Lord Goldsmith
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Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, we have had Latin from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, and French from my noble friend Lord Bassam. Later in the day, somebody else might be able to say something in Welsh or Irish, but I cannot do either.
This group of amendments relates to topics that we have already discussed in Committee and no doubt we will do so again: the extent of delegated powers and the extent of protection of rights. When the noble Lord, Lord Low, moved his amendment very cogently, he emphasised points with which I absolutely agree. There is concern that rights should not be removed as a result of what is taking place in the Bill. We have also looked at this topic before in Committee and no doubt we will do so again. I have referred on several occasions to the promise by the Prime Minister that rights after exit will be the same as the day before.
These amendments concern a different aspect— the explanatory statements which are proposed to be used for statutory instruments. The technique of using statements to be laid before the House is a valuable one. I previously referred the Committee to the benefits of the requirements under Section 19 of the Human Rights Act for certificates on the face of the Bill that the provisions are, in the opinion of the Minister, compliant with the Convention rights. The significance of such a statement is that, first, it puts a personal obligation on the Minister to be satisfied that the Bill does what is being certified. What is more, it is a requirement that those conditions are met and not simply that there is an argument that they might be met. I am glad to see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, in his place. I have referred before to the memorandum that resulted in there being a requirement on Ministers when they come to certify under the Human Rights Act to do so on the basis of legal advice provided by government legal officers, or the law officers themselves, and also to be satisfied, at least more probably than not—I paraphrase and hope I have it right—that the requirement will be met in the case of a particular provision. That makes it not an idle requirement that the Minister should so certify but a very valuable requirement.
The idea of the statements is an important one. We have several questions here in relation to them. The first, raised by Amendment 242A, is that the requirement for such explanatory statements should apply to all cases where statutory instruments are being made under the Act and not simply those which are identified. I look forward to hearing from the Minister why the Government do not think, having taken the view that it is necessary, appropriate and right to have such statements in relation to certain statutory instruments, that it should apply to all statutory instruments made under this Act. Bearing in mind that it is not a requirement that stops the instrument being made, such a statement tells this House and the other place what the Government think they are doing—whether they think they are reducing protections or not—and puts both Houses in a position to take the steps that they think appropriate to deal with that in the light of what the Government say. Therefore, I look forward to hearing why the requirement for explanatory statements does not apply to all instruments under the Act.
The second amendment is the important amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Low, which asks why it is not right that the words,
“is satisfied that it does not remove or diminish any protection provided by or under the equalities legislation”
should be inserted in place of the much weaker words in the Bill providing that the Minister should have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, et cetera. As he rightly pointed out, this, in any case, deals with only one aspect of equalities legislation. I would hope that Ministers always had due regard to that, whatever the circumstances and whether or not the Bill stated it. Something more is needed: a requirement that the Minister is satisfied that this does not in fact reduce the protections currently provided. That amendment should be supported and we look forward to what the Minister has to say.
The third amendment, Amendment 246, has been spoken to by my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton. It would be valuable for Parliament—whichever House —to be told what the intention of any proposed modification is and whether it is intended to reduce or change EU law. That is a valuable proposal, though it goes in a slightly different direction to the other amendments, which are concerned with rather more concrete statements as to whether or not rights are being retained.
The noble Lord, Lord Low of Dalston, rightly referred to one aspect of the Bill that has been mentioned in Committee before. While the Government recognise that there needs to be special protection for rights protected by our Human Rights Act, which is drawn from the European Convention on Human Rights, it does not do the same for rights that come from other areas, in particular EU law. Again, we need to understand from the Government why they do not think the same sort of protection is necessary in relation to rights derived from EU retained law. One example is data protection. Nothing could be more pertinent at the moment, as we read today’s newspapers. We see that data is a critical area that needs protection. Very important protection comes from the EU at the moment. This will come into law, but do the Government take the view that it is subject to much easier removal, or should it not be subject to the same degree of protection as rights under the European Convention on Human Rights?
