European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 21st February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to use my time not to repeat the arguments that have already been well rehearsed in the context of the referendum but to reflect on the significance of the Bill before this House. We are, after all, discussing the simplest of simple Bills—just two clauses—with the simplest of simple objectives, which is to begin the process of carrying out the decision of the British people as expressed in a referendum. It was a referendum based on a Bill that this House passed without opposition and, by the way, it was a referendum held all of eight months ago. Yet here we are with a two-day debate on the Second Reading and 184 speakers. I cannot remember when we ever had a speakers list quite like this, but it is absolutely in line with the phenomenal focus that this House has shown on the referendum and related matters since 23 June last year.

Like, I dare say, one or two other people in this House, I spent a bit of time during the short recess knocking on doors in a by-election, and I have to report to the House that our interest in this subject is not matched by people on the doorstep. Bearing in mind that one of the reasons most frequently advanced for the leave vote being so high is that people feel politicians are out of touch, I simply hope that in the months ahead there is a better match between the subjects that we are discussing in this House and those being discussed by our fellow citizens. The fact is—and the polls demonstrate this—that the public have largely made up their minds about the referendum, its significance and the result. An ICM poll on Saturday showed that 68% of us want the Government to get on with the process of leaving the European Union, and that includes no less than 48% of those who voted to remain.

That brings me to the role of the Lords in relation to this Bill. The first point is something on which I think we all agree—the primacy of the Commons. This, of course, expresses itself in a number of different ways. Very rarely, the Commons has to assert itself through the Parliament Act; much more frequently, the view of the Lords in respect of Commons decisions, and the extent to which they are challenged, is dependent on the clarity of the judgment the Commons has made. Well, the message in respect of this Bill is clearer than any I can remember. The Commons decided by a majority of 384 that this Bill should become law. What is more, the Commons’ verdict is a massive endorsement of the even more important decision made by the people in the referendum. Let us be absolutely clear: there really is no wriggle room. If you enter a contest or competition, especially one in which you have written the rules yourself, as we did in the referendum Bill, then surely you must accept the result.

“Ah,” say some remainers, “but this was only an advisory referendum”. Of course, legally that is true. It is advisory. Parliament could reverse it. There are no substantial constraints on what our Parliament can do, apart of course from the very substantial ones applied by the European Union. But politically, and most of all democratically, the referendum was binding. I very much doubt that if remain had won the argument and the Government had then decided that we were going to leave the European Union anyway, there would have been many remainers saying, “Well, fair enough, it was only advisory”.

If you play the game, you accept the result. When I watch Stoke City at the weekend I accept the rules and the result, though I have to admit there have been many occasions when I would have loved to have been able to say that the goals against us were only advisory. Any amendment proposed during the passage of this Bill that has either the effect of seriously delaying the implementation of the verdict of the British people, or at worst rejecting it, should, in my view, be unceremoniously rejected.

What about the suggestion coming from the Liberal Democrats that it is not one referendum we need but two? No doubt they are hoping that the second one will go the other way. I have to say in passing that, where I come from, that would make it one all and we would need a decider. However, I have to acknowledge, at least, that a second referendum would be in the finest traditions of democracy European Union style. Have a referendum if you must, but if you get it wrong, have a second one to reverse it. The EU has plenty of form on this—ask the people of Denmark and Ireland.

A second referendum would be a betrayal of the record number of people who voted in June last year. The turnout was 6% up on the 2015 general election. In my own region, 60% voted to leave. People were enthused to vote who never normally take part in elections. They were assured they had been given a hugely important, once-in-a-lifetime decision to make.

“Ah”, say some opponents of the Bill, “the people were duped. They were fed false information. The referendum wasn’t fair. The people didn’t know what they were voting for”. I say this with all seriousness—with acute seriousness—that in a democracy we should be extraordinarily careful about using the argument that we know what is good for the people better than they know themselves. I have some authority on this because I have the dubious distinction of having lost more general elections than probably most people in this House. My record is: played eight; won four; lost four. The pattern when you lose is always the same: it is because your opponents made promises they could not possibly keep, you say; it is because they lied; it is because they had the press on their side; it is because they had far more money for their campaign. When you win, of course, it is a triumph for democracy.

