Recall of MPs Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack

Wednesday 14th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack (Con)]

I entirely agree with the noble Baroness, with whom I had the great pleasure of serving when I was acting as deputy shadow leader in the other place. We worked together on the Privileges Committee and I came to have a very high regard for her total integrity and judgment. I still have that high regard. What she said this evening was entirely right.

I think that the other place is in danger of talking itself down. That is something that we really need to focus on. I remember reading many years ago a comment by one of the great 18th century admirals—I think from memory it was Admiral Rodney—who, as many others did, served in the House of Commons. He made a remark to the effect that there was no greater honour that any man could have—it was just men in those days—than to be in the House of Commons, representing a constituency. That was long before the days of anything approaching modern democracy. When I was elected in June 1970 I certainly felt that. I am sure that those others of your Lordships’ House who have had the privilege of serving in the other place would have had similar feelings.

In any group of 600 or 650 people you are bound from time to time to have some who transgress. However, it always has been and it is—and please God it always will be—the exception. For the past few years, since the expenses scandal and the witch-hunt that followed—and it was a witch-hunt—there has been a real reluctance on the part of Members of the other place to think highly, not of themselves, but of the institution of which they have the honour to be Members. We are, in fact, playing to that tune in putting this Bill through Parliament. I accept that it is going to go through. I regret that infinitely, because I think it does no service to Parliament in general or to the House of Commons in particular. That is a deep sadness to me and, I know, to many others.

However, if the Bill is to go through, this amendment is essential. Sentences of a few days can be given for offences which are in no sense improprieties in the generally accepted sense of the word. Every institution must have the power to discipline its members. If somebody is consistently failing to obey the Speaker or to abide by the rules of the House, of course they will suffer. We know some who have done so. I can think of the late Lord Bannside as Ian Paisley; Andrew Faulds, one of my dearest friends; Tam Dalyell, who was mentioned earlier; and others, who have, for perfectly honourable reasons, even though I may have disagreed with them, flouted the rules, been named and excluded for a period. But the House of Commons would have been a much poorer place without any of those Members. The thought that anyone like that, for a parliamentary transgression, could be in danger of recall is just too awful to contemplate.

This places a great weight on the shoulders of those who serve on that committee. I am bound to say that I regret that there are lay members on the committee, because I think it should be, as it always was, a committee of Parliament. I agree entirely with the noble Baroness when she said that, as Leader of the House, she decided not to chair the committee and that the chair should be a respected Back-Bencher. I think that that was a very wise and modest decision. It was the right decision. You should be judged by a group of your peers, unless you are transgressing the law of the land, and then, of course, other procedures follow. We all recognise that. However, I would beg my noble friends on the Front Bench—and particularly the Front Bench opposite, because this originated with an Opposition-led amendment—to think again about this. For 20 days, the offence has to be reasonably serious.

The other point alluded to by the noble Baroness, which was a very good and powerful one, was that there could be a danger of politicising these things, in a party sense, particularly in the sort of frenetic pre-election atmosphere that we have at the moment. One of the distinguishing features of the other place, and indeed of this place, is that Members in committee—particularly Select Committees, one of which I had the honour of chairing for five years—look at issues on their merits and seek to have recommendations that address the issues without polarising or dividing the committee. I would deplore anything that led to the former tendency in the Standards or Privileges Committees.

The least that we can do to help mend this very broken vehicle that is being pulled before us is to accept this amendment. I hope we can accept it tonight, without any Division or controversy at all. If not, I hope it can be accepted on Report. It goes just a little way to making a Bill that has come about, frankly, because certain people do not have enough confidence in that great institution at the other end of the Corridor and because party leaders have been rather craven—I use the word deliberately—a little better than it is at the moment. We want to put this right. This amendment will achieve precisely that.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I thought that my noble friend Lady Taylor put it very well in terms of the huge significance of a 10-day suspension, with it basically being the end of a parliamentary career. It is rather like the point about the death penalty made by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth. This is not a marginal decision between whether you give someone nine days or 10 days; it is not even the difference, to use a footballing analogy, between a yellow card and a red card. It is the difference between a yellow card and a ban for life.

