Higher Education and Research Bill

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Monday 9th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick (CB)]

My Lords, when the noble Viscount winds up will he address a question I will put to him in supporting my noble friend Lord Kerslake’s Amendment 65 and Amendment 71 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Garden, which are about autonomy? The Government say very firmly, which I do not dispute, that they support the idea of institutional autonomy, but will the noble Viscount address how that squares with the consultation the Home Secretary is currently undertaking, which seems to me, on the face of it, to be designed possibly to interfere with the right of universities to decide what courses they will offer and what subjects they will teach? It would be a very serious intervention if the Government were, in granting visas to overseas students, to take account of restrictive views of their own about which courses universities ought to be teaching. Will he address that? It is germane to Amendments 65 and 71.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, so far as the concepts which are in issue in these amendments are concerned, I am entirely in favour of the autonomy of our higher education institutions, but autonomy does not mean they can do what they like. There is a severe restriction on that autonomy in the provisions for academic freedom, because they prevent universities trenching on the freedom of their academic staff in the way described.

This question of academic freedom is grounded on my heart. As a new Lord Chancellor I had been given the rather unpleasant responsibility of taking the universities section of the 1988 Bill through this House. There were about as many chancellors of universities then in the House as there are now. It was rather a difficult task. One of the things I was determined to have was protection for academic freedom in view of the provisions relating to university tenure. I therefore promoted in government an amendment to deal with academic freedom. When the Bill came to Committee, at a very early stage Lord Jenkins decided he had a good definition of academic freedom, which he put to the vote. From my point of view, it had the great effect of not requiring further consultation in the Government.

Academic freedom became a statutory provision then and remains, but it is an innovation on the complete idea of autonomy. One of the other things we have to remember relating to autonomy is a matter raised in the debate this afternoon on the governance of universities and higher education establishments. The form of the governance can be extremely important.

I was involved long ago in litigation about the governance of Scottish universities where they have a rector. For the first time in the history of Scottish universities, a certain student was nominated to be a rector of Edinburgh University—it does not take a lot of guessing to know who that was. He graduated to be the rector of Edinburgh University notwithstanding the judicial proceedings and later became the Prime Minister, so he had excellent preparation for that office. It has therefore to be borne in mind that autonomy does not necessarily mean that you can do exactly what you like, but it means that there is considerable freedom in how you do what you are there to do.

One issue raised by the first amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, was that of profit. As he said, every institution that wants to be ongoing has to ensure that its income is at least somewhat greater than its expenditure—as Mr Micawber pointed out to us long ago. Every institution that is a university or a higher education establishment has to have that. Why should it make all the difference that the people who set that establishment up want a return on the capital that they put into it? I agree with the noble Baroness who said that exploitation is quite wrong—nobody, I think, could dispute that—but it does not necessarily follow that because you run an establishment for profit you will exploit those who come to it. In a free-market situation, which is what we had until fees were controlled by the Government, universities were free to charge what they thought appropriate. I imagine that if a university is fee-paying, as is one of the institutions of which the noble Baroness, Lady Cohen, is chancellor, it must have some effect on the fees that are charged to the students.

I think that the law is that the purpose of education is a charitable one, but it does not follow that every institution set up as educational is itself a charity, because to be a charity you have to be established for charitable purposes only. One purpose that is not charitable is distributing profits to those who set the establishment up, so that university and any others that might follow in the same pattern would not be charities. I do not think that that matters too much; what matters is whether you can guarantee the quality of the teaching and research—if it does research—that such an establishment can bring forward. I do not feel that the provision that was made by a previous Government is necessarily incorrect. We have had a good example of what such an establishment can achieve. I think I am right in saying—I am depending very much on my recollection—that at least some of the examining boards are now set up by organisations that are for profit.

Protection from government of the autonomy of an institution strikes me as fundamental. I do not think that the Bill infringes on that directly, but I can see the advantage of making sure by way of negative provisions that it does not happen in the future, because we never know who may come along after the present Government. Proper protection for autonomy strikes me as highly appropriate, although there may be some dispute with my noble friend the Minister about the extent to which it is necessary. Such principles seem fundamental and I hope that they will be followed in consideration of these amendments and many later amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to this important group of amendments. Our universities are a key part of national life and contribute significantly to the public good and economic prosperity. I fully understand that protecting the sector’s reputation is at the heart of many of the amendments. I assure the House that the Government’s reforms are designed to ensure exactly that and that, like now, only high-quality providers will be able to enter the market, award their own degrees and obtain university title. Once again, I assure noble Lords that the Government are determined to protect institutional autonomy in the Bill every bit as much as the current legislative framework has protected it for the past quarter of a century or so, and I will say a little more about that later.