For those reasons, I look forward to the Minister’s response and I hope that it will promise change. I follow my noble friend Lord Bassam in hoping to see an amendment brought forward on Report by the Government to deal with these important points.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, the Government are committed to transparency before Parliament for the statutory instruments that will come under the Bill. We hope the statements we have already committed to in Schedule 7 will assist Parliament and deliver the due level of scrutiny required for secondary legislation. We have been listening to the debate and, for Report, we are looking closely at where these could be expanded to address some of the concerns raised in Committee.
Amendment 242A to Schedule 7, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Low, would extend the requirement for Ministers making secondary legislation under the Bill to make statements in respect of all the powers in the Bill. With respect, these statements are designed to apply only to the key powers under the Bill, and for good reason. The other powers in the Bill are tightly limited to specific purposes, such as allowing for challenges to the validity of EU law or making provision which is consequential on the Bill. These other powers will not be making the sorts of changes to which these statements are applicable and are designed to be applicable. We will debate these other powers in more detail in due course but I hope that that will reassure the noble Lord as to why we have proceeded in this way on the matter of statements.
The noble Lord, Lord Low, also tabled Amendment 245A, which would adjust the equalities statement in Schedule 7. Let me assure everyone, including the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, that I understand and sympathise with the motivation behind this amendment, which I know is shared by many others on all sides of the Committee. The amendment looks very like the Government’s existing political commitment. However, the language of a political commitment does not necessarily lend itself to the very different context of the equalities statute book.
In the equalities area, it is not always straightforward to determine what is deemed to be “protection”—the term used in the amendment—for one group of people when it may exist in tension or potentially conflict with the protection of other groups. To take a simple example, looking at the operation of domestic violence refuges or rape counselling centres taking account of the provisions in the Equality Act that relate to women, how does that also relate to gender recognition? These are quite complex areas that we have to bear in mind. That is precisely why, for example, the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 are so detailed and granular rather than creating high-level rights that would potentially raise more questions than they answer. I note that the 2010 Act dwarfs the mere 68 pages of the Bill.
In these circumstances, we are concerned about the limits of the statement that would be required. I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Low, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said about the scope of the public sector equality duty and the notion that perhaps only a part of that is expressed in Schedule 7. We will take that away for consideration before Report.
Amendment 246, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, raises an interesting point regarding how further clarity can be provided on the effect of regulations made under Clauses 7, 8 and 9. As he observed, the point was mentioned in the recent report by the Constitution Committee. The Government want the Bill to provide certainty and clarity, and I have listened to his observations on this with some interest.
As we discussed on day five of Committee, Clause 6(3) provides that questions on the validity, meaning or effect of unmodified retained EU law are to be interpreted in accordance with retained EU case law. Clause 6(6) goes on to provide that modified retained EU law may still be interpreted under Clause 6(3) if that is consistent with the intention of the modifications. It is this point that the noble Lord’s amendment strikes at. It seeks to impose an obligation on Ministers by adding to the explanatory statement requirements in Schedule 7 to explain the intention of any modification, and how that modified law should be interpreted under Clause 6.
I understand the aim, but we have to be cautious before adding to the explanatory statement requirements in Schedule 7. Requiring a statement for each modification as to its intent and instructions to the courts on whether Clause 6(3) should apply to them could complicate matters. In that context, I merely observe that it is important to bear in mind that courts themselves will already have the text of the modification itself together with a statement explaining the reasons for it, the law before exit day that is relevant, and any effect of the modification on retained EU law. It may be that this could complicate matters.
I have listened carefully to the points raised on that matter and I can confirm that we will reflect on what I appreciate is a constructive suggestion in order to bring further clarity to these parts of the Bill. I hope that with that reassurance, the noble Lord may not have to engage in sequential groups of amendments in Committee this morning.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I had not intended to intervene in this debate—the devolution aspects will come later today—but if one looks at paragraph 17 of Schedule 7, on page 51, and the interplay that it has with Clause 17, on page 14, I read it that the powers exercisable by the Welsh or Scottish Ministers under Schedule 7 are subject to the orders that they can make but that, if they do not make them, they can be over- ruled by the provisions of Clause 17—paragraph 17 on page 51 gives a Minister the right to do that. Am I interpreting this rightly?
Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, the provision indeed looks a bit innocuous when one first looks at it. The noble Lord, Lord Newby, is absolutely right. But the more one examines it, as has been demonstrated by speeches from noble Lords in this short debate so far, it is much more than that.
Two ways have been proposed for dealing with this clause. One had been to follow the golden thread of “appropriate” and “necessity” that the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, referred to. Amendments 253 and 254, which have already been debated, touched on that and we will have to come back to those important proposals in due course. But this amendment goes even further in proposing that the power should be removed. As it stands, the idea that the Minister can, by regulation, make any change that he or she considers appropriate under this Act is extraordinarily wide. I therefore share the hope of other noble Lords that we hear from the Minister—having seen, as I am sure he has, how wide this provision is—that something needs to be done: probably something more radical than simply changing the words “considers” and “appropriate”.
We will listen to what he says. However, the powerful speeches by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick, Lord Cormack and Lord Wigley, and by my noble friends Lord Liddle and Lord Bassam, demonstrate that there is a real risk—as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, put it—that this is another example of the accretion of power to the Executive at the expense of Parliament. It is our duty to put the brakes on when that sort of provision is put before us. Again, I look forward to what the noble and learned Lord will say; I am sure he has seen the point—in all languages. We need a clear commitment, not just to comfort, but to a change that will satisfy this House that it is not being asked to sanction untrammelled power to the Executive in such an important area.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the Government are always listening. The Government are concerned to ensure that we have appropriate powers to deal with the consequences of this Bill: to bring the statute book into line with the consequences of the repeals brought about—or intended to be brought about—by it.
The context is that the European Communities Act has been a central piece of legislation for the past 46 years and is spread throughout our statute book. So much current legislation stems from the ECA. Repealing the 1972 Act, and the other key EU-related Acts listed in Schedule 9, will leave many loose ends that need to be addressed.
The purpose of the consequential power is to deal with the consequences of the widespread changes to the statute book that may arise from the provisions in the Bill itself. I stress “in the Bill itself” in the light of the suggestion by my noble friend Lord Cormack that we are dealing here with “untrammelled powers”. In that context, I understand the expressions of concern about particular provisions—which can sometimes be read out of context—but I stress again that these consequential powers can be used only in consequence of the provisions of the Bill itself, rather than in consequence of our withdrawal from the EU more generally. I see the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, frowning, but if he feels that a different interpretation can be placed on this provision I would welcome discussion on it, because that is clearly its intention. If, in his view, it goes further, I would be happy to listen to him on that.
Lord Goldsmith
In the light of his invitation, I ask the noble and learned Lord to consider this question. I take his point that the words are “in consequence of the Act”, but the Act includes the repeal of the European Communities Act and all that it has brought with it. He may not want to reply to this question now and I am very happy to have further discussions with him, as they are always useful and constructive, but does he not see that the repeal of the Act and the instruments under it may indeed give rise to very wide opportunities if all that is required is for the Minister to consider it “appropriate” to do something in consequence of that?
Lord Keen of Elie
I am not sure that I am in a position to answer that question. Nevertheless, when we legislate, we must also legislate as to what a future Administration would do with that legislation. I quite accept that point.