We touched on this in earlier exchanges, but it seems to me that being suspended for 20 days clearly indicates a very serious offence. That is shown by the House of Commons Library research paper, according to which there have been just two cases in the last 25 years when that would have happened. As we have all remarked already, that would be even less likely to happen if it was known that it would lead to expulsion from the House because it would trigger a petition—as it would have, had this provision been in existence then. There has to be some doubt whether even the two that passed the test, if you like, would still pass the test, because Members would be very reluctant to impose a 20-day suspension.

Perhaps we are all in danger of repeating ourselves, but surely the position as it stands at the moment is that the House itself can expel someone and that, in effect, the provisions of this Bill—as it stands, a 10-day suspension; as it originally stood, a 20-day suspension—amount to the equivalent of expelling someone from the House. My view is that if that is what the House wants to do, the House has the power to do it now and we do not need a Bill to enable it to do that. To that extent, as with so many of the other provisions of this Bill, the organic mechanism by which Parliament operates tends to deal with these matters without introducing legislation that is not needed. That is the substantial point I want to make, but I want to ask a question to which I should know the answer, and I doubt whether the Minister will know the answer immediately.

I think there may be an odd juxtaposition here. Unless I am completely wrong, the Speaker of the House of Commons can suspend people. I cannot think of an occasion when someone has been expelled for as long as 10 days, but I think that, as my noble friend Lord Maxton says, if someone is suspended until they apologise, heaven knows how long that could be.

Am I then right in thinking—I would love to be told that I am wrong—that we now have a situation where 10 days, as imposed by the Standards and Privileges Committee, results in, “Thank you, goodnight, you are out”, whereas 10 or 11 or 12 or 13 days from the Speaker is, “Come back, all is forgiven and we are off to the tearoom”. I need an answer to that question because I do not know the answer to it myself. If it is the case, that needs sorting out.

City of Wakefield (Mayoral Referendum) Order 2012

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack

Tuesday 17th January 2012 Grand Committee

[Lord Grocott]

As my noble friend has argued for a referendum, I simply say to him: let the people in these other cities decide whether they want to continue with their mayoral system. They have had long enough to test it out, and he may be right that it is only in Stoke that they would say, “No, thank you very much”. If we are to have referendums in places that do not have mayors—I would rather we did not have any at all—then let us have them in places where they do.

I have a couple of questions about the cost. The only statistic that I have is from House of Commons Hansard of 20 December, where the Government said that,

“the cost of referendums for elected mayors will be £2.5 million”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/12/11; 1187W.],

That is an average of about a quarter of a million pounds per referendum. Frankly, I am not very interested in who pays for it; all I know is that we will. I suppose it would be very unfair to put it all on the local authority, but the blunt truth is that those of us who do not live in any of these cities—I am one of them—will be paying for them to have a referendum, which I certainly do not want. We will find soon enough whether the public want that. Can the Minister confirm whether those figures are accurate?

I also note that paragraph 10 of the Explanatory Memorandum says:

“A Regulatory Impact Assessment has not been prepared for these instruments as they have no impact on business, charities or voluntary bodies and the cost of conducting the referendums across the 11 cities is less than £5 million”.

I do not know how these impact assessments are worked out these days, but that may be the cost of the referendum. Of course, if the referendum results in a yes, then the cost of implementing this system in 11 cities will be massively in excess of £5 million. In effect, through these orders we are setting a train in motion that will cost an awful lot of money. I would like the Minister to tell us who will pay for the reorganisation costs in the event of there being a yes result of a referendum. I would also like to know the estimate that the Government are making before we go on this journey about the cost for each of the local authorities because most of them can ill afford any unnecessary expenditure at the moment.