On the argument that the public did not know what kind of Brexit they were voting for, the answer is simple—they did not vote for Brexit at all. It was not on the ballot paper. The choice was remain or leave. They voted to leave. Brexit may be ambiguous; leaving is not. If you leave an organisation, you no longer sit on the executive committee, you do not have to pay the subscription and you do not have to obey the rules. That applies whether you are leaving a political party, the snooker club or the European Union.

Those in this House who are seriously thinking about voting against the Third Reading and voting this Bill down should think very carefully about the implications. That would mean a straightforward clash between the Commons and the Lords. It would, in my view, inevitably result in a general election very quickly after such a decision had been made. We can all speculate about the conclusion of that general election. It is now eight months since the people made their decision, and one which the Commons has overwhelmingly endorsed. It is now our job to scrutinise the Bill in the most effective way, as we always do, but as our constitutional practice has made clear, not to thwart, delay or block it, and I am confident that we will do just that.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 27th February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

The noble Lord is uncharacteristically inaccurate; he normally does his homework before intervening in this way. He is quite right that I and many on the remain side argued against the EEA being the right solution but he is quite wrong to suggest that any of us argued that it was the worst solution. On the contrary, throughout the campaign I always said while it was a very bad solution, it was the least bad solution of all those on offer. I am on record as saying that and probably said it in debates in which the noble Lord took part. Indeed, that is my strong view today and is the case I now argue.

I wish we could stay in the EU—period, as the Americans say, or full stop—but if we cannot we must try to mitigate the enormous damage. That is the argument I have been making. The way to do that is to try to find a way to stay in the single market, and one way we could certainly do that is to rejoin EFTA, as my noble friend Lord Lea set out. It is extraordinary that the Government have excluded that possibility and I now come to their extraordinary behaviour.

The Government have not only revealed that the benefit for which they are prepared to pay this high cost is nothing like as great as it was always made out to be, but not even considered negotiating on the single market regime provided by the EEA and using that as a basis for trying to get some concessions on freedom of movement. My two noble friends suggested a way forward that might be possible. I do not think that we on this side of the House will be able to take over these negotiations but we want to know—it is important that everybody in the country knows—why the Government did not even think it worthwhile to sit down with our European Union partners and say we would like to stay in the single market but we would also like to curb freedom of movement at least to some extent. We could have a negotiation on that basis.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

Could my noble friend refresh the House’s memory on what success the previous Prime Minister had in having this as an objective in his renegotiation of our terms of membership of the European Union?

[Lord Davies of Stamford]

I think the previous Prime Minister was a completely incompetent negotiator. The way to make progress in European affairs—it is extraordinary that after all these decades the Tory party has not learned this—is to adopt a communautaire approach and the language of one’s partners, to say that what one is seeking to do is in the interests of everybody and not purely in the selfish interests of this country, and certainly not just to get a good headline in the Daily Express or Daily Mail. We make it clear that we share the long-term objectives of our neighbours and partners for the future of western civilisation, as well as for prosperity, competitiveness and employment and these important economic but ultimately subsidiary objectives. Then we say pragmatically, as we have a reputation for being pragmatic, “Would it not be a good idea to do X, Y and Z which would strengthen our common purposes and take further forward our common ambitions?”. That is the way to make progress but it is the opposite of the confrontational approach the last Prime Minister adopted. It is not surprising that he did not get very far.

I am glad that my noble friend made this brief intervention because it enables me to say that I am extremely worried—I am not alone in this—that the Tory party has learned nothing at all from this experience or from any other experience over the last 40 years of the European Union and so will make the same mistake again. It will find itself not achieving what it ought to in the national interest in these negotiations. They will be a disaster, and a largely avoidable disaster, precisely because the Tory Government have not learned the obvious lessons of the past which my noble friend was kind enough to give me the opportunity to remind them of this afternoon.

If you have somebody negotiating on your behalf—a solicitor, an accountant or some representative, agent, trustee or whoever—and you watch carefully what they are doing, you are entitled to get worried should they do something that goes quite counter to normal human common sense. I pointed out three ways in which the Government are behaving in an extremely irrational fashion. I will repeat them so that the Minister can address them when he sums up. First, why are we pursuing this particular objective with the same kind of intensity and passion when we have acknowledged that the objective that we are trying to achieve—what we are trying to obtain in exchange for the high price of giving up our membership of the single market—is not anything like as great it was previously made out to be?

