Employment Rights Bill

Lord Hacking Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 19th May 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

Hear, hear! It was a very good speech.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

There we go. We have had the adjudication. It was a very good speech. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Jones of Whitchurch. She demonstrated the patience of a saint in earlier, more contentious groups, if I can put it like that. If there needs to be further evidence of her patience, I was very grateful for the significant time that she and her Bill team and other experts gave me to discuss this issue and a later issue in the Bill.

Numerical accidents aside, I have to commend the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on her impeccable opening to the debate. I think we can all agree that it was a fabulous tour de force around the issues.

In contrast to the Bill as a whole or previous groups, there is some serious room for non-partisan and cross-partisan consensus in this area. I really do believe that, for reasons that ought to be self-evident from what we have heard from Members of the Committee already.

We have heard from noble Lords—actually, it may be a total accident but I think it has been noble Baronesses so far—and we know that there is a place for a certain type of non-disclosure agreement to protect commercial confidences and client lists, et cetera. We are trying to be more balanced and more forensic than that in this group, and we know why. We want to protect those things, to have a decent employment relationship and to have commerce and so on, but not to have the abuses. I suggest that the abuses have to go broader than harassment; that is why Amendment 281 in my name is drafted in terms of illegal activity more broadly. I will say more on that in a moment.

I support the thrust, the intention and the aspiration of all the amendments in the group. At this stage I consider them all probing amendments. Realistically, I suspect that what the Committee, or everyone who has spoken so far, wants is a government amendment, informed by these discussions, that we can all get behind. That is the way to do it, obviously.

I will speak in favour of Amendment 281, or of the drafting approach that I have taken, having listened to other Members of the Committee and tried to take on board their Second Reading speeches and their considerable work, over many years in some cases. I commend Amendment 281 because it aspires to some simplicity, some versatility, some breadth and the avoidance of unintended consequences.

For example, it is broader than harassment. The approach I have taken is based on my understanding of what the common-law position was anyway. Like everyone else in the Committee and beyond, I watched the scandals around Harvey Weinstein and #MeToo, et cetera. When they began to erupt—and, goodness me, do they not keep on coming?—my analysis, my view, was that these contractual agreements were all voidable in the public interest in any event. As a matter of common-law principle, they should all have been voidable in a court and therefore unenforceable in any event. The problem with relying on just my understanding of the common law is that it does not send a signal to the wicked employers—not all of them, but the ones who are wicked—nor give confidence to victims, whistleblowers and so on.

This is one of the areas where there is some value in putting some common-law principle clearly, succinctly and non-exhaustively on the face of a statute, to give confidence and clarity so that people know that abusive non-disclosure agreements—not the ones that we think are valuable, but abusive ones—which are being used to silence and cover up revelations of illegal activity, broadly, will not be enforceable in court, whether or not you have shelled out some money in the first place. That was what I attempted to do in the drafting approach that I chose with Amendment 281.

Members of the Committee who have come armed with the actual Marshalled List, which I know is a novel thing to do, will find Amendment 281 on page 114. The approach I have taken is to say that non-disclosure agreements are voidable. They are not automatically so, but they are voidable—that is, in those circumstances, unenforceable—if they prevent disclosure of conduct that may be contrary to law.

When a court is considering whether to void such an agreement—to make it unenforceable—there are certain factors that ought to be taken into account. The severity of the allegation of proven or admitted conduct, including the veracity of those allegations, would come up in an attempt by the former employer or current employer to enforce this agreement. The second factor is whether all parties to the contract were in receipt of independent legal advice. This means that an employer trying to construct one of these agreements and to get an employee to agree to it will have to realise that if that independent legal advice is not evidenced and not provided, later, the whole thing will be an expensive waste of time, because it is likely to be voided in the public interest by a court or tribunal. Therefore, they had better do what employers often do in standard consent agreements, which is pay for independent advice and have that witnessed.