China: Security and Trade (IRDC Report)

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 20th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, particularly since he referred to a couple of themes I will mention myself: the pitiful state of our international aid performance and how that affects competition with China, and climate change.

We should perhaps be thankful for small mercies: we are debating this valuable report from the International Relations and Defence Committee a mere 13 months after it was published and nearly a year after the Government’s response to its conclusions and recommendations. I join those who say that if we cannot remedy that sort of delay, we are not performing very effectively. However, I would not give any criticism whatever to the excellent introduction and presentation by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, at whose feet I sat for the years I was on the IRDC—not, I hasten to say, when this report was being written—and the noble Lord, Lord Howell of Guildford, who started that committee off on its voyage of discovery.

What a year it has been. It has upended some of the foundations of both the report and the Government’s response, principally with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and it is now concluding with President Xi’s likely coronation for a further five years in power—or perhaps longer. It is no wonder that the Government are said to be going to revisit their pre-predecessor’s security review; it would certainly be welcome to have the Minister’s indication on the timing of that when he replies to the debate.

The first requirement for such a review would be the rather overhyped “tilt” in our security and defence policy towards the Indo-Pacific region—overhyped because not much has actually happened since it was proclaimed, other than the very welcome AUKUS agreement over the provision of nuclear propulsion submarine technology. In any case, the trouble about a tilt towards something is that it is necessarily a tilt away from something else, and this is hardly the time—following the invasion of Ukraine and Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling—to be tilting away from European security, which surely remains at the heart of this country’s overall security and to which NATO has now committed itself with renewed vigour and determination. How do the Government plan to adjust that balance or, I suggest, potential imbalance? Do the Government recognise that perhaps the best contribution Britain could make to the security of Taiwan is to ensure that Putin’s Ukraine gamble fails?

It was somewhat surprising to see nothing in the report, or in the response to it, about China’s role as a nuclear weapons state, one which without much shadow of a doubt is substantially increasing its nuclear capabilities and arsenal. The need to draw China into a serious discussion of strategic stability between the P5 recognised nuclear weapons states is surely more necessary than ever, however daunting the obstacles may now look in the short term. What is the Government’s view and policy on that critical issue?

I found some contradictions, in both the report and the Government’s response to it, between the section on China’s role in the multilateral system, on which the report and the Government’s response were critical and rather negative, and what was said about the handling of some of the vital global multilateral challenges such as climate change and trade rules—and one should probably add health pandemics to that list. The report states bluntly:

“The challenge of climate change cannot be addressed without engagement with China.”


That surely cannot be gainsaid, in which case we will have to accept that China will need to play a major role in the search for solutions to these challenges. There I slightly differ from my noble and gallant friend when he said that we must lay down the rules; good luck to him, going off to the Chinese, telling them that we need their full commitment to climate change and saying, “By the way, here are the rules”. That sort of approach may be manageable with Russia, which can be treated as a pariah state, but it cannot be successfully used with China.

The problem of China’s human rights record, which several noble Lords have referred to, clearly cannot, should not and must not be ducked—whether one is talking about Xinjiang or Hong Kong. However, we need a rapier rather than a battle-axe when responding to the abuses taking place. Do the Government agree with that analysis? By the way, how will we handle China’s bid to join the CPTPP if, as is to be hoped, we succeed in joining that group before China does and thus acquire a say in China’s accession? How will we use that say?

In conclusion, I add one caveat to the committee’s broadly very welcome call for a clear British strategy towards China. It must surely be evident that Britain cannot, on its own, hope to fashion or apply such a strategy. We must work one out in concert with our main allies and partners. We also need to recognise that we will not get a lot of support for such a strategy from the wide range of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, which have been referred to by many participants in this debate, if we frame it simply as a “with us or against us” choice and, even more so, if we continue to shrink our overseas aid contribution to helping these countries face their own main challenges. We need to reach out to like-minded countries to fashion this strategy and not simply wrap a towel around our head and produce it ourselves. I noticed that the advice that the Foreign Minister of the European Union gave to the Heads of Government who are meeting today on toughening up the EU’s policy towards China bore a singular resemblance to the views expressed by many noble Lords around this Room this afternoon —so I think we know where to start.