First, I will address the new clause in Amendment 2. The Government agree that our universities should be expected to have high standards and to do more than simply teach courses. They benefit the communities they are based in, and there is a strong correlation between opening universities and significantly increased economic growth. However, we believe that what matters is this contribution, not the form of the institution. Universities are private, autonomous bodies, not public bodies as such, although of course they contribute greatly to the public good. They therefore come in a variety of forms, as has been discussed, and we value this diversity immensely, as I mentioned in the first debate. We would not wish to exclude excellent institutions such as the University of Law from having full university status simply because it is for-profit. My noble and learned friend Lord Mackay asked why profit is so vilified; he makes a fair point.

Our reforms do not seek to overhaul the current framework for obtaining degree-awarding powers or university title in any major way. Currently any provider, regardless of its corporate form or background, can obtain degree-awarding powers if it passes rigorous scrutiny. Only providers with degree-awarding powers can apply for university title. Again, they need to meet specific criteria but these are not tied to corporate form. The proposed new clause would in effect introduce a two-tier system of universities or degree-awarding providers, when what we are trying to achieve is a more level playing field. It would be a step back in time, rather than further developing a well-functioning system.

To ensure that only high-quality providers can obtain degree-awarding powers, we are planning to keep a track record requirement of three years for all those that seek full degree-awarding powers. However, in parallel, we are also planning to introduce, as has been mentioned, a new route of obtaining degree-awarding powers on a probationary basis. This would mean that high-quality providers that have the potential to achieve full degree-awarding powers can be permitted to award degrees in their own name from the start—crucially, subject to close supervision. As the noble Baronesses, Lady Cohen and Lady Brinton, mentioned, under the current regime new and innovative providers have to wait until they have developed a track record lasting several years before operating as degree-awarding bodies in their own right, no matter how good their offer is or how much academic expertise they have. This stifles innovation, and the new clause would further entrench this system of new providers usually having to rely on incumbents.

However, I assure noble Lords that quality is still paramount. As we set out in one of the published factsheets to accompany the Bill on market entry and quality assurance, in order to be able to access time-limited probationary degree-awarding powers, providers will also need to pass a new and specific test for probationary degree-awarding powers. I realise from the tone of their remarks that this may not necessarily please the noble Baronesses, Lady Cohen and Lady Brinton, but we believe that this is important as a quality check. We absolutely do not intend a complete overhaul of the system of degree-awarding powers. We fully intend that the current criteria will continue to exist in a broadly similar form.

Returning to institutional autonomy, noble Lords will know that, while this concept has been central to our higher education system for many years, the Further and Higher Education Act 1992, which establishes the current legislative framework, does not explicitly mention institutional autonomy. The Bill goes considerably further by placing in legislation explicit new protections for the freedom of English higher education providers. Those protections apply to all the ways in which the Secretary of State may influence the Office for Students: guidance, conditions of grant, and directions. In each case, the Bill places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to,

“have regard to the need to protect academic freedom … of English higher education providers”.

We strengthened this further on Report in the other place.

I assure noble Lords that there is no disagreement, as I see it, over the importance that we place on institutional autonomy and academic freedom. We have sought to protect these fundamental principles in the Bill. I agree that they are the cornerstone, as many noble Lords have said this afternoon, of our higher education system’s success. We have heard considered and well-informed debate—more so on this group of amendments—and I am grateful for the views that have been put forward, but we believe that the Bill enshrines and protects academic freedom. Having said that, I recognise the strength of feeling that has been expressed about institutional autonomy. I continue to listen and reflect on views from noble Lords and will reflect further on this issue. I hope that gives some reassurance regarding the concerns raised on this issue. These provisions represent the most comprehensive suite of explicit statutory protections for institutional autonomy ever contained in a single Bill.

Amendment 55, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, places a duty on the OfS to have regard to,

“the need to act in a manner compatible with the principle of institutional autonomy”,

when it discharges its statutory functions. I understand and sympathise with the motivation of the amendment, but in the light of the new and additional protections I have just described, the Government do not feel that a statutory duty on the OfS is appropriate. I reassure noble Lords that the existing provisions in the Bill already require that academic freedom and institutional autonomy be taken into account by both the OfS and the Secretary of State. As such, the amendments are unnecessary.

The noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, asked whether it is right that the Office for Students can intervene “if it appears” that registration conditions have been breached. Intervention based on “if it appears” is standard legislative drafting and is underpinned by the usual public law considerations so that the OfS cannot act irrationally. As a public body, the OfS must at all times act reasonably and proportionately in accordance with public law when exercising its powers.