Secondly, why have we not decided to negotiate on the basis of the available option, which we know exists, of our potential membership of the EEA and see if we can perhaps do a little better and achieve some additional concessions? We have not even tried to do this—why not? Thirdly, why are we proceeding in this negotiation by giving up options in advance, before we have even explored them and before we have even started the negotiations? It is a very extraordinary thing to do.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, this simple amendment would require the people to ratify in a referendum any agreement reached by the Government pursuant to triggering Article 50, and I thank my co-signatories from across the House who support it.

I set out the arguments for such a confirmatory referendum in my Second Reading speech. Fundamentally, we believe that the people, having initiated the Brexit process, should have the final say. It is clear that the Government’s preferred option is that they should have the final say. Under pressure, and no doubt as a result of votes that we shall have in your Lordships’ House, they will be dragged slowly but inexorably towards giving Parliament a final say on all the options. However, while that is better than the Government simply taking the final decision themselves, it simply will not do.

As we saw with Parliament’s votes in advance of last year’s referendum, the Government’s track record in judging the public mood on this issue is poor. While as a general principle it is accepted that parliamentarians should exercise their own judgment and not simply echo that of public opinion on this issue, Parliament has already said that our membership of the European Union is for the people to decide. Trying to take back power at the end of the process having ceded it at the outset is both devoid of principle and likely to stoke further public dissatisfaction, whichever way the decision goes.

Secondly, and flowing from this, is the fact that in contradistinction to what the Prime Minister asserted in the White Paper, the country is more divided than ever over Brexit. That is largely because those who were in favour of remaining in the EU were relatively passionless in advance of the referendum because they complacently thought that they would win it. They were wrong, of course. Now many of them are angry about the issue for the first time. No small part of that anger is caused by the fact that they believe that many people were decisively influenced in the way that they voted by what they see as a number of misrepresentations, most notably on NHS spending, which were assiduously asserted by the leave side, including of course a number of members of the current Cabinet. They are also angry that, by leaving the single market and customs union, the Government have chosen a particularly harsh form of Brexit. As a result, they believe that the people should have a vote on the final deal, when it will be impossible to conceal the real consequences of leaving the EU—as happened last summer.

At Second Reading, the Minister asked me why such a vote would help to bring the country together. The answer is that such a vote, conducted in the full light of the facts of the deal, would produce a result that could not be questioned, in the same way as last June’s vote, on the basis that the people were misled. I believe that that would apply to the losing side as well as to the victors. At Second Reading the noble Lord, Lord Butler, asked why,

“those who base their arguments for Brexit on the will of the people are now opposed to consulting the people on the outcome of the negotiations”.

As he said:

“Do the Government regard the views of the British people on the outcome of the negotiations as irrelevant to our departure?”.—[Official Report, 21/2/17; col. 208.]


In reply, the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said that the Government opposed a referendum on the terms on the grounds that it would dash the certainty and clarity that we need. I agree that we need that too, but nothing would give greater certainty and clarity than the people having expressed the final view on the deal. The Government’s attitude is that if the views of the people were to change significantly against Brexit over the next 18 months, the Government would still ask Parliament to ratify any deal it reached, or simply crash out of the EU. How could that be justified? They are saying in effect that the people are not allowed to change their mind—an approach that is the antithesis of democracy, which is that the people are regularly asked to express their preferences and do indeed regularly change them. This is from a Government with many members who have very publicly changed their minds from being convinced remainers to being cheerleaders for Brexit.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, the noble Lord may be coming to this in his speech, but the first requirement of his amendment is that any agreement must be,

“laid before and approved by”,

both Houses of Parliament. I ask him: if one House says, “Yes, we agree with the agreement that has been negotiated”, but the other House says no, what happens next?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, we will spend a lot more time on Wednesday discussing the role of Parliament. The point I make in my amendment is that Parliament will want to express a view before the vote goes to the people again. We will talk in great detail on Wednesday about how it might do that. That part of the amendment is not its most central part.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Wheatcroft]

My Lords, I have just said that I have no intention of defying the will of the people; I am giving the people a chance to exercise their will, which some noble Lords may not wish to do. I do not believe that we should not give the people the final say.