I would also like to ask the Minister about the responsibility for implementing the new system. The order is loose enough, as it stands at the moment. Article 4, under the title,

“Action to be taken after referendum”,

states:

“If the result of the referendum held by virtue of this Order is to approve a change to a mayor and cabinet executive, the authority must implement that change”.

It goes on to say that if a local authority does not do that, the Secretary of State will. Following the question asked by my noble friend Lord Beecham earlier, if there is a decision to make the change, I would like to know the timescale within which the implementation of that change must take place whether it is done by the local authority or by the Secretary of State?

I very much regret that these orders have come forward. I know this was an idea dreamt up by some policy expert in some recess of the previous Labour Administration. I did my best to stop it happening then, but without success, and this is my second attempt. I do it with more confidence now as I know—I will check the figures because they are around somewhere—that there was no evidence of any great enthusiasm for this system when local areas had the chance of holding referendums under the legislation that the previous Government brought in. There were very low turnouts, by and large. Some were lower than normal for local government elections. I know of no great evidence that these places have been a riotous success. Mercifully, where I live in the West Midlands, we do not have a directly elected mayor but, like the rest of us, I spend lots of time in London, and I am massively unimpressed with the directly elected mayoral system. I do not find it a wonderfully impressive and exciting operation, and I do not know why we should proceed with this without the evidence to justify it. I am, to put it mildly, unhappy with these orders.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I came to listen, but I am provoked into saying a few words because, not for the first time in my brief period in this House, I find myself almost totally in agreement with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, who has deservedly acquired a reputation for speaking his mind and speaking with a lot of common sense.

I was one of the very few Conservative Members of Parliament who voted against the abolition of the GLC. An amendment of mine came quite close to defeating the Government of the day. My argument was complex, but it was basically that I thought that if we abolished the GLC we would finish up with something worse. I believe that that has proved to be an accurate prophecy. We have the mayor and of course I shall campaign for his re-election later this year as a dutiful member of his party.

I would not be detaining the Grand Committee now if these Benches were crammed, but as they are not, and as I believe that I am the only Conservative Back-Bencher in the Grand Committee Room, I want to say this to the Grand Committee, the Minister and everyone else. The noble Lord, Lord Grocott, does not claim to speak for the Labour Party, and I do not claim to speak for the Conservative Party, but just as many of his colleagues in his party have grave reservations about the whole concept of the elected mayor, so do many people in the party to which I have belonged for well over half a century.

Many people feel, as does the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that it is not quite the way we do things in this country. I believe in the collegiate atmosphere of local government which, at its best, delivers a real service. As the country has demonstrated many times—the greatest example of this was Joe Chamberlain in Birmingham—that does not prevent a great leader emerging. The balances and counterbalances that are built into the committee system make for better local government. They also provide a greater challenge for individual councillors, each one of whom has the opportunity to shine. Since we moved to elected mayors and cabinet systems, one has very often found in local authorities that only a handful of people really count. I do not believe that that can be right. I do not believe that it is in the British tradition to elect one supremo to be the mayor.

I am entirely happy about the concept of a referendum. I did not used to like referendums, and I still do not like them very much, but the fact is that they are now here. Because they are here and they are here in abundance today, it makes absolutely uncontestable the case that there must be a referendum if anybody is ever so silly as to propose the abolition of the House of Lords. However, that is another story, although I felt it right to get it in because I know that the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, at least is entirely at one with me on that, and maybe others are too.

If we must spend this money, let these towns and cities have their referendums. I shall be interested in the turnout. I personally do not believe that any referendum should count unless there is a threshold. Here I have great sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, who went along those lines not long ago. If it is the genuine wish of local people to have an elected mayor in these cities, having had the opportunity to consider the merits and the problems, so be it. However, I hope that they will reflect very carefully and that they will realise that if they go for an elected mayor—somebody with real executive authority—they will be turning their backs on a system of local government which has served this country well over the years. That is a system which I and many others have admired and one in which the Minister has played a considerable and constructive part, as has the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who has an enviable record in these matters. They provided leadership, but it was leadership of a team. The danger with a mayor is that he dictates to a team. People should bear those things in mind.

