Free Trade Agreement: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 14th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I am not used to debates without speakers’ lists; I am a bit nervous about going first.

I thoroughly congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on securing this debate before the expiry of the scrutiny deadline. As he noted, this is the first genuinely new post-Brexit free trade agreement, as opposed to a copy-and-paste of the agreements we enjoyed as an EU member state. As such, it has to be welcomed—but with some caveats. The committee notes that, although this is substantially a new trade agreement, there is a different government approach to parliamentary scrutiny for this one compared to others, such as the forthcoming Australia free trade agreement.

The committee says that government commitments on scrutiny have developed “iteratively”. A less diplomatic way of putting it might be that it is all over the place. Certainly, government commitments on consultation, publication of negotiating objectives, scrutiny of documents, briefings to the committees, access to the texts and so on have not been respected in the case of this agreement. My experience as a Member of the European Parliament was that if the negotiators—the Commission and the Council—took MEPs into their confidence early on, particularly through an approval of negotiating objectives, the further stages were much smoother. But of course, the European Parliament has much greater powers than the Westminster Parliament over trade agreements.

The committee called the layout of the parliamentary report, one of the explanatory materials, “hard-to-read”. It certainly is; I made the mistake of printing it out and it has the titchiest font that I think I have ever seen. The committee also said that the

“rationale for its production is unclear”

and that even the impact assessment was “less informative” than on previous occasions. I hope that this might get a commitment from the Minister to do better in future.

I am interested to note that this free trade agreement includes mutual recognition of professional qualifications, which the Government did not manage to secure in the trade and co-operation agreement with the EU, such that any UK qualified workers wishing to work in the EU have to meet the qualification requirements of each individual EU member state, such that host country rules apply. Can the Minister, as an off-shoot of the subject we are debating, tell us what progress has been reached in securing reciprocal arrangements with any EU member state on a sectoral basis for recognition of qualifications?

The committee notes that although the agreement applies differently in Northern Ireland compared with the rest of the UK, none of the explanatory materials—the explanatory memorandum, the impact assessment, the parliamentary report—makes any reference to that, which is quite strange. Northern Ireland officials advised the committee that

“there remain considerable complexities around how Northern Ireland will fully benefit from UK FTAs”,

and that the

“inability to fully comply with FTA measures for NI, where these conflict with … the Protocol”,

needs to be considered. Obviously, the protocol is much in our minds now—as ever. Can the Government provide the committee and the House with a full explanation of these difficulties—this interaction between the protocol and FTAs—and what they involve in terms of WTO transparency, potential trade dispute risks and any other factors?

The Northern Ireland Government apparently saw the detailed text of this agreement only shortly before the announcement that an agreement had been reached. The Scottish Government have complained that they did not have a full role and were not involved in any of the crucial detail on tariffs and goods access or consulted on significant aspects of the negotiations. Unlike some colleagues—I am sitting behind one—I am not well up on the role of the devolved Governments, but I am concerned if a professed unionist party that currently sits in government is failing to be inclusive in trade negotiations. Can the Minister explain the Government’s record in respect of this FTA and what they intend in the future?

As the committee notes, and as the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, repeated, this FTA is

“in part an exercise in damage limitation”.

We cannot get back, certainly via this FTA, to what we had as a member of the European Economic Area. I notice that the explanatory memorandum does not even mention the EEA in its background section; it has been airbrushed out of history. It compares this FTA only with the previous ones on goods only. A fair comparison would be what we had as all being members of the EEA. This reaches the same level of farce as “Don’t mention the war”—Captain Mainwaring style.

The impact assessment claims that the FTA

“delivers more opportunities across services and investment and a range of other areas including digital, procurement and telecoms.”

This again can be compared only to the previous 2019 and December 2020 agreements, which covered only goods. As the Law Society protested, this FTA comes

“nowhere close to replicating the level of market access members”—

that is, solicitors, the members of the Law Society—had “prior to Brexit”, when we were in the EU and the EEA, in the provisions giving complete freedom to provide services. That is what the comparison needs to be with. It is disingenuous of the Government not to mention and describe that, since we here are all going to know it. At least there are some mobility provisions in this FTA, unlike in the TCA with the EU, but they are only WTO mode 4, in the jargon, and thus more far more restrictive than the freedom of movement to work that we all had in the EEA.

A big gap is the failure to get diagonal cumulation on rules of origin. This is a subject for which I have always had to put a wet towel on my head, but what it means in practice is that while the UK, Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein will be able to cumulate EU content, the EU has not reciprocated in the TCA. This means that Norwegian and Icelandic raw materials incorporated above a certain threshold into goods exported from the UK to the EU will attract tariffs as third-country content. Can the Minister give us any glimmer of hope of resolving that important issue in future?