When a majority of those voting voted to leave the EU, they had different visions of what that would entail. In answer to my noble friend Lord Lamont, I do not think that the original referendum was, with the benefit of hindsight, drafted as well as it might have been, because I think that people were voting for different things. Some might have favoured an arrangement that continued to give us strong trading links with Europe while others might have voted with a view that we could remain very close to the single market. Some might have hoped that our students would be able to continue their education throughout Europe while others, particularly those in the financial services sector, would almost certainly have been hoping that what they were voting for was an arrangement that would allow their products to be passported into Europe so that they could continue doing business as they do now. That looks increasingly unlikely to happen, with dire consequences for our Exchequer. The one thing on which most voters would surely have agreed is, as others have suggested in this debate, that they were not voting to get poorer.

The most logical solution is that, once the terms of departure are clear, the public should be able to weigh them up and decide whether they want them. Do those who oppose such a suggestion not believe that the British electorate are capable of examining a deal and judging it on its merits? To take that view certainly would be to show contempt for the electorate and I do not. I am not a fan of government by referenda, but nevertheless once one has embarked on that route, it seems that only a referendum can complete the process. This is about listening to the will of the people, not defying it.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak but I need to, because so far no one has addressed the specific terms of the amendment that is before the Committee. There is no element of sarcasm in this when I say that that is uncharacteristic of the noble Lord, Lord Newby. I asked him a specific question about his amendment. Also uncharacteristically, the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, has made a speech that is not based on the terms of the amendment. So let me remind the Committee briefly of what the amendment states. Three conditions are set out:

“No agreement with the European Union … may be ratified unless … it has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament”.


I do not know what meaning that has other than that it has to be approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, which the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, said is not a problem because we always defer to the lower House. If that is the case, it needs to be in the amendment.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

Perhaps the noble Lord would be good enough to look at Amendment 32 tabled in my name, which will be debated on Wednesday. He will see that this point is addressed in the proposed new clause by using the phrase “both Houses”. I take the point that the noble Lord is making with regard to “each House”, but does he agree that if the phrase “both Houses” is substituted, the point is made?

[Lord Grocott]

I am a long way from reaching Amendment 32, but I shall certainly look at it in good time. Before we get to any question of consulting the people on an agreement, which was the thrust of the comments of both the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, and the noble Lord, Lord Newby, it has to clear the first hurdle of being passed, or I should say approved, by both Houses of Parliament. We need to know what happens if one House says yes and the other no, because it occurs to me that there is a considerable possibility that the House of Commons, with a Conservative majority, might well, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, agree to approve the Prime Minister’s recommendation. There is also a considerable possibility that this House, not being so bound by recommendations of Prime Ministers of whichever party, will decide that it does not agree with the recommendation made by the Prime Minister and the Government. That is the question: what happens if one says yes and the other no?

That is the first hurdle that would have to be cleared before there can be a referendum, but there is another. New paragraph (b) says,

“the Prime Minister has obtained authority to put it to a national referendum”.

That would require a Bill and an Act of Parliament. That is the second hurdle that would have to be cleared by the House of Commons and the House of Lords before we could reach the third stage, which is the referendum itself—new paragraph (c) provides that it should have been,

“approved by such a referendum”.

I say to those who have spoken so far that unless there are rather better answers to the question, particularly about the two Houses—

[Lord Rooker]

On the issue of the two Houses, I agree with the amendment, although I will vote against it.

[Lord Rooker]

No—the amendment’s flaw is: are we seriously going to attempt to send an amendment to the other place that requires the accession of some 15 to 20 Conservative Members of Parliament to vote with the rest of the Opposition to keep it in the Bill? That is the only audience we have. It is not ourselves or the people; it is the 20 Tories in the other place who would be prepared to vote for what we send. They are not going to vote for this, so why are we going to try to send it there?

[Lord Grocott]

After the best part of 40 years over which my noble friend and I have been in Parliament, we do not disagree on much. I am delighted to see that we clearly do not disagree on this amendment either. In the absence of any satisfactory answers to the questions I have put, I hope that the House will decide against the amendment, should it be put to a vote.

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords, I intervene briefly in opposition to the amendment. In fact, referring to an amendment coming down the track that I hope will be discussed on Wednesday, I have tabled a new clause that would enable Parliament to direct a referendum. The amendment that we are discussing would require Parliament to hold a referendum. That seems to be fundamentally different in kind. If two years down the track the public mood has changed after the negotiations, I for one believe that the public’s opinion should be tested in a referendum, which Parliament would then decide. Alternatively, if in two years’ time Parliament decides not to approve agreed terms, I fancy that Parliament would decide that its decision had to be underwritten by a referendum.