Procedure of the House (Proposal 9)

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack

Tuesday 8th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, a very small step is being proposed. Therefore, I am sure that it will be rejected.

I strongly support the proposal. I felt that I had to speak today on this issue out of memory of my very good friend Lord McIntosh of Haringey, who was one of the most able Ministers I have ever seen in operation. I watched him when I first arrived, because you are always a bit diffident about making sure that you obey all the rules of the new institution, et cetera. I noticed early on that he never obeyed any of the details of the regulations laid out in the Companion, which frighten new Members to death. I am not normally anxious about those kinds of things, but it certainly caused me some anxiety to get the title absolutely right, to remind myself that it is only lawyers who are learned and that the rest of us are not, and that it is only field marshals who are gallant and those captains or corporals are not.

It is such a small change. Lord McIntosh of Haringey—my late noble friend—completely disregarded the rules from the start. If it was Lord Campbell-Savours, he would say “Lord Campbell-Savours”; he would not say “the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours”. Nothing happened. No lightning struck and everyone knew perfectly well what was taking place. Ditto with the proposal that we have just passed—I was amazed that it got through; Members must have been going for tea, or something. I refer to the one that states that we should no longer refer to the House of Commons as the other place. Just to confuse everyone, we have to call it the other place. What other place? It is the House of Commons, so why not say “the House of Commons”. We have already made that revolutionary decision, so all I am suggesting to the House is that we carry on in that revolutionary spirit.

[Lord Cormack]

I am grateful to the noble and irreverent Lord, but we have not in fact agreed to any such thing. All we have said is that we may refer to it as the House of Commons. He, of course, will; some of us will not.

[Lord Grocott]

Well, I am relaxed about what people do individually. All I am saying is that I really think that it would be helpful if we gave a clear indication to new Members, other Members and the public, who find some of the appellations completely bewildering, that it is perfectly in order to do so. Nothing untoward happens; it does not affect the courtesy of debate in the slightest. We are still referring to people in the third person—which is absolutely right; it is essential that we preserve that—but we can simply say “Lord Campbell-Savours” instead of “the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours.”. That has no effect whatever on his nobility. We should cease to use the endless different gradations of rank and of title, which mean nothing to anyone outside. I infinitely prefer to refer to “the Bishop of Leicester” than to “the right reverend Prelate”. I like to know where he comes from; I like to know what his title is. I am a regular, practising attender of the Church of England, but I was only vaguely aware of what a prelate was until I came here. However, I know what a bishop is.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack

Tuesday 10th May 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, before we consider the Report of the Bill, I should like to put a couple of points to the Minister. We are about to embark on a major constitutional reform at Report, but since we considered the Bill in Committee, a matter of considerable constitutional significance has taken place. That is to say, there was a referendum on the alternative vote system which, I am delighted to say, was overwhelmingly defeated by the British public—including, I might say, a 72 per cent no vote in Telford and a Labour-control gain from the Conservatives in Telford.

It is normal, if significant national events occur after Committee or between any stages of the Bill, that there be some reaction and, perhaps, amendments to the Bill. I see the Minister looking a little startled and, I am sure, thinking, “What is the significance of the referendum to this Bill?”.

I put it to him that there is considerable significance. Many of us on this side of the House spent a lot of time, when we debated the Bill that set up the referendum, arguing strongly that this was not an issue that the British public wanted put to them in a referendum, and that it was certainly not at the top of their list of priorities. I suggest that the read-across ought to be that the Government, rather than concentrating on constitutional Bills for which there seems to be very little public support, should concentrate on bread and butter issues.

The Deputy Prime Minister has repeatedly said that the three Bills that we will consider—the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill, the constituency boundaries and referendum Bill, which we have already considered, and the Bill to reform the House of Lords—are part of the greatest reform package since 1832. Therefore, if one plank is shown to be fallible, one would assume that, even in the view of the Deputy Prime Minister, other parts would be as well. I do not know what the Minister's experience was when he canvassed, but after the canvassing that I did my judgment is that there is as little public support for, or interest in, the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill—and I predict the same for the Bill to abolish the House of Lords and replace it with a Senate—as the yes campaign garnered in the referendum.

