European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, it may be downhill all the way from this point.

This is a very straightforward amendment, which would require any Brexit deal to be put to the people to approve or to reject. It is based on the principle that, having asked the people whether they wish to initiate the Brexit process, only the people should take the final decision.

In asking the people to do this, we are not sidelining Parliament. Clearly, Parliament should debate and vote on all the options at the end of the negotiating process, as we will discuss later, but Parliament was completely at odds with the views of the people in advance of the referendum. If Parliament took a decision that went against the majority popular view, having given the people the initial decision-making role in the process, we would be faced with widespread and justifiable anger that would be corrosive to our national life for many years to come.

I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for his drafting advice, which he so generously gave me in Committee. I hope that he feels that, even if he cannot agree with the amendment before us, it at least avoids some of the shortcomings he saw in its predecessor.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I am grateful for that generous tribute. Will the noble Lord advise us as to whether the referendum he proposes would be an advisory or a mandatory one?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, we have already seen the referendum being taken as decisive. Parliament did not decide that it should look at it as merely advisory. I think that any referendum has to be seen as decisive, to the extent that it requires Parliament to act on the basis of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, because he, like me, sat through most of the debate that resulted in this House, without opposition, deciding that we should have a referendum to determine whether to remain in or leave the European Union. I say that perhaps particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, who expressed his strong opposition to referendums. I respectfully say to him that, if that is the case, he should have opposed in this House the Bill that established the referendum mechanism to decide whether we should leave or remain.

I want to make an observation and will then specifically address the amendment. The observation is simply that there has been an awful lot of rerunning of the referendum argument in the discussion so far. I always want to urge this House, above all institutions that I have been able to be involved in, not to ascribe motives to people in elections and to assume that we understand precisely why they voted in the way they did, and then to challenge them somehow on the basis of whether they made what we consider to be the right or wrong decision. Perhaps I have a considerable qualification in this regard in that I have lost an awful lot of elections over the course of my career. Although the motive is always to say that your opponents lied or misled people, or that the people were not bright enough to make the decision, my advice, when they eventually elect you, is to acknowledge that they are a pretty shrewd electorate. That is how we all react to success and failure in elections.

Specifically on the amendment, we still have not had a reply on whether such a referendum would be advisory. I respectfully need to point out to the noble Lords who have spoken that one or two mistakes have been made in arguing this case. I think that it was my noble friend Lord Morgan who said that all referendums are advisory. That simply is not right. The referendum that we held on whether we should have AV or first past the post was based on legislation that this House had passed in the form of the Bill for the AV referendum. That laid out precisely the system that the electorate would put into place, should the referendum be passed.

[Lord Morgan]

I apologise for interrupting my noble friend. With regard to that referendum and all referendums, this is a constitution based on parliamentary sovereignty. Unlike France, it is not based on popular sovereignty.

[Lord Grocott]

My noble friend is absolutely right but in this case the Act of Parliament that this House passed to establish the referendum included precisely the mechanism for the alternative vote election that would come into place should that referendum be carried.

[Lord Lang of Monkton (Con)]

My Lords, I am in no doubt that the referendum of 23 June was technically advisory but the Government of the day and the leaders of the campaigns had made it absolutely clear that the Government would implement its findings without qualification. It also featured in the governing party’s manifesto in the last general election.

[Lord Grocott]

I do not disagree with that at all. The debate when the referendum campaign was under way was clearly on the basis that this was a once-in-a-lifetime decision, and we need to acknowledge that as well.

My main points are in respect of the validity of the decision and whether it should be replaced with a second referendum. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, at the time of the referendum it was never said that there would be a second referendum. I hate to disagree with my noble friend Lord Foulkes—particularly not on matters relating to Scotland; I have never done so in the long parliamentary careers that we have shared—but I think he said, and he will no doubt intervene and I will be happy to give way if I am wrong, that the choice in the Scottish referendum was absolutely clear. However, it did not come over like that in the way that it was reported in England. There appeared to be a great lack of clarity about things such as the currency that would be used and whether an independent Scotland could reapply, or would successfully be able to reapply, to join the European Union. There is a whole host of uncertainties around all referendums, and I have never heard of one where there were no uncertainties or difficulties to address.

That brings me to the only really substantial point that I think has not been made so far: that somehow or other—this, according to its proponents, is the whole basis of having a second referendum—circumstances will change in a very fundamental way, making it absolutely essential that we again test the opinion of the British people. I cannot avoid a trip down memory lane at this point because this is not the first referendum on whether we should be a member of the European Union; it is the second. The first one was held in 1975 and the overwhelming decision was to remain in the European Union.

[A noble Lord]

Can I say—

[Lord Grocott]

Please can I finish my point? A lot of people said thereafter that perhaps we should have another referendum, and of course we did. The only problem from the perspective of those who voted no in the first one in 1975 was that we had to wait 41 years to be given the choice. Several generations of 16, 17 and 18 year-olds had become pensioners, so on that occasion there was a long gap between the decision taken in the first referendum and the second one, whereas it is proposed that there should be two or perhaps three years in the gap between referendums on this occasion.

The point I want to make is this: no one voting in 1975 could possibly have anticipated the consequences of a yes vote in that referendum. It was not the European Union then because it has changed its name several times since. It was the Common Market that people voted for or against in 1975.

[A noble Lord]

It was the European Community.

[Lord Grocott]

I am sorry and I stand corrected. It was the Common Market, then the European Community, then the European Union and no doubt it will be something else in due course. The people who voted yes in the 1975 referendum did not know that it would triple in size over the ensuing 41 years, that qualified majority voting on all related matters would develop and that we would get a European foreign ministry, 150-odd offices of the European Union around the country, a European foreign affairs spokesman and so on. I am not necessarily criticising that, but I would say that no one who voted yes in 1975 could conceivably have thought that that would be the way in which the European Union would develop. Correct me if I am wrong, but do I recall anyone who voted yes in 1975 saying, “No, the circumstances have changed dramatically and we need to have another referendum to check whether the people agree with what they voted for”? The answer of course is no, that did not happen, and we waited 41 years between the first referendum and the second.

If we adopt the same principle in this respect, we shall have another referendum in 2057. I am a generous man looking for compromises and I think that would be an unreasonable gap between this referendum and any subsequent one. However, it is inevitable that after any decision, whether in a referendum or at a general election, some people will be dissatisfied with the result and will want to have it checked—correction, they will want to have it reversed. That is precisely the motive behind this proposal for a second referendum— unacknowledged in the Bill and unacknowledged during the referendum debate, and now being demanded as an entirely novel proposal. I hope that the House will agree with me that that is not acceptable.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I think that it would be sensible to hear from the Front Benches now. Perhaps we may hear from the Labour Front Bench and then the Minister.