Pension Schemes Bill [HL]

Lord Freud Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 28th November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Altmann (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments, and I would like to probe the Minister on what the pause order is really meant to achieve. As the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, has just asked, how does he envisage it will work in practice? If a pause order is introduced by the Pensions Regulator, it is likely that an employer will be in breach of its auto-enrolment duties and potentially in breach of contract with its employees. In those circumstances, we could need some of the bulk DC transfer regulations, which we have discussed and I hope we may come to later, to enable a scheme to ensure that such transfers can be made relatively swiftly and without too much expense—perhaps before a triggering event, although the proposal is currently only if there is a triggering event. That would require some of the existing regulations that are made with DB schemes in mind to be undone.

[The Minister of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Lord Freud) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for the debate last Monday when a number of amendments were considered. Today should bring an equally interesting discussion on a slightly broader range of topics. This group relates to the new pause power introduced in Clause 31, and includes some amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and some tabled by me. I thank the Committee for its forbearance in considering government amendments at this stage.

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[Baroness Altmann]

If there is no such provision as that in Amendment 46, what exactly protects members and employers by ensuring that they can continue with their legal duties to contribute to pension schemes for their members under auto-enrolment? Currently, it is not clear to me how it is intended that this pause order will fit with the legal obligations or contracts between the employer and the employee in relation to ongoing pension contributions.

[Lord Freud]

I think I am right in saying that the pause order would effectively trump those obligations while it is operating. However, I will come back on the detail of that. I think that is accurate. That is why it is in the legislation—so that there is legal clarity about the obligations people have when they pay into a scheme that is formally paused by the regulator.

Under Amendment 50, the pause order would not be able to prevent payments with regard to ill health benefits. The current provisions mirror those in the Pensions Act 2004 with regard to the Pensions Regulator’s freezing order. I am not convinced that there is sufficient argument on why this should differ to those provisions. In particular, the pause order direction can specify payments, so—in response to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake—the regulator will be able to consider whether to use the power to stop such payments.

The provisions in Schedule 1 to which the noble Baroness has added her amendments make it clear that there is no impact on orders made on divorce which modify members’ rights in the scheme. They do not provide for generalised exemptions to the power to prevent transfers under the pause order. The amendment would mean that, regardless of the situation, ill health payments could not be affected by a pause order. Government Amendment 47 would enable the regulator to tailor the pause order to the circumstances with regard to stopping benefit payments. I hope that the noble Baroness will agree that that solution is better than the one in Amendment 50. That would include being able to apply the pause to specified benefits and specified members, and in a way that would take account of the specific case and situation. I therefore trust that this gives some comfort that the regulator could consider certain types of membership.

To come back to the question raised by my noble friend Lady Altmann, on the legal duty for employers, paragraph 13 of Schedule 3 ensures that a pause order will not cause employers to fall foul of their legal duties. I am glad to be able to confirm that.

[Baroness Altmann]

Does that also apply to a contract between the employer and the employee for pension contributions rather than just under auto-enrolment, if it is a term of the employment contract?

[Lord Freud]

I think that the situation is the same—the fact that you have primary legislation will allow that to happen. I will clarify that, but I think that is the point of primary legislation.

I make the point to the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, that the Pensions Regulator will make a pause order only under carefully considered circumstances. The pause order may last for the duration of a triggering event period but is not likely to continue for a significant length of time, and the regulator must weigh up the potential impacts on members when considering whether to issue such an order.

I shall now turn to the government amendments on the pause power.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton (Lab)]

My Lords, perhaps I might speak to my amendment in this group, which he has answered in part. That might make it a tidier process.

The purpose of Amendment 47A is to look at the issue of tax relief, as the Minister has identified. Under the pause provisions, an order can direct that no new members are to be admitted to the scheme and no further contributions and payments are to be paid towards the scheme by, or on behalf of, any employer or members. This does not apply, under Clause 31(6), to,

“contributions due to be paid before the order takes effect … and … references to payments … include payments in respect of pension credits”.

Our amendment seeks to make it clear that amounts recoverable by the provider from HMRC in respect of tax relief attributable to the permitted contributions—that is, those paid before the order—will still be available to the master trust. For the purposes of Clause 31(6)(a), it is presumed that the tax component is a contribution or payment. If so, do the mechanics of how relief at source operates mean that the HMRC payment is due to be paid before the order if the related contribution is—there is a timing issue here—or is it proposed that there will be some form of carve-out for the tax relief under Clause 31(5)(b)?