I will put two questions to the Minister. First, what is the urgency to consider the Bill on Report, in particular as the Government have decided very wisely that a period of three months’ reflection is sensible between Committee and Report for the health Bill? That is a welcome development and—I think the Minister will agree—a clear precedent for doing a similar thing with this major constitutional Bill. Secondly, does the Minister, with his long political experience, have any grounds for thinking—perhaps I have missed something—that there is strong public demand for the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill and for the Bill to abolish the House of Lords in its present form? If he cannot answer those questions reasonably positively, it would make sense to have a period of reflection before we go on with constitutional Bills in which there is no public interest and for which there is no public support.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I will briefly but thoroughly endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. When one talks to people in the country, they say that they are desperately concerned about matters of health, education, taxation and all of those things. At the moment, they are deeply concerned about events in the Middle East and in other parts of the world. They find it quite incredible that the two Houses of Parliament, and this one in particular, should detain themselves by debating measures that are of no possible benefit to the public good, are diversionary and—to most people, whether it be in the club or the Dog and Duck—are of very little interest or relevance.

Along with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, I urge that we have a period of reflection. We should recognise that the constitution is the most important part of our democratic heritage. It should be the plaything of nobody, and certainly the consolation prize of nobody. Therefore, I hope that the Minister, who will shortly address the House, will recognise the strength of feeling not only in the House but in the country, and will discuss with government business managers how the House can more properly and sensibly address issues that are of real importance to the people of this country.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, I am tempted briefly to intervene, partly because of what the noble Lord, Lord Martin, said. I always remember that one of his predecessors—the late, great Jack Weatherill, who many of your Lordships will remember from his time in this House—once said to me, “If you have any doubt, do not go in and listen to the debate; just stay out and vote”. I must say that I have heard every word in this debate and uttered one or two myself, but the more I look at the Bill and listen to what noble Lords say, the more convinced I am that this is a wholly unnecessary piece of legislation.

If the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister wish to make a binding undertaking to go to the country in May 2015, there is nothing in our current legislation that would stop them. I can well understand why the two leaders of the new Government—a coalition which is a new experiment in many ways—wanted a period of five years. God bless them, they can have five years, and I genuinely wish them success; but I am not so naive as to suppose that if there is some extraordinary rift or argument during those five years, all those protestations will not fall to the side and there will be an election. The Bill provides for an escape clause, in Clause 2, which we shall debate next week. I have tabled a significant amendment to delete it and to replace it with something else. However, I must not rehearse those arguments now.

The more I listen to this debate, the more two things come to mind. The noble Lord, Lord Martin, talked about the fifth year. Everything he said was correct. I was there for the five-year Parliaments that existed between 1970 and last year. It is quite true that, in every case, the fifth year was the least glorious. However, it would be a little naive to suggest that there would not be a concentration on the forthcoming election in the fourth year. One has only to look across the Atlantic at the ridiculous two-year cycles for the House of Representatives and the four-year presidential cycle to see that potential presidential candidates are already being lined up by the Republicans although the general election is a long time ahead. Of course that would happen here as well. Therefore, we in this House have to accept—in my case reluctantly—that the House of Commons has sent us the Bill. We have the ultimate power to reject it completely. However, that would not be an advisable course for your Lordships' House to take, even though we would be entirely within our rights to take it. Instead, we should decide whether the five-year term enshrined in the Bill is the right way forward.

The Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister have put themselves into a difficult position, because if we insert “four” rather than “five” into the legislation, their resolution made last year to serve five years will be blown apart. Of course, the House of Commons would send back the Bill. Therefore, I suggest that perhaps the best way forward is to accept, with whatever degree of reluctance but with total understanding, the five-year wish of the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, but then to look to the future beyond that to consider what should be the normal life of a Parliament. On that question, the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, in an excellent speech, put his finger on a number of very important points. Beyond 2015, it would be prudent and sensible to listen to the advice not only of many theoretical experts and academics, but of others who have had practical experience of politics, and to say that if the Government insist on fixed-term Parliaments after 2015, the term should be four years.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I am not sure that I would be happy with the proposal that the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, made, although I can see merit in it. However, I was very interested in what he said about the Bill laying bare the criticism that has been made of the Prime Minister for using as a defence of the five-year Parliament and of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill the argument that somehow it will take away power from the Prime Minister. It will take away power from subsequent Prime Ministers. As David Laws's book and the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, spelt out clearly, it was the Prime Minister who decided, with the Deputy Prime Minister, that the next general election would be five years hence, and gave the precise date. He did it far longer in advance than previous Prime Ministers, but none the less he made the decision himself.

I will address a comment made by a number of noble Lords in various debates that deserves a response from people like me who do not like the Bill but feel that if we must have fixed terms, we would prefer four years to five. The criticism directed toward us is that the worries in the final year of a five-year Parliament are not significantly different from the difficulties that come at the conclusion of a four-year Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Cormack, touched on that. The argument is that people will be electioneering for a full year, knowing when the election will come, that the Government will gear their legislative programme to the timing of the election, and that the situation will not be significantly different regardless of whether that election comes at the end of four years or five.

However, it is my experience, and that of many other noble Lords who have spoken, that a five-year Parliament historically has been less successful than a four-year Parliament, and that the fifth year is always a tired and weary year, when the authority of the Government is running down and may or may not get renewed. It is often a very bad-tempered year, with constant demands from the Opposition for the Government to resign and put their record to the electorate. I will not quote names, but many Ministers in the fifth year of a Parliament want to retire but know that it would be disloyal to the Government to quit when an election is coming at a proximate but indeterminate date. A Parliament gets tired and needs refreshing. It is almost a relief when the election comes and a new Parliament can, with renewed vigour, come into operation with a new Government, although not necessarily of a new party. All sorts of things contribute to that. Members of Parliament announce their retirement during the course of a Parliament, but there would be far more such announcements towards the end of a five-year Parliament than towards the end of a four-year one. I had better be careful how I say this but people who know that they are retiring do not give it quite the full welly as they would if they thought they might be sitting in the following term.

There is also a practical problem. This is probably rather an esoteric point but I think that many in the Chamber will recognise it. With fixed five-year terms, when you have to commit yourself to fighting the next general election, which is normally around half-way through a Parliament, you are committing yourself to remaining in Parliament for at least eight years—no one dares to call a by-election these days, or at least they do so only very rarely—and that is a very big commitment to make, certainly when you get to about your mid-50s.

Therefore, in terms of the last year, there is a significant difference between a five-year and a four-year Parliament. Of course, this country has the advantage of a wonderfully flexible constitution, so we are able empirically to compare what has happened in the past with four and five-year Parliaments. I hope that I have at least attempted to answer the criticism that it really does not make much difference whether it is a four or a five-year term.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, may think that I am rather a sad figure but over the weekend I reflected on what he said in his response last week. He said something that threw me—I had not thought of it. I was arguing, as I am now, for a four-year Parliament—not of a fixed term but normally four years—and I challenged him on why on earth a Liberal Democrat within a Government would say that the electorate should be consulted less frequently, because I suggest to the Committee that that is what would happen. I suggested that since the Second World War there would have been 13 rather than 18 elections and the noble and learned Lord said, “Ah, you can’t really assume that that is the case because, under the provisions of this Bill, who knows how many elections there would have been. Some might have been instigated by the two-thirds rule”. On reflection, that is not the strongest of arguments. I hope that in responding to this debate he will at least concede that there could not have been more general elections than there would have been had his Act been in operation, because there is a maximum amount of time that a Parliament can sit. Therefore, it must surely be true that there would have been fewer. I think it is incredibly unlikely that the two-thirds provision would have precipitated an election. The only occasion when there was an early election due to parliamentary activity was when the Jim Callaghan Government lost the vote of confidence, and that would have applied under this legislation. In fact, it might not have applied and poor Jim Callaghan would have had to enter a 14-day cooling-off period, or whatever you call it. That has always struck me as an odd suggestion.