Similarly, I find myself in agreement with the main intention of the amendments relating to the Secretary of State’s powers to set conditions of grant and give directions to the OfS. But I assure noble Lords that the Bill as drafted does not leave any room for a future Secretary of State to be lackadaisical about this duty. The amendments, while well intentioned, do not add much by way of strength to the duty as it stands. As I have outlined, the Bill includes new and additional protections for institutional autonomy. I sympathise with the motivation for these amendments but I am not sure that adding a duty to have regard to institutional autonomy adds much in practice to the protections already in the Bill. I fear that the amendments may require future Secretaries of State to become rather more interventionist than they are now, guiding or directing the OfS to act in particular ways in particular cases to protect institutional autonomy.

Amendments 425 and 431 relate to the Secretary of State’s powers to set conditions of grant and give directions to the OfS. These amendments, while well intentioned, do not add much by way of strength to the duty as it stands and may risk inadvertently weakening other duties of the Secretary of State in the Bill which do not have this amended formulation.

I am entirely sympathetic to the intention behind Amendment 66, which seeks to build on existing protections within the Bill to ensure that when the Secretary of State gives guidance to the OfS, it is prevented from naming individual higher education providers. However, the restrictions on the Secretary of State already in the Bill will have the effect of preventing individual institutions being named in the Secretary of State’s guidance to OfS. Clause 2(6) requires that guidance,

“which relates to English higher education providers must apply to such providers generally or to a description of such providers”.

It is hard to conceive of a scenario where the Secretary of State could comply with these restrictions and yet name individual institutions. On that basis, I assure noble Lords that this amendment is not necessary to ensure the protections it seeks, and that we may rely on these being implicit in current drafting.

I am grateful for the thorough and thoughtful nature of Amendments 65, 71 and 165. The desire and determination of noble Lords to ensure that the Bill protects institutional autonomy is both evident and impressive—again, as we have discussed extensively today. However, I do not believe that these definitions of institutional autonomy and academic freedoms add anything substantive to the protections already enshrined within the Bill. Furthermore, as detailed in my letter to noble Lords following Second Reading, the Bill holds the Haldane principle at its core. The Government are fully committed to the fundamental tenet that funding decisions should be taken by experts in their relevant areas. The amendment risks compelling the Secretary of State to issue guidance to the OfS on issues beyond its remit, which I believe is unintended.

Amendment 165, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, seeks to include in the definition of institutional autonomy the right of providers,

“to constitute and govern themselves”,

as they consider appropriate. It is of course quite correct that providers have this right. However the powers of the OfS, or indeed any other body empowered by the Bill, to influence how providers constitute and govern themselves are already very limited. The public interest governance condition in Clause 14, for example, merely seeks to ensure that the governing documents of providers subject to this condition have best governance practice embedded within them. As now, the public interest principles are not intended to prescribe in any detail how providers are to be governed. We expect that they will continue to operate in tandem with sector-owned codes, such as that of the Committee of University Chairs.

Finally, Amendment 65, as put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Kerslake, would add specific protection for academic staff to speak and challenge freely. Again, there is no disagreement from the Government about the importance of this protection. However, institutions are autonomous and the Government cannot interfere in any decisions regarding academic staff, therefore only the institution itself can protect the freedom of its academics. The Bill already takes steps to ensure that this will continue to be the case by allowing the OfS to place a public interest governance condition on all registered providers, which will ensure that their internal governance must include the principle of freedom for academic staff. We therefore believe that the amendment is not needed.

The amendments that I have just spoken about—and there are quite a few—have understandable and laudable motivations, which the Government share. But on the whole they do not substantively add to the protections for institutional autonomy already contained in the Bill. In some cases, they may interfere with the OfS and UKRI’s distinct areas of responsibility, or create a risk of requiring more intervention from the Secretary of State rather than less. None the less, I will consider carefully the points that have been raised, as the Government agree that it is fundamentally important to ensure that the Bill protects institutional autonomy. The suggestions from noble Lords have been very helpful in understanding some of the concerns about this aspect of the Bill.

Amendment 73 would require providers to operate—

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I think that the Minister is drawing to a close. He has not yet addressed the question I put to him about the compatibility with institutional autonomy of the consultation that is taking place about student visas for certain subjects. Will he please address that matter, because there is a genuine potential contradiction here? I am not suggesting a contradiction in his intention but it does not look to me as if the findings of that consultation, if they were turned into an attempt by the Government to tell universities which courses they could offer to overseas students, would be compatible with institutional autonomy. Can he please now respond to that?