The intention behind the amendment was to probe that narrow issue rather than to achieve a wider objective, but of course it raises the wider issue of the amounts of the two forms of tax relief, touched upon in particular at Second Reading by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann. They set down very clearly the problem for schemes operating net pay arrangements for individuals who do not pay income tax, in contrast to those who use the relief at source method and can get tax relief at 20% on the first £2,880 paid into a pension—equivalent to a gross of £3,600. Those who are not subject to income tax and are within the net pay method are clearly missing out. The extent to which they miss out in aggregate may not be dramatic at present and will be influenced by auto-enrolment thresholds or current required contribution levels and the income tax threshold—the personal allowance. However, this will increase as more and more auto-enrolment takes place, the required contribution increases to 3% and there is still a gap—possibly a widening gap—between the threshold and the income tax personal allowance.

Can the Minister tell us how many non-taxpayers are currently contributing to a pension under net pay arrangements and could benefit from relief at source, and what is the aggregate tax benefit forgone? Going back to my earlier point, the amendment is intended specifically to focus on the technical issue of how that tax is garnered and paid before the cut-off point of the pause order.

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, on that narrow point, I hope that I can again reassure the noble Lord that, when those rebates are due, before the pause order is in place, we have a way of making sure that they are paid—through Clause 31(6)(a). It may be easier for me to write to the noble Lord and describe that process, but I think that it achieves what he is looking for. I will have to provide the figures on the net pay separately but will write to him on those, too.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I would be grateful if the noble Lord could write on that specific point because I am struggling to see how a contribution—particularly one which comes in fairly late in relation to the date of the pause order—could immediately be converted into a receipt from HMRC, which is what I think the Bill requires.

[Lord Freud]

This is really a specific point, but I will write to the noble Lord both on the numbers and on how the process will work. I hope that that will be satisfactory and that we can then dispose of the matter for the purposes of later stages of the Bill.

I turn to government Amendments 47, 48, 49 and 52. These are intended to provide further clarity and some tidying up of the provision. They are based on further consideration of the comparisons with the Pension Regulator’s freezing-order power in the Pensions Act 2004, and are intended to ensure that they work sufficiently in a triggering event period. Amendment 47 makes clear that the pause power can be used to prevent benefits being paid out. Following the introduction of the Bill to the House, we have received some inquiries as to whether this is achieved through the provisions in the Bill. That was our intent, and as the freezing-order power makes separate provision to cover this aspect, we have, through Amendment 47, made an equivalent and explicit provision in respect of the pause order. Amendment 48 inserts a missing definition of “pension credit”, which was an oversight, and mirrors the freezing-order power. Amendment 49 is consequential to Amendment 47, and ensures that members retain their entitlement to any benefit payments affected by the pause order.

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[Baroness Drake]

I thank the Minister for his detailed response to the particular issues I raised in the amendments that I spoke to. However, I do not find the arguments very convincing. The noble Lord said that a pause order would be exceptional—I very much hope it would be, because it would mean that the preceding authorisation and supervision regime had not been very successful. But looking forward, even in an exceptional circumstance, the numbers affected in a failing master trust could be quite significant. It is clear how large the footprint of those trusts will become. What will remain is that it is unfair to the individual during a pause order because the employee loses a contractual and statutory right to contributions, and the employer fails to honour a statutory and contractual obligation to make contributions. Unless the Minister wishes to direct me to a provision in the Bill, I can find nothing that protects the individual or the employer from breaches in those statutory provisions.

Unfortunately, I do not have with me the letter that the Pensions Minister wrote to my noble friend Lord McKenzie and me in response to a meeting of Peers on 8 November, where the Minister conceded that the Government had not fully considered a provision that would allow those contributions to be held in some alternative vehicle while the pause order was in place. As the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has said, there is a breach of a statutory obligation potentially arising from a term within this Bill.

The Pensions Regulator need not hold the funds. The Pensions Regulator would clear the arrangements, consistent with any regulations that were set, but the holder of the funds could be an alternative operator or provider, which regulation or the Pensions Regulator could choose to identify. The records that come in from the employer should still be possible because, immediately before the pause order, the employer would have to provide records of contributions collected and paid. No failure is being posed in terms of the employer, so records should be available for reconciliation quite quickly if those contributions are held in some kind of cash account or cash fund.

I note the Minister’s comment that the Pensions Regulator has a discretion as to what payments it does or does not prevent being paid out during a pause order, but it is concerning that we do not have clarity on the policy thinking around how those with serious ill health or real income dependency on their savings would be dealt with in a pause order situation, should they be embraced or potentially embraced by the terms of the order. I fully understand the need for an exceptional power, if evidence of fraud emerges in the records, for the regulator to have some control over payments made or contributions received, but at the moment the way in which it is proposed that this pause order would operate seems unfair on the individuals, puts the employer in breach of a statutory obligation and leaves unclear what protections would be afforded to the most vulnerable who may be impacted by that pause order.