That is different in kind to this amendment, which would require Parliament to direct a referendum, whether there is a change in opinion or not. That seems fundamentally undesirable, because we know that referenda are profoundly divisive mechanisms. They are the policy of last resort. If there is not a perceptible change in public opinion, or if Parliament is not minded to vote down the agreed terms, I see no need to require the holding of a referendum. This is a mandatory amendment; I am against it for that rather narrow reason.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby (LD)]

My Lords, it may be downhill all the way from this point.

This is a very straightforward amendment, which would require any Brexit deal to be put to the people to approve or to reject. It is based on the principle that, having asked the people whether they wish to initiate the Brexit process, only the people should take the final decision.

In asking the people to do this, we are not sidelining Parliament. Clearly, Parliament should debate and vote on all the options at the end of the negotiating process, as we will discuss later, but Parliament was completely at odds with the views of the people in advance of the referendum. If Parliament took a decision that went against the majority popular view, having given the people the initial decision-making role in the process, we would be faced with widespread and justifiable anger that would be corrosive to our national life for many years to come.

I begin by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, for his drafting advice, which he so generously gave me in Committee. I hope that he feels that, even if he cannot agree with the amendment before us, it at least avoids some of the shortcomings he saw in its predecessor.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I am grateful for that generous tribute. Will the noble Lord advise us as to whether the referendum he proposes would be an advisory or a mandatory one?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, we have already seen the referendum being taken as decisive. Parliament did not decide that it should look at it as merely advisory. I think that any referendum has to be seen as decisive, to the extent that it requires Parliament to act on the basis of it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, because he, like me, sat through most of the debate that resulted in this House, without opposition, deciding that we should have a referendum to determine whether to remain in or leave the European Union. I say that perhaps particularly to the noble Lord, Lord Taverne, who expressed his strong opposition to referendums. I respectfully say to him that, if that is the case, he should have opposed in this House the Bill that established the referendum mechanism to decide whether we should leave or remain.

I want to make an observation and will then specifically address the amendment. The observation is simply that there has been an awful lot of rerunning of the referendum argument in the discussion so far. I always want to urge this House, above all institutions that I have been able to be involved in, not to ascribe motives to people in elections and to assume that we understand precisely why they voted in the way they did, and then to challenge them somehow on the basis of whether they made what we consider to be the right or wrong decision. Perhaps I have a considerable qualification in this regard in that I have lost an awful lot of elections over the course of my career. Although the motive is always to say that your opponents lied or misled people, or that the people were not bright enough to make the decision, my advice, when they eventually elect you, is to acknowledge that they are a pretty shrewd electorate. That is how we all react to success and failure in elections.

Specifically on the amendment, we still have not had a reply on whether such a referendum would be advisory. I respectfully need to point out to the noble Lords who have spoken that one or two mistakes have been made in arguing this case. I think that it was my noble friend Lord Morgan who said that all referendums are advisory. That simply is not right. The referendum that we held on whether we should have AV or first past the post was based on legislation that this House had passed in the form of the Bill for the AV referendum. That laid out precisely the system that the electorate would put into place, should the referendum be passed.

[Lord Morgan]

I apologise for interrupting my noble friend. With regard to that referendum and all referendums, this is a constitution based on parliamentary sovereignty. Unlike France, it is not based on popular sovereignty.

[Lord Grocott]

My noble friend is absolutely right but in this case the Act of Parliament that this House passed to establish the referendum included precisely the mechanism for the alternative vote election that would come into place should that referendum be carried.

[Lord Lang of Monkton (Con)]

My Lords, I am in no doubt that the referendum of 23 June was technically advisory but the Government of the day and the leaders of the campaigns had made it absolutely clear that the Government would implement its findings without qualification. It also featured in the governing party’s manifesto in the last general election.

[Lord Grocott]

I do not disagree with that at all. The debate when the referendum campaign was under way was clearly on the basis that this was a once-in-a-lifetime decision, and we need to acknowledge that as well.

My main points are in respect of the validity of the decision and whether it should be replaced with a second referendum. As the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, at the time of the referendum it was never said that there would be a second referendum. I hate to disagree with my noble friend Lord Foulkes—particularly not on matters relating to Scotland; I have never done so in the long parliamentary careers that we have shared—but I think he said, and he will no doubt intervene and I will be happy to give way if I am wrong, that the choice in the Scottish referendum was absolutely clear. However, it did not come over like that in the way that it was reported in England. There appeared to be a great lack of clarity about things such as the currency that would be used and whether an independent Scotland could reapply, or would successfully be able to reapply, to join the European Union. There is a whole host of uncertainties around all referendums, and I have never heard of one where there were no uncertainties or difficulties to address.