The preamble reaffirms the commitment of all parties to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. What about the European Convention on Human Rights? As far as I know, and indeed I do know, all the partners—Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and, at least for now, the UK—are members of the ECHR. So why is the ECHR not cited and namechecked in the text while only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is? Should I be worried about that?

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, speaking as a member of your Lordships’ European Affairs Committee, whose report we are debating, I welcome these three agreements. That may surprise the Minister, who has taken a certain amount of criticism on some of the other debates that we have had on trade agreements, but I do. It is important to avoid the legal and, potentially, practical hiatus in our trading relationship with those three countries that would have followed from our ceasing to be covered by the EEA at the beginning of 2021, this year. Now, as a result of those agreements, that will not happen, which is certainly good news.

However, I have to say to the Government that they would get more credit on an occasion like this if they did not claim, as official spokesmen have done, that these agreements were in some way a massive break- through, a first new-era post-Brexit set of free trade agreements. That is the sort of hyperbole that I am afraid, since it is not true, tends to discredit what is actually a perfectly well-done job. These are nothing of the sort. We have actually been in a free trade area relationship with these countries for many decades, since before we joined the European Community when we were part of EFTA with them. I have to admit—to my shame, because there is the problem of ageism—that I was part of the negotiations for the free trade agreement with Norway and the other members of EFTA when we joined the European Community.

Republic of Cameroon: Economic Partnership Agreement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 29th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, the two trade agreements we are debating today are with two very different countries: Ghana, a flourishing democracy with a robust and growing economy, and Cameroon—[Inaudible]—racked. Noble Lords have spoken so eloquently. They need, therefore, to be considered separately.

I believe we should give our full and unqualified backing to the agreement with Ghana, but I would be grateful if the Minister would give the House a progress report on the preparatory work his department has in hand for a full, new-style free trade agreement with Ghana and other African countries, not just the tread-water, rollover one of which the present agreement consists. In the case of Cameroon, it would be helpful if the Minister could say, quite clearly, whether the reported human rights abuses were raised in the negotiations. If so, what was the response of the Cameroon Government? If not, why not? Is it not the case that the EU’s Cotonou agreement, to which we were hitherto a party, does in fact provide scope for raising human rights abuses?

More widely, what are the Government doing, together with others including the African Union and the Commonwealth, to prevent the internal tensions between the anglophone and francophone communities in Cameroon sliding into a full-blown crisis, of which there are far too many in Africa?

When the Trade Bill was passing through this House, the Minister gave a number of assurances that human rights issues would be an integral part of the Government’s future trade policy. So, these questions are valid ones, and I hope he will be able to answer them. In April, we heard that there had been no discussion of human rights in the context of the UK-Turkey negotiations, despite the prevalence of such problems in that country. I will listen carefully to the Minister’s replies to this debate and, in the light of that, decide whether to support the Motion to Regret which I am minded to do.

Turkey: Free Trade Agreement

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 27th April 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is good that we have an opportunity to debate this trade agreement because that fulfils a commitment given by the Minister as the Trade Bill passed through this House, and more particularly because this agreement is a seriously disturbing one. I note, incidentally, that it was not the object of the surge of hyperbole from the Secretary of State for International Trade which usually greets the conclusion of an agreement; this is not surprising when you look at the content.

Why so? Many recent trade agreements fall into the category that I would describe as running to stand still: they just roll over the trade access which the UK already had as an EU member state. But this agreement does not clear even that low bar. The new requirements for rules of origin checks and the absence of cumulation provisions with other countries in the region will in fact leave British exporters to Turkey worse off than they were when we were inside the EU-Turkey customs union, and therefore at a competitive disadvantage to EU exporters to Turkey with which they were previously on a level playing field. Will the Minister confirm that that is in fact the case and say where the UK will be left if and when the negotiations between the EU and Turkey to strengthen and possibly expand their customs union, which are, I understand, likely to begin soon, lead to agreement?

The other equally if not more disturbing feature is the absence of any provisions covering human rights. Did we seek such provisions? There can be few countries in the world with which we are currently seeking to conclude a preferential trade agreement in which some provisions on human rights are more necessary. I recall the Minister’s eloquence about such provisions in trade agreements when we debated the Trade Bill. Here is a country which is locking up journalists, members of parliament and academics, all with scant or no due process, and we have no locus for raising these matters. Will the Minister at least give an assurance that human rights issues will be raised when the two-year review of this agreement falls due, and that the UK will press in those negotiations for this lacuna to be filled?

As a final thought, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, will send a copy of his contribution to this debate to President Trump in Mar-a-Lago. It is fortunate, perhaps, that Mr Trump has had his Twitter account cut off because the response might be a little startling.