[Lord Freud]

Let me just respond. The difference is that we are trying to get control of an obviously difficult situation. The pause is to allow the regulator to go in and make sure that the situation is sorted. We are not talking about keeping the flow of things going in a normal way; we are talking about a very difficult situation. We are worrying about losing the money that is already there, not about the smooth flow. We are typically talking about a very short period. Setting up large paraphernalia, which the noble Baroness is beginning to drift towards, would not be the point. The real point is to get the funds transferred as quickly as possible.

The noble Baroness asked where the legislation is. I can direct her to Clause 31(5)(c), which states that any contributions not paid over to the scheme are returned to the member, and paragraph 13 of Schedule 3, which ensures that the pause order will not cause employers to fall foul of their legal duties. I hope that that helps the noble Baroness in her consideration of what we are doing.

[Baroness Altmann]

I have a couple more probing questions for my noble friend. The pause order is obviously intended to be used only in exceptional circumstances and in extreme concern about the solvency or probity of the master trust itself. I can certainly understand that, in that situation, one would not want to take any new employers, so it would pause adding any new employers. But it still seems that there is no protection for the ongoing accrual of members’ pension benefits, which is what we are trying to do with auto-enrolment. If the procedures suggested in the amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, and the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, are not considered appropriate—in other words, for the regulator itself to collect in the contributions—would it not be prudent at this stage and before the legislation is passed to have a proper plan for how ongoing contributions can be made and collected, perhaps through some form of bulk defined contribution transfer, even on a temporary basis, for members without consent to another master trust? At this stage we should produce such a plan rather than wait and hope that it will be okay.

[Lord Freud]

I am grateful to my noble friend. There are different processes going on and the intention of the pause order is not to be the paraphernalia for sorting out a scheme that is in difficulty. What we are looking at is a process we can go to where we can discuss option 1 and option 2 in order to transfer the funds to a better functioning scheme. While we are doing that, we are pausing it to allow the process to happen. It is important to view the two things on more of a sequential basis than trying to make a big performance of the pause order. It is there for a different reason: it allows us to get on with sorting out the scheme and making the transfers that my noble friend is looking for.

[Baroness Drake]

I thank the Minister. He has said that the pause order will be short, but the problem is that the noble Lord contradicts himself because the Government have just tabled their Amendment 52 which removes the six-month limit on a pause order. That implies that situations are anticipated where the pause order would need not to be short and certainly in excess of six months.

I am certainly not looking for complicated paraphernalia here, although I would suggest that working through whether individuals are due a refund of contributions and sorting out the tax implications of such a refund could indeed be very complicated. My noble friend and I have suggested something simpler. The employer will still have the statutory obligation so it will have its records and collect the contributions. It was a question of having something simple for holding those contributions during the period of the pause order so that they can subsequently be reconciled against the individual members; it certainly does not need to be overly complicated.

I accept the noble Lord’s point that the driving force for a pause order is to deal with a threat to the assets or the scheme members’ interests in general, but in resolving that bigger problem it appears that the detail of the route being taken is unnecessarily unfair in terms of its impact on the statutory and contractual rights of individuals to continue having access to pension savings. I think that we have gone into the detail of this issue at some considerable length in this exchange, but I do feel that the Government have not explained satisfactorily why the contributions cannot be held during the pause order without believing that this needs to be terribly complex. They have not addressed the issue that this will put individuals in a position where they are denied their statutory and contractual rights for a period, and an employer in breach of its statutory duties, and there remains a lack of clarity in thinking about the impact on vulnerable people in the manner in which the pause order is introduced. However, at this stage I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

47: Clause 31, page 22, line 11, at end insert—
“(ca) a direction that no benefits (or no specified benefits) are to be paid to or in respect of any members (or any specified members) under the scheme rules;”

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

48: Clause 31, page 22, line 36, at end insert—
““pension credit” means a credit under section 29(1)(b) of the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 or under corresponding Northern Ireland legislation;”

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

49: Schedule 1, page 30, line 26, at end insert “, and
(ii) a direction under section 31(5)(ca) does not prevent the payment becoming due.”

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

51: Schedule 1, page 31, line 23, at end insert—
“(6A) Regulations under sub-paragraph (6) override any provision of the Master Trust scheme, to the extent that there is a conflict.”

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

55: Schedule 2, page 37, line 16, leave out “application has not yet been determined” and insert “decision on the application has not yet become final (see section 35)”

[Lord Freud]

I thank noble Lords for allowing me to speak to these amendments. Once again, please accept my sincere apologies for proposing these amendments now rather than including them in the draft Bill as introduced. Most of my proposed amendments modify the procedures the Pensions Regulator must follow when exercising some of the new functions introduced by the Bill.