Lord Goldsmith
The Minister’s self-effacing remark draws attention to the other aspect of this clause. It was helpful when he said—and I hope that we will see some concrete results from this—that the Government will look at the word “appropriate” and, I hope, change it to “necessary”, but that is only part of the problem in this and other clauses. There are two elements. One is that the Minister “considers” and the second is what it is that the Minister considers. In this clause, it is “the Minister considers appropriate”. Many of the amendments before the Committee want to see that it is changed to “is necessary”—an objective rather than a subjective test. Sharing, as I do, views as to the good will and intentions of the Minister who sits here at the moment, we need to have, as he says himself, more conviction about what might happen in the future. So will the Minister also consider in those circumstances not just changing the word “appropriate” to “necessary”, but removing the subjective element so that we are satisfied that there has to be a clear objective statement before the Minister can actually exercise these powers?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am not going to draft at the Dispatch Box and I will not give undertakings about any part of this clause at this stage. I am saying that we will look at it in the context of the observations that have been made in Committee, and we will do that responsibly.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that one way or another it must be for Parliament to decide the essential ground rules that should apply in the future categorisation of retained EU law, certainly under Clauses 3 and 4, although perhaps not under Clause 2 as it is already domestic law. As I made plain some weeks ago—it seems like months—in an earlier debate, I do not, however, subscribe to the view of the Constitution Committee that all retained EU law should be designated as primary legislation. We discussed all this at the time. If what I may call in shorthand Professor Paul Craig’s suggested solution to this problem is adopted by following the EU’s own categorisation, under both the pre-Lisbon and post-Lisbon arrangements, somebody will have to apply that ground rule to this mass of 10,000, 20,000 or 30,000 instruments—however many they may be.
I suggested in an earlier debate, because this is what Paul Craig had said, that in fact four competent EU lawyers could carry out that whole process in a matter of three days. I may have those figures slightly wrong, but that is about it. But if that is left to be done after the passage of this legislation, some regulating power will have to be available to government to give effect to that process. The ground rules settled its application for regulation. I hold no particular brief for this being done under Clause 17(1); it may be that the better course would be to introduce the ground rules—as I say, Parliament’s specification of how basically the process is to be completed—within the legislation, and have a regulation-making power attached to that for the sole purpose of applying the ground rules. But I would not wish to leave unchallenged the Constitution Committee’s suggestion that the whole shooting match should be primary legislation.
Lord Goldsmith
My Lords, to some extent this is a continuation not just of the previous debate today but of previous debates that we have had on earlier days in Committee. That leads me to two observations, before I come to specifics on the amendment. One is on the very pertinent observation of the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that if we do not advance at all before we get to Report we will have just as much time spent on Report as in Committee. Therefore, we very much hope that the Government respond to his suggestion or injunction to the Minister that we have some greater clarity on what the Government are going to do as a result of the consideration that they have been having for the last few days, when they have had time to consider some of these points. Indeed, I hope that it is not only the noble and learned Lord who is working on this—there are a lot more people in government who should and could be working on it. That is just one observation that demonstrates how much work there is to do, and how we need to move forward, hoping of course to do that in co-operation with the Government.
Secondly, I suppose people outside listening to this debate will wonder what on earth we are talking about. They expect that this Bill is about in or out and when and what the terms are, and the customs union. Those are important issues, too, but this debate illustrates how important some of the provisions in this Bill are. The question of whether something is to be regarded as a piece of primary legislation is fundamentally important; it has consequences for who legislates and how easy it is to amend that legislation, as well as for its effect in relation to other statutes. I draw this as a general view that has been expressed around the House, that it cannot be left simply for a Minister to decide. In previous debates, we have heard how many Ministers that could be. I made the observation—no one has yet contradicted it, although maybe it should be contradicted—that when you say that a Minister does something, under the Karl Turner principle that means that a civil servant can do it. I have the greatest of admiration for civil servants, but that would multiply the number very considerably. If we are talking about important constitutional provisions, about protection of rights and all the other things that the Bill is concerned with, it is not appropriate that decisions on who makes that decision should be left in this way.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for drawing attention to the fact, as others have too, that one consequence of this particular provision that my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton has dealt with touches on the question of who decides whether something is primary or secondary. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, made a very important observation, and so did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Today is not the day to decide which should be primary; what we are talking about is whether it should be simply for a Minister or for his officials to determine whether a particular piece of law should be treated as primary or secondary legislation. That is what the amendment raises, and it is important that we should have clarity on it, I hope before we get to Report.
The summary that is given in paragraph 69 of the Constitution Committee’s report, already referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, puts it in clear terms, including the last sentence that, as it stands:
“This is a recipe for confusion and legal uncertainty”.
We cannot afford this Bill, when it has completed its passage through this House and the other place, to leave the country in a state of confusion and legal uncertainty.