Economic Partnership Agreement: Kenya

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome the maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord McDonald of Salford, and in doing so express my sadness that his late father-in-law, Lord Wright of Richmond, was not here to see him make it. I worked once for someone who said he was a founder member of the son-in-law club. He was a former Leader of this House, Lord Soames, and his father-in-law was Winston Churchill, of course. He always used to say, “the son- in-law also rises.”

In so far as the UK-Kenya agreement we are debating is one of the category that the Government call continuity agreements—perhaps more clearly described as rollover agreements of the terms which already existed between the UK and Kenya when we were a member of the EU or in transition out of it—there is probably no need to go into too much detail, which is fortunate since, as usual, we have no time to do so.

Perhaps when the Minister replies to the debate he can identify any elements in the agreement which provide better access to our market than Kenyan exporters already had, or provide our exporters of goods or services with better access to the Kenyan market than they already had. What we are talking about, therefore, is running to stand still. I am not denigrating that; it is certainly better than nothing and better than regressing to straightforward third-country treatment of each other. But it is still light years removed from what was promised by the promoters of Brexit once we had shaken off what they described as the “shackles” of EU membership.

That brings me to a wider point, which was raised forcefully in the report of your Lordships’ International Relations and Defence Committee on the UK’s relations with sub-Saharan Africa—a report published last July and still languishing undebated. It is now nearing five years since the Department for International Trade was set up in the aftermath of the 2016 referendum to establish the outlines of the UK’s new independent trade policy, yet to this day not a word has been revealed about what that policy should be towards Africa —a substantial proportion of the world’s population, containing many rapidly growing markets. Not one word has been said about those African countries’ improved access to our market, which must surely be an integral part of any serious partnership between the UK and Africa.

This failure to identify and to promote the countries of Africa as a priority part of our new trade policy is surely a lamentable one which must be remedied. However, the Government’s written replies to our report’s recommendations—two attempts were needed—were vapid and imprecise, and contained no sense of urgency. Clearly, pursuit of the mirage of a UK-US agreement and that of an agreement with the Pacific grouping, with seven of whose 11 members we already have free trade agreements, were crowding out any consideration of Africa. I hope that the Minister can say that this will not continue to be the case and give us chapter and verse on how that lacuna will be filled, at the latest when the report on sub-Saharan Africa is finally debated.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)]

I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft. I beg your pardon, the next speaker is the noble Viscount, Lord Waverley.

United Kingdom Internal Market Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 19th October 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I regret that our virtual proceedings mean that one can no longer welcome maiden speeches across the Chamber but has to do so remotely. I do that now, both to the one already made and to those that are coming.

I make no apologies for concentrating my remarks in this Second Reading exclusively on Part 5 of the Bill and its Clauses 44, 45 and 47. Other parts of the Bill certainly require the customary careful scrutiny, and very possibly the amendment, that we normally give to legislation, but this section is unprecedented—indeed, unique—and requires more drastic treatment. Why so? Because never before in Britain’s modern history have a Government brought forward a Bill giving them the authority to unilaterally break international law and override our treaty obligations—in this case, obligations entered into less than a year ago and legitimised by legislation passed by this Parliament following last December’s election. There is no doubt about that, because the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stood at the Dispatch Box in the other place and told us quite explicitly that it was so.

Does that have implications going far beyond the subject matter covered by this Bill? Indeed it does. This country has prided itself that its word was its deed. In the 20th century, we twice went to war—to world war—in 1914 and 1939, to uphold our treaty obligations, but apparently our word will no longer be our deed if these provisions become law. Moreover, it is the Government’s view—which I happen to share—frequently put forward at our own Dispatch Box, that it is in Britain’s national interest to sustain and strengthen the rules-based international order. That order is currently under severe strain. How much credibility will our advocacy of that order have if we start picking and choosing which bits of it we intend to apply and which ones we intend to ride roughshod over? Very little, I suggest. I can just visualise the justifications that the representatives of Presidents Putin and Xi will put forward next time they wish to break international law and their international obligations; they will be identical to the arguments being used by the Government to defend the measures brought forward to us today.

I insist that this is not a matter of which side of the Brexit argument you are on. That matter was settled last January when this House endorsed the deal that the Prime Minister struck with the EU—the very same deal that we are now being invited to override—and it was settled when we left the EU at the end of January. That is demonstrated by the fact that critics of these measures are drawn from both sides of that Brexit argument. What really is relevant is the risk to the Northern Ireland peace process if the Government persist in the course that they have set out on. The Government’s protests to the contrary ring quite hollow to me. The balance of analyses points to a real, genuine, serious risk to that process.

Those are the reasons why I believe the principled course of action is to remove those parts that I have referred to from the Bill. There is just one word that I can find to describe them: an aberration. That is why I shall vote with the Motion in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge.