The Ukraine Effect (European Affairs Committee Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 21st November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as back in the mists of time, when this report, so excellently introduced by my noble friend Lord Ricketts, was published, I was a member of the European Affairs Committee. On this occasion, the delay inadvertently makes the report even more topical, as the impending change of Administration in the US brings us ever closer to important decisions that will crucially affect Ukraine’s and our own future security and prosperity. These are decisions over which we must always remember that we in the UK do not have a determinant say.

The self-image in this country and in this House of our role in backing Ukraine since Russia’s 2022 invasion is rightly positive, and successive Governments, up to and including the present one, rightly get credit for that, but it is not the whole story. In 2014, when Russia seized the Crimea and parts the Donbas by force, we were not so forthright. By standing aside from the Normandy group—France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine—which shaped the two ill-fated and ill-conceived Minsk agreements, which Russia then ignored and trashed, we committed an error of judgment in my view, and we must not repeat that error.

While I am in the process of mentioning sins of omission, the committee’s report dealt with the issue of sanctions in detail, and I found the previous Government’s response to that report pretty unconvincing, frankly. The concerns have been considerably increased by recent reporting in the press of ways in which the overseas territories of the UK are being used as loopholes for evading sanctions. I hope that when the Minister replies to this debate she will give us an account of how the meetings this week with the leaders of the overseas territories have done something—a lot, I hope—to close those loopholes.

We and Ukraine now face critical choices, not only on the battlefield and in the supply of weaponry but in geopolitics too in relation to Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, which was guaranteed by Russia in the Budapest memorandum when Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons and was subsequently junked by it, and in relation to Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership and to join the EU. Any geographical settlement based on Ukraine ceding territory and citizens to a neighbour that has seized them by force in disregard of Russia’s international obligations, including the UN charter itself, is necessarily precarious and risks being reopened in the future. Think only of Alsace and Lorraine, where many millions died before a final determination was achieved. Ukraine’s place in NATO could perhaps have been discussed prior to Russia’s aggression, but now, when its permanent exclusion from membership can be achieved only at gunpoint, is that still so? When the hard fact is that any guarantee given by others, ourselves included, will necessarily fall short of the commitment to collective defence in Article 5 of the NATO treaty, there is a lack of credibility there that falls short of what is needed if Russia is to be effectively deterred in the future.

As to EU membership, as a non-member we no longer have any say over that, but it is surely clear enough that Ukraine’s EU membership is in our national interest too, and I suggest that we should not hesitate to say so. In any case, as a signatory of our trade and co-operation agreement with the European Union, and hopefully the new security pact and reset which the Government aim to achieve, we will be a party to those with Ukraine too. Should we not be travelling with them every step of the way, together with our EU partners?

Speculation about which way the unpredictable President-elect Trump will lean on all these issues is probably fruitless. What is essential is that we discuss in depth with the incoming Administration their thinking as it emerges with the aim of ensuring a strengthened and reinforced overall European contribution.