Amendments 58 to 65 and Amendments 73 and 76 change the procedure that the regulator must follow when making a decision on an application for authorisation from an existing master trust scheme. The majority of the Pensions Regulator’s statutory functions are exercised through internal procedure known as “standard procedure”, with “special procedure” applying to certain functions where there is an immediate risk to members or assets. These procedures are set out in the Pensions Act 2004. The Bill as introduced provides for standard and special procedure to apply to the power to grant or refuse authorisation to an existing master trust scheme. However, on further consideration, we do not believe that some of the steps involved in these procedures would be appropriate.

The standard procedure provides for the issuing of a “warning notice” to such persons who, in the view of the regulator, would be directly affected by the regulatory action under consideration. They would then have the opportunity to make representations before a decision could be made about whether to exercise the regulatory function. This means that the Pensions Regulator would be obliged to send the trustees of an existing scheme such a notice after the trustees submit an application for authorisation.

In this instance, the regulatory action the notice would refer to would be the power to grant or refuse authorisation. It would not be necessary to warn the trustees that the regulator intends to take this regulatory action and make this decision, nor would it be appropriate to invite further representations at this point as the trustees would have submitted all necessary representations in their application. Special procedure, which dispenses with the warning notice and representations steps in the first instance, could be used only when the regulator considers there is an immediate risk to the interests of the members or assets of the scheme.

Amendments 58 to 65 and Amendments 73 and 76 would align the process of deciding whether to grant authorisation to an existing master trust with the process the Bill specifies for making this decision for new schemes. However, the amendments retain the requirement that the decision to grant or refuse authorisations must be made by the determinations panel of the Pensions Regulator. This is appropriate because in both situations a scheme operating in the market will be required to transfer members out to an authorised master trust scheme and to wind up. The impact of this is significant, and under these circumstances it is appropriate for the determinations panel to make the decision. The amendments I propose would maintain rights of appeal to the First-tier or Upper Tribunal should the decision be to refuse authorisation. The amendments would simply remove unnecessary steps and delay.

Amendment 55 has a slightly different purpose. It would ensure that if an existing master trust scheme—that is, a master trust in operation before the commencement date—submits an application for authorisation and the Pensions Regulator decides to refuse authorisation, it would not have to commence the process of transferring members out and winding up until any appeals are disposed of.

The final amendments I seek to move within this group are Amendments 72 and 77, which also deal with changes in procedure, but in relation to different regulatory powers within the Bill. The regulator has a power to direct the trustees of an authorised master trust to comply with the requirements of Clause 26 in relation to the implementation strategy. Where there is no strong reason to specify a different procedure, it is right that the regulator’s functions should be subject to the standard procedure, and for this reason Amendment 72 makes this power to direct subject to that procedure. In addition, where the trustees of a master trust should be following an approved implementation strategy but are failing to do so, under Clause 28(4) the regulator has the power to direct the trustees to pursue the continuity option identified in the strategy and to take such steps as are identified in the strategy to carry it out.

Amendment 77 makes this a power which can only be exercised by the determinations panel under standard procedure. The Government consider this appropriate, as it is a power which may have a significant impact on the scheme and its members. I hope I have given a thorough explanation of my proposed amendments. I thank noble Lords again for bearing with me in bringing these amendments at this stage of the Bill process, and I beg to move.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his full explanation of these provisions. I am bound to say that we would like to study them a bit further and bring something forward on Report, if necessary, but I thank the Minister and the Bill team for supplying us with a Keeling schedule, which made these provisions somewhat less impenetrable than they might otherwise have been. As far as the panel is concerned, we discussed the issue of resources available to the regulator before. Will the determinations panel have the necessary resources available to it, and how speedily can it act and pick up these matters?

I have two brief questions on Amendments 73 and 76, which delete particular provisions in the Bill. Amendment 76, for example, deletes:

“The power to grant or refuse authorisation of a Master Trust scheme in operation on the commencement date under section 5”.

I presume that power is being deleted because it flows to the determinations panel, but will the Minister just clarify that for us?

[Lord Freud]

I am pleased to do that. My understanding is that the second assumption is correct: Amendment 76 moves it over to the determinations panel and I spelled out last Monday the process by which we will get the financial resources required by the Pensions Regulator. Clearly, one of the issues in that process will be the funds required to operate the determinations panel.

Amendment 55 agreed.

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

58: Schedule 2, page 38, line 10, leave out from “if” to end of line 19 and insert “at the end there were inserted—
“(7) In the case of a notification under subsection (5) relating to an existing Master Trust scheme, the notification must also include an explanation that the decision is a triggering event for the purposes of sections 20 to 33A, and of the trustees’ duties under those sections.(8) In relation to an application received under section 4 from the trustees of an existing Master Trust scheme, the functions of the Regulator under this section are to be exercised by the Determinations Panel on behalf of the Regulator.(9) In subsection (8), “the Determinations Panel” means the committee established under section 9 of the Pensions Act 2004.””

