Brexit: Deal or No Deal (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Garel-Jones Excerpts

Tuesday 16th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Garel-Jones (Con)]

Does the noble Lord agree that one of the characteristics of this country is that we do not have a written constitution, that the non-constitution is summed up by the words “Parliament is supreme”, that therefore the Supreme Court was right to rule that the referendum has taken place because it was authorised by Parliament and that Parliament has not authorised the outcome, which is, at the moment, unknown?

[Lord Whitty (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not, in my limited capacity tonight, going to argue with the Supreme Court or, indeed, the noble Lord. Clearly, there is a parliamentary process which, no doubt, noble Lords in the course of this debate may well refer to, and which I may refer to in my final remarks. However, the position of Parliament and how binding the role of Parliament in the final vote would be—a meaningful vote, which is now being debated in the other place on the withdrawal Bill—did not form part of this report.

What businesses and people across the country now need is an absolute assurance that there will indeed be a deal at the end of this process, and both sides need to realise that tone is as important as substance. As we say, government statements that no deal is better than a bad deal are not helpful. Last week’s spat between the Secretary of State, Mr Davis, and the Commission over the EU’s preparations for a no deal outcome was a case in point. Once the Government raise the possibility of no deal, of course the Commission is equally justified in advising those who will be affected by such an outcome of how it will affect them. In fact, our report attempts to do the same thing.

The evidence we received was that no deal would be deeply damaging to key sectors of the British economy: financial services, the agri-food sector, freight and transportation, higher education and research. Against this overwhelming evidence, it makes no sense for the Government to talk about retaining no deal as an option. We say that in paragraph 57. As last week’s events so clearly demonstrate, this kind of language,

“risks becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy”.

It does not make any sense to threaten the EU that we will shoot ourselves in the foot if we do not get what we want. It is we who will end up limping.

No deal will affect not just the economy; co-operation on security, counterterrorism, foreign policy—co-operation that is hugely in our interest—would be affected, too. That is no doubt why David Davis spoke to the committee about a so-called bare-bones deal covering some of these non-economic issues, but even if it were possible to negotiate such a deal, the damage to the rest of the economy of not reaching a trade deal would remain, so I hope the Minister will reassure the House, when he replies to this debate, that the Government are wholly and unambiguously focused on achieving the best possible deal, one that will benefit both the United Kingdom and the EU.

The second major theme of our report was transition, or implementation as the Government prefer to call it. This is an altogether more complex, though equally important, issue. Almost everyone, including the Government, agrees that we need a transition period; we cannot simply switch off the system of EU law, which has underpinned so many aspects of our national life for 45 years, at 10.59 pm on 29 March next year. There will have to be a transition, a bridge to lead us safely from where we are today to our as yet unknown final destination.

The Government continue to insist that transition will be merely an implementation phase, a time-limited period that will allow for a phased adjustment to the terms of the new UK-EU relationship, but if that is to be the case, the terms of that new relationship will have to be agreed, in full, before exit day in March next year. The committee agrees, at paragraph 123, that an “early and comprehensive” agreement would be the best outcome, but we have to be realistic, and the fact is that almost no one outside Her Majesty’s Government thinks that achieving agreement on this timescale will be possible, so unless there is extraordinarily rapid progress in the coming weeks, sooner or later the Government will surely have to acknowledge that transition will, in fact, be made up of at least two distinct elements. There will have to be an initial standstill phase, where everything stays pretty much as now, while negotiations to finalise the terms of the future relationship continue, and there will then be a period of adaptation or implementation.

We cannot say much about adaptation or implementation at this stage, since the negotiations on future relations have yet to start, but so far as the initial standstill phase is concerned, we cannot afford to wait. Uncertainty over the terms of UK trade with the EU from 30 March 2019 onwards is already having an impact on many sectors of our economy, for instance in the financial services sector, where insurers will soon be issuing policies which, by their very nature, extend beyond that date. So the forthcoming negotiations on transition really need to be concluded quickly and decisively. We cannot afford any lingering impression that the transition period is contingent upon reaching agreement on the future relationship. That would be damaging for business confidence and the wider economy. Instead, we need a commitment from both sides that, in effect, the legal framework for trade will remain unchanged between 29 and 30 March next year. In other words, we want to confirm that it is the Government’s intention that the transition period will be a standstill period in all respects, save that the UK will no longer be party to EU institutions.

My next point may appear more technical, but it is equally important. Both the Government and the Commission have indicated that they envisage transition forming part of the withdrawal agreement under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. The fact that both sides agree on this is welcome, but the ultimate arbiter of EU law is neither the UK Government nor the Commission, but the Court of Justice of the European Union. There is every likelihood that the ECJ will be asked to review the compliance of any proposed withdrawal agreement with EU law before March 2019.

As the report therefore points out, there remains a possibility, however remote, that even if political agreement is reached on transition, the court could strike it down before it comes into force. We recommend that the Government, as a matter of urgency, and if possible in agreement with the Commission, set out their view on the legal basis for transition. I hope that the Minister, if he cannot set out those views tonight, will at least assure the House that the Government will accept that recommendation.

Finally, I touch on the last paragraph of our report. There are two legally watertight ways to achieve a time- limited standstill period to buy more time to finalise the details of the agreement on the future UK-EU relationship. These are clearly set out in Article 50 itself: either to extend the two-year negotiating period or to post-date the withdrawal agreement so that it takes place later than March 2019. I recognise that neither side is currently contemplating such an extension of our EU membership, but the committee suggests that we should not rule it out, if only as a last resort—not to thwart Brexit, but in order to make it as smooth as possible.

We now have 14 months before we leave the European Union. I welcome the agreement the Government reached with the EU in December, although the substance of an agreement on Ireland remains dangerously opaque. The most difficult phases of the negotiations lie ahead. Time is short. The objective must be an orderly and legally certain transition to a new and lasting partnership between the UK and the EU. I beg to move.