that aspects of that will not be suitable for publication, but that is not to say that the broad strategic considerations cannot be set out on the table and debated among us without words such as “unilateralist” being flung around.

Finally, because this has been mentioned by several other noble Lords, I would like to say a word about the false argument that Britain’s permanent membership of the Security Council of the UN somehow depends crucially on our possession of nuclear weapons. That is simply not the case; it is totally unhistorical to suggest that it is. When the five permanent members of the Security Council were established under the UN charter, only one had nuclear weapons. China, the last of them to join, did not have them for another three decades. The link is really not there. The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, put his finger on it when he said that the sustaining of our permanent membership depends infinitely more on the role that we play in peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict prevention, and matters such as that, than it does on making this false linkage with nuclear weapons. As I have said, I am not a unilateral disarmer. I am not suggesting that we should give up our nuclear weapons, but is important that we keep them for the right reasons and not for the wrong ones.

European Union: Recent Developments

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 17th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, 2012 has not been a good year for the European Union and it has not been a good year either for Britain in Europe. To deny either of those two pretty evident propositions is to delude oneself and to make the search for remedies even more difficult than it already is. The members of the eurozone have remained locked in an existential crisis from which they have yet to find a safe way forward. Even if they have made some progress and have managed to avoid some of the traps into which they might have fallen—most obviously the contagion that would almost certainly have followed a Greek exit from the euro—this crisis has diverted the energy and the attention of leaders away from a whole range of other challenges, such as completing the single market, continuing to give a firm lead on climate change and facing up to the difficult foreign policy choices in places such as Syria and over Palestine, for example. At the same time, Britain has slipped into its own, quite separate, existential crisis over its membership.

The coincidence of these two existential crises is in itself a negative factor, characterised by a sharp reduction in the sense of mutual solidarity that is needed if neither is to end in disaster. Even when a piece of good news comes along—such as the award to the European Union of the Nobel Peace Prize in recognition of its major contribution to peace and prosperity in the period after the Second World War, by anchoring the former dictatorships in southern Europe and the countries of central and eastern Europe, liberated from Soviet domination, to democracy and market economies, and by stabilising the Balkans after the tragic experiences of the 1990s—that good news is rapidly discounted or, in this country, derided by those whose narrative it simply does not fit. The Prime Minister’s absence from the Nobel awards ceremony in Oslo left me feeling ashamed. How petty we have become.

What are the main choices for this country and the European Union for the period ahead? I suggest three main lines of policy. First, we should continue to be supportive of the eurozone countries as they struggle to shape a more integrated economic policy structure within which to secure the future of the euro. Their success is as much in our interest as it is in theirs. Anyone who believes that the single market could survive unscathed a break-up of the eurozone is not awfully good at risk assessment. So we should eschew any further completely unnecessary and counterproductive confrontations, such as occurred over the fiscal union treaty last December.

We should work constructively and pragmatically to develop a system of variable geometry, a concept that has worked well in the EU since the end of the 1980s. We should look at the euro, look at Schengen and look at the way in which we handle justice and home affairs legislation to encompass also now the relationship between the euro ins and outs in the fields to be covered by the new eurozone steps towards economic integration, while safeguarding the integrity of the single market for all 27—soon to be 28—member states. Both these objectives seem to me to have been advanced modestly by last week’s European Council decisions on the first steps towards a eurozone banking union. This means rejecting the siren voices of those advocating a two-speed, two-tier European Union, which I believe is neither negotiable, sustainable nor in Britain’s interest. It means ceasing to chase the will-o’-the-wisp of repatriation.

Secondly, we should work flexibly and in partnership with the other EU member states that favour a rigorous approach to EU spending to secure agreement on a multi-annual financial framework for the seven years ahead when the European Council next meets, in February, to discuss this. That group of countries has already achieved considerable success in shrinking the excessive spending bids of the Commission and the European Parliament. There could and should be more progress in that direction before a deal is struck. However, we need to avoid snatching defeat from the jaws of victory by pushing the EU back into relying solely on annual budgets, which would likely be higher and less sensibly distributed than the multi-annual framework. This will require the Government to be bold enough to ignore the quixotic and opportunistic urgings of the House of Commons a couple of months ago at an earlier stage in the negotiating process.

Thirdly, we urgently need to develop a positive agenda for ourselves and for the European Union that reaches beyond the traditional fixed points of Britain’s EU positions on completion of the single priorities, completion of the single market and further enlargement, valid though those priorities remain and welcome though the recent agreement on the European patent is—a clear case, by the way, of more Europe being good for Britain and good for the EU. Should we not be working with the new French Government to respond to the pressure being put on our defence budgets by the policies of austerity? Should we not give a lead, as only our two countries can in this sector, to a more effective European defence and security policy that reflects the realities of the US Administration’s pivot towards Asia and its insistence that Europe needs to do more in its own back yard? I draw some encouragement from the wording of the European Council’s conclusions, which seem to provide a perfect framework within which we could give a lead, with the French, in the year leading up to the discussion that is to take place in December 2013.

Should we not, too, be working with our fellow EU partners in the G8 and in the G20 to ensure that Europe’s shared objectives of freer and fairer world trade and of more effective policies to combat climate change are properly reflected in the outcomes of the two summit meetings to be held in 2013? If Europe cannot get its act together, we can be sure that those two gatherings will be dominated by the relationship between the US and Russia and the US and China respectively. The Europeans, ourselves included, will be sidelined and marginalised. Both the World Trade Organisation talks and the UN-led negotiations on climate change desperately need new momentum from outside their overlarge and unwieldy negotiating processes. There is an opportunity to provide that and to check the tendency to turn away from international co-operation, which could be so damaging for middle-ranking powers with global interests such as ourselves.

None of these three lines of policy will be easy to achieve, nor will they be supported by the noisy band of Europhobic activists both outside and inside the Government’s own ranks, whose sole objective and priority is to propel the United Kingdom towards an early exit from the European Union; nor will they be achieved if the leadership of all three main parties, which continue to support Britain’s membership, do not put a lot more effort than they have in recent years into setting out, in compelling and persuasive terms, why it is in Britain’s interest to remain an active participant in EU policy formulation, and one with plenty of positive and appealing ideas. In the past four weeks there have been the first tentative signs of a response to that imperative. The speeches of the leader of the Opposition and of its own chair at the CBI conference and the speech of the Foreign Secretary in Berlin were such straws in the wind. However, much more will need to be done if the tide of Euroscepticism by default and by meretricious assertion is to be stemmed and reversed.

I shall conclude with a few words about the two European Bills to which we are being asked to give a Second Reading today. The Bill to enable the UK to ratify Croatia’s accession should be strongly supported. It represents another building block in the EU’s response to the sanguinary break-up of the former Yugoslavia, which is still work in progress with a long way to go. The aspirations of Montenegro, Macedonia, Serbia, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina must not be overlooked. Much has changed in Croatia for the better since it first applied. I was able to see some of that when I visited Zagreb in May to celebrate the 20th anniversary of Croatia’s joining the UN. The EU institutions and the people of Croatia will need to be vigilant to ensure that the ground gained in the approach to membership does not slip away after it is achieved, but there is no reason to hesitate now.

The second Bill, which enshrines the political deal to set aside the original intention of the Lisbon treaty to limit the continuing expansion of the European Commission and to ensure that the system of appointing one Commissioner for each member state remains in force, I support, too, but, I fear, only while holding my nose. The Commission is already too numerous and is unable to give all its members worthwhile jobs, a problem that will only get worse with enlargement, which I happen to support very strongly. While I accept the present provision as necessary, it is a necessary evil. This area will need to be revisited in the years ahead.

I am sure that 2013 will be another turbulent and difficult year for the EU, but it could also be the year in which a turning point is reached in those two existential crises that I have identified. I hope that all those who support an EU with Britain as a full and active member of it will join forces to make it so.

UK-Israel Life Sciences Council

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 6th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Warsi]

As the noble Lord will be aware, the UK-Israel Life Sciences Council is a group of top scientists from both countries and includes Members of your Lordships’ House as well as, I think, four Nobel Prize winners. I think that all noble Lords would agree that we are at a very delicate stage in the Middle East peace process. As I have said from this Dispatch Box on many occasions in the past few weeks, 2013 will be a critical year. It is therefore important that we use whatever avenues we have to strengthen those diplomatic relations to achieve a peaceful resolution to a two-state solution in the Middle East.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, does the Minister accept that I would have no difficulty in answering my noble friend’s Question? I oppose fundamentally any boycotting of co-operation between academics and researchers in this country and those in Israel. However, does she not also agree that when the Government of Israel pay absolutely no respect to the views of the British Government on crucial issues of international policy, such as the legality of settlements, that is bound to have an effect on government-to-government relations, even if it should not have an effect on co-operation between scientists and academics?

[Baroness Warsi]

I am a firm believer that when matters are most difficult to discuss, that is the time to strengthen relationships further. We have never managed to resolve any matter by walking away from relationships. It is because we have strong relationships with Israel on a variety of issues that we can be so robust in our engagement. I hope noble Lords will agree that we have been robust in that engagement in the past week. Noble Lords will be aware that on Monday the Israeli ambassador was called in by the Minister for the Middle East to express our grave concerns about illegal settlements and the comments made by the Israeli Government.