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Moved by

[Lord Freud]

66: Schedule 3, page 39, line 31, after “of” insert “and Schedule 1 to”

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[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I will be brief as I do not want to echo the fantastic contributions made by the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, my noble friend Lady Drake, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and the noble Lord, Lord Flight. I can see that if an intelligence unit were part of a wider cross-government approach, it could well pay dividends. However, I fear that we would simply replicate arrangements whereby HMRC constantly chases tax avoiders, alights on some and then there is a change, and then somebody draws a line somewhere else and it is a never-ending process. Nevertheless, it may be worth while pursuing that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, should be congratulated on bringing forward this amendment, the thrust of which we clearly support—although I disagreed with her on her last amendment. As others have said, events have to a certain extent overtaken it because we heard from the Chancellor last Wednesday the welcome news that the Government will shortly publish a consultation on options to tackle pension scams, including cold calling. It proposes giving firms greater powers to block suspicious transfers and making it harder for scammers to abuse “small self-administered schemes”. So this approach appears to take us a little further than the strict terms of the amendment, but if we are to forgo the opportunity to legislate now, at least on cold calling, we need some reassurance from the Minister on how short is “shortly” and what legislative vehicles will give effect to these conclusions.

I do not seek to repeat a number of the awful situations that noble Lords have identified, of people being deprived of their life savings. We have argued before that insufficient groundwork was undertaken by the coalition Government when they introduced these reforms; my noble friend Lady Drake made that point. One omission was clearly to anticipate the opportunities for fraud which these changes attracted. So if the Government are not able to convince us how quickly they can introduce measures to tackle these problems, we will be minded to support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, at least as an interim measure.

[Lord Freud]

This amendment seeks to make it a criminal offence to make a cold call or send other unsolicited electronic mail or communications for the purpose of scamming a pension scheme member of their pension savings or to make changes to their existing arrangements; for example, inducing them to participate in high-risk investments. The noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, focuses on a substantial issue. The figures are enormous. According to the ONS—the Office for National Statistics—eight scam calls happen every second in the UK, or over 250 million a year. Almost 11 million pensioners are targeted annually by cold callers, and savers have reported losses of nearly £19 million to pensions scams between April 2015 and March 2016. The amendment also stipulates that a person convicted of such an offence is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine, or both, so it aims to deter scammers from such activity.

I state firmly that this is a priority for the Government, and we are determined to tackle the scourge of fraudulent nuisance calls. We want to send a strong message to consumers that they should not respond to such approaches. However, as my noble friends Lady Altmann and Lord Flight and the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, pointed out, that is not enough—banning cold calling alone will not stem the flow of transfers in scam vehicles or the establishment of those vehicles in the first place. Scammers who make cold calls are criminals and will continue to cold call and incite people to part with their savings. It probably does not make a huge amount of difference to the savers whether the criminals are based in this country or elsewhere in the world where we find it difficult to get hold of them.

The Government have explored this issue in detail, which is why in the Autumn Statement last week we announced that we will consult on how best to ban pensions cold calling. That needs to be supported by a wider package of proposed measures intended to tackle pension scams themselves. With regard to timing, on which I have been pushed by the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, the plan is to publish a consultation on these measures before Christmas and to have the next steps ready for the 2017 Budget—I think it is still called a Budget—which will be in the spring. Comments can then be made on proposals to: ban cold calling in relation to pensions investments, and tackling inducements to do that; placing restrictions on certain types of transfer, which seeks to limit the flow of funds into scams; and making it harder for scammers to set up and run fraudulent small self-administered schemes, which tackles the potential vehicles for scams. We intend to provide more detail on these proposals in the consultation document.

To tackle the scams effectively, it is clearly vital to get this right and to do so in a way that does not impact on legitimate businesses. The consultation will seek to understand what impact these proposals would have on legitimate firms and member transfer activity, and what, if any, legislative solutions might be available and proportionate to disrupt the scams. In answer to the noble Baroness’s question, we will also be consulting on appropriate custodial sentences, although imposing them on people in different parts of the world is harder to achieve.

As I said, we need to ensure that we get this right, and the consultation, alongside existing engagement with experts from the pensions industry and consumer groups, will help inform our thinking. With that in mind, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment, with which we are entirely in sympathy.

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[Baroness Drake]

My Lords, as others have referred to, central to the resolution regime for a failing master trust is the transfer of the members and their benefits to another approved master trust. However, for this to be achieved efficiently and promptly, and indeed legally, it would be necessary to undertake a bulk transfer of members and their assets. But as the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, has detailed, the current rules on bulk transfers would not be fit for purpose for a failing master trust, with its range of different employers and the potential to provide a wide range of benefits and investments to members, who could be either accumulating or accessing their savings. The amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Flight, is an attempt to address that problem and provides a welcome opportunity to address the issues, because they are concerns that are clearly shared by various Members of this House.