That brings me to the only really substantial point that I think has not been made so far: that somehow or other—this, according to its proponents, is the whole basis of having a second referendum—circumstances will change in a very fundamental way, making it absolutely essential that we again test the opinion of the British people. I cannot avoid a trip down memory lane at this point because this is not the first referendum on whether we should be a member of the European Union; it is the second. The first one was held in 1975 and the overwhelming decision was to remain in the European Union.

[A noble Lord]

Can I say—

[Lord Grocott]

Please can I finish my point? A lot of people said thereafter that perhaps we should have another referendum, and of course we did. The only problem from the perspective of those who voted no in the first one in 1975 was that we had to wait 41 years to be given the choice. Several generations of 16, 17 and 18 year-olds had become pensioners, so on that occasion there was a long gap between the decision taken in the first referendum and the second one, whereas it is proposed that there should be two or perhaps three years in the gap between referendums on this occasion.

The point I want to make is this: no one voting in 1975 could possibly have anticipated the consequences of a yes vote in that referendum. It was not the European Union then because it has changed its name several times since. It was the Common Market that people voted for or against in 1975.

[A noble Lord]

It was the European Community.

[Lord Grocott]

I am sorry and I stand corrected. It was the Common Market, then the European Community, then the European Union and no doubt it will be something else in due course. The people who voted yes in the 1975 referendum did not know that it would triple in size over the ensuing 41 years, that qualified majority voting on all related matters would develop and that we would get a European foreign ministry, 150-odd offices of the European Union around the country, a European foreign affairs spokesman and so on. I am not necessarily criticising that, but I would say that no one who voted yes in 1975 could conceivably have thought that that would be the way in which the European Union would develop. Correct me if I am wrong, but do I recall anyone who voted yes in 1975 saying, “No, the circumstances have changed dramatically and we need to have another referendum to check whether the people agree with what they voted for”? The answer of course is no, that did not happen, and we waited 41 years between the first referendum and the second.

If we adopt the same principle in this respect, we shall have another referendum in 2057. I am a generous man looking for compromises and I think that would be an unreasonable gap between this referendum and any subsequent one. However, it is inevitable that after any decision, whether in a referendum or at a general election, some people will be dissatisfied with the result and will want to have it checked—correction, they will want to have it reversed. That is precisely the motive behind this proposal for a second referendum— unacknowledged in the Bill and unacknowledged during the referendum debate, and now being demanded as an entirely novel proposal. I hope that the House will agree with me that that is not acceptable.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I think that it would be sensible to hear from the Front Benches now. Perhaps we may hear from the Labour Front Bench and then the Minister.

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 3 is in my name and the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. The purpose and effect of Amendment 3 is very simple. It would ensure that at the end of the negotiating process, the approval of Parliament would be required for the terms of our withdrawal from the EU. The Prime Minister has accepted that principle: she has undertaken that any agreement with the European Union on the terms of our withdrawal, and any agreement on our future relationship with the EU, will be put to both Houses of Parliament for their approval. She has also promised that this will occur before the withdrawal agreement is sent to the European Parliament for its consent. That must be right: this Parliament must have at least the same opportunity as the European Parliament to disagree with the terms of any draft agreement. The Prime Minister has given an undertaking but the Government are refusing to include the commitment in the Bill. Given the importance of the decision to leave the EU and the importance of the terms on which we are to do that, the role of Parliament must surely be written into the Bill—no ifs and no buts.

The amendment has been revised since the very helpful debate in Committee last Wednesday evening. As suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, during that debate, proposed new subsections (1), (2) and (3) in the amendment set out the undertaking given to the House of Commons by the Minister, Mr David Jones, on 7 February at col. 264. The only alteration to what Mr Jones said is that the amendment does not commit the Government to proceeding by way of a Motion in both Houses. The amendment allows the Government to decide what would be the best means of seeking and obtaining approval from both Houses. That is because of the point made in Committee last Wednesday night by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, with his enormous knowledge and experience of parliamentary procedure.

