Diplomacy

Lord Hannay of Chiswick Excerpts

Thursday 11th November 2010 Lords Chamber

Moved By

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

To call attention to the case for Britain to have a properly resourced and active diplomacy; and to move for papers.

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, the timing of this debate on the case for Britain to have an active and well resourced diplomacy is fortunate, not just fortuitous. If we had been holding this debate in advance of the comprehensive spending review, it could easily have been dismissed as a piece of special pleading on behalf of one of many government departments about to face deep cuts—all the more so since I have to declare an interest as a former member of the Diplomatic Service. But now that the comprehensive spending review is out on the table, the opportunity is there to focus not on the overall quantum but on how best to put it to good and effective use in the national interest—how to ensure that doing more with less is not just one of those meaningless and infuriating mantras but is a reality.

It was well over a century ago that Lord Salisbury gave his often repeated prescription for British foreign policy—that it should be like floating down a river, fending off the bank from time to time. In fact, this classical description of a passive, purely reactive foreign policy was out of date even when it was coined. As the country found at the time of the Boer War, it could well lead to splendid, or rather not so splendid, isolation; and that discovery led to a hasty scramble to acquire allies in the failed attempt to stabilise Europe, which culminated in two world wars. Out of date then, any such prescription is a great deal more out of date now.

The hard fact is that a country that is a global superpower, as Britain was then, needs an active diplomacy less than a middle-ranking power with worldwide interests, such as we are now. Everyone beats a path to the door of a superpower, which can take its time in responding because it is so indispensable. But a middle-ranking power has to work actively to further and protect its interests if they are not to go by default, and it needs to have strong alliances and networks in good working order for when they are needed. That is a lesson which was very clearly drawn in the recent national security strategy and in the defence and security review.

Such networks and allies do not simply drop effortlessly into our lap; nor can their policies be shaped to fit our as well as others’ interests without ceaseless diplomatic work. Add to this the fact that multilateral diplomacy, which now makes up so much of the foreign policy mix, is a labour-intensive industry necessitating work not just where a particular organisation is headquartered but in the capitals of each of the members of that organisation, and you have a lot on your hands. It was considerations such as those which led the Callaghan Government, some 30 years ago in the midst of an earlier period of cuts and austerity, to reject the view of the Berrill report that Britain could no longer afford what was charmingly described as the luxury of a first-class diplomatic service. Those considerations are even more compelling today than they were then.

If we are successfully to do more with less then we will have to increase the coherence of the foreign policy instruments at our disposal and the way they are deployed. We will need to marry our hard power—now considerably diminished—to our soft power and ensure, as we have not always done in the recent past, that together they are up to the demands we are putting on them. We will need to break down the stovepipes in which policy is formulated at home and executed abroad—security, diplomacy, development, energy, climate change and so on. We must also ensure that the practitioners—the diplomats, the military and the development aid experts—understand each other’s work much better and gain experience of each other’s work and how to work together and not in competition with each other.

We will need, too, to make the best possible use of the new European External Action Service, which is gradually taking shape in Brussels and around the world. To treat it as, at best, a tiresome and duplicative nonsense and, at worst, a competitor would be to miss a golden opportunity. We surely need to be thinking imaginatively about what the European External Action Service can do collectively for us and for the rest of the EU and what we should therefore no longer be trying to do individually ourselves. We need to second good people to the EEAS and support its efforts to reduce turf fighting between the European institutions, to achieve greater policy coherence among the EU’s external policies, to increase its own professionalism and to extend its outreach so that less time and effort are spent on cobbling together tortuous internal European compromises, and more time is spent on persuading third countries of the value of the EU’s policies and on public diplomacy.

Let me turn to the issue of resources, without which all that I have said previously in general terms could just remain empty words. Here are a few suggestions. First, I hope that we will avoid falling into the false dichotomy of thinking that there is a choice to be made between bilateral and multilateral diplomacy. One does occasionally hear echoes of that sort of approach in ministerial statements and briefing. But this is surely not an either/or matter but, rather, one of both/and. The two forms of diplomacy are now inextricably linked and need to be mutually supporting if we are to further our interests successfully.

Secondly, on the exchange rate risk to British diplomacy’s overseas expenditure—that is, most of it—I do not wish to delve too deeply into the background to the decision a few years ago to remove the existing policy of compensating losses as a result of exchange rate fluctuations. It reflects credit on neither the Treasury, which imposed it, nor the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, which accepted it. The result when sterling dropped sharply in 2008 was a double whammy for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of external and internal cuts. Can the Minister tell the House that this will not happen again?

Thirdly, I hope the temptation to save by closing more diplomatic posts will be resisted. Multiple accreditation—having a mission in another country that serves the country in which you have closed down on a very random basis, visiting once or twice a year—is not a viable alternative to a presence, however small, on the spot. I still remember the helplessness I felt as ambassador at the UN when we had no post in Kigali when the Rwandan genocide broke, no post in Kabul in the years after the Soviet withdrawal and no post in Mogadishu through the UN’s troubled experience there. If very small posts have to operate somewhat differently from larger ones, and we have to accept that we can get fewer services from them, I would say “So be it”. We will just have to get used to that, but let us avoid ending up with a diplomatic cloak full of holes. I hope the Minister can say something on that aspect too.

Fourthly, my view is that the decision to shift the funding of the BBC World Service from the Foreign Office budget to that of the BBC should be a plus, at least in presentational terms. I have to admit that I never managed to persuade a single foreign interlocutor of the BBC World Service’s total editorial independence every time I had to admit that it was in fact being financed from the Foreign Office budget. That should be easier to achieve now. But how are we to be sure, under the new arrangements, that the World Service is not being bled to meet the BBC’s domestic demands? How, too, is the World Service’s coverage and editorial autonomy to be protected from interference by the BBC’s management, as it was from interference by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office? I wonder whether the Minister could give us a bit more detail on this; not very much has been said so far about this really important aspect of our foreign policy and our soft power. Could he also say something about that other crucial part of Britain’s projection of soft power, the British Council?

Of course, the resources that really matter in diplomacy are the Diplomatic Service’s human resources. I have the impression that in recent years those resources and their morale have been under considerable stress. Recent losses through early retirement, while perhaps unavoidable, have resulted in the departure of many top-class diplomats whom Britain could hardly afford to do without. I am, however, struck when travelling abroad by how well the morale and quality of our diplomats is holding up. But it is surely time that a bit more effort was put into reducing the stresses on them. We often speak, quite rightly, in this House about our admiration for Britain’s Armed Forces; not so often about our admiration for our diplomats, who also run very considerable risks. We should not forget what the Duke of Wellington said when asked, towards the end of his life, what he would have done differently. He replied, “I should have given more praise”.

I hope I have managed, in opening this debate, to set out a compelling case for Britain having an active and well resourced diplomacy. If we are successfully to meet the challenges of the increasingly multi-polar world in which we now live, that is what we will need. If we are to work effectively for an increasingly rules-based world, which I believe it is in our interests to achieve, that, too, is what we will need.

I conclude with a perhaps slightly eccentric plea for less frequent use of the phrase, “Britain punches above its weight”. I admit that I may have been partly responsible for its entry into our diplomatic lexicon but it tends to play to a strain of post-imperial nostalgia which I believe we must now leave behind us. Like courage, it is surely one of those characteristics which are better noted by others and not bestowed on ourselves. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hannay of Chiswick]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this excellent debate. I have served long enough in your Lordships' House to know that it is not my place at this moment to mention everyone who spoke. If I did, I would be way outside the limits. I have also learnt that it is not wise to refer selectively, so I will simply congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Monks, on his maiden speech and say what pleasure it gave me personally to know that the UK permanent representation in Brussels is still the best team in town, as I hope it was when I left it 20 years ago.

One thing that startled me most about this debate was the absence of any reference to that phantom beloved by newspapers—the special relationship. Not one single Member who debated mentioned it. I do not say that as someone who believes that our relationship with the United States should be downplayed—quite the contrary—but I have fought all my life against what I call the false choice between Europe and the United States. Having a debate today in which we were able to look at the whole world in the round and not obsess and agonise about the special relationship shows a great deal of wisdom and a healthy approach.

On a final point, a lot of noble Lords spoke about realism. I am sure that we must have it, but we must not confuse it with that dreadful concept, declinism. There is no reason for us to think that we cannot look after our interests in the world we now live in, if we are ingenious about it and apply the resources we have in an effective way. I hope that when we talk about realism we will mean seizing new opportunities, not retreating into ourselves. I beg leave to withdraw the Motion in my name on the Order Paper.

Motion withdrawn.