I have a final question for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace. The defence that his leader gave of the proposal for a five-year Parliament is contained in the Second Reading debate of the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill. When challenged as to the justification for five years, he said:

“Leaving aside the very short Parliaments, half of all Parliaments since the war have run for more than four years, so five years is … in keeping with our current arrangements”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/10; col. 625.]

I do not know what he did at university, but it was not logic. That is the equivalent of a batsman saying, “My batting average would have been 100 if you eliminate the ducks”. Basically that is what he is doing in terms of averages. We need from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, a better justification for five years than has been offered to the Committee so far.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I am very conscious of the fact that we probably have only about 10 minutes before we ought to break for dinner. These things fall as they do, but I hope that I may be presumptuous enough to suggest that this is an important amendment. It is a simple one and says straightforwardly that if we are to go down the road of fixed-term Parliaments over five years—I am opposed to that—there is a very strong case indeed for saying that there should be annual Sessions of Parliament, and that it should not be within the remit of government, having fixed the Parliament, then to be allowed absolute flexibility over the length of Sessions.

I perhaps would not have thought it necessary to put this amendment down and in effect legislate for the Session of a Parliament were it not for the very bad experience of the current practice whereby, to my amazement, last September the Government announced that the first Session of this Parliament would last for two years. So far as I know, this was done without any consultation, although the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, can correct me on that. That was an extraordinary unilateral decision to make. The only defences of it that I have heard are, “This is the first Session, so we have a lot to do”, or the rather feeble defence that it is only five months longer than the first Sessions of Parliament have often been in the past. Speaking as a former Chief Whip, I can say only that if you had said to me, “It is only five months”, five months longer for a Session of Parliament for any Government is absolute gold dust. It is a discipline on Governments who are putting in their legislative programme to do that within a 12-month period. I remind the House of the current situation before I explain why it is essential, when faced with this fixed-term Parliament, that we legislate to ensure that Sessions are at least annual.

At present, Governments normally decide around September each year—perhaps a little earlier—the date of the Queen’s Speech. I do not know the details of the negotiations between No. 10 and the palace, but I know, as the Committee knows, that we all understand that normally there will be a Queen’s Speech in November each year. Occasionally, it has drifted into December. That is excepting the Queen’s Speeches that come after general elections, which can come at any time—although they cannot come at any time if the Bill becomes an Act. We know that Governments work within a parameter, which is usually some time in November. There is the usual argy-bargy whereby if a Queen’s Speech comes too early, it is because the Government do not have enough legislation and are running out of steam; or if the Queen’s Speech comes too late it is because the Government have lost control of their legislative programme. However, the parameter means that there is a discipline that gives a big advantage to the Opposition—because parliamentary time is valuable, as we know only too well—and the Government really have to get their act together, manage their programme, and finish it within the 12-month period. To extend unilaterally the normal length of a Session is an abuse and is certainly to the massive advantage of the Government.

I do not know whether I should say this in anger or in envy, because anyone involved in managing a Government’s legislative programme every year has the nightmare period of October and early November when you are trying to fit a quart into a pint pot, you know that you have to do it and that you have to observe the conventional gaps between the stages of Bills—or at least you used to have to observe them; this Government do not have a good record on that aspect of our constitution. However, you know that there is a discipline within which you have to work. Moreover, both Houses—the Commons and the Lords—have recognised this process as important. Both Houses have procedures to enable Bills to be carried over. We have all been familiar with the debates that allow, in exceptional circumstances, individual Bills to follow a recognised constitutional procedure—if I may put it as grandly as that. Motions have to be passed and so on. There is a recognition that either House of Parliament can breach the annual sessional understanding only if the Government obey certain rules in relation to individual Bills and do not do that as regards their overall programme.