Proposed new subsection (4), which has also been revised since the debate last Wednesday, requires the “approval of both Houses” if the Prime Minister decides that,

“the United Kingdom shall leave the European Union without an agreement”,

as to the terms. Parliament must also have a role in those circumstances. It must be for Parliament to decide whether to prefer no deal or the deal offered by the EU.

I will also address a point that has been raised with me by some noble Lords, about what happens if the two Houses disagree when the agreement, or lack of agreement, is put to Parliament. It is of course the Prime Minister who has decided that the terms of our withdrawal are so important that the approval of both Houses of Parliament should be required. The White Paper says, at paragraph 1.12:

“The Government will … put the final deal that is agreed between the UK and the EU to a vote in both Houses of Parliament”.


The Minister, Mr David Jones, stated in the House of Commons in Committee that,

“the Government will bring forward a motion on the final agreement, to be approved by both Houses of Parliament before it is concluded”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/2/17; col. 264.]

In any event, if this House were to agree this amendment today, it is open to the Government, if they are concerned about this issue, to seek to amend this proposed new clause in the Commons next week to address what happens if the two Houses were to disagree.

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

This is a very important point, and I am glad that the noble Lord is addressing it in such detail, but we cannot make our judgments on the basis of what the Government have said they might do. The judgment today must be on the basis of what is in this proposed new clause. I therefore ask the noble Lord, from his perspective, given that the proposed new clause repeatedly says,

“the approval of both Houses of Parliament”,

what, in his judgment, would the solution be if one House said yes and the other said no?

[Lord Pannick]

As I have said, this is the Prime Minister’s undertaking, but since the noble Lord has asked me—I do not have to tell him this, given his enormous experience—if the House of Commons were to give its approval, this House would, in my judgment, rightly be told that it should be very slow indeed to take a different view from the elected House. If we were to disagree with the Commons, I understand that it would be open to the Government immediately to take the matter back to the Commons for a further confirmatory resolution, which, if agreed, would lead to a further approval Motion in this House. I expect, at that stage, it would be exceptionally unlikely that this House would stand its ground. I repeat, however, that if the Government were dissatisfied with that, which is the consequence of the undertaking given by the Prime Minister, it is open to the Government to bring forward an amendment in the other place. Indeed, it was open to the Government in this House to bring forward an amendment to this amendment to deal with the matter.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard]

I am grateful to the noble Lord. The first of my two quick points is to clarify the issue of irrevocability raised by the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein—and I am glad that he did so. We discussed the issue extensively at Second Reading and he told his readers in the Times that we did not mention it at all, so I am glad that he is here this time. I also pay tribute to the skill of the Lord, Lord Pannick, both in court and in this House. When he won his case in the High Court—not the Supreme Court—the No. 10 spokesman was asked about revocability and said that,

“as a matter of firm policy, our notification to withdraw will not be withdrawn”.

After our extensive debate at Second Reading, the Minister was put on the spot by the noble Baroness, Lady Symons of Vernham Dean, about whether it was revocable or not. The Minister is a very clever man and replied:

“As a matter of firm policy, our notification will not be withdrawn”.—[Official Report, 21/2/17; col. 320.]


That is very similar to what was said by the No. 10 spokesman, which is always wise in a Minister. Last Wednesday, in Committee, the same issue of revocability was raised. When the Minister replied to the debate on the amendment, he said that,

“as a matter of policy we will not withdraw our notice to leave”.—[Official Report, 1/3/17; col. 923.]

The wording was slightly wrong there, but I am sure they will forgive him.

Every time the Government say that,

“as a matter of policy”,

firm or infirm, they will not withdraw the notification which the Bill authorises, they implicitly confirm that, in law, they could withdraw it—and they could. If you want a definitive source, do not look at me, listen to the President of the European Council, who has said so on the record. If you want a definitive EU legal view, and this would be an EU legal question if it were ever tested, try the present head of the Council’s legal service or the one who advised me when I was writing the wretched thing. Just a point of clarification: it is revocable.

My second point relates to the discussion of subsection (4) of the new clause proposed in the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Lawson, detected deep evil in it. What is being said there is that it is for Parliament to decide whether no deal is better than a bad deal and to make a judgment on whether the deal is bad and that the chaos and disruption of leaving with no deal is preferable. I struggle to think of a deal which could be worse than no deal. Last week, the president of CBI said that the worst possible scenario was leaving with no deal. However, that is not the point: the point is about parliamentary sovereignty. The issue of whether no deal is worse than the deal which is available on the table on that day is for Parliament to decide. That is what subsection (4) of the amendment says, and I support it.