The provisions in the Bill and the regulations will need to enable those bulk transfers to take place efficiently and legally. The regulations will need to set out a clear set of rules. Amendment 80 gives the Secretary of State considerable overarching and overriding powers to require the trustees of a failing master trust to transfer accrued benefits. They are extensive powers, but I suspect of an order probably needed to make the transfer regime work in the event of a master trust’s failure.

These powers will give the Secretary of State and the regulator the ability to direct where, potentially, many millions of pounds of members’ money is transferred to. Had we had draft regulations before us, we might have had many questions. I refer in particular to the House having discussed at length the problems that can occur if the administrative records of the master trust are incomplete or in disarray. Even something simple like the lack of a current address for a member can cause delay if a notification is required, I promise. I have been there and bought the T-shirt. It is a nightmare.

Is it the Government’s intention that bulk transfers will be able to take place during a triggering event before all past records are clarified? Post-transfer to the receiving scheme, who will bear responsibility for any administrative errors that existed at the point of transfer? Will there be circumstances where the regulations under this Bill will override other pension regulations in order to effect that bulk transfer? I have one small example. Under auto-enrolment, when members are in self-select funds and are transferred without their written consent, they are from then on treated as having been put into a default fund and the charge cap of 0.75% is applied. I do not want to go into too much detail, but that is to illustrate the question of whether there will be circumstances where the regulations under the Bill will override other pension-related regulations. I commend the amendment because it seeks to address an issue that all of us are aware of if the resolution regime will be based on directing the trustees of failing schemes to transfer their members’ benefits to other master trusts.

[Lord Freud]

My Lords, I hope that I do not have the wrong end of the stick with this. As I see it, my noble friend’s amendment is effectively about individuals being able to move and consolidate their pots, whereas the regime that we have for master trusts is for bulk transfers.

[Lord Flight]

To clarify, my amendment is about bulk transfer where the trustees deem it desirable to move from, say, one fund manager to another.

[Lord Freud]

Does my noble friend mean scheme manager or fund manager?

[Lord Flight]

Essentially, fund manager, but they may, in the case of a master trust, be the same.

[Lord Freud]

We have spent a lot of time talking about the continuity options 1 and 2 for trustees in a scheme in difficulty transferring in bulk, and I am sure we will return to those areas on Report. When I read the amendment, I took it to refer to a transfer where a member wants to consolidate his pension fund, which is something that we looked at in the 2014 Bill. I am at something of a loss as to how much I can add to what we discussed earlier, given my misreading of the amendment, which was talking about members wanting to consolidate their pots.

In certain circumstances a scheme may undertake a bulk transfer of members’ accrued pension rights without their consent. This could be, for example, because an employer has two or more pension schemes and wants to consolidate them. The provisions in the Bill provide the opportunity to require master trusts to transfer those members. The existing provisions in the Bill will permit a transfer on a trigger event, as my noble friend was asking.

[Baroness Altmann]

Perhaps I may follow up that comment. Yes, indeed, there will be transfers on a triggering event, but I seek some reassurance that proper provision will be made for bulk transfers that do not depend on defined benefit rules which make those bulk transfers much more costly and time-consuming and do not automatically ensure that they can occur in a timely way. Does the Minister also consider that there could be circumstances where a bulk transfer could happen without a triggering event? We are trying to consolidate schemes, but we know that there are schemes already in existence that will need to consolidate and either will not or will not wish to meet the authorisation criteria. If there were the possibility of doing so, that would be helpful. Finally, going back to a point that I raised on our previous day in Committee, it is true that the Bill will place what is potentially a legal duty on trustees to effect a transfer, so there will be an obligation for that transfer to happen. But I am not clear that we are any the wiser as to who would be able to fund the transfer if the records of the scheme are in disarray and there are no funds to pay for advice or administration services to enable the transfer to be made. What provisions can we rely on to ensure that the transfer takes place, and of course I am referring again to some kind of potential back-stop insurance as required in case the costs cannot be met anywhere else.

[Lord Freud]

We are currently considering whether there may be some scope to simplify the current arrangements which will make life easier for defined contribution schemes when making bulk transfers, but we must do that at a time when we do not compromise member protection. As my noble friend will be well aware, there are certain protections in place such as the requirement for an actuary to certify that the members’ rights in the receiving scheme are broadly no less favourable than those which are being transferred. When a transfer is made under the mechanisms of this Bill, after a triggering event when the regulator is looking at it, one of the main points is to make sure that there is adequate capital to fund such an event. I will have to come back to my noble friend on how that will work when a bulk transfer is made and the regulator is not involved in the process. What one would normally expect to see is a negotiation with the receiving scheme manager to ensure that it is able to fund the transfer because of the benefits of scale through putting together two systems. I imagine that when the regulator is not involved in the process, that is where the money will come from. I will double-check that and come back to my noble friends, but that is how I foresee it happening.

