But enough of this—to summarise: the present position as regards the relationship between the Attorney-General and the Charity Commission is wrong in principle, and has proved flawed in practice. The change that I put before the House tonight is supported overwhelmingly by the sector, by trade bodies such as the NCVO and by academic opinion. With due deference to my noble friend on the Front Bench, the government arguments against this change are threadbare. I beg to move.
Lord Grabiner Portrait Lord Grabiner (CB)
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My Lords, I support this amendment. In view of the hour, as well as the great clarity of the explanation given by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, in moving it, I can be brief. The Charity Commission is an expert body. It is perfectly placed to form its own view on all the matters identified in Section 325(1)(a) and (b) of the Charities Act 2011. The curiosity is that, notwithstanding that rather basic fact, Section 325(2) permits the commission to make a reference to the tribunal on these matters, or any of them, only with the consent of the Attorney-General.

I have two points. First, it seems to me rather wasteful for the Attorney-General, in effect, to have oversight—indeed control—over the decision-making of another expert body. That is especially the case here because the subject matter of Section 325 is very far removed from the traditional territory that we associate with the office of the Attorney-General—the criminal-law side of which will be familiar to all Members of your Lordships’ House. Secondly, I find it surprising that the Attorney-General should wish to retain this power at the margin of the regular diet of the office. One might imagine that the Attorney-General has many other very important matters to be thinking about, without the need to second-guess the deliberations of the commission.