[Lord Grocott]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, quite rightly—and entertainingly as always—referred to the crucial element of parliamentary sovereignty. We have heard from top lawyers and diplomats and I only offer some thoughts as a run-of-the-mill parliamentarian. I could not possibly vote against parliamentary sovereignty. Voting against an amendment such as this would be like voting against motherhood and apple pie. It is something in which I passionately believe. It was one of the reasons why many people—and I was one of them—were concerned during the course of the European referendum because it seemed incontrovertible that the way in which the European Union had developed involved a steady erosion of parliamentary sovereignty. It would be quite difficult to disagree with this proposition.

When addressing this amendment, we have to decide what a decision by Parliament actually comprises. I am forced to read the amendment. Proposed subsection (1) refers to,

“without the approval of both Houses of Parliament”.

Subsection (3) requires:

“The prior approval of both Houses of Parliament”,


Subsection (4) refers to:

“The prior approval of both Houses of Parliament”.


With great respect to the weight of legal opinion being offered, to propose this amendment without being clear as to what is involved in the approval of both Houses of Parliament is to leave an ambiguity at its heart. It is hardly necessary to add to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has already said.

I was concerned about this from the start. I raised it in Committee. There has been an attempt to move towards answering the question, “What happens if the Commons say ‘yes’ and the Lords say ‘no’?”. The solution is certainly not contained within these amendments.

I made an, admittedly inadequate, attempt with the Public Bill Office to see if there was any way in which I could put down an amendment which would satisfy, or at least address, this problem at the heart of the Bill. If the House will forgive me—as I will conclude shortly afterwards—I will read out the terms of the defunct amendment. It would have said:

“(5) If, under the provisions of subsections (1), (3) or (4), there is disagreement between the House of Commons and the House of Lords as to whether or not the agreement or decision should be approved, the view of the House of Commons prevails over the view of the House of Lords”.


That makes an attempt to explain precisely—or, I hope, resolve precisely—the ambiguity at the heart of the Bill.

[Lord True]

I was following the noble Lord’s argument, and I agree with it in terms of the imprecision and lack of clarity as to what happens if both Houses disagree. Does he agree that there is a further issue in relation to the different procedures of the two Houses? In the House of Commons, the Government control the agenda. We heard from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that what happens in this House will be up to the Government. But am I not right in saying that any noble Lord can put down an amendment at any time to disapprove a resolution and this House will vote on it? Surely there cannot be any circumstances in this House in which the Government control what might constitute approval or disapproval. Is this not a further difficulty with the amendment?

[Lord Grocott]

Yes. I can understand that point. I want to emphasise the central problem, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, has identified. I ask the House—or, more specifically, the mover of the amendment—whether something like that, included at Third Reading, would solve the difficulty which I think even he would acknowledge was expressed in the various interventions that he dealt with.

There is one thing that I can influence to some degree—something which, if not within the control of this House, is within the control of my beloved Labour Party. For as long as I have been in it, it has been absolutely clear about the primacy of the elected House over the unelected House. I say this to my Front Bench and to my very good noble friend Lady Hayter, who will be winding up. Should we pass this amendment as written and, in two years’ time, find ourselves in a situation where there is a clash between the House of Commons and the House of Lords, and if all the normal attempts at agreement and solutions to the differences had been tried, this party, at any rate, would assert clearly that, ultimately, the primacy of the House of Commons must prevail.

[Baroness Altmann]

My Lords—

European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Grocott Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, the idea that by speaking and voting, as we will now do, we will block this Bill is, of course, fantasy. It has been abundantly clear that the Opposition in your Lordships’ House will vote for the Bill, as will the Government. I simply repeat—

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

It cannot possibly be honourable for the noble Lord to say that he is going to vote against the implementation of—to kill—the Bill, which has been overwhelmingly passed by the Commons and which is, of course, the result of a referendum, in the full, secure knowledge that the Bill will in fact pass. If he is voting on his amendment I hope he can assure the House that it is with the full intention of trying to kill the Bill. Anything else could be interpreted only as complete cynicism.

[Lord Newby]

Like everybody else, I have got to live with my conscience on this Bill, and I am going to sleep easy tonight. I repeat what I said earlier. We are voting now to record our opposition to the damaging course on which the Government are set and their refusal to allow the British people—