I do not know whether I should be angry or envious about the fact that the Government have unilaterally given us a two-year Session. I just wish that I had thought of it. When we were in government I wish that I could have thought, “Blimey, I don’t need to worry about getting these Bills through in 12 months; let’s just postpone the Queen’s Speech for another year or however long—whenever it is convenient to the Government to decide when the Queen’s Speech should take place”. Given that we have had all this hyperbole from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, and others—not very convincingly—about the Government or the Prime Minister giving away power regarding fixed-term Parliaments, I hope that he will acknowledge, if he believes that argument, that they should give away the power of unilaterally being able to decide when a new Session of Parliament should begin.

By having this two-year Session, the Government have breached an important convention of both Houses. It is reasonable for those of us who are concerned about this to say that we now need to enshrine the proposal in my amendment in legislation. I cannot think of any good argument against, if you know when general elections are going to be, why you should not also determine when the Sessions should be. I beg to move.

[Lord Cormack]

My Lords, briefly, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, said. I very much hope that my noble and learned friend will be positive in response. There is nothing that we can do about this extended Session. It will last until May next year. I regret that. Sessions should last as near as possible for a year, and if we are to move to fixed-term Parliaments, the obvious thing is to have the state opening for each Session in the May of each year. I hope that my noble and learned friend will give me some comfort when he responds.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Grocott and Lord Cormack

Tuesday 15th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I start by apologising to the Committee because my amendment includes the dreaded word “referendum”. I can understand why everyone else's heart sinks just as much as mine does at the very mention of that word. I tabled this amendment alongside my noble friend Lord Howarth, who has amendments along similar lines in this group—and they may well be better than mine—because I want to raise two or three issues. It is important that we correct an error that has been uttered on a number of occasions by no less a person than the Deputy Prime Minister. It is an error to say that this Bill removes the right of the Prime Minister to determine the date of the election. At Second Reading in the House of Commons on 13 September last year, the Deputy Prime Minister said:

“We have a Prime Minister who is the first in history to relinquish the right to set the date of the general election”.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/9/10; col. 622.]

What he should have said is, “This is the first Prime Minister to relinquish the right on behalf of future Prime Ministers to determine the date of the next general election”. Not only has this Prime Minister decided the date of the next general election, he has legislated to enshrine in law his choice of date. I hope from now on no one will use that as a justification for this Bill, which, as the House may know, is not a Bill that finds much favour with me. Can we at least correct that error? As I shall say later on, the Prime Minister is uniquely legislating to enshrine his favoured date in law, so people need to have a say about that, which is what we do in a referendum.

My second reason for tabling this amendment was to seek clarification from the Government on when and why they use referendums as a basis for constitutional change. The Committee is entitled to an answer to that question. The Deputy Prime Minister has said many times that these are hugely important constitutional changes. As far as I know so far, and we may still be counting, four major constitutional changes will be decided in this Parliament. We have already determined two, which are quite separate issues. The first was that there should be a referendum on AV and the second was that there should be fewer Members of Parliament. There is a referendum on one of those but not on the other. The one that we are debating now is to fix the terms of Parliaments, which is an important issue on which the present thinking from the Government is that there should be no referendum. The one coming down the line, which may take a bit of time in this House, is to abolish the House in its present form and replace it with senators.

I would simply like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, who always treats these questions with great seriousness, to tell us why there is a referendum for one of those four major changes but not the other three. What factors have the Government brought to bear in determining which will be decided by referendums? Although I need some persuading of this, we have been told quite frequently by the Government that this is a coherent whole of constitutional change.

[Lord Cormack]

The answer is simple: the Government knew that they could not get AV through the House of Commons. Therefore, they have gone to a wider electorate.

[Lord Grocott]

I hope that the wider electorate reach a sensible conclusion. We shall know soon enough.