Ukraine

Lord Glasman Excerpts

Friday 26th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Glasman (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, for initiating this debate and his excellent opening remarks. I am proud to sit behind my noble friend Lord Coaker and my party in relation to our approach to the war in Ukraine.

I have been to Ukraine for maybe up to four months since the war began. I have been four times, all over the country; I spent a lot of time in Kyiv and in Odesa. Two very intense and conflicting emotions characterise the people of Ukraine. The first is a visceral loathing of Russia and a desire to protect their homeland and their freedom. The second is a genuine weariness with the war and a genuine sense of grief over the loss. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, mentioned the 300,000 Russian dead, but he did not mention what looks to be over 200,000 Ukrainian dead over this period—a huge number relative to the size of the country.

I also commend the Government on the policy they have pursued from the outset. One of the very strange experiences of being in Ukraine is the uniform affection for Britain that characterises people throughout it. We have established trust, which is an incredible thing. It is to be noted, as well, through the Belvedere process and other things that the noble Lord, Lord Risby, mentioned very powerfully, that we have assumed a leadership position in relation to the eastern European states, most particularly Poland but also the Baltic states. I noticed that Scandinavia too is looking to Britain for not just military leadership but political leadership.

This is an extraordinary circumstance, not unrelated to the fact that Germany and France both remain deeply confused, which we have not mentioned in this debate so far. The noble Lord, Lord Robertson, mentioned that one rule of politics is that it is not what you say but what is heard; I commend to the House the other golden rule of politics, as developed by Muhammad Ali, which is that you never get knocked down by a punch you see coming. It seems that Germany and France are still both reeling around; they still cannot comprehend the scale of this. It is important to note that the two new parties that have come out explicitly for peace in Germany—the AfD and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance —are both now polling above any of the coalition partners in the German Government. There is a very strong feeling within Germany; we also know that Le Pen in France, who is most in favour of peace in the Russia-Ukraine war, is also leading in the polls. Extraordinarily, we have an outstanding capacity, as the noble Lord, Lord Risby, pointed out, to actually take a leading role if we can co-ordinate with the different aspects of the help.

I also commend the speech by the noble Earl, Lord Oxford and Asquith. I do not think that there is any significant difference between Vladimir Putin, Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great in terms of besieged imperial Russia. But I have one element of dissent; the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that this is not an academic debate, and I apologise to him—it is really difficult to leave the field. In international relations terms, I am a realist. The words of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, have to be heard very strongly in the long-term development of our capacity within defence, most particularly the Navy.

That brings me to my one area of dissent with the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, which is also with the noble Lord, Lord Bilimoria. The port of Odesa is essentially besieged by the Russian army. Very little gets in. Some stuff is allowed out, but this is leading to long-term consequences for the import of the fundamental needs of Ukraine, such as white goods and medicines. Everything is coming in from Poland by land, which is 10 times the price. Effectively, Ukraine has been cut off from Black Sea trade, which is stymied.

Building on other contributions—I will be as brief as I can—we have to conceptualise some form of ceasefire here strategically, so that we can build up our arms and long-term strategic relationships with partners. Therefore, we have to acknowledge that the assumption that was very prevalent at the beginning of the war—that Russia would fall; that Putin would fall—is in the levels of fantasy. The Russian state has consolidated its alliances with China and North Korea, and, particularly in drone technology, with Iran. These are very serious, but the economic sanctions we imposed have not had the effect we wished. Therefore, Russian interests and capacities have to form part of our calculation of how we pursue this.

The first conclusion is that we need to build up our own, which will take several years to do, but we also have a great interest in some form of ceasefire because the losses inflicted on Ukraine are, frankly, unendurable. We have to notice the looming dark shadow: President Trump will not even meet representatives of the Ukrainian Government. It is not that he is indifferent; he is actively hostile. So we will have to bear an enormous burden. One aspect of the ceasefire would be to go back to a previous tradition: like Gdańsk or Danzig in the First World War, Odesa becomes a free city so that the Russians lift their naval blockade. That would enable Ukraine to reconstruct its economy and rebuild its civic institutions.