[Lord Flight]

I thank the Minister. I will paint a particular picture. Some 95% of group personal pension schemes will typically be in default funds. Where the sponsor and, if it is a master trust, the trustees observe that the fund management performance has been poor, they will often conclude that they want to change. They have an ability to write to all members to advise of this and to advise them to move, but they have no power to require a bulk transfer. In these situations, particularly if there are any deferred members, little bits of money get left behind. The individual almost forgets they have them. They get little or no reporting and they do not get the best out of their pension savings. I observe from within the industry that, particularly for default funds, there is a powerful argument for requiring the new fund manager to require and activate a bulk transfer.

[Lord Freud]

Now we are moving more closely into what I thought the amendment was about, which is the pot following the member. As my noble friend will know, that mirrors the spirit of Schedule 17 to the Pensions Act 2014. We have not commenced that schedule.

We are looking at another approach, which is the launch of a pensions dashboard. We want to see whether that will work. This would allow people to see their retirement savings from across the industry in one place, which they could consolidate where they felt it was in their interests. The Government will support industry in designing and delivering a pensions dashboard by 2019, with a prototype being developed by March 2017. Clearly, when we know how it works, it will set the context for looking at how best to worry about the problems of being left either in funds that an individual thought were not performing, or wanting to consolidate. It is not necessarily the case that it is always advantageous to consolidate all the different pots, given the way legislation works—in other words, where the member has valuable benefits or lower scheme charges in one or other of those pots.

There is a lot of development here and a lot of change going on. The pensions industry is absorbing a large number of reforms. The Government’s approach is to see how the industry’s plan to have the dashboard will allow much greater flexibility for individuals.

[Baroness Drake]

On rereading the amendment, its first subsection, which states:

“The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring the trustees … to transfer”,

is quite open-ended, so people would choose how to interpret it. The point I want to leave with the Minister is that in the particular instance of failing master trusts—I accept that in other circumstances there is a problem with the bulk transfer terms—the resolution regime is to transfer members and their benefits to another master trust. Existing bulk transfer regulations and legal requirements are not fit for purpose. As they stand, they will not permit the Government to achieve the objective of their resolution regime under the Bill. Although I wish the Government well in having an efficient resolution regime, it is important to understand their policy and thinking on how they will amend the bulk transfer regulations and processes to allow these bulk transfers in a failing trust situation to be undertaken both efficiently and legally. Both aspects need clarification. Certainly, if I may presume, the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and I are particularly concerned about the Government’s proposals for reviewing the bulk transfer arrangements in a failed master trust situation.

[Lord Freud]

I shall try to wind this up. I accept the implied—or not so implied—concern of noble Lords that making bulk transfers is more difficult than it should be when there is no regulator process. We are now looking at whether we can simplify those arrangements. I am not in a position to say that there is going to be a consultation, or any major process, but we are looking at that. It is not straightforward, as all noble Peers will accept.

I think I have the answer: master trust bulk transfer provisions will trump existing provisions on voluntary transfers. I hope that is a useful clarification for the noble Baroness, Lady Drake. With that explanation, I urge my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, my objective was to raise the issue of bulk transfers and to understand what government policy is both for master trusts and for other forms of retail pensions. I am particularly pleased to hear that for master trusts, bulk transfers trump voluntary requirements. It is a wider territory than just master trusts, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, seeks a way of tackling the concern about the calculation of DB pension liabilities and deficits, particularly their volatility and the impact a large deficit can have on a company’s balance sheet.

By way of illustration, the LCP annual survey of FTSE 100 company schemes estimated deficits at 31 July 2016 of £46 billion, compared with £25 billion a year earlier and an estimated surplus in February 2016—big swings, clearly. Of course, a significant factor in these calculations is bond yields, which reduced sharply following the EU referendum, pushing up liabilities, although it is suggested that some of this reduction has been negated by interest-rate hedging and that foreign currency-denominated assets have benefited from some decline in sterling.

The reality is that a number of factors feature in how DB schemes should be accounted for: life expectancy, inflation and discount rates, as well as contribution levels and benefits. In seeking to understand the sensitivity of this, for FTSE 100 companies, as reflected on the basis of International Accounting Standard 19, the aggregate pension deficit of £46 billion in July 2016 comprised liabilities of £628 billion and assets of some £582 billion. These are very large aggregates.

The noble Lord’s amendment concentrates on the calculation of defined benefit pension liabilities and would enable directors to use an alternative method if,

“they are satisfied that accounts give a true and fair view”.

It provides that the Secretary of State must,

“set out one or more alternative methods”,

for these purposes—I understand that this is based on actuarial advice—and that an alternative method of valuing DB liabilities must not be,

“contrary to international accounting requirements”.

I am grateful to the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales for the information it provided in helping me to frame this contribution. At present, listed companies have to adopt international accounting standards. In other cases, companies can choose to use IFRS or FRS 102, which replaced FRS 17. However, it is understood that so far as pension scheme liabilities are concerned, the two standards are broadly consistent. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, would not appear to apply to listed companies which are bound by international accounting standards—but for how long? He raised that interesting question. FRS 102 sets out how defined benefit plan liabilities are to be measured and recognised. It requires a defined benefit obligation to be calculated on a discounted present-value basis, using a rate of discount by reference to market yields at the reporting date on high-quality corporate bonds. This has to be recognised in full on the balance sheets.

We have sympathy with the amendment to the extent that it seeks to dampen the volatility of the measurement of liabilities for accounting purposes, but not if it is seen as a route to lessen employer contributions to DB schemes. We recognise that the current accounting treatment which generates this volatility is not ideal, although it is not helped by government policies such as quantitative easing. However, we have concerns about this approach. The Financial Reporting Council is responsible for setting UK accounting standards, not the Secretary of State.

A process in which generally applied standards are overridden on particular issues would set a precedent that could lead to a confusing regime and not help transparency and confidence in financial reporting. It begs the question of what alternative method of valuing DB liabilities would enable directors to be satisfied that the accounts give a true and fair view. What would this mean for trustee scheme valuations? The era of very low interest rates has brought the matter into sharp focus. In winding up our Second Reading, I think the Minister said that the Government had this issue in their sights and would explore it in the upcoming winter Green Paper. We look forward to that but, in the interim, we seek an update on where the thinking is going.

[Lord Freud]

I thank my noble friend Lord Flight for this amendment, which opens up a fascinating area. Amendment 81 would require the Secretary of State to make regulations which would have the effect of allowing companies to disregard any method of valuing defined benefit pension liabilities required by accounting standards. I recognise and understand the concerns that have been expressed in this debate and during Second Reading about the measurement of the liabilities under accounting standards, particularly when we are in what one would hope is an unusual period of interest rates being low not for reasons of the economy but because of quantitative easing.

Following its recent public consultation on its future agenda, the International Accounting Standards Board concluded that,

“there was no evidence of problems that were sufficiently widespread and significant to require a comprehensive review of IAS 19”.

However, I assure my noble friend that this is not the end of the matter. The UK’s Financial Reporting Council is in the early stages of considering the impacts of the current approach and will be examining the case for an alternative approach. I believe that this is the most appropriate way forward compared with the approach proposed by this amendment. The independence of the standard-setting approach is widely regarded as one of its strengths. I do not think it would be right for government to intervene directly—here I echo the wise words of the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie. It should not effectively set aside the accounting standards framework that has been developed to deal with these complex matters. If the Financial Reporting Council finds objective evidence or broad stakeholder demand for change, any proposals would need to take fully into account the risks they may pose to members’ benefits and would need to be tested through public consultation.

My noble friend talked about the experience in the US. When he did so at Second Reading, he got me to do some work—I always resent that—to look at that. In the US, schemes may move to calculate their funding based on yields from high-quality bonds averaged over the past 25 years. That approach would effectively discount rates by 1% and lead to employers paying significantly less into their pension schemes. What we must not allow to happen—again I echo the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, and it is not often that that happens—is a change that releases pressure on employers, only to find that that leads to their pension scheme being less well funded and members losing out.

I do not think there is a quick and easy solution here. Nobody who looks into this issue can be in any doubt that this is an extremely complex and technical area. To come up with an alternative accounting methodology would require a number of substantial steps. Those would include: undertaking a detailed analysis of the current commercial, financial and broader economic impacts of the current methodology to determine whether there is a need for that change; developing alternative approaches, which would also have to model transition impacts between the two regimes; seeking views from the market through public consultation on identifying the costs and benefits and any adverse impacts; and, finally, developing the detailed standard itself, which again would require a further round of public consultation.

We are planning to publish a Green Paper over the winter, and I can reassure noble Lords that it will explore the issue of how liabilities are measured and reported in the round. We want to ensure that measures of liabilities and deficits are properly understood and are being used and interpreted appropriately. We will explore and seek views on whether the measures used could, in some cases, be driving investment behaviour that is not in the best interests of members or employers, and we will look at what the alternatives might be. I hope I have reassured my noble friend that his concerns are being addressed and that he will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response. I think that if the Government talked to everyone in the pension fund industry and to many of the large companies in this country, they would all tell a similar story: that the present discounting rate hugely exaggerates the reported scale of deficits. It is an important issue and I wish the Green Paper good luck because, clearly, it is most sensibly dealt with by agreement with the accounting profession. It is not so much about reducing company contributions—there is certainly no scope for that—but it is quite economically damaging if, as now, contributions are required which are way beyond